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Abstract 
Effective fisheries management is limited in the developing world by weak institutions, 
inadequate financing and a lack of reliable data. Conservation payments are a novel concept in 
fisheries management. In this thesis I take a multidisciplinary approach to explore whether they 
could help to address gaps in traditional fisheries management, using the Bangladesh hilsa 
(Tenualosa ilisha) fishery and its ongoing payment scheme as a case study.  
I develop a qualitative frame of reference against which current or potential hilsa management 
interventions could be evaluated, demonstrating that – even in data-limited fisheries – 
counterfactuals can be developed and used to guide management. In the absence of data for 
formal evaluation, I then investigate the scope for additionality in hilsa management by 
assessing the evidence for and against a reconstructed theory of change. Although the potential 
for overall additionality is equivocal, my findings demonstrate scope for individual elements of 
the management package to have had additionality, and provide some support for the use of 
conservation payments.  
As is common in artisanal fisheries management, hilsa management is focused on the protection 
of juveniles. Through population modelling, I demonstrate that size selectivity is much less 
important than catch volume, in terms of effect on overall hilsa population biomass. This 
analysis suggests that the targeting of payments would benefit from a more rigorous ecological 
foundation. Through statistical modelling of household survey data, I find a strong spatial 
pattern in payment distribution that reflects the political economy of Bangladesh rather than 
the official social goals of the scheme. I also find evidence of strong trade-offs between social 
and ecological goals. 
Finally, I investigate the potential for Conservation Trust Funds (CTFs) to enhance the 
sustainability of payments. Developing-world fisheries pose challenges to the translation of 
conservation payments from concept to reality. I find that CTFs can support and catalyse the 
development of enabling conditions for sustainable payment institutions, but only if best 
practice standards are followed.  
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1.1 Context and problem statement 
Fish and other seafood play a vital role in supporting marine and coastal1 ecosystems, which in 
turn provide their own multitude of services to humans (TEEB 2012; Liquete et al. 2013). They 
also directly support human wellbeing through their contributions to employment and food 
security (Smith et al. 2010; Teh & Sumaila 2013; Béné et al. 2016). However, a global decline in 
marine fish stocks and ecosystem health has been observed over the last half of the 20th century 
(Myers & Worm 2003; Worm et al. 2006; FAO 2014). Through poor governance, the provision of 
harmful subsidies and subsequent overcapacity, a growth in demand for fish products has led to 
overexploitation (Sumaila 2012; Srinivasan et al. 2012).  
Management tools such as gear restrictions, spatial closures, and capacity reduction have great 
potential to reverse this decline (Beddington et al. 2007), and many developed countries are 
now implementing them effectively (Hilborn 2007). As the goals and perspectives of fisheries 
science and marine conservation begin to converge (Salomon et al. 2011), there has also been a 
shift away from traditional single-species fisheries management towards an ecosystem-based 
approach (Ward et al. 2002; Jennings et al. 2014). Furthermore, in recognition of the strong 
economic argument for fishery reform (Dyck & Sumaila 2010; Costello et al. 2012; Sumaila et al. 
2012), marine resources and ecosystems play an increasingly prominent role in global political 
commitments to sustainable development (Veitch et al. 2012; UN 2015a).  
Nevertheless, current efforts are not operating at the scale necessary to rebuild fisheries 
globally (Mora et al. 2009; Worm et al. 2009). Effective implementation of sustainable 
management is limited by a lack of will and ability to bear the inevitable short-term costs 
(Shertzer & Prager 2007; Ye et al. 2012; Rangeley & Davies 2012), particularly in small-scale 
                                                             
1 Hereafter referred to as marine. 
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and artisanal2 developing-world fisheries (Carbonetti et al. 2014; Brown et al. 2015; Ovando et 
al. 2016). Often dispersed in remote locations with complex social structures, these fisheries 
tend to be poorly assessed, if at all, and neglected by national fisheries policies. If management 
is implemented, the personal costs may be perceived by individual fishers or groups of fishers 
to exceed the benefits, which may lead to resistance and non-compliance, particularly when 
enforcement is weak (Wells 1992; McClanahan et al. 2012; Wallace et al. 2015). These costs and 
benefits may be social as well as economic; individuals might feel that regulations threaten their 
rights or access to resources, or that they are inequitable (McDermott et al. 2013). It is, 
therefore, critical that developing-world fisheries management evolves beyond the conventional 
command-and-control model to recognise fisheries as complex and dynamic social-ecological 
systems (Berkes 2012; Leenhardt et al. 2015; Purcell & Pomeroy 2015), in which the 
consideration of incentives is crucial to achieving behavioural change (Castilla & Defeo 2005; 
Hilborn et al. 2005; Begossi 2014). 
Since the vast majority of people engaged in fishing are part of small-scale and artisanal 
fisheries in the developing world (World Bank 2010; Barnes-Mauthe et al. 2013), the potential 
effects of fishery reform on poverty alleviation could be substantial (Garcia & Rosenberg 2010; 
Begossi 2013; Wilen 2013). Moreover, despite the management challenges that they present, 
small-scale fisheries are potentially more sustainable than industrial fisheries; they tend to use 
less energy-intensive gears, fish closer to shore, have lower discard rates, and use less fuel to 
catch the same amount of edible fish (Jacquet & Pauly 2008; de Melo Alves Damasio et al. 2016).  
                                                             
2 Definitions of ‘small-scale’ and ‘artisanal’ commonly depend on location, and are often used 
interchangeably, but small-scale tends to refer to the size of a fishery or vessel, and artisanal to the 
relative level of technology. Artisanal fisheries are defined by the FAO as ‘traditional fisheries involving 
households (as opposed to commercial companies), using relatively small amount of capital and energy, 
relatively small vessels (if any), making short trips, close to shore, mainly for local consumption’ (Garcia 
2009). In practice, they can be subsistence or commercial, and provide for local consumption or export. 
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In line with the recent surge in ‘market-based’ approaches to resource management and 
conservation, a range of economic instruments3 are becoming available for fisheries 
management (Innes et al. 2015). By attempting to realign the incentives faced by individuals 
with the objectives of management, they are advocated for their potential to alleviate some of 
the short-term costs of fishery reform (Ferraro & Gjertsen 2009; Davies & Rangeley 2010; Fujita 
et al. 2013). Conservation payments, which include compensation and positive incentives for 
actions taken to maintain or enhance a resource, are a group of economic instruments that are 
well established in terrestrial conservation (Vatn 2010; Muradian & Rival 2012). Compensation 
can be distinguished from incentives on the basis that compensation payments aim to offset 
costs, whereas incentives aim to change behaviour voluntarily, and may even have additional 
benefits (Vatn 2010). But a payment can both compensate and incentivise, and I focus here on 
the incentive element. Payments for ecosystem services (PES) is, in theory, a subset of incentive-
based approaches – although it is commonly used as blanket term for a whole range of types of 
payments. Conceived as a market solution to environmental externalities (Wunder 2005; Engel 
et al. 2008), PES can more usefully be viewed as an instrument aiming to improve the provision 
of ES by resource users to beneficiaries, by offering conditional positive incentives for 
behavioural change (Sommerville et al. 2009; Muradian 2013). Since ES are usually common 
pool or public goods, I follow Muradian’s (2013) view that their management is more of a social 
dilemma than an externality problem. Although PES should not, in theory, pay individuals for 
already legally enforceable behaviours, in some circumstances a ‘carrot-and-stick’ approach can 
be used to strengthen individual and collective motivations for compliance, enabling poor 
communities to reduce their reliance on resources under protection while facilitating a more 
                                                             
3 I do not use the umbrella term ‘market-based’ in this thesis, because although all of these instruments 
rely on price signals, many do not rely on markets at all, and the term places a restrictive focus on 
efficiency (Pirard 2012; Boisvert et al. 2013; Muradian & Gómez-Baggethun 2013; Hahn et al. 2015; Vatn 
2015). 
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equitable distribution of the costs of doing so (Wunder 2007; Kosoy et al. 2008; Clements et al. 
2010; Sommerville et al. 2010a; Gross-Camp et al. 2012).  
Documentation of the implementation of conservation payments, particularly PES, in marine 
environments is still relatively rare, as is critical discussion of their social and ecological impacts 
(Begossi et al. 2011a; Lau 2012; Mohammed & Wahab 2013; Binet et al. 2013). Empirical 
research to date has focused mostly on the use of compensation in small-scale, artisanal fishing 
communities around Marine Protected Areas in Brazil, Kenya, the Coral Triangle, and 
Bangladesh (e.g. Clifton 2013; Islam et al. 2014; Begossi 2014; Corrêa et al. 2014), but much of 
this is hypothetical (Barr & Mourato 2009; Barr 2012). There is, however, an opportunity to 
transfer PES experience from terrestrial conservation to fisheries. This could support the use of 
conservation payments as an alternative or complementary approach to conventional 
regulatory fisheries management, thereby helping to reconcile the conservation of fishery 
resources with sustainable development and poverty alleviation. 
1.2 Aim and objectives 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the potential for conservation payments to meet social and 
ecological objectives in data-deficient, developing-world fisheries. I approach this using the 
management of hilsa shad (Tenualosa ilisha) in Bangladesh as a case study. Hilsa are in the 
clupeid family, with herrings and sardines, and are found throughout South and Southeast Asia 
in marine and freshwater. Not only are they a flagship species for Bangladesh, a symbol of 
national pride, but up to 500,000 people directly depend upon the species for their livelihoods, 
particularly in coastal communities (Islam et al. 2016). The fishery is typical of small-scale, 
developing-world fisheries; it is complex, poorly understood, and characterised by centralised 
governance and weak monitoring and enforcement. It does, however, present a rare carrot-and-
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stick management approach, and thus a real-world platform for the exploration of the feasibility 
and potential implications of such an approach in challenging circumstances.  
This thesis will address the aim through the following objectives: 
1. Explore the suitability of and challenges to the design and implementation of PES in a 
developing-world fisheries context; 
2. Develop a frame of reference for the Bangladesh hilsa fishery – comprising ecological, 
institutional, social, economic and physical components – against which current or 
potential conservation payment schemes could be evaluated; 
3. Identify which fishing households have the greatest ecological impact on the hilsa 
fishery, in terms of their socioeconomic characteristics and fishing activities; 
4. Explore whether the current hilsa management package, including the compensation 
scheme, has had any additional impact on the sustainability of the fishery to date, and 
whether it has scope for additionality in the future; 
5. Assess whether the compensation for hilsa fishers is reaching the ‘right’ people, in terms 
of the scheme’s social and ecological objectives; 
6. Explore whether Conservation Trust Funds can provide a sustainable framework for 
conservation payments in developing-world fisheries, with a focus on the Bangladesh 
hilsa fishery; 
7. Make recommendations for the development and improvement of the compensation 
scheme for hilsa fishers in Bangladesh and for payment schemes more broadly, in a 
data-poor, developing-world fisheries context. 
1.3 Thesis outline 
Subsequent to this introductory chapter, the thesis is structured as follows (Fig. 1.1): 
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Chapter 2: Payments for Ecosystem Services in developing-world fisheries  
Here I consider the potential role of marine PES in addressing current challenges and gaps in 
fisheries management. I do this through a comprehensive review of the literature and a 
conceptual analysis of four contrasting real developing-world case studies – one of which is the 
main case study used throughout the thesis, the Bangladesh hilsa fishery. 
A version of this chapter has been published as: 
Bladon, A.J., Short, K.M., Mohammed, E.Y. and Milner‐Gulland, E.J. (2014). Payments for 
ecosystem services in developing world fisheries. Fish and Fisheries. DOI: 10.1111/faf.12095 
Chapter 3: Creating a frame of reference for hilsa conservation and management interventions in 
Bangladesh 
This chapter describes the social-ecological system of the case study in depth and thus provides 
a basis for subsequent chapters. I combine qualitative and some quantitative analyses of 
secondary datasets and literature in a qualitative way to explore not only ecological trends in 
the hilsa fishery, but also patterns of social, economic, institutional, and physical change 
relevant to its management. I show that useful counterfactuals can be developed to guide 
fisheries management even in complex, data-deficient systems. 
Chapter 4: Characterising the impacts of selective fishing on the Bangladesh hilsa population 
Here I use minimal life history parameter data to model the potential relative ecological impacts 
of size selectivity on hilsa population biomass. I show that the focus of hilsa fishery management 
on the protection of juveniles may not be the most effective approach. Having characterised the 
hilsa fishery using household survey data, I then assess the relative potential impacts of 
different harvesting regimes at the household level, using reported size-selectivity and average 
hilsa catch volumes to develop an index. Statistical modelling shows this household-level index 
of ecological impact to be influenced largely by spatial factors, and to a lesser extent by boat 
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ownership and fishing location, which appear to be driven largely by catch volume rather than 
selectivity. 
Chapter 5: Exploring the ecological additionality of hilsa fishery management in Bangladesh 
Building on the frame of reference, I reconstruct a post-hoc theory of change for hilsa 
management, before assessing the available evidence (literature and primary and secondary 
data) behind each of the assumptions underpinning its logical pathways. Overall, I find that the 
potential for additionality (i.e., the degree to which a management regime, or component 
thereof, improves the status of the fishery over and above how it would be in the absence of that 
management) is very uncertain. But although the use of payments in this fishery is not 
supported by robust social or ecological evidence of success, I conclude that in the absence of 
effective top-down enforcement, development and improvement of the compensation scheme is 
necessary. This demonstrates that even when data deficiencies limit rigorous impact 
evaluations, potentially useful studies of the scope for, or confidence in, additionality can still be 
conducted.  
Chapter 6: Does compensation for hilsa fishers in Bangladesh reach the ‘right’ people? 
The compensation scheme is designed to provide food support to the poorest and most 
vulnerable households targeting juvenile hilsa and living inside and around sanctuary areas, 
during a period when fishing is banned. I present data from a household survey of 
compensation recipients and non-recipients and use statistical modelling to profile hilsa fishers 
who catch juveniles, to identify the current correlates of compensation allocation, and to 
explore perceptions of fairness in allocation. I find that the pattern of compensation allocation is 
largely spatial rather than based on relevant household characteristics (e.g. indicators of 
poverty, vulnerability, or fishing activities), and largely perceived to be unfair. I then 
demonstrate how the spatial distribution of compensation would change under alternative 
targeting scenarios that might improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the scheme, such as 
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targeting those who are most dependent on fishing for their livelihood. I provide evidence not 
only of the need for a more focused and transparent targeting strategy in Bangladesh, but of the 
need for improved targeting effectiveness, which highlights a challenge for developing-world 
payment schemes to achieving social objectives.  
Chapter 7: Can Conservation Trust Funds provide a sustainable framework for conservation 
payments in developing-world fisheries? 
The Government of Bangladesh is currently developing a Conservation Trust Fund (CTF) to 
support the management of the hilsa fishery. Using a literature review and key informant 
interviews, I demonstrate how CTFs can potentially, under best practice, support the 
development or improvement of conditions that enable sustainability in developing-world 
fisheries conservation payments. This will, however, depend on best practice design and 
implementation; in Bangladesh, the institutional context may limit potential for a CTF to 
support improvements in the sustainability of the compensation scheme for hilsa fishers. I 
provide recommendations for addressing the key challenges that a CTF may face to providing a 
sustainable framework for hilsa conservation payments. 
Parts of this chapter are published in: 
Bladon, A.J., Mohammed, E.Y. and Milner-Gulland, E.J. (2014). A Review of Conservation Trust 
Funds for Sustainable Marine Resources Management: Conditions for Success. IIED Working 
Paper. IIED, London 
Chapter 8: Discussion. 
This chapter provides a synthesis of research findings, key implications for fisheries 
management and conservation science, policy recommendations, and directions for future 
research. 
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Figure 1.1: Conceptual framework for thesis. Boxes are numbered by chapter and arrows indicate logical flow of chapters. Dotted line indicates which chapters 
focus on the case study. PES = Payments for Ecosystem Services; CTFs = Conservation Trust Funds. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) is a tool widely used in terrestrial conservation to 
change incentives for environmental decisions (Sattler & Matzdorf 2013). Traditionally viewed 
in terms of Coasean economics as a market approach to the internalisation of environmental 
externalities (Wunder 2005; Engel et al. 2008), in practice numerous different institutional 
forms of PES exist, few of which conform to pure market transactions (Muradian et al. 2010; 
Farley & Costanza 2010; Muradian 2013a; Sattler & Matzdorf 2013).  
Although there has been limited empirical analysis of PES implementation and efficacy (Farley 
& Costanza 2010), evidence suggests that PES can effectively complement conventional 
regulatory approaches to conservation, both in developed and developing countries (Wunder et 
al. 2008). Often promoted as a ‘win-win’ approach to achieving environmental and social 
impacts, PES is historically most popular in middle-income developing countries (Pagiola et al. 
2005; Grieg-Gran et al. 2005; Bulte et al. 2008). While any conservation intervention is less 
likely to succeed in the weak institutional settings that are common in developing countries, PES 
may facilitate the strengthening of institutions and ease cooperation in cases where governance 
is poor (Kosoy et al. 2007; Clements et al. 2010; Wunder 2013). Furthermore, although the 
social impacts of PES have not been well measured, there is some evidence that it can enhance 
rural livelihoods (Clements & Milner-Gulland 2014; Ingram et al. 2014; Bremer et al. 2014). The 
approach can also be sustainable in the long term, especially when integrated with other 
instruments such as co-management (Chapter 7; Clements et al. 2010; Fisher 2012; Goldman-
Benner et al. 2012; Sarkki & Karjalainen 2015), and thus can be an innovative way to generate 
sustainable financing for conservation (Sattler & Matzdorf 2013; Bos et al. 2015).  
Marine conservation is increasingly adopting an ES framework, and a range of economic 
instruments and market-based approaches are becoming available (Fujita et al. 2013). However, 
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the concept of marine PES is still nascent, largely due to the fluid, transboundary and often 
common pool nature of marine ecosystems. Discussion has been directed towards the 
development of payments for the protection of coastal ecosystems such as mangroves, 
particularly for their role in carbon sequestration, where lessons can be drawn more easily from 
terrestrial experience (Lau 2012; Locatelli et al. 2014). In recent years, PES has received 
attention as an approach that could complement conventional regulatory fisheries management, 
particularly in small-scale, developing-world fisheries (Pagiola 2008; Lau 2012; Mohammed & 
Wahab 2013; Binet et al. 2013; Micheli et al. 2014; Innes et al. 2015). Furthermore, some 
authors hypothesise that by linking marine ES buyers with providers, PES could provide a novel 
way to guide investment in sustainable fisheries (Short 2012, 2014). However, critical 
discussion and empirical analysis are limited (Barr & Mourato 2009; Begossi et al. 2011a; Barr 
2012; Hallwass et al. 2013; Begossi 2014; Corrêa et al. 2014).  
In this chapter I explore the potential for a PES approach to help address current challenges and 
gaps in commercial fisheries management in the developing world. Although they may present 
the greatest tests for PES, regarding weak governance, ill-defined property rights, and lack of 
technical resources and capacity (Grafton et al. 2008), developing countries also present some 
of the greatest opportunities for additional gains, particularly through potential contributions to 
food security and poverty alleviation. I first outline the principles which, in theory, distinguish 
PES from other fisheries management tools and explore the ways in which PES might be applied 
in fisheries. I then discuss the institutional and environmental preconditions that would help to 
ensure successful delivery of a fisheries PES scheme in practice, before illustrating some real 
world opportunities for and limitations to the approach using four contrasting case studies.  
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2.2 The defining principles of PES in a fisheries context 
PES is most commonly defined as a voluntary transaction whereby a well-defined ES (or actions 
likely to secure it) is ‘bought’ from at least one ES provider by at least one buyer, if and only if 
the payment is conditional on provision of that ES (Wunder 2005). In other words, it translates 
external values into positive incentives for behavioural changes that are expected to increase 
the provision of one or more ES. These positive incentives, which might be financial or in-kind, 
are paid to the ES provider (the individual or group accountable for ES delivery) for carrying out 
a specific management activity. Although Wunder’s definition is the clearest and most detailed, 
in practice PES schemes rarely fulfil each of his five criteria (Muradian et al. 2010). Recent 
conceptualisations focus on the core principles of positive incentives and conditionality, and 
emphasise the consideration of additionality – the degree to which a PES scheme adds value 
over what would have happened in its absence (Sommerville et al. 2009; Tacconi 2012; 
Muradian 2013a). Here I outline the principles which theoretically set PES apart from other 
fisheries management tools, and the extent to which they may be addressed in a fisheries 
context (Fig. 2.1). 
 
Figure 2.1: Schematic for a fisheries Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) scheme. Buyers may include 
seafood supply chain actors, governments, and NGOs; management outcomes may include fishery 
recovery and therefore enhanced profitability or provision of other ES of concern to the buyer; solid 
arrows represent payment flow, which should be conditional on provider behaviour or management 
outcomes. 
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2.2.1 Clearly defined ES 
Theory states that the service(s) in question should be clearly defined in order for provision to 
be quantifiable (Wunder 2005; Tacconi 2012), but the interconnectivity of marine ES makes 
them difficult to define in time and space (Sousa et al. 2016). For example, if payments were 
made to fishers for avoiding a specific area of habitat, with the aim of increasing fish stocks, this 
service might be difficult to disentangle from other ES that might also be delivered through this 
action (such as improved benthic habitat). ‘Bundled’ PES schemes could be used to address 
these challenges, whereby payment is received for multiple ES grouped together in a single 
package of conservation outcomes (e.g. habitat conservation or fishery performance), which, in 
turn, may raise the incentive for management activities with multiple potential outcomes and 
reduce trade-offs between ES (Lau 2012). Lau (2012) also considers the benefits of ‘stacking’, 
whereby separate payments are generated for distinct ES, but this kind of payment structure is 
less able to reflect the complexity and interconnected nature of ecosystems. Successful 
implementation of bundling in terrestrial conservation has been rare (Engel et al. 2008); it can 
be more costly and difficult than dealing with single ES due to the involvement of more 
stakeholder groups (Lau 2012). However, efforts are underway to address these challenges 
(Wendland et al. 2010; LaRocco & Deal 2011). In particular, lessons from work on markets for 
the bundling of agricultural products with other ES in Africa and Latin America may be 
applicable to the bundling of seafood with other ES (Andersson et al. 2010).  
2.2.2 Buyers and providers 
The potential providers in a fisheries PES scheme range from individuals or communities of 
small-scale fishers to industrial fishing fleets to nation states. If a provider is to receive payment 
and thereby be held accountable for ES delivery, or at least for management actions, they must 
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have some level of ownership or control over ES delivery (Wunder 2013). However, property 
rights are often unclear in fisheries, particularly in the developing world where they may be 
traditional or undocumented, making the identification of providers potentially difficult 
(Muradian 2013b). Even when rights are defined and enforced, the high mobility of marine 
resources makes it difficult to prevent others from accessing the resources and their ES, which 
might reduce the suitability of a PES approach (Kemkes et al. 2010). Furthermore, fisheries 
stakeholders tend to be numerous, widely dispersed, and mobile. In a scheme where fishers act 
as providers, as a group they may have a strong incentive to change their behaviour, but as 
individuals they each have an incentive to avoid doing so (Pagiola 2008). This fragmentation 
could also lead to multiple and conflicting claims for payment and raise transaction costs – 
issues encountered in the management of forests, another system in which goods and services 
are supplied by a variety of different stakeholders at a range of geographic scales and in which 
land tenure is complex (Wunder 2007; To et al. 2012). There can also be interdependence 
between fisheries sectors: for example, shellfish gleaners might be affected by fisheries 
practices, but not necessarily included in a PES scheme. 
The buyer in a PES scheme can be any actor who benefits from service provision – fishers, an 
NGO, a government body, a private company, consumers, or any combination of these. 
Interested buyers may vary with the ES or action that is targeted: a government might have an 
interest in paying for an overall management plan, and an NGO for actions such as reduction in 
the use of damaging gear, whereas a private company is more likely to be interested in a specific 
ES such as fish provision. Although no single source is likely to be sufficient, the seafood sector 
is a potentially significant and largely untapped source of investment for PES (Blasiak et al. 
2014). It has already shown willingness to support the transition to sustainable fisheries 
through corporate social responsibility programmes and involvement in fisheries improvement 
projects (FIPs), certification schemes and ecolabelling (Micheli et al. 2014; Chaplin-Kramer et al. 
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2015). However, research suggests that this willingness is not fully exploited (Vallejo et al. 
2009; Short 2011, 2012). PES could be used to capture this willingness and guide investment, 
thereby strengthening supply chain accountability. For example, by providing fishers with an 
economic incentive to avoid fishing in nursery grounds, private companies might invest in the 
natural capital of this habitat; i.e., the fish stocks and the flow of ES which support these stocks. 
Through increased fishery profitability, this mechanism could in turn stimulate additional 
public or private investment.  
2.2.3 Voluntary transaction 
It is generally agreed that PES should at least be voluntary for the provider, in order for the 
payment to have conditionality, but that this is less important for the buyer (Tacconi 2012; Lau 
2012). For example, payments might be generated through taxation, where the buyers 
themselves may not necessarily be directly involved in the transaction (Goldman-Benner et al. 
2012). Others propose that the extent to which the transaction is voluntary depends on 
institutional context; for instance, if payments are being used to alter behaviours which are 
already illegal, in combination with regulatory approaches, then the providers may not act 
voluntarily (Sommerville et al. 2009; Farley & Costanza 2010). Furthermore, in cases where 
communities as a whole are acting as the provider, as may often be the case in artisanal 
fisheries, the transaction could be voluntary at the level of the group rather than the individual 
(Sommerville et al. 2009). 
2.2.4 Conditionality 
Conditionality is the methodological core of PES, the component which creates a consequence 
for not providing the ES (Sommerville et al. 2009). Payments that are conditional on outcomes, 
i.e., ES provision, are thought to be the most effective (Ferraro & Kiss 2002; Banerjee et al. 
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2013), but in practice the technical and financial challenges of monitoring mean that provider 
compliance with the agreed management actions is often used instead (Sommerville et al. 2009, 
2011; Pattanayak et al. 2010). Due to the high levels of uncertainty attached to most marine ES, 
conditionality on their provision may be particularly difficult to establish. Where the target is 
fish provision or habitat protection, conditionality on, for example, stock status or area 
protected may be relatively easy to maintain, but proxy indicators are much less available for 
regulating and cultural services than they are for provisioning ES (Liquete et al. 2013). Action-
based payments still require enforcement, however, and may therefore still lead to high 
transaction costs in marine systems. 
2.2.5 Additionality 
Additionality is a measure of the outcome of an intervention relative to the situation in its 
absence, and thus an important indicator of the benefits and cost-effectiveness of PES as an 
approach (Chapter 5; Sommerville et al. 2009; Tacconi 2012). It is vital to assess cost-
effectiveness, not only in relation to the original situation, but also to alternative management 
approaches. The measurement of additionality can help to avoid the allocation of payments to 
individuals who were already going to carry out conservation actions. It can likewise help to 
inform the prediction of when a scheme should end (continuing payments beyond the point 
when they are having additional impact would not be cost-effective); and it can be crucial in 
generating and maintaining financial support (Wunder et al. 2008; Pattanayak et al. 2010). 
However, additionality is often difficult to establish and therefore rarely explicitly monitored in 
PES schemes (Pagiola & Rios 2008; Honey-Rosés et al. 2009). The estimation of baselines and 
counterfactuals in the marine environment suffers from similar challenges to those encountered 
in the monitoring of marine ES provision, particularly in small-scale developing-world fisheries, 
which often lack even the most basic management tools such as stock assessments. It may be 
more practical to assess actions rather than outcomes in such cases (Muradian 2013a). Surveys 
36 
 
 
assessing perceptions of compliance and scheme acceptability could also be used to monitor 
and evaluate some components of PES impact over time (Hallwass et al. 2013; Bennett 2016). 
Social diffusion, where the change in behaviour of a small percentage of fishers may have 
positive impacts on the behaviour of others, should be taken into account when assessing 
overall additionality of a scheme (Goldman-Benner et al. 2012), as should displacement, where 
payments allow ecosystem damage to be shifted elsewhere, resulting in no net change in 
fisheries practice or ecosystem condition on a broader scale (Wunder et al. 2008). 
2.3 Scope for PES in fisheries 
A fisheries PES scheme may be used to support an overall management plan, a specific 
management action or the provision of a specific ES. It might, for example, be a short-term 
measure to support seafood provision, or the adoption of actions known to increase seafood 
provision. However, the principles of an ecosystem approach would ideally require a broader 
focus which encompasses additional ES. A scheme supporting a management plan, conservation 
outcome, or bundle of ES is more likely to maintain additionality over alternative approaches, 
and therefore may be more sustainable in the long run. 
The use of economic instruments, including PES, as tools to reduce the negative impacts of 
commercial fishing has been reviewed by Innes et al. (2015). There are examples in the peer-
reviewed literature of proposed mechanisms that compensate fishers for earnings lost or costs 
incurred through a change in gear type, fishing location or fishing practice (Döring & Egelkraut 
2007; Vinha et al. 2010), and of ‘conservation agreements’ whereby philanthropic investment is 
chanelled via NGOs to local communities in exchange for stewardship activities (Niesten et al. 
2013). In particular, the feasibility of government and tourist compensation payments to small-
scale artisanal fisheries has been investigated (Barr & Mourato 2009; Clifton 2013), but 
examples of actual implementation are rare (see Table 2.1). Furthermore, the extent to which 
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many of these mechanisms conform to the defining principles of PES is unclear. Though they use 
payments, conditionality rarely appears to be in place. For example, the Brazilian Government 
operates a payment scheme called the defeso, whereby fishers receive compensation for costs 
incurred during periods of fishery closure. However, criticism of their systems of monitoring, 
control and surveillance (MCS) indicates that payments are not fully conditional on compliance, 
nor is the transaction voluntary from the perspective of the providers (Begossi et al. 2011a; 
Corrêa et al. 2014). According to Begossi et al. (2011a), improvements in the scheme could 
allow it to serve as the ‘basis for more effective PES instruments’. 
One of the only examples of a fisheries payment mechanism formally and legitimately referred 
to as PES in the literature to date is that of the Banc d’Arguin National Park in Mauritania, where 
the European Union (EU) allocates part of its payment for the EU-Mauritania Fisheries 
Partnership Agreement to the management of the park (Binet et al. 2013). By investing in the 
biomass productivity of the park, the EU is protecting nursery and breeding sites which 
contribute to the productivity of its commercial fishing grounds. This mechanism is the first 
international payment of its kind and undermines some of the theoretical barriers to marine 
PES. It has led to enhanced management of the park, and there is potential for the mechanism to 
be extended to benefit other major fisheries in Mauritania and in Guinea Bissau (Binet et al. 
2013). 
Seafood certification schemes are sometimes described as a form of PES (e.g. Forest Trends & 
The Katoomba Group 2010), though they fulfil only some of the defining principles. The most 
prevalent of these, the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), aims to create positive market 
incentives for sustainable fishing by shifting consumer demand towards MSC-certified products, 
thereby generating a return on investment in sustainable practices. In theory, the certified 
fishery (voluntary provider) receives a price premium from the consumer (the buyer) which is 
conditional on the effective management and health of the fishery and its impact on the 
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environment (Roheim et al. 2011; MSC 2013). Although the MSC has begun quantitatively to 
evaluate its performance (MSC 2013), it has been criticised for weak linkages between 
certification and conservation outcomes (Ward 2008; Jacquet et al. 2010; Christian et al. 2013; 
Micheli et al. 2014). Certification of bundles of marine ES may increase opportunities for 
ecological and socioeconomic impacts, but it does not yet explicitly address defined ES other 
than seafood production. Furthermore, the participation of developing-world fisheries in MSC 
certification is currently limited by the costs of entering FIP or MSC processes and of monitoring 
compliance with standards (Ponte 2012; Micheli et al. 2014; Blackmore et al. 2015; Sampson et 
al. 2015). There is already pressure on companies throughout the seafood supply chain to 
source MSC-certified products (Chaplin-Kramer et al. 2015). PES initiatives thus have the 
potential to complement and strengthen MSC certification schemes by channelling investment 
from these companies to help cover some of the costs to potential providers of participating in 
the scheme (Short 2011, 2012, 2014). 
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Table 2.1: Examples of marine and coastal fishery payment mechanisms documented in the peer-
reviewed literature. All are based on positive incentives, but the extent of conditionality and additionality 
are unclear in all but the case of the European Union-Mauritania fisheries agreement. 
Scheme Start  Buyer Provider Payment Ecosystem Service 
Defeso: 
compensation for 
fisheries closure 
during fish 
reproduction 
(Begossi et al. 
2011a). 
1986 Brazilian 
Government 
Artisanal 
fishers, Brazil 
Financial 
compensation 
Fish production 
Marine Stewardship 
Council scheme 
(Roheim et al. 
2011) 
1997 Consumer Certified 
fishery 
Price premium Meeting MSC 
standards 
Sea turtle bycatch 
release (Ferraro & 
Gjertsen 2009). 
1998 Watamu 
Turtle Watch: 
Kenyan NGO  
Artisanal 
fishers, Kenya 
Financial 
performance 
payments 
Sea turtles 
Sea turtle bycatch 
release (Ferraro & 
Gjertsen 2009). 
2000 RENATURA: 
Congolese 
NGO 
Artisanal 
fishers, Congo 
Materials to 
fix/replace net 
Sea turtles 
Biodiversity offsets 
or bycatch 
mitigation scheme 
(Janisse et al. 2010).  
2004 FISH: an 
association of 
California 
drift gillnet 
swordfishers  
 
ASUPMATOMA
Mexican NGO 
Financial 
payments  
Sea turtles 
Vaquita bycatch 
reduction (Gjertsen 
& Niesten 2010). 
2007 Mexican 
Government 
Artisanal 
fishers, 
Northern Gulf 
of California 
Gillnet permits 
purchased or 
leased from 
fishers 
Vaquita population 
Compensation for 
hilsa conservation 
in Bangladesh 
(Islam et al. 2016). 
2005 Government 
of Bangladesh 
Affected 
Bangladeshi 
communities 
Compensation 
in the form of 
rice and 
alternative 
livelihood 
support 
Fish production 
International 
payment operating 
through a bilateral 
fisheries agreement 
(Binet et al. 2013). 
2006 European 
Union 
Banc d’Arguin 
National Park, 
Mauritania 
Funding for the 
direct 
conservation of 
marine and 
coastal 
biodiversity 
Biomass 
productivity, 
including protection 
of nursery and 
breeding sites for 
commercial species  
‘Reverse fishing 
license’ programme 
for lost commercial 
fishing revenue 
(Lau 2012). 
2008 Multiple 
public and 
private 
bodies acting 
through the 
PIPA* Trust 
Government of 
Kiribati 
Financial 
compensation 
Protection of tuna 
spawning areas, 
seamounts and reefs 
* Phoenix Islands Protected Area, Kiribati  
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2.4 Preconditions for PES in fisheries 
From the terrestrial and marine literature (e.g. Wunder 2005; Sommerville et al. 2009; Tacconi 
2012; Lau 2012), six key preconditions have emerged that are likely to enable the successful 
delivery of a fisheries PES scheme, as defined by the principles above. Ideally, there should be: 
1) demand for one or more ES where supply is threatened; 2) suitable baseline data available 
and a set of potential management actions underpinned by robust science; 3) clarity and 
security of property rights; 4) capacity for hybrid multi-level governance; 5) capacity for 
rigorous MCS; and 6) potential for financial sustainability of the scheme. 
2.4.1 Demand for one or more ES where supply is threatened 
In order for a PES to deliver additional benefits, there should be some level of current or future 
threat to ES supply, be it overfishing or a more indirect threat. Terrestrial experience indicates 
that PES is most feasible when this threat is intermediate or robustly predicted (Wunder 2005). 
Finding buyers is likely to be more difficult in low threat scenarios where conservation benefits 
are unlikely to be additional, but in very high threat scenarios the opportunity costs of ES 
provision to providers also tend to be very high – for example, when fishers depend on a rapidly 
declining resource for their food security.  
The more demand there is for the service(s) in question, the easier it will be to identify buyers 
and the greater the payment is likely to be. For example, sea turtle conservation and carbon 
sequestration would probably generate greater demand than demersal invertebrate 
biodiversity or the biological regulation provided by coral reef shark populations. Although 
economic valuation is by no means a prerequisite for PES, it can, in addition to giving an 
indication of scheme viability and appropriate design, help to promote this demand (Emerton 
2013; Wunder 2013). Because of the existing market for seafood there is likely to be sufficient 
demand for seafood provision, particularly if the species are commercially valuable; it may be 
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more difficult to convince potential buyers of the benefits provided by other non-market 
services impacted by fisheries. An investigation into the dependence of seafood companies on 
ES, using standardised metrics and indicators (Houdet et al. 2012), and advances in valuation 
methods for non-market services (Barbier et al. 2011) may help to generate demand by 
demonstrating the interrelatedness of seafood supply and wider ES (Chaplin-Kramer et al. 
2015). Moreover, bundling closely coupled services which are in high demand and have 
established PES markets (e.g. carbon sequestration) with seafood production may attract 
buyers from outside the seafood sector.  
2.4.2 Availability of suitable baseline data and robust science 
For good design, implementation and monitoring, PES requires a clear understanding of the 
social-ecological system, and therefore the availability of baseline data on the ES in question, 
system dynamics, and current/previous management approaches (Wunder 2005). Although 
marine ES data are often lacking (Guerry et al. 2011), novel approaches are now emerging for 
their rigorous assessment, quantification and mapping, particularly for commercial fisheries, 
but also for non-market services (Chan & Ruckelshaus 2010; Tallis et al. 2012; Liquete et al. 
2013; Blasiak et al. 2014). In the developing world, however, fisheries are rarely well 
characterised and new approaches to stock assessment, ecosystem modelling, and the 
incorporation of uncertainty will be required (Costello et al. 2012). For instance, low capacity 
for data collection might be addressed through the application of existing mobile phone 
technology; mobile application surveys are being trialled in the Solomon Islands with a view to 
improving the management decisions of its inshore fisheries (K. Rhodes, T. Welch, R. Pomeroy, 
M. Knight, S. Diffey and K. Simeon, unpublished data). In many developing countries even the 
poorest of fishers have access to mobile phones, and fishers could be compensated for using 
their phones to participate in data collection. When low quality or few data are available, 
Models of Intermediate Complexity for Ecosystem assessments (MICE) can be used to support 
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fisheries decision-making in an ecosystem context, while accounting for a broad range of 
uncertainties (Plagányi et al. 2012a, b, c). They take into account ecosystem objectives, but 
include only the components essential to answering the management question at hand. 
Furthermore, PES may facilitate investment in building capacity for data collection and 
identification of the minimal data requirements. Alternatively, ecological data and model 
frameworks from well understood fisheries can be transferred and applied to data deficient 
situations (Chapter 5).  
A clear and preferably causal link should also be established between the management action 
that is being paid for and service delivery, allowing for strong conditionality on outcomes (Binet 
et al. 2013). Yet causal relationships are dynamic and difficult to establish in marine systems 
(Guerry et al. 2011). Furthermore, the fluidity of the marine environment means that resources 
can travel quickly between management areas – particularly in the case of migratory species 
and those with a long-distance larval dispersal phase – making it difficult to directly link 
conservation outcomes with activities undertaken by the provider. Nevertheless, as discussed in 
detail by Lau (2012), the types of management activities which lead to enhanced service 
delivery are well understood in fisheries (e.g. no-take zones, seasonal closures, bycatch 
reduction devices) – though causal links may not always be established specifically for the 
system in question. 
2.4.3 Clarity and security of property rights 
Rights-based management systems such as Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) and 
Territorial Use Rights (TURFs) can empower fishers to use resources more sustainably and help 
to build institutional capacity that could benefit PES schemes, if these management systems act 
on the same scale as the PES (Costello et al. 2008; Kemkes et al. 2010). TURFs are likely to be 
more appropriate than ITQs in developing-world, coastal fisheries (Costello et al. 2012). 
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However, in small-scale and artisanal fisheries, where recognition and enforcement of rights 
often fails, PES has the potential to facilitate the process of rights clarification, which can in turn 
act as a precursor to other forms of management (Clements et al. 2010; van Noordwijk et al. 
2012). For example, Janssen et al. (2007) have proposed that PES might be used to address 
rights allocation issues and achieve both fishery sustainability and protection of traditional 
fishing communities in South Africa by compensating artisanal fishers for limiting their catch 
with revenues from commercial fishery license fees. Success would depend, however, on the 
interdependencies of those two fisheries and the sustainability of the commercial fishery. PES 
schemes might also be established under open-access or common property regimes, as they 
have been in terrestrial systems, by providing incentives for collective action and formalising 
customary rights (Greiber 2009; Clements et al. 2010; Muradian 2013b; Midler et al. 2015). 
Moreover, in Lower Amazon floodplain fisheries, the creation of co-management Fishing 
Agreements (FAs) has defined some access rules and established a legal institutional 
framework, a process which could in theory be applied to provide an institutional basis for PES 
in other coastal fisheries (Hallwass et al. 2013). On the high seas, which are essentially devoid of 
rights, PES is not currently thought to be feasible (Lau 2012). However, the concept of ‘side 
payments’ is being explored for internationally shared tuna stocks (Bailey 2013), and with the 
right cooperative institutional arrangements and industry-wide agreements, a high seas PES 
scheme might help address current weaknesses in high seas governance (Aqorau 2007; Blasiak 
et al. 2014; Visbeck et al. 2014).  
2.4.4 Capacity for hybrid multi-level governance 
A PES mechanism requires a good governance structure if it is to be sustainable, provide the 
accountability mechanisms to facilitate payments to the correct providers, increase 
transparency, and reduce transaction costs (Chapter 7; Vatn 2010; Wunder 2013). Due to the 
highly mobile and dispersed nature of most marine resources and stakeholders, hierarchical 
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(e.g. state) and market governance structures will rarely be suitable in marine PES schemes 
(Muradian & Gómez-Baggethun 2013). Muradian (2013a) argues that hybrid forms of 
governance such as collective management, which sit between markets and hierarchies, will be 
most efficient in marine systems, although this will depend on the institutional context 
(Clements et al. 2010; Vatn 2010; Ingram et al. 2014).  
Although PES is often viewed as an alternative to the failure or lack of conventional regulatory 
measures, government regulation can be complementary and synergistic (Habtezion 2013), and 
PES is often led by governments (Engel et al. 2008). Whether it is a public scheme or not, there 
must be support of the PES from the government in the state(s) where the fishing takes place 
(Binet et al. 2013). The variability of fish markets and subsequent variability of opportunity 
costs mean that in some circumstances a fisheries PES scheme would probably fail without 
regulation (Barr & Mourato 2009; van Noordwijk et al. 2012). Moreover, if fishing rights are 
ambiguous, governments may need to assist with their clarification and enforcement. Where 
national governance is poor, however, local champions of fisheries management, collective 
institutions, and systems of community governance could increase the opportunity for and 
durability of a PES scheme (Clements et al. 2010; Gutiérrez et al. 2011; Begossi et al. 2012; 
Carbonetti et al. 2014; Ingram et al. 2014). These institutions may in turn benefit from the 
introduction of PES if collective payments included, for instance, funding of training to improve 
internal collaboration (Hallwass et al. 2013). The pre-existence of certain locally developed 
institutions like co-management schemes may thus prove an advantage for PES (Chapter 7; Vatn 
2010; Kemkes et al. 2010; Ingram et al. 2014). However, the formation of new multi-level 
institutions may also be necessary to drive coordination between relevant stakeholders at 
multiple scales (van Noordwijk et al. 2012; Habtezion 2013). At a regional or national scale, this 
might entail the integration of community-level organisations, government agencies, NGOs and 
the private sector (Bailey et al. 2015). On an international scale, a PES might be integrated into 
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pre-existing multilateral environmental agreements like the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS), which would benefit from increased international coordination (Habtezion 
2013; Visbeck et al. 2014). Lessons in multi-scale PES governance can be drawn from initiatives 
to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+; van Noordwijk et al. 
2012). 
2.4.5 Capacity for monitoring, control and surveillance 
With good governance there should come rigorous systems of MCS. Whether a PES scheme is 
outcome- or action-based, the technical and financial challenges of MCS are heightened in the 
marine environment (Lau 2012). The requirement of conditionality under PES may raise 
transaction costs compared to other management approaches. However, MCS is vital for 
sustainable fisheries management, regardless of whether PES is in place, and many 
management agencies already have the equipment and resources required. In low-income 
developing countries where this is not the case, there are alternatives that would reduce 
transaction costs. For example, if a scheme were established under the common property rights 
of a fishing community, conditionality could be achieved through social norms which emerge 
from collective action (Clements et al. 2010), or through active community-level enforcement 
(Begossi et al. 2012).  
If payments are conditional, they should therefore incentivise investment in MCS so that 
providers qualify for these payments. Furthermore, PES could be designed explicitly to alleviate 
or cover the costs of MCS. For example, collective providers of PES could use their payments to 
cover the cost of boats and fuel or for the training or participation of community members 
(Hallwass et al. 2013). It has been proposed that coastal artisanal fishers participating in 
compensatory mechanisms could use their local knowledge to monitor fishing sites used by 
industrial fishers in order to reduce the catch of juveniles and supplement landings data 
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(Begossi et al. 2011b). On an international scale, through the EU-Mauritania Fisheries 
Agreement and PES scheme, the EU is investing in MCS of the Banc d’Arguin National Park 
(Binet et al. 2013).  
2.4.6 Potential for financial sustainability 
When PES connects direct beneficiaries of ES with ES providers through a closed loop system in 
which environmental externalities are internalised, it should in theory be financially sustainable 
(Engel et al. 2008; Farley & Costanza 2010). Governments, however, often act on behalf of 
beneficiaries, in which case financial sustainability may depend solely on budget allocations 
(Wunder et al. 2008). Furthermore, when payments are for biodiversity conservation, which is 
inherently more abstract than provisioning and supporting services (Morar et al. 2015), the 
loop between buyers and providers is less tangible, and ongoing payments may be less secure. 
In these circumstances, there must be a mechanism in place for financial sustainability – 
whether this is established through a tool which generates a constant flow of finances, for 
example in the form of user fees or taxes on fishing license fees, or one which generates revenue 
from investments in ES provision (e.g. impact investment, see Chapter 7). It is likely that any 
investment in an ES related to seafood provision will increase fishery profitability, whether this 
is a result of stock recovery or the ability to set a price premium on an end product. Yet this may 
not be the case if, for instance, the action being paid for is one which may not affect fishery 
profits (e.g. bycatch reduction). The development of a Conservation Trust Fund (CTF) may 
enhance the financial sustainability of PES in such cases (Chapter 7; Goldman-Benner et al. 
2012). A CTF, where payments are made using the revenue from investment or a portion of 
principal funds, can act as an intermediary between buyers and providers and thus enable the 
use of tools such as endowments and revolving funds to create a sustainable source of financing 
for payments (Bladon et al. 2014a). Though the majority of experience comes from terrestrial 
conservation, trust funds are being used to generate and allocate funds in marine conservation 
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agreements, MPA management plans and some marine PES schemes. For example, the creation 
of a CTF for Mauritania’s marine PES scheme has played a role in attracting investment (Binet et 
al. 2013).  
2.5 An exploration of the applicability of PES in real world circumstances 
In order to assess whether PES could actually satisfy its defining principles and be successfully 
implemented in a real developing-world fisheries management situation, I explore the presence 
or absence of the above preconditions in four contrasting case studies (Table 2.2). In each case, 
the potential configurations and contributions of PES are discussed and the suitability of and 
barriers to such an approach are analysed, thereby highlighting the strengths and weaknesses 
of PES under a broad range of institutional and ecological circumstances. The case studies are: a 
relatively simple and well-managed domestic whitefish fishery; a complex multi-sector 
domestic shrimp fishery; a lucrative international fishery targeting a highly migratory species; 
and a multi-sector and poorly understood domestic fishery targeting a largely anadromous fish.  
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Table 2.2: Potential structure of PES mechanisms in three contrasting fisheries and a summary of the 
extent to which they fulfil the design preconditions for marine PES. ‘’ indicates complete fulfilment of a 
precondition; ‘’ indicates partial fulfilment; ‘’ indicates failure. 
 Namibian hake 
fishery 
 
Mozambican 
shallow 
water 
shrimp 
fishery 
PNA skipjack 
tuna fishery 
Bangladesh hilsa 
fishery 
Potential PES configuration     
ES / management action 
 
Hake production 
/ bycatch 
reduction 
 
Mangrove or 
seagrass 
habitat / 
shrimp 
production.  
 
Skipjack 
production / 
reduction of 
juvenile & non-
tuna bycatch.  
Fish production 
(hilsa & other food 
products) / range 
of regulatory & 
supporting 
services of coastal 
habitat. 
Buyers 
 
 
 
International 
seafood 
companies; 
European 
retailers; 
Governments of 
Namibia, South 
Africa & Angola; 
international 
consumers. 
 
International 
seafood 
companies; 
European 
retailers; 
commercial 
fishing 
companies; 
international 
consumers; 
tourism, oil & 
gas 
industries. 
 
PNA, tuna 
retailers; 
Pacifical; 
seafood 
companies; 
international 
consumers; 
longline fleets. 
Commercial 
marine fishers; 
Governments of 
Bangladesh, India 
& Myanmar; 
international 
consumers; 
national & 
international 
companies. 
Providers 
 
Namibian and 
South African 
hake fleets. 
Artisanal 
fishing 
communities 
in 
Mozambique. 
PNA skipjack 
fleet. 
Artisanal river 
fishing 
communities in 
Bangladesh. 
Design preconditions     
   Demand for & threat to ES     
   Baseline data & science     
   Property rights     
   Capacity for governance     
   Monitoring & enforcement     
   Financial sustainability     
 
 
2.5.1 Namibian hake fishery 
This industrial demersal trawl and longline fishery, targeting cape hake (Merlucius capenis) and 
deep-water hake (Merlucius paradoxus), is the country’s most valuable fishery and almost 
entirely exported (OECD 2012). Although it is widely thought to be relatively well managed, 
stocks appear to be in decline and issues of social equity have been highlighted (Paterson et al. 
2013). A PES scheme might improve management by realigning social, ecological, and economic 
goals. 
Demand for one or more ES where supply is threatened 
There is evidence of a decline in hake stocks in Namibia (BCC 2011) and global demand is high, 
so a short-term transitional and international PES scheme may be appropriate. This could be 
expanded to pay for bycatch reduction, but whitefish fisheries tend to deliver relatively few 
other ES and opportunities for bundling may therefore be limited. In turn, this reduces the 
potential for PES to produce additional ecosystem benefits over conventional management 
approaches in the long term.  
Availability of suitable baseline data and robust science 
After decades of overexploitation, Namibia has rebuilt its hake fishery through access limitation 
and a reduction in effort, and the impacts of these actions are well established. Reliable stock 
assessments, strong ecosystem understanding, and modelling approaches are available, which 
could be used to support conditionality on ecosystem outcomes (Roux & Shannon 2010; 
Kirchner et al. 2012). However, more detailed and reliable social data might be required to 
ensure the equitable distribution of benefits (Paterson et al. 2013). 
Clarity and security of property rights 
Namibia has developed a clear rights-based legal framework and distributed individual non-
transferable quotas (Armstrong et al. 2004). This policy aims to ensure that social benefits are 
returned to citizens, but has been criticised for favouring the elite minority over local 
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development (Paterson et al. 2013) – an issue which any PES scheme should address. 
Nevertheless, the pre-existence of clear and secure access rights would make the identification 
of buyers and providers relatively simple, considering that the marine fisheries sector is 
exclusively industrial and conflicts with other users are unlikely. 
Capacity for hybrid multi-level governance 
A PES approach would fit within the perspective of current fisheries management. Despite being 
a developing country with limited financial resources, Namibia has made a formal commitment 
to ecosystem-based fisheries management (Roux & Shannon 2010; MFMR 2012) and the 
Government has already shown interest in a participatory and incentive-based approach, as 
well as in maximising the value returned to Namibians (the allocation of fishing rights was itself 
driven by tax reductions connected to quota fees). Although they hardly enter international 
waters, both species of hake are managed together as a single stock which is shared with South 
Africa and Angola, so a PES scheme would require international cooperative governance – a 
prospect which is currently being put into action through the Benguela Current Convention and 
Commission (MFMR 2012).  
Capacity for MCS 
With the majority of fishing rights owned by Namibians, users are proximate and not too high in 
number; and there is a good MCS system already in place (Bergh & Davies 2004; OECD 2012). 
This should reduce transaction costs and allow benefits to be directly linked back to the activity 
which is being paid for. 
Potential for financial sustainability 
Buyers could be promised a return on investment through increased fishery profitability. 
Furthermore, the Namibian Government currently collects catch levies for a ‘fisheries fund’ 
which is used to finance fisheries research (OECD 2012), although it is unclear whether it would 
have the institutional capacity to administer a PES. 
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Verdict 
The hake fishery satisfies most of the preconditions: it has clear and secure property rights, the 
beginnings of a hybrid multi-level governance system, good MCS and a potential mechanism for 
financial sustainability. Nevertheless, there may be limited opportunities for long-term 
additionality of a PES scheme. 
2.5.2 Mozambican shallow water shrimp fishery 
Mozambique’s shallow water shrimp fishery (Indian White prawn Fenneropenaeus indicus and 
Speckled shrimp Metapenaeus monoceros) is a commercially important and multi-sector fishery 
(Palha de Sousa et al. 2011). It fulfils some of the preconditions for a PES scheme, which has the 
potential to address the need for a holistic management approach, but there are a number of 
social and ecological uncertainties which may limit implementation. 
Demand for one or more ES where supply is threatened 
Although the fishery is considered to be relatively sustainable, there is overcapacity, conflict 
between the artisanal and commercial sectors, and high levels of non-shrimp bycatch and 
discarding (Banks & Macfadyen 2011). For example, continued expansion of the artisanal 
sector, in which there is juvenile overfishing, could have serious economic implications for the 
semi-industrial sector (Palha de Sousa et al. 2011). If a PES scheme were to operate through 
payments from downstream supply chain companies to artisanal fishers – for instance, as 
compensation for avoiding nursery grounds in a marine reserve – inter-sector conflict might be 
reduced. Economically, the shrimp fisheries are the most important in Mozambique, and the 
artisanal sector is the principal source of food and employment for coastal communities (Banks 
& Macfadyen 2011). Local and foreign demand for shrimp from producers, retailers, and 
consumers is therefore high, and buyers could be convinced of the importance of mangrove and 
seagrass habitats in this production. The potential for mangrove-based PES systems is well 
recognised (Locatelli et al. 2014), and if services were bundled it might also be possible to 
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attract investment from other industries such as tourism or oil and gas, and thus the global 
carbon market. 
Availability of suitable baseline data and robust science 
This ecosystem is not well understood, and fishery success in any one year is likely to be 
strongly affected by variation in freshwater flow from the Zambezi River and its effect on 
recruitment (Gammelsrod 1992), making a direct link between a particular management 
activity and ecological outcomes difficult to establish. Artisanal catches are not yet incorporated 
into annual stock assessments, although they are estimated to form a substantial proportion of 
the total shrimp catch, and data on the number of artisanal vessels in operation are highly 
inconsistent (Banks & Macfadyen 2011). The resulting uncertainty in catch data is one of the 
main reasons why a pre-assessment for MSC certification found the fishery to be unsuitable in 
its recent state (Moody Marine Ltd 2008). However, the requirement for conditionality in PES 
may incentivise investment in innovative new methods of artisanal data collection. It might also 
be possible to use models developed for other fisheries as a framework for the Mozambican 
shrimp, given that there has been extensive work conducted on the well managed and well 
understood multi-species Australian northern prawn fishery, which incorporates the issue of 
uncertainty (Dichmont et al. 2006a, 2006b, 2006c).  
Clarity and security of property rights 
The fishery is contained within Mozambique’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and commercial 
access is restricted to licence holders. Furthermore, the Government is moving towards a rights-
based approach, which would make the system more amenable to PES (Tindall 2012). However, 
there is a great deal of interaction between the shallow and deep water fisheries in the region, 
and a PES scheme should probably not be limited to the shallow water fishery. The artisanal 
sector is essentially open access and supports several thousand fishers along the coastline 
(Banks & Macfadyen 2011), so making the identification of providers complex. Nevertheless, 
local co-management committees operating licensing systems have now been established in 
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most fishing communities, with some success, which might provide an institutional basis for 
PES (MRAG 2010). 
Capacity for hybrid multi-level governance 
Through a comprehensive management plan, the Government is beginning to address 
management concerns, but it still lacks implementation capacity. Furthermore, the interactions 
between the shallow and deep water fisheries in the region – and between the commercial and 
artisanal sectors of the shallow water fishery – are not currently reflected in their governance. A 
PES scheme would require the development of institutional capacity through the coordination 
and integration of management authorities in different sectors, regions and at different levels, 
as well as with corporations and co-management organisations (Banks & Macfadyen 2011). 
Capacity for MCS 
For a basic level of conditionality to be achieved, the current system of MCS would need 
improvement (Banks & Macfadyen 2011). Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is a 
problem in Mozambique (MRAG 2005), the industrial Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) is not 
fully operational (Banks & Macfadyen 2011) and the artisanal fishery is largely unregulated. 
Artisanal fishers are not included in the seasonal closures imposed on commercial sectors, and 
they operate close to shore, often in estuarine mangrove nursery areas, and increasingly using 
illegal mosquito nets (M. Rodrigues 2013, WWF Mozambique, personal communication, 22nd 
April.) Low levels of national educational capacity and access to technology in Mozambique may 
mean that considerable investment in capacity building would be required to achieve the 
necessary improvements in top-down research, administration and enforcement (FAO 2007). A 
system of co-management may be preferable (Béné et al. 2010) and it could be possible for a 
PES scheme to be designed so as to include mechanisms for alleviating the social costs of 
community monitoring and enforcement (Begossi et al. 2011a).  
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Potential for financial sustainability 
Buyers could be promised a return on investment through increased fishery profitability and 
there may be opportunities for mechanisms which generate a constant flow of revenue through 
user fees. 
Verdict 
Application of PES to the shrimp fishery in its current state may in theory be limited by poor 
ecosystem understanding and a lack of institutional capacity for integrated governance, MCS, 
and financial sustainability. But through investment in capacity building and the identification 
of gaps in understanding, PES might provide a mechanism to address these deficiencies. 
2.5.3 PNA Western and Central Pacific purse seine skipjack tuna fishery 
The application of PES to tuna fisheries would be ideal in terms of their lucrative markets, but 
also particularly challenging in terms of the highly migratory nature of tuna. The PNA (Parties to 
the Nauru Agreement) is a sub-regional alliance between eight adjacent Pacific island states for 
the management of a purse seine skipjack tuna (Katsuwonus pelamis) fishery. Although the 
institutional and political complexities of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) tuna 
fisheries might on first glance render them ineligible for PES, the PNA has created an 
environment in which PES could be feasible. 
Demand for one or more ES where supply is threatened 
Tuna has high economic value (Collette et al. 2011) and demand is therefore great from 
consumers, international retailers, producers and the economies of dependent Pacific states. 
PNA skipjack is considered to be sustainably managed and the free-school skipjack fishery has 
gained MSC certification (Moody Marine Ltd 2011). However, those fleets that still target 
skipjack near Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs) catch undersize tuna and contribute to the 
overfishing of other species such as bigeye tuna (Thunnus obesus; Bailey 2013). A PES targeting 
skipjack production and/or bycatch reduction might generate additional benefits over those 
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delivered by current PNA management. Payments to PNA skipjack fleets channelled from 
various potential sources, including longline fleets which target bigeye, could incentivise free 
school purse seining. 
Availability of suitable baseline data and robust science 
Good stock assessments and data on skipjack and bigeye movements are available, and 
relatively advanced spatial ecosystem and population dynamics models can also be used for the 
investigation of tuna management scenarios and inter-species interactions in the Pacific 
(Lehodey et al. 2008). 
Clarity and security of property rights 
WCPO tuna fisheries fall under the jurisdictions of multiple states which hold property rights 
within their EEZs, and fishing operations range from coastal artisanal fleets to industrial purse 
seine and longline fleets on the high seas (Aqorau 2007). The variable movements of tuna 
therefore complicate the identification of buyers and providers and may create a free-rider 
problem: one buyer might end up paying for conservation measures while a distant actor reaps 
the benefits (Bailey 2013). However, the PNA states have asserted their property rights to 
control 70 per cent of WCPO and 50 per cent of global skipjack tuna catch, and established high 
seas closures in the areas between their EEZs (Maurice Brownjohn 2013, Commercial Director 
of PNA, personal communication, 28th April.) The PNA also operates a Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) 
for purse seiners. This is a rights-based transferable effort scheme whereby PNA members are 
allocated fishing days which they can trade among themselves and allocate to distant water 
fleets at their discretion (Aqorau 2007; Havice 2013). The strengthening of rights which this 
entails would make it possible to identify providers clearly in a PES regime.  
Capacity for hybrid multi-level governance 
PNA was established following the recognition of mutual concerns among the participating 
states over sustainability and economic opportunity; and there has since been a paradigm shift 
in the way they view and manage their resources. In addition to political will of individual 
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states, the PNA forms an institutional basis for the implementation of a PES scheme, although 
the complexity of creating such a large-scale and international PES cannot be underestimated. 
PNA resources are not located solely within the PNA states, but fall under the jurisdictions of 
multiple and overlapping regional management and advisory bodies, including the WCPFC 
(Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission), FFA (Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries 
Agency), PNA, and TVM (Te Vaka Moana). A multi-level governance framework for the 
integration of each of these bodies would be desirable, but mutual economic and ecological 
objectives would first need to be identified. 
Capacity for MCS 
PNA terms of license enforce strict management rules with 100 per cent observer coverage (M. 
Brownjohn 2013, Commercial Director of PNA, personal communication, 28th April) and the VDS 
provides a mandatory real-time Vessel Monitoring System (Havice 2013), which might allow 
payments to be conditional upon actions or outcomes. Enforcement is difficult on the high seas, 
but PNA has also established high seas closures in areas between EEZs, reducing IUU and, 
therefore, the risk of free-riding.  
Potential for financial sustainability 
PNA management is funded through fixed conservation levies from fishing vessels; and although 
these levies are not currently conditional on meeting any specific ecosystem objectives or MSC 
standards, this could provide the basis for a sustainable PES. Furthermore, there is already 
strong supply chain and market interest in the sustainability of the fishery. Thanks to the 
market access enabled by its joint venture with import and branding agency Pacifical, the PNA 
generates a 20 per cent premium on free school skipjack products via MSC certification and 
labelling, the majority of which is channelled back to the industry. Its co-branding programme 
with Pacifical also allows traceability of a can of tuna back to the vessels and factory involved in 
its production (Tindall 2012) - a system which has created an unprecedented level of 
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transparency within the supply chain and which could allow corporate responsibility to be 
apportioned accordingly (Short 2012). 
Verdict 
This case study fully satisfies five out of six of the preconditions. The only theoretical barrier to 
PES is the complexity of WCPO tuna governance; increased levels of coordination between PNA 
and other governing bodies may not be a realistic expectation. 
2.5.4 Bangladesh hilsa fishery 
Hilsa (Tenualosa ilisha) are largely anadromous, the majority of the population migrating from 
marine to fresh water for spawning, and as such support riverine and marine fisheries in 
Bangladesh (Blaber et al. 2003b; Amin et al. 2008). The Bangladesh Government currently runs 
a compensation scheme for hilsa fishers, which is designed to improve their socioeconomic 
positions in the face of fishing regulations; but there are questions surrounding the 
effectiveness, efficiency, and equity of the scheme (Chapters 5 & 6; Islam et al. 2016), which 
might be addressed through a more formalised PES approach (Mohammed & Wahab 2013).  
Demand for one or more ES where supply is threatened 
The hilsa fishery is the largest and most valuable single-species fishery in Bangladesh, but there 
has been a decline in stocks in recent years (Mome & Arnason 2007). As a fish with historical 
significance in Bengali culture, there is strong demand for hilsa, both locally and internationally 
amongst the Bengali diaspora (Chapter 3). As such it supports the livelihoods of up to 500,000 
fishermen and an additional 2-2.5 million workers involved in the supply chain (Haldar 2004; 
Mohammed & Wahab 2013; Islam et al. 2014). Although there may be less demand for hilsa 
from international companies than for seafood which is more popular in the west, the 
Government has already demonstrated a willingness to invest in sustainability improvements 
through its current management approach, which recognises the socioeconomic cost imposed 
upon hilsa fishers during fishing bans. The bundling of other ES into a PES scheme would 
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increase investment opportunity outside of the seafood sector. For example, small-meshed 
gillnets used to catch hilsa are associated with aquatic biodiversity issues in the riverine fishery 
(BOBLME 2012), and the coastal habitats protected within the hilsa sanctuaries provide 
regulating and supporting services, including those that contribute to the resilience of fisheries 
and coastal communities to climate change (Allison et al. 2009). There is potential for payments 
for hilsa conservation to be integrated with other social and environmental protection schemes 
(Chapter 8). 
Availability of suitable baseline data and robust science 
Hilsa are poorly understood; stock assessments in Bangladesh are highly unreliable; and there 
is little baseline social, economic, or ecological data available, particularly for the riverine 
fishery (Chapter 3; Mome & Arnason 2007; Amin et al. 2008; BOBLME 2010). Hilsa are 
threatened not only by overfishing, but by pollution, upstream damming, and climate change; 
and yet research on the impacts of non-fishing threats is limited (Blaber et al. 2003a; BOBLME 
2010). Reported declines in production prompted the Government to designate sanctuaries in 
major riverine and coastal nursery grounds, in which seasonal fishing bans are implemented for 
the protection of juveniles (Chapter 3). However, the scientific basis for this approach is weak, 
and it has not been possible to link causally any changes to the compensation scheme or 
associated management (Chapters 4 & 5). On the basis of data currently available, ecological 
additionality may be difficult to monitor directly, and payments may need to be conditional on 
actions rather than outcomes (Chapter 5). Even so, a PES could be undermined by the rapid 
environmental changes that are affecting the hilsa fishery. 
Clarity and security of property rights 
The process of buyer/provider identification would be complex due to the migratory nature of 
hilsa and the open access nature of the fishery. There is a lack of recognition of traditional 
property rights and most vessels are unregistered (Chapter 3; Amin et al. 2008; BOBLME 2010). 
Identification cards are being issued to help the authorities distinguish genuine fishers from 
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those claiming to be so within Bangladesh (Chapter 5), but hilsa stocks in the Bay of Bengal are 
also commercially exploited by Myanmar and India (BOBLME 2010). Not only would these 
countries benefit from measures implemented by Bangladesh, but their river fishery 
management will in any case affect stocks in Bangladesh. The prospects of transboundary 
management is being discussed through the Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem Project 
(BOBLME 2012), and a cooperative transnational PES system would therefore be desirable, 
though perhaps not politically feasible at present (Chapter 7). 
Capacity for hybrid multi-level governance 
Current management in Bangladesh indicates that there is political will for the governance of a 
national PES scheme. The Government has taken up management recommendations made by a 
number of external projects (BOBLME 2010), and currently makes budget allocations to the 
compensation scheme itself (Mohammed & Wahab 2013). Linkages between the various 
agencies involved in hilsa management are, however, weak (BOBLME 2012), and PES would 
require more cooperation between institutions at multiple levels (Chapter 7). Risks posed by 
potential political instability should also be considered, though these might be mitigated by 
decentralisation of management (Chapter 7). Ideally, a multi-level institution should be 
established among Bangladesh, India and Myanmar, integrating the relevant national and local 
governments and agencies, NGOs, and community level organisations.   
Capacity for MCS 
Compliance with conservation measures in the hilsa fishery is low and MCS is poor (Chapter 5; 
Siddique 2009; BOBLME 2010). Although conditionality may therefore be difficult to achieve, 
the implementation of PES could help to build capacity for MCS. The scheme might be designed 
to involve local communities and fisher associations in monitoring and enforcement; collective 
payments might be used to invest in mobile phone technologies to provide more reliable data 
from the artisanal fishery; and compliance might be monitored indirectly through surveys of 
fisher perceptions over time (Hallwass et al. 2013).  
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Potential for financial sustainability 
Although compensation currently comes directly from Government budget allocations, the 
creation of a CTF for hilsa conservation is, at the time of writing, underway, which could 
generate new and more sustainable sources of finance for a PES (Chapter 7; Mohammed & 
Wahab 2013). 
Verdict 
The hilsa fishery appears to be the least amenable case study, satisfying only one of the six 
preconditions fully. However, in these less-than-perfect circumstances PES might be used to 
leverage the changes required. The recent political support for a sustainable increase in hilsa 
production indicates great potential for a national PES scheme to facilitate investment in 
capacity building for community-based monitoring and enforcement, as well as the 
development of a more cooperative and integrated system of governance. 
2.6 Conclusions  
There are challenges to the design and implementation of PES in marine environments, but too 
much focus on theory may restrict and obscure opportunities for unconventional PES schemes 
to benefit fisheries management and stakeholders (Muradian et al. 2010; Farley & Costanza 
2010). PES is not a silver bullet, but when used together with conventional regulatory 
approaches it could play a significant role in incentivising sustainable fishing practices in 
developing countries. Furthermore, through systematic private sector engagement, PES could 
facilitate increased investment in fisheries improvement by buyers of ES, thereby reducing the 
burden of costs and responsibility placed on governments and fishers themselves. 
First and foremost, payments should be conditional on actions, if not on conservation outcomes, 
but these actions still need a robust scientific basis. Six key preconditions have been identified 
which would, in theory, enable the successful delivery of a fisheries PES scheme. It is rare that a 
developing-country fishery will fulfil each of these preconditions a priori, but that is not to say a 
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PES approach would be inappropriate in such circumstances, as long as there is capacity for 
improvement (Micheli et al. 2014). In practice, design will depend on the precise institutional 
context and may require creative and innovative approaches to the maintenance of 
conditionality and additionality. For example, the Bangladesh hilsa fishery satisfies few PES 
preconditions, but the level of political will already displayed for sustainable management 
presents an opportunity for improvement through the support of a PES (see Chapter 7). 
Although the hilsa fishery lacks a history of rights-based and ecosystem-based management as 
demonstrated by the Namibian hake and PNA tuna examples, it does have a compensation 
scheme already in place, and any conjunction between existing institutions and those required 
for PES increases the viability and sustainability of such a scheme. For highly migratory species 
like tuna, the development of international collaborative institutions such as the PNA may play 
an important role in the feasibility of PES, though they must grow in scale if they are to operate 
on the high seas. Where weak governance and institutions reduce the potential for 
conditionality, as is often the case in developing countries, PES could drive institutional reform; 
it might, for instance, be used to facilitate rights clarification, to pay for or incentivise 
improvements in MCS, or to address the shortcomings of an existing co-management 
programme. More research at the interface of PES and complementary institutional structures 
such as CTFs, TURFs, ITQs and co-management systems could encourage and facilitate the 
appropriate application of PES in developing-world fisheries. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Creating a frame of reference for hilsa management and conservation 
interventions in Bangladesh 
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3.1 Introduction 
An effective conservation intervention should have a measurable conservation benefit, and thus 
requires the specification of an appropriate frame of reference against which it can be evaluated 
(Maron et al. 2013; Bull et al. 2014). A frame of reference is an umbrella term that may refer to 
fixed baselines (e.g. current conditions or a past reference state), dynamic baselines (dynamic 
scenarios reflecting background rates of change) and counterfactuals (projected scenarios 
estimating what would have occurred in the absence of an intervention; Bull et al. 2016). Truly 
rigorous evaluations of conservation impact require the development of a frame of reference 
that includes not only a baseline understanding of the current status of the conservation target, 
but also the projection of a counterfactual (Ferraro & Pattanayak 2006; Bull 2014; Bull et al. 
2015). It is the counterfactual that enables the measurement and attribution of true 
conservation impact; i.e., the difference between the outcome of the intervention and the 
estimated outcome in the absence of the intervention. 
The frame of reference should include at least two dimensions of environmental change: 
ongoing trends in the ecological status of the conservation target, and anthropogenic impacts 
upon this target (Bull et al. 2014, 2015). The development and evaluation of any conservation 
intervention should also consider the social-ecological and historical contexts in which it 
operates – a perspective that has been slow to reach the fisheries management community 
(Ostrom 2007; Pooley 2013; Hilborn et al. 2015). Ideally, therefore, a frame of reference should 
include ecological trends; institutional, social, economic and physical factors; and the potential 
interactions and feedbacks between them (Ferraro & Pattanayak 2006; Nicholson et al. 2009).  
Impact evaluations using experimental and quasi-experimental methods are emerging in the 
conservation literature (Andam et al. 2008; Pattanayak et al. 2010; Clements & Milner-Gulland 
2014). However, few examples exist of counterfactuals being developed early in the 
intervention design process, and when they are, they are often developed with incorrect 
assumptions or assumptions that are not made explicit (Maron et al. 2013). A common reason 
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for this is lack of data; counterfactuals are subject to numerous sources of uncertainty and it can 
be challenging to develop and validate projected trends when knowledge is poor (TEEB 2010; 
Bull et al. 2014, 2015).  
In fisheries management, uncertainties limit the ability of policymakers to project trends and to 
predict the effects of management interventions (Davies 2015). These challenges are most 
pronounced in small-scale and developing world fisheries, where data limitations mean even 
fixed baselines can be difficult to estimate (Carruthers et al. 2014). Nevertheless, useful 
counterfactuals can be developed even in these circumstances, as long as assumptions and 
limitations are acknowledged (Bull 2014; Bull et al. 2015). The process of developing baselines 
and counterfactuals can actually thereby highlight key areas of uncertainty which might hinder 
the development of effective interventions and our ability to evaluate them. 
In this chapter I demonstrate the value of this process by developing a frame of reference for the 
hilsa (Tenualosa ilisha) fishery in Bangladesh, which could be used to evaluate current or 
potential hilsa management and conservation interventions. I combine qualitative and some 
quantitative analyses of secondary datasets and literature in a qualitative way to explore a) 
patterns of social, economic, institutional and physical change relevant to the management of 
hilsa in Bangladesh; and b)  ecological trends in the hilsa fishery.  
3.2 Methods 
I followed the framework of Bull et al. (2015) for the development of a frame of reference. I first 
set the context with a brief history of Bangladesh since its independence in 1971, before 
exploring the potential drivers of ecological change in the hilsa fishery: institutional, social, 
economic and physical. I then looked for trends in hilsa abundance and distribution from the 
available literature and secondary data. I compiled and analysed secondary data taken from 
published literature, online sources and collected by Bangladesh Agricultural University. Based 
on expectations formed through this analysis, I developed a conceptual map of the potential 
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interactions between these drivers and attempted to combine them into a useful frame of 
reference. I outlined what I expected to be key interactions between hilsa and key factors and 
created a set of potential counterfactuals that consist of projections based on the identified 
trends. I did not explore in depth the interactions between current management and hilsa 
trends because this is the focus of Chapter 5, which assesses the potential ecological 
additionality of current management.  
3.2.1 Potential drivers of change 
I reviewed the literature and assessed secondary datasets for trends in those factors that I 
hypothesised could affect hilsa abundance and distribution, and I conducted statistical analyses 
using linear models where appropriate. 
Institutional drivers 
I explored the current national institutional and legislative context of hilsa management.  
Social drivers 
Human population data for Bangladesh were obtained online and poverty trends were taken 
from the Bangladesh Poverty Assessment (World Bank 2013; UN 2015b). I expected population 
size to be relevant as a factor which may influence natural resource use. I also expected 
livelihood and poverty trends to be relevant because low income and a lack of alternative 
livelihood options have been linked to illegal fishing activities (Chapter 6).  
Economic drivers 
I explored the economy of Bangladesh, identifying trends in sectors that would be expected to 
impact the hilsa fishery, whether through their role in supporting livelihoods and potential 
subsequent implications for fishing pressure, or through potential direct or indirect 
environmental impacts on hilsa populations. Because of the direct impact of exploitation on 
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abundance I focused on bioeconomic trends in the fishing industry, looking for trends in 
commercial catch per unit effort (CPUE) and economic value in the hilsa fishery.  
Physical drivers  
Fish population variability is closely linked to environmental variability (Lehodey et al. 2006), 
and the life history of hilsa is known to be influenced by environmental conditions (Rahman et 
al. 2012a; Ahsan et al. 2014). Since climate change is therefore a potential driver of change in 
the hilsa fishery (Klyashtorin & Lyubushin 2007), temperature and precipitation data were 
obtained from five meteorological stations within the Meghna Estuary case study area used 
throughout this thesis (see Appendix B.1). I also considered sea-level rise, which can be linked 
to salinity and flooding (Ali 1999; Agrawala et al. 2003; Miah 2015); siltation and water 
diversion activities, which may cause morphological and hydrological changes that can be 
linked to reduction in availability of inland hilsa habitat (BOBLME 2010; Miao et al. 2010; 
Rahman et al. 2012b); pollution, which can affect the quality of freshwater and marine habitats 
and is considered a threat to the inland hilsa fishery (Islam 2003; Das 2009; BOBLME 2012); 
and deforestation, which might be linked to flooding, salinization and (if upstream) to turbidity 
and siltation.  
3.2.2 Hilsa trends 
I compiled secondary data for parameters underlying movement, reproduction, growth and 
mortality, and explored trends in the abundance and spatial distribution of hilsa in Bangladesh, 
which these parameters partially determine. I included national catch statistics (and CPUE, 
where available), which can be useful indicators of abundance when other data are sparse 
(Pauly 2013).  
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3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Brief recent history 
The People’s Republic of Bangladesh gained independence from Pakistan at the end of the 
Liberation War in 1971 and has since experienced rapid political, socioeconomic and 
environmental change (Fig. 3.1). Famously dubbed by Henry Kissinger a ‘basket case’, following 
this independence Bangladesh suffered from famine, natural disaster and military rule, before 
the restoration of parliamentary democracy in 1991. Administration has since been passed back 
and forth between the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Awami League, but due to 
widespread corruption, institutional politicisation and misallocation of resources, governance is 
poor (BTI 2012). This has allowed developmental NGOs – through their partnership with 
western aid agencies – to dominate the rural economy and act as a powerful ‘shadow state’ 
(Karim 2008). The political climate has remained tense and following the International Crimes 
Tribunal, set up in 2009, tensions mounted and led to the disruption of transport and movement 
of goods (BTI 2012). Nevertheless, Bangladesh has made remarkable social progress and 
become a model for other developing countries (Asadullah et al. 2014).  
Numerous environmental acts and supporting policies have been introduced during the process 
of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation triggered by independence – many of which are 
relevant to the hilsa fishery (Fig. 3.1). For example, the National Environmental Policy of 1992 
emphasised the conservation and management of fisheries, and the National Environmental 
Conservation Rules of 1997, introduced following the 1995 Act, emphasised the mitigation of 
industrial water pollution. The Government has taken a great deal of interest in the hilsa fishery 
since the 1980s, developing various policies that are discussed in detail in Section 3.3.2 (Islam et 
al. 2016). However, in general, legislation has not kept pace with environmental change and it is 
often poorly implemented (Clemett 2004; BOBLME 2011a). 
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Figure 3.1: Timeline of key institutional, social, economic and ecological events in the recent history of 
Bangladesh classified by potential direct and indirect relevance for hilsa. BFDC = Bangladesh Fisheries 
Development Corporation; BFRI = Bangladesh Fisheries Research Institute; BNP = Bangladesh Nationalist 
Party; HFMAP = Hilsa Fishery Management Action Plan; BOBLME = Bay of Bengal Large Marine 
Ecosystem; IIED = International Institute for Environment and Development. Cyclones, famines and other 
natural disasters are not noted here because of their frequency. 
                                                             
4 Implements the Marine Fisheries Rules, 1983. 
5 Based on the Protection and Conservation of Fish Act and Rules, 1950, amended in 1985 by the Protection and 
Conservation (Amendment) Ordinance, 1982. 
 
Direct  
 
 Indirect  
 1970  
   Independence from Pakistan 
   
 Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Act   
 BFDC established under the Bangladesh 
Fisheries Development Corporation Act 
1975  Vulnerable Group Feeding programme 
established following 1974 famine 
   Environmental Pollution Control Ordinance 
   
   
 1980  
 Protection and Conservation of Fish    
       Ordinance   Army coup 
 Marine Fisheries Ordinance4   
 Fish catch assessment survey initiated   
 Protection and Conservation of Fish Rules,  1985  
19855.    New Fisheries Management Policy 
   BNP founded 
   
   
 1990  
 BFRI research on hilsa starts and lowest hilsa 
catch levels 
  Restoration of democracy by BNP 
 National Environmental Policy  
   
   
 1995  National Environmental Management Plan 
   Awami League Government 
   Environmental Conservation Act & Rules 
   National Fisheries Policy 
 Fourth Fisheries Project begins   National Water Policy and Management Plan 
 2000  Coalition Government 
   Environmental Court Act 
 Low hilsa catch levels   
 HFMAP implemented   
 Jatka fisher rehabilitation programme   
 begins 2005  
   Coastal Zone Policy and Strategy 
 Hilsa export banned   Awami League Government 
   Mobile Court Ordinance 
   International Crimes Tribunal set up 
 BOBLME Programme begins 2010  
   
 IIED Darwin Initiative begins   
   
 Fisher ID cards phased in   Oil spill 
 ECOFISH project begins 2015  
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3.3.2 Institutional drivers 
Institutional framework 
The institutional arrangement of fisheries management in Bangladesh is hierarchical (Fig. 3.2; 
Appendix A.1). The Department of Fisheries (DoF), within the Ministry of Fisheries and 
Livestock (MoFL), is the principal organisation for the management and development of fish 
resources, represented at divisional, district and upazila (sub-district) levels. DoF activities are 
supported by autonomous organisations under the administrative control of MoFL: the 
Bangladesh Fisheries Development Corporation (BFDC) was established to promote the fishing 
industry and develop landing and marketing facilities; and the Bangladesh Fisheries Research 
Institution (BFRI) conducts research. Both the DoF and BFRI has been criticised for a lack of 
human resources, and BFRI for a lack of coordination between research bodies (DoF 2002; 
Islam et al. 2016).  
 
Figure 3.2: Administrative hierarchy in Bangladesh. DoF = Department of Fisheries 
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National fishery legislation 
Of the 53 most active fishing countries in the world, Bangladesh has been ranked 47th based on 
its lack of compliance with the UN Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (Pitcher et al. 
2009), and the effectiveness of its marine fisheries management regime has been scored among 
the lowest in the world (Mora et al. 2009). In 1983 the DoF initiated a catch assessment survey 
system for inland and marine fisheries in Bangladesh, with particular emphasis on hilsa. There 
are, however, problems with sample sizes and sampling procedure; the assessment focuses on 
sample villages (many of which no longer exist) in major rivers and some marine areas, and it 
cannot therefore provide an accurate picture of catches (DoF 2002; Rahman et al. 2012b; Ullah 
et al. 2014). The creation of the marine wing of the DoF in the 1980s led to some improvements 
in the assessment of marine fisheries (Ullah et al. 2014). The DoF also enacted the Marine 
Fisheries Ordinance6 and Rules7 (MoFL 1983), under which waters less than 40 m in depth at 
high tide are reserved for the artisanal fishery and waters beyond this point are for the 
industrial fishery – although trawlers continue to fish up to 20 m depth (Islam 2003; Ali et al. 
2010). All mechanised and, since 2001, non-mechanised vessels in the marine fishery must pay 
registration fees when commissioned, as well as annual vessel and fishing license fees (Islam et 
al. 2016). There is a restriction on numbers of trawlers fishing in marine waters, but no effort 
restriction has been imposed on the artisanal fisheries, and although the river fisheries have 
been through various systems of short-term licensing, they are now classified as ‘open access’ 
(Rab 2009; Ali et al. 2010). These ‘open-access’ river fisheries are, however, under complex 
systems of customary or traditional rights held by investors, which are not well documented (A. 
Bladon 2015, personal observation; Dastidar 2009).  
All coastal and inland waters are managed under the Protection and Conservation of Fish rules, 
1985, in accordance with the Fish Protection and Conservation Act, 1950 (MoFL 1985). 
Monitoring and enforcement of these rules by the DoF is supported by the Navy, coast guard, 
                                                             
6 An ordinance is a law passed by a local administration.  
7 Rules define the guidelines that must be followed for the successful implementation of an act, which is a 
law passed by Government. 
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police, Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), Air Force, Border Guard and local administrations. 
However, management has been criticised for corruption at various levels, and a lack of 
resources and general institutional weakness has contributed to low levels of compliance 
(Chapters 5 & 7; Islam 2003; Ali et al. 2010; Jentoft & Onyango 2010).  
In 1986 the New Fisheries Management Policy emphasised tackling the overexploitation of 
resources and the inequality of fishing rights (Islam et al. 2016). Then in 1998 a National 
Fisheries Policy (NFP) was prepared with the objectives of increasing fish production and 
promoting economic growth through sustainable fisheries management and aquaculture in 
inland open water and the sea, while conserving biodiversity and ecological function and 
alleviating poverty (MoFL 1998). It did not, however, formulate a specific strategy for the 
management of the artisanal hilsa fishery. 
Hilsa Fisheries Management  
Government budget allocations to the DoF for hilsa management have increased from about 
USD 4.11 million in 1998-1999 to USD 23.11 million in 2014-2015 (Majumder et al. 2015a). The 
DoF responded to concerns about hilsa catches in 1991 by initiating research on the fishery, 
which led to international collaborations with the Australian Centre for International 
Agricultural Research (ACIAR) and the World Bank-DFID Fourth Fisheries Project (FFP). Policy 
directives and recommendations from these projects have largely been implemented through 
the Hilsa Fisheries Management Action Plan (HFMAP). More recently, research has been 
conducted on hilsa through a Darwin Initiative project led by the International Institute for 
Environment and Development (IIED) and the WorldFish-led Enhanced Coastal Fisheries 
(ECOFISH) project, which is supporting the DoF to develop an updated HFMAP. Based on the 
assumption that recruitment is compromised, and that this is a result of overfishing of juvenile 
hilsa (locally known as jatka) and spawning hilsa, the HFMAP aims to sustain and increase hilsa 
production, prevent loss of hilsa habitat and build the capacity of implementing organisations 
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(DoF 2002). The following key recommendations have been taken up by implementing 
agencies8.  
Protection of spawning hilsa  
Spawning hilsa are protected with a ban on hilsa fishing throughout the country for 15 days of 
the perceived peak breeding season9, with the aim of minimising disturbance to spawning and 
recruitment (see Chapter 5). Monitoring for compliance with this ban is targeted within a 7000 
km2 area that is thought to cover important spawning grounds (see Fig. 3.3). But inconsistencies 
in ban periods between years and locations indicate a lack of communication between scientists 
and authorities (Islam et al. 2016).  
Implementation of Protection and Conservation of Fish Act and Rules, 1950 
Under the Protection and Conservation of Fish Act and Rules, 195010 (MoFL 1985), special 
operations for jatka conservation ban all activities related to jatka (catching, transportation, 
marketing, selling and possession) between 1st November and 31st July across the country. 
Jatka was originally defined as a hilsa fish of less than 23 cm long, but this has recently been 
amended to 25 cm (Islam et al. 2016). Use of monofilament gillnets (current jal) under 4.5 cm 
mesh size was banned in 1988, and both the use and production11 of those under 10 cm mesh 
size is now banned, although not strictly enforced (Islam et al. 2016). The Fish Rules are 
implemented by the DoF’s Upazila Fishery Officers (UFOs), and more recently the Navy and 
Coast Guard in the main rivers, which are reported to have improved enforcement (DoF 2002). 
It is not currently financially or logistically possible to enforce rules nationwide, so enforcement 
is targeted to the 152 upazilas where jatka are distributed, and particularly those areas that are 
thought to be important nursery grounds. However, the Fish Act has numerous institutional 
                                                             
8 Those that have not yet been implemented are not mentioned here, except the recommendations for 
regional hilsa management, which are only beginning to be explored. 
9 This period was originally five days before and five days after the full moon of Bara purnima in the 
Bengali month of Ashvin, which falls in October, but was in 2015 extended from 11 to 15 days: 3 days 
before and 11 days after the full moon. 
10 Amended in in 1985 by the Protection and Conservation Ordinance, 1982. 
11 Use was banned in 1988 but the 2002 ban on production, marketing, importation, and possession was 
blocked by producers until resolution by the High Court in 2005. 
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weaknesses, and there have been instances of social and political interference with 
implementation (Islam et al. 2016). For instance, the Mobile Court Ordinance, 2007, allows a 
magistrate to operate a mobile court to deal with offenses on site, but resources are still lacking 
to gather mobile courts in time to do so. An analysis of trends and issues in enforcement can be 
found in Chapter 5. 
Hilsa sanctuaries 
Under the amended Fish Act and Rules (MoFL 1985), four major nursery areas in the Meghna 
and Padma rivers were designated hilsa sanctuaries in 2005, with another designated in the 
inshore marine area in 2011 (Fig. 3.3). All fishing is banned in these areas during their 
perceived peak period of jatka presence: March to April12 in all but the southernmost sanctuary 
(a 40 km stretch of the Andharmanik River where fishing is banned from November to January).  
  
                                                             
12 The ban was originally from February to March. 
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Figure 3.3: Map showing sanctuary areas (red) and rivers flowing into the Bay of Bengal (blue). From 
north to south the sanctuaries are: 100 km of Meghna River from Chandpur to Laxmipur, 20 km of Padma 
River in Shariatpur, 90 km of Shahbajpur channel (Meghna tributary), 100 km of the Tentulia River from 
Bhola to Patuakhali districts, and 40 km of the Andharmanik River in Patuakhali. All fishing is banned in 
the sanctuaries from March to April, apart from the Andharmanik River, where fishing is banned from 
November to January. Black polygon demarcates important spawning area where enforcement is targeted 
during peak spawning season. 
 
Jatka fisher rehabilitation  
In recognition of the socioeconomic hardships imposed by the fishing rules, in 2004 the DoF 
introduced the jatka fisher rehabilitation programme, which aims to improve the socioeconomic 
condition of affected fishers living inside and around sanctuary areas and thereby to incentivise 
compliance with the fishing bans (Islam et al. 2016). This is largely based on the distribution of 
compensation in the form of rice during ban periods (centered on the sanctuary fishing bans), 
which is funded through the pre-existing national Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) programme 
(Ahmed et al. 2009; Uraguchi 2011). Allocations and coverage increased from 10 kg per 
household for one to three months for 145,335 households in 2008, to 40 kg per household for 
four months (February to May, period of peak jatka abundance; Islam et al. 2016) for 224,102 
households in 2014 (Table 3.1). However, the extent to which the food compensation actually 
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incentivises compliance with regulations is probably limited by distributional issues and 
undermined by poor enforcement (Chapter 5; Siddique 2009; Haldar & Ali 2014; Islam et al. 
2014).  
In 2008 the rehabilitation programme was extended to provide a smaller proportion of 
households with alternative livelihood support such as rickshaws, vans, livestock and grants for 
small businesses. This support might be a more appropriate incentive than food distribution 
(Chapter 5) but, despite calls for increased coverage, the numbers of households receiving 
alternative livelihood support have actually decreased in recent years (Table 3.1), probably due 
to a lack of resources and needs assessment (Chapter 5; Siddique 2009; Islam et al. 2014).    
Since 2003, awareness has been raised on the importance and status of the fishery, particularly 
jatka, and on the Fish Act and Rules, through boat rallies, mass media, and distribution of 
leaflets and posters (see Chapter 5).  
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Table 3.1: Distribution of rice compensation and alternative livelihood support (DoF 2014a). Upazila = subdistrict. 
* Rice not provided 
RICE COMPENSATION ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOOD SUPPORT 
Year No. of upazilas 
(and districts) 
Total 
volume 
distributed 
(mt) 
No. of 
households 
Monthly 
allocation 
household 
(kg) 
No. of 
upazilas 
(and 
districts) 
Total allocated 
amount (USD) 
No. of 
households 
Amount allocated 
per household (USD) 
2004-2005 - 1,000.00 - - - - - - 
2005-2006* - - - - - - - - 
2006-2007 - 1,546.00 - - - - - - 
2007-2008 59 (10) 4,360.00 145,335 10 20 (4) - - - 
2008-2009 59 (10) 5,730.08 143,252 10 20 (4) - - - 
2009-2010 59 (10) 19,768.60 164,740 30 20 (4) 17,157.08 4,388 3.91 
2010-2011 85 (15) 14,470.64 186,264 20 20 (4) 45,816.23 6,869 6.67 
2011-2012 85 (15) 22,351.68 186,264 30 20 (4) 58,854.60 7,785 7.56 
2012-2013 88 (16) 24,747.48 206,229 30 20 (4) 2,928.24 1,743 1.68 
2013-2014  88 (15) 36,296.32 224,102 40 28 (6) 1,759.15 1,165 1.51 
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Marine fishing ban 
In 2015 an amendment was made to the Marine Fisheries Ordinance and Rules (MoFL 1983), 
which bans all fishing by all vessels in the marine fisheries between May 20th and July 23rd each 
year, for conservation purposes. No science has been published to justify this ban, but the DoF 
has based it on concern for hilsa populations (A. Bladon 2016, personal observation.) 
Regional hilsa management 
Although Bangladesh shares its hilsa stocks with other countries in the Bay of Bengal (BoB), 
there is no formal agreement in place for regional management of hilsa (Rahman et al. 2012b). 
However, the Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem project (BOBLME) is supporting countries 
in the implementation of an ecosystem-based approach to the management of shared BoB fish 
stocks, under which a Hilsa Fisheries Assessment Working Group has been established to 
provide technical information to the BOBLME countries (BOBLME 2014). The IUCN has also 
proposed a set of policy options for transboundary management of hilsa for India and 
Bangladesh (Ahsan et al. 2014), and there has been a recent push to strengthen regional 
cooperation generally (BBS 2012). 
Hilsa culture 
As an alternative approach to increasing wild hilsa production, the MoFL has been supporting 
the exploration of pond culture (not found to be economically viable) and cage culture, which 
has had limited success (Puvanendran 2013; Sahoo et al. 2016). Captive breeding techniques 
are also being explored to supplement the natural population levels through ‘hatch and release’ 
(BOBLME 2014). 
Summary 
A number of acts, ordinances and rules have been passed that support the sustainable 
management of hilsa (Fig. 3.2), some of which are intended to support the artisanal hilsa fishery 
directly, largely through the protection of jatka. However, there are weaknesses in the 
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institutional arrangements behind these policies, which lead to poor enforcement of rules and 
limit the effectiveness of the jatka fisher rehabilitation programme. 
3.3.3 Economic drivers 
Industrialisation 
The economy of Bangladesh is rapidly developing (largely through industrialisation and 
exports) with an average national GDP growth rate of six per cent over the last decade (BBS 
2012), and is classified as one of the ‘Next Eleven’ – a group of countries recognised for their 
potentially large, fast-growing markets (Goldman Sachs 2007). More than half of GDP is 
currently generated by the service sector, followed by industry (30 per cent) and by agriculture, 
forestry, and fisheries (16 per cent; BBS 2013). The garment industry, which emerged over the 
last two or three decades, provides the most foreign exchange earnings (80 per cent; CIA 2014). 
Other growing industries are shipbuilding and ship breaking; the world’s largest ship-breaking 
area is in the Bangladesh city of Chittagong (BBS 2012). Over 45 per cent of the population is 
employed in the agricultural sector, but although there has been a substantial increase in food 
grain production in recent years, due to modernisation and mechanisation, agriculture is failing 
to absorb the rising labour force and its contribution to GDP is projected to fall (BBS 2012; GED 
2012). Bangladesh has substantial untapped oil and gas reserves and is promoting international 
exploration (BBS 2012). Although it has limited coal reserves, there are also plans to increase 
coal-fired power generation (Allchin 2015). 
Fishery sector 
As a result of its geography, Bangladesh is heavily reliant on both inland and marine fisheries. 
They contribute over four per cent to the national GDP and are second only to the garment 
industry in foreign exchange earnings, which are derived largely from shrimp and prawn 
exports (FRSS 2013). Aquaculture is the dominant source of fish production (contributing over 
50 per cent), while small-scale inland capture fisheries contribute about 30 per cent and marine 
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capture fisheries 18 per cent (FRSS 2013). An estimated 88 per cent of marine catches can be 
attributed to artisanal fisheries, and the remainder to the industrial (trawl) sector. There has 
been a general upward trend in total fish production since 1983, but a steady increase in 
aquaculture production contrasts with a decline in capture fishery production since 2008 (Fig. 
3.4; Table A.1). According to production statistics, the total fishery sector growth rate more than 
doubled between 2005 and 2012, although it should be noted that the reliability of these 
statistics is questionable. By way of example, a reconstruction of marine fisheries catches for 
Bangladesh from 1950-2010 found reconstructed catches to be 157 per cent higher than those 
reported by Bangladesh to the FAO, largely due to unreported subsistence catches (Ullah et al. 
2014). 
 
Figure 3.4: Graph showing the trend in total reported marine and inland fishery and aquaculture 
production in Bangladesh from 1983-84 to 2011-2012 (DoF 2014b).  
 
Hilsa fishery 
Bangladesh lands 50-60 per cent of reported global hilsa catches (BOBLME 2010). The hilsa 
fishery is a commercial one comprised of inland (artisanal) and marine (artisanal and 
industrial) sectors; hilsa are rarely caught purely for subsistence because they are high value 
fish (Ullah et al. 2014). There are large and highly variable numbers of fishing vessels in use, 
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mostly unregistered: an estimated 100,000 vessels inland and 25,000 in the marine fishery 
(Rahman et al. 2010). Estimated numbers of hilsa fishers in Bangladesh range from 300,000 to 
500,000 (Haldar 2004; Rahman et al. 2014a; Islam et al. 2016). Fishing occurs throughout the 
year, peaking from mid-August to October, when the majority of hilsa are reportedly caught (60-
70 per cent), and to a lesser extent in January and February, inland (Rahman et al. 2012b). 
Fishing activity is reduced in most areas from November to July, particularly during the 
monsoon months from June to mid-August. Artisanal fishing practices are strongly influenced by 
traditional knowledge of lunar periodicity and tides passed down from generation to generation 
(Sharma et al. 2012). 
Inland stocks are exploited using traditional non-mechanised boats (chandi, khosa and dingi), 
and some mechanised boats. According to the literature, the gears most commonly used are set 
gill nets (chandi jal) and drift gill nets (gulti, kona and current jal), with variable mesh sizes, but 
numerous others are in use (e.g. clasp nets, set bag nets and barrier nets; Rahman et al. 2012b). 
Jatka are targeted during their downstream migration, particularly at night when large numbers 
can be intercepted using illegal monofilament current jal, mosquito seine nets (moshari jal), set 
bag nets (behundi jal) and fixed encircling nets (char ghera jal; Siddique 2009; Rahman et al. 
2010). Illegal jatka fishing is reported to have increased in recent years (Islam et al. 2016).  
About 60 per cent of marine landings can be attributed to mechanised and non-mechanised 
boats and gill nets, and the rest to the industrial sub-sector that uses small trawlers to fish up to 
250 km from the coast (Haldar 2004).  
Traditionally, professional fishers in coastal areas were ‘low caste’ Hindus and fishing was 
considered taboo for Muslims, but now there are increasing numbers of poor and landless 
Muslims engaging in fishing, and wealthy Muslims investing in the fishing business (Hussain & 
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Hoq 2010). Artisanal fishers may fish from their own boat or a boat owned by a mahajon13 
(Alam et al. 2012). They often fish in groups of 4-20 to a boat, each fisher receiving small shares 
of the catch (Mome & Arnason 2007), whereas fishers working for industrial trawler companies 
can earn fixed salaries and catch-based bonuses (Kleih et al. 2003). Artisanal fishers often take 
dadon or loans for gear or boats from aratders14 or dadonar15, which commit the fishers to sell 
back to or through these middlemen exclusively and for lower than market price (Alam et al. 
2012; Islam et al. 2016). Violence and piracy is widespread in the marine and inland fisheries 
(Kleih et al. 2003); pirates, known as dacoits, often have political connections and increase in 
numbers during peak hilsa season (R. Mohkles 2014, Centre for Natural Resource Management, 
personal communication, 23rd May). 
The hilsa marketing system is long and complex (see Appendix A.2), with 2-2.5 million workers 
estimated to be involved in the market chain and ancillary activities such as boat-building, 
including women and children (Ahmed 2007; Mohammed & Wahab 2013). Fishers rarely sell 
catch directly to consumers, but instead operate through a number of intermediaries or 
middlemen (Alam 2010; Rahman et al. 2013). These intermediaries have complete control of 
the marketing system, which lacks Government regulation and exploits fishers (Islam 2003; 
Haque 2011; Islam et al. 2016). Not only does the presence of so many players in the market 
chain limit profitability for fishers, it locks extremely poor fishers in remote areas into cycles of 
debt, which traditional microfinance schemes have largely failed to drag them out of (Uraguchi 
& Mohammed 2016; Ahmed 2007; Ali et al. 2010; Alam 2012).  
Most hilsa catch is marketed and consumed domestically as fresh fish (Alam 2010), but post-
harvest management of fish in Bangladesh is generally poor. Only BFDC landings centres at 
Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong (established specifically for the marketing of BFDC trawler catch) 
                                                             
13 Relatively wealthy and powerful ‘armchair fishers’, who do not fish, but retain a large proportion of the 
catch or profit. Like other moneylenders, having given loans or credit in the form of boats or nets, they 
have complete control over fishing activities and market prices. 
14 Relatively wealthy and powerful commission agents who connect buyers and sellers of fish by handling 
the auctioning process at wholesale markets. 
15 Moneylenders, who can be aratdars or mahajons. 
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have adequate facilities (Islam 2003; Ahmed 2007), but there are about 6500 private fish 
markets in the country, more than half of which are small village markets (Rahman 1994, cited 
in Islam et al. 2016). Post-harvest loss rises during peak fishing season, when supply exceeds 
the availability of ice (see Appendix A.2). Until the late 2000s less than two per cent of total 
catch was legally exported to India and countries in the Middle East, Far East, Europe, USA and 
Australia where there are Bangladeshi diaspora, bringing in some foreign exchange earnings 
(Mome & Arnason 2007; Alam 2010; Table 3.2). However, the DoF has since implemented an 
export restriction (2007) and ban (2012 onwards) – a reported attempt to reduce the domestic 
price of hilsa and increase availability of the fish in national markets, with probable political 
motivations (Padiyar et al. 2012; M. Mome 2014, Department of Fisheries, personal 
communication, 29th May). In fact, a great deal is still being illegally exported to Kolkata (C. 
Meisner 2014, WorldFish, personal communication, 26th May).  
Table 3.2: Officially reported hilsa export tonnage (metric tonnes) and earnings since 2002 (DoF 2014c). 
Unknown figures left blank. 
Year Hilsa export 
(mt) 
Per cent of total hilsa 
catch exported 
Export earning 
(million BDT) 
Export earning 
(million USD) 
2002-03 1148 0.6 150.00 1.91 
2003-04 1930 0.8 790.00 10.07 
2004-05 3584 1.3 519.50 6.62 
2005-06 3672 1.3 696.10 8.87 
2006-07 3433 1.3 648.10 8.26 
2007-08 2647 0.9 754.50 9.62 
2008-09 3680 1.2 1490.60 19.00 
2009-10 3107 1.0 1241.20 15.82 
2010-11 8539 2.5 3524.90 44.93 
2011-12 6174 1.8 2940.00 37.48 
2012-13 523* - 243.70 3.11 
2013-14 0 0 0.00 0.00 
* Ban implemented half way through year 
The reported contribution of hilsa to total reported capture fishery production has increased 
from 18 per cent in 1983 to 30 per cent in 2011 (Table A.1). Historically, fishing was 
concentrated upstream in major rivers, but the proportion of hilsa landings coming from the 
inland fishery has declined, and over the last two decades the marine sector has become the 
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dominant source of hilsa (Fig. 3.5). This shift has been attributed both to jatka overfishing 
inland and to the mechanisation and expansion of the marine sector (Amin et al. 2002; Haldar 
2004; BOBLME 2010). However, due to the previously discussed shortcomings of the catch 
assessment survey system, the reliability of the landings data is questionable. A reconstruction 
of marine catches from 1950 to 2010 indicates that hilsa makes up 18 per cent of total marine 
catches and 41 per cent of artisanal marine catches, and that reported landings have been 
underestimated by 19 per cent (Ullah et al. 2014).  
 
Figure 3.5: Total reported annual hilsa landings, inland hilsa landings and marine hilsa landings in 
Bangladesh from 1982-1983 to 2012-2013 (DoF 2014b).  
 
The lack of reliable estimates of annual fishing effort also makes actual CPUE difficult to 
calculate, particularly for the inland fishery. Numbers of mechanised and non-mechanised boats 
in the artisanal marine sector have been estimated by the DoF and appear to have increased 
since 1983, which indicates that numbers of fishers (although not specifically hilsa fishers) are 
also increasing (Haldar 2004; Table A.2). Analysis of official marine landings and effort data 
shows a decline in CPUE between 1984 and 2006, although the trend was less clear for the non-
mechanised sector (Mome & Arnason 2007; Sharma 2012). Sharma (2012) found catchability 
(the relationship between CPUE and standing biomass) of hilsa in the non-mechanised marine 
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sector to be almost twice that of the mechanised marine sector – probably because the 
mechanised sector is targeting other species as well, rather than just targeting vulnerable 
concentrations of migrating hilsa, and has a shorter history of fishing.  
Catch values are also difficult to estimate because of the complexity of the market chain and the 
relationships between fishers and intermediaries (Appendix A.2). Estimated annual landings 
revenues range from USD 380 million (or one per cent of GDP) in 2006 to USD 640-850 million 
in 2009 (Mome & Arnason 2007; BOBLME 2012). By multiplying an average value of 430 BDT 
per kg (based on a one year survey of four fish markets; Fernandes et al. 2015) by the latest 
reported annual hilsa catch volume, I found a much higher estimate of two billion USD. Through 
a very simple bio-economic assessment of the marine artisanal fishery (restricted by data 
limitations) Mome & Arnason (2007) found annual net profit to be only seven per cent of total 
revenues, due to high costs of fishing. Concluding that stocks were overexploited, they made 
recommendations for a 60 per cent reduction in effort, through restrictions on numbers of 
mechanised vessels in the artisanal marine sector. In turn this was expected to more than 
double hilsa stocks and increase individual vessel catch rates, which they calculated could raise 
annual net profits by 10-15 per cent. Yet, the industrial sector, in contrast to the artisanal sector, 
has been described as under-developed and under-utilised, and Bangladesh is now aiming for a 
‘blue economy’ under which the trawler industry could expand (C. Meisner 2014, WorldFish, 
personal communication, 26th May). 
Summary 
Bangladesh is experiencing an upward trend in fishery production and hilsa forms an increasing 
proportion of this production. Landings and effort data suggests that this increase is largely due 
to expansion of the marine hilsa fishery, but that marine CPUE is nevertheless in decline. Yet, 
the reliability of these data is questionable. Moreover, very little is known about the inland 
fishery; inland landings appear to have remained fairly constant and clearly support the 
livelihoods of huge numbers of people, but inland fishing effort remains undocumented. Due to 
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the absence of effort data, it is unclear whether the shift in dominance of production from the 
inland to marine hilsa fishery is due to inland overfishing, a decline in inland habitat quality or 
simply to expansion of the marine sector. 
3.3.4 Social drivers 
Human population 
The population of Bangladesh has been growing since before independence, and it has one of 
the highest population densities in the world (UN 2015b). Despite this growth, there has been a 
steady decline in poverty over the last decade or so and two thirds of the population are now 
above the poverty threshold (World Bank 2013; UN 2015b). The Government’s vision for 2021 
is to bring it down to less than 15 per cent (GED 2012). The proportion of people living in urban 
areas increased from 15 per cent in 1980 to 30 per cent in 2015 and, since independence, rural-
urban migration has accounted for two thirds of this urban growth (Afsar 2003; UN 2014). 
Extreme poverty is most prevalent in rural areas and poverty declines have been much more 
substantial in the west of Bangladesh than the east, where the hilsa fisheries are concentrated 
(World Bank 2013). The DoF estimates that fisheries support the livelihoods of 11 per cent of 
the total population (FRSS 2013) and fishers are often described as the poorest and most 
vulnerable social group in the country; they are usually landless with little education, low 
income and few or no other livelihood opportunities (Leterme et al. 2004; Deb & Haque 2011; 
Islam 2012). In Chapter 6, I demonstrate that low income is indeed associated with jatka fishing 
and with strong fishing dependence in hilsa areas, which is characterised by illegal fishing and 
lack of other livelihood activities.  
Capture fisheries are not only essential for livelihood support but for direct consumption and 
dietary diversity, providing over 60 per cent of the animal protein in the Bangladeshi diet (FAO 
2014; Belton et al. 2014). During the hilsa sanctuary fishing bans, malnutrition is a risk even for 
those households who receive rice compensation (Islam et al. 2016). Fish is a preferred food 
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among Bengalis and hilsa are of great religious and cultural importance; it is sacred in Hindu 
mythology, features in numerous ceremonial and religious festivals, and has been named the 
national fish of Bangladesh (Sharma et al. 2012; Mohammed & Wahab 2013). Because supply 
does not meet demand, particularly during festival periods, market price is generally high 
(Padiyar et al. 2012) – although it was quite recently still one of the most widely consumed fish 
by all income groups (Belton et al. 2011). Jatka – being smaller and less tasty – has historically 
been the more affordable option for low income groups. These cultural values have bred a 
tradition of hilsa conservation – it is customary to buy a pair of hilsa on the day of Vijay Dashami 
(October) and not eat it again until Basant Panchami (February), a period which coincides 
roughly with the peak hilsa breeding season (Sharma et al. 2012). 
Summary 
Hilsa has tremendous social value, particularly for the coastal poor. The human population of 
Bangladesh is increasing, and poverty is declining – although much more slowly among hilsa 
fishers, where livelihood dependence on hilsa is high.  
3.3.5 Physical drivers  
Climate 
As a low-lying deltaic country, Bangladesh is extremely vulnerable to the impacts of climate 
change (Huq 2001). It suffers from intense tropical cyclones and storm surges and although 
there has been an emphasis on climate change adaptation research in recent years, the country 
lacks capacity for implementation and there have been few regional climate change studies 
focusing on Bangladesh (Agrawala et al. 2003; Reid & Huq 2014).  
Within the study area of this thesis (Appendix B.1), over the period of 1983 to 2014, mean 
monthly temperature peaked in May at 28.9°C ±0.1, with a low of 18.6°C ±0.2 in January (Fig. 
A.3a). Mean monthly total rainfall showed even more variation, from a low of 6.9 mm ±2.4 in 
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January to a high of 922.3 mm ±43.0 in July (Fig. A.3b). This inter-annual variation is consistent 
with the main seasons; the dry winter season (December to February), pre-monsoon (March to 
May), monsoon (June to September) and post-monsoon (October to November) (Agrawala et al. 
2003). Mean annual temperature in the study area has shown a significant upwards trend since 
1983, whilst annual rainfall has declined significantly (Fig. 3.6a, Fig. 3.6b). The local trends in 
temperature are consistent with regional studies; Bangladesh as a whole has experienced 
warming over the last 100 years (Adger et al. 2003; Agrawala et al. 2003). Regional 
precipitation trends are unavailable but climate models tend to show an increase in 
precipitation during monsoon season – a trend which is consistent throughout South Asia 
(Agrawala et al. 2003; IPCC 2013).   
There is no specific trend on which to base a regional scenario for sea-level rise due to the 
dynamic morphology of the Ganges delta, but approximately one fifth of Bangladesh lies within 
one metre of the high water mark (Huq 2001). It is therefore particularly vulnerable to the 
effects of the projected global rise in sea level, which in turn may compound the enhanced storm 
surges associated with cyclones, increasing flood risk (Karim & Mimura 2008). Salinity 
intrusion in coastal areas has also been linked both to the intensification of flooding (Dasgupta 
et al. 2014). It is unclear if or how these trends have affected hilsa, but given the importance of 
temperature, river flow and salinity in its life cycle, they are likely to have affected migratory 
and spawning behaviour, and ultimately production (Fernandes et al. 2015; Miah 2015).  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 3.6: (a) Mean annual temperature from 5 meteorological stations in the study area, 1983-2014 
(linear model: r2 = 0.169, p = 0.019); (b) Mean total annual rainfall from 5 meteorological stations in the 
study area, 1983-2014 (linear model: r2 = 0.124, p = 0.047). Source: Bangladesh Meterological 
Department (2014). 
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River hydrology and morphology 
River channels are subject to constant changes in morphology through erosion and deposition. 
Annual monsoon inundations deposit alluvial sediments from the Himalayas into the 
Bangladesh river system (Fig. 3.7), which carries it into the BoB (Curray & Moore 1971; Shibly & 
Takewaka 2013), and the sandy islands that form as a result in downstream channels are 
thought to be blocking hilsa migratory routes (DoF 2002; Ahsan et al. 2014). High inter-annual 
and inter-study variability makes it difficult to draw conclusions on temporal trends in 
sediment loads entering the BoB (Islam et al. 1999).  
The construction of dams and barrages for irrigation and flood control within and outside 
Bangladesh, together with estuary drainage and land reclamation projects, have also led to 
hydrological and morphological changes in rivers (DoF 2002; Ahsan et al. 2014). In particular, 
the construction of the Farakka Barrage on the Indian Ganges has led to a decrease in dry 
season freshwater discharge in Bangladesh (Mirza 1997), and branches and tributaries of the 
Padma and Brahmaputra – for example the Kumar River (Fig. 3.7) – are reported to have dried 
up as a result (Ahsan et al. 2014). By reducing the input of freshwater and silt, damming has also 
probably increased salinity downstream (Gupta et al. 2012; Shibly & Takewaka 2013). Some 
stretches of river are dredged to facilitate navigation and reduce flooding, and loop cutting – 
where the monsoon flood is diverted to eliminate meanders and loops, resulting in the 
deposition of large amounts of sediment – is a common practice in smaller rivers (Smith et al. 
1998). Whereas dredging should open up migratory routes for hilsa, loop cutting may have the 
opposite effect. Many authors have linked these water diversion activities to hilsa population 
declines, and there are reports of large areas of hilsa spawning habitat having been lost in the 
upper region of the country due to these activities, particularly in the upper Padma and Kumar 
rivers (Blaber et al. 2003a). 
90 
 
. 
Figure 3.7: Map showing the major rivers of the Ganges-Padma river system in Bangladesh (Ganges-
Brahmaputra delta). Where the Ganges flows out of India, its main channel becomes the Padma River, 
which joins the Meghna River, which continues to flow into the Bay of Bengal. Farakka marks the 
approximate site of the Farakka Barrage, across the border in India. Capital letters indicate major cities. 
 
Deforestation 
Forest cover is around 17 per cent in Bangladesh. Although this is an estimated 10 per cent of its 
original extent, recent net annual change appears to be stable or even positive (Laurance 2007; 
BBS 2012). Much of this cover is moist deciduous forest, but the south western coastal area is 
dominated by the Sundarbans mangroves and the freshwater swamp forests that lie behind 
them. Studies on forest cover have focused on this western coastal zone due to the important 
role mangroves play in shoreline stabilisation, storm protection, flood control and fishery 
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support (Iftekhar & Islam 2004). Mangrove loss has been caused by timber collection, and by 
increased salinity resulting from unregulated encroachment of shrimp farming and storm 
surges (Hoq 2007). The importance of mangroves as fish habitat – particularly nursery grounds 
– and their impacts on fishery yields are clear (Aburto-Oropeza et al. 2008; Hutchinson et al. 
2014). No direct link between forest cover and hilsa is known, and hilsa do not appear to favour 
mangrove areas. However, it is probable that hilsa are affected by changes in forest cover 
through nutrient availability and primary productivity. 
Pollution  
There is very little information on water pollution in Bangladesh and the BoB, but it is a clear 
environmental threat (BOBLME 2011a). Pollution is known to restrain phytoplankton growth 
and diversity, in turn reducing primary productivity (Huang et al. 2011). With few and poorly 
enforced environmental standards, industrial effluents and untreated municipal waste and 
sewage are released from urban areas into the river systems of Bangladesh, particularly around 
Dhaka (Fig. 3.7), eventually reaching the BoB (Karn & Harada 2001; BBS 2009; Hoque & Clarke 
2013). Principal sources of inland pollution are tanneries, engineering, and pharmaceutical, 
textile, and chemical factories (Karn & Harada 2001). Water quality in polluted rivers has 
declined since 2000 (BOBLME 2011a), and there is evidence for a rapid increase in the 
production of hazardous industrial waste in Bangladesh between 1994 and 2007 (Waste 
Concern 2010). Eutrophication caused by the expansion of intensive agriculture and 
aquaculture activities is also an increasing problem (Islam 2003; BOBLME 2011a). Some areas 
of river are reportedly no longer suitable for hilsa as a result, particularly the Buriganga, which 
receives effluent from Dhaka (S.N. Chowdhury 2014, Winrock International, personal 
communication, 13th May), and possibly the Andharmanik (Chapter 5). In coastal waters, 
mechanised vessels, shipbuilding and ship breaking activities are producing petrochemical 
pollution, which has anecdotally been linked to reduced availability of hilsa in coastal areas (Das 
2009). Petrochemicals can affect fish, their eggs and larvae and the plankton on which they feed, 
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and can persist for long periods (Farrington 2014). Most research on marine pollution in 
Bangladesh has been focused on Chittagong (Fig. 3.7), a large port and ship breaking area 
(BOBLME 2011a).  
Summary 
Bangladesh is experiencing warming temperatures, a reduction in annual precipitation and 
probable intensification of monsoon precipitations, which could be compounded by sea-level 
rise. Sediment loads vary inter- and intra-annually, but water diversion activities are reducing 
inputs of freshwater and silt, and might be resulting in increased salinity downstream. Forest 
cover has declined dramatically but recently stabilised. Water pollution is an increasing threat 
both inland and in coastal areas, with potential impacts through direct mortality and reduction 
in productivity. Declines have been observed in adult and juvenile habitat quality and in river 
flows, which have been identified as attributes of susceptibility of the hilsa fishery to threat 
(BOBLME 2010), but the reported impacts of the trends presented here on hilsa are largely 
conjecture, and potentially difficult to tease apart.  
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3.3.6 Trends in hilsa 
Although categorised as a species of least concern (Freyhof 2014), hilsa are – like many other 
shads – poorly understood, particularly in their marine phase (Chapter 5). Here I explore trends 
in abundance and distribution of hilsa by compiling all available information on the key rates 
that determine this abundance and distribution (movement, reproduction, growth, and 
mortality). I also explore trends in stock status; due to data limitations, no reliable stock 
assessments have been conducted in Bangladesh waters, but I review the information that is 
available. 
Movement  
Hilsa are distributed throughout coastal regions of the Indian Ocean, from Kuwait eastwards 
towards Myanmar (Whitehead 1985), but stocks in the Persian Gulf are genetically distinct from 
those in the Bay of Bengal (BoB; Milton & Chenery 2001; Salini et al. 2004). Hilsa are typically 
understood to be anadromous (migrating from marine to freshwater to spawn), but movements 
are complex and varied and there may be some permanent riverine and marine populations in 
Bangladesh (see Chapter 4 for detailed description of life cycle). Within the BoB, otolith 
microchemistry and allozyme variation provide evidence of substantial gene flow between 
groups of hilsa, indicating that fish in Bangladesh may also have spawned in India or Myanmar, 
and vice versa (Milton & Chenery 2001; Salini et al. 2004). Movements are strongly influenced 
by environmental conditions: water salinity, turbidity, temperature, pH, dissolved O2, and 
phytoplankton availability – indicated by chlorophyll concentration or nutrient levels (Table 
3.3). Water quality maps, generated using acceptable ranges of water quality parameters for 
hilsa, have been combined with catch data to explore its migration route through the Ganges-
Padma river system (Ahsan et al. 2014). Upstream migration is associated with the increased 
flow and turbidity that comes with the monsoon, and fluctuations in hilsa abundance in 
different areas have been linked to monsoon intensity (BOBLME 2011b). The peak migration 
period is therefore generally understood to start somewhere between May and July, and to 
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continue to October or November, although a shorter migration season in winter months from 
January to March has also been observed (Ahsan et al. 2014; Islam et al. 2016). Catch data from 
Bangladesh indicate that hilsa prefer water of at least 20 metres’ depth for migration (Blaber et 
al. 2003a; Rahman et al. 2012a; Ahsan et al. 2014). Hilsa have been reported in the past to 
migrate over 1000 km upstream and major spawning grounds have been identified in and 
around the Moulvir char (about 120 km2), Monpura (about 80 km2), Khalirchar (about 194 
km2), and Dhalchar (about 125 km2) areas of the Meghna River and Shahbazpur Channel (Fig. 
3.3; Amin et al. 2004; Haldar 2004). Absence of hilsa has since been reported in some rivers and 
migratory distances are estimated to reach only 50-100 km, probably due to the disturbance of 
migratory routes (DoF 2002; Rahman et al. 2010; Sharma 2012; Miah 2015). Jatka can be found 
in all major rivers in Bangladesh, but major nursery grounds have been identified by 
experimental fishing in the lower reaches and estuary of the Meghna River and on the coast 
from Kuakata to Dubla Char (Fig. 3.3; Haldar 2004). 
Table 3.3: Threshold values of physical and chemical parameters for hilsa spawning and nursery 
activities in Bangladesh (Ahsan et al. 2014). 
 Spawning activities Nursery activities 
Depth  ≥ 20 m for migration and pre-spawning 
congregation 
Comparatively shallower 
depth  
Turbidity (NTU) 100-140 70-80 
Temperature (°C) 29.3-30.2 29.8-30.8 
Salinity (ppt) < 0.1 < 0.1 
Dissolved O2 (ppm) 5.0-6.8 4.8-6.8 
pH 7.70-8.30 7.9-8.40 
Chlorophyll (µg/l) 0.114-0.180 0.140-0.180 
 
Reproduction  
Fecundity varies with body size and habitat (Rahman et al. 2012a; Table 3.4), and although 
views on temporal trends are inconsistent (Blaber et al. 2003a; Haldar 2004; Miah 2015), 
historical data suggests an overall decrease in fecundity in the last four decades (Table 3.4). 
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Spawning (like migration) is influenced by exogenous factors (Table 3.3). Spawning occurs year 
round, with a peak in September and October following the monsoon flooding (Hasan et al. 
2016; Rahman et al. 2012a; Ahsan et al. 2014; Bhaumik 2015).  
Table 3.4: Historical hilsa fecundity data from 1968-2007 (Milton & Chenery 2001; Haldar 2004). 
Date Habitat Length (cm) Weight (g) Egg numbers 
1968 Padma-Meghna  22.5-48.3 - 900,000-2,000,000 
1977 Meghna  38.0-52.0 - 382,702-1,821,420 
1982 Padma-Meghna 33.0-51.0 - 600,000-1,500,000 
1992 Padma (Goalunda) 26.6-51.1 228-1635 179,000-1,302,000 
1998 Meghna  28.7-52.3 - 226,000-1,931,000 
2001 Bangladesh  17.1-41.5 - 108,500-1,993,846 
2002-2004 Ramgoti (Laxmipur) 35.5-47.0 448-1300 135,600-1,703,200 
2002-2004 Kuakata (Patuakhali) 26.8-46.2 220-1270 209,000-1,088,200 
2006-2007 Chandpur/Ramgoti 24.0-48.0 220-1130 112,554-950,625 
 
Growth   
From the point when the larvae become fry, hilsa feed on plankton (mainly phytoplankton) and 
so their growth is heavily influenced by phytoplankton availability, which can be estimated by 
measuring chlorophyll concentration (Table 3.3; Hasan et al. 2015). Growth parameters have 
been estimated based on length-frequency data collected between 1992 and 2009 (Table 3.5). 
Although these data are difficult to compare, because only one study adjusted data for gillnet 
selectivity (Rahman & Cowx 2008), they have been validated by other studies using length-at-
age data based on otolith microchemistry (Milton & Chenery 2001; Blaber et al. 2003a; Rahman 
& Cowx 2008). A decrease in size at first capture can be seen between 1992 and 2000, indicating 
that many hilsa were being caught before reaching maturity, but it appears to have increased 
again since (Haldar 2004; Table 3.5).  
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Mortality  
Total mortality comprises natural mortality (loss of stock through natural causes) and fishing 
mortality (removal of stock through fishing). Estimates of mortality parameters have been made 
from length-frequency data collected over time, though again it should be noted that 
methodologies differed between studies, making comparison difficult (Table 3.5). Estimated 
instantaneous rates of natural mortality are variable, ranging from a low of 0.98 in 1998 to 
highs of 1.36 in 2002 and 2009. Instantaneous rates of total mortality also peaked in 2002 at 
3.51, compared with a low of 2.34 in 1998. Instantaneous rates of fishing mortality increased 
overall from 1992 to 2009, peaking in 1999 (2.49), and well exceeded natural mortality in every 
year. Fishing mortality was higher for inland samples than marine samples.  
Hilsa landings data also provide some indication of trends in fishing mortality. Annual hilsa 
landings have increased since 1983 (Fig. 3.5). Hilsa are harvested throughout the year from the 
Padma River, the Meghna Estuary and the inshore waters of the BoB (FRSS 2013). Despite an 
upward trend in total landings, marine landings have actually increased at a much faster rate 
than inland landings, which have stayed fairly stable. However, as discussed in Section 3.3.3, 
marine CPUE appears to have declined. 
Stock status 
Stock assessments have been conducted in Bangladesh with hilsa population parameters 
estimated using length-frequency data (Amin et al. 2002, 2004, 2008; BOBLME 2010). Although 
this approach is not rigorous, it provides some of the only available indicators of hilsa 
abundance in Bangladesh and results are quite consistent. Between 1992 and 2009, estimated 
exploitation rate increased overall and fishing mortality rate was consistently higher than 
natural mortality, although since 1999 there has been a downward trend in exploitation and 
fishing mortality rate (Table 3.5). These studies broadly concluded that the fishery was 
overexploited, and attributed this to growth and recruitment overfishing, although some 
reports made contradictory recommendations for exploitation levels to be increased (DoF 2002; 
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Rahman et al. 2012a, 2012b). The only study that analysed marine and inland samples 
separately concluded that both populations were still under the maximum acceptable effort 
limit (Rahman & Cowx 2008). While inland hilsa stocks were found to be slightly overexploited, 
Rahman & Cowx (2008) concluded that the biologically optimal yield could still be obtained at a 
higher exploitation level for marine populations.  
The BOBLME Project used a productivity-susceptibility analysis (PSA) to assess hilsa stocks in 
the BoB – a risk assessment approach with fewer data requirements than stock assessment, 
where ‘productivity’ is a composite measure of several key parameters (fecundity, catch rates, 
growth rates, age composition, mortality index and probability of breeding) and ‘susceptibility’ 
of attributes which determine susceptibility to threats (including protected areas, range and 
habitat quality; BOBLME 2010, 2011b). The study identified a declining trend in most of the 
productivity parameters in hilsa, but concluded that although there is evidence of recruitment 
overfishing in Bangladesh, stocks are not depleted or in need of rebuilding.  
Systems dynamics simulation modelling has also been conducted using hilsa population 
parameters from the studies above (Bala et al. 2014). The study predicted a Maximum 
Sustainable Yield (MSY) of 268,000 tonnes (much lower than landings estimates in that time 
frame), and found growth rates of jatka and spawning adults to be very small, concluding that 
stocks are under ‘severe stress’ and vulnerable to overfishing. However, it did not show a 
decline in productivity; simulated weights of standing stock increased from 290,000 tonnes in 
2004 to 380,000 tonnes in 2014 under current harvesting practice. These weights are higher 
than other estimates of 218,000 tonnes in 2003 (Mome & Arnason 2007) and an average of 
95,144 tonnes from 1997-1999 (Amin et al. 2004).  
Periodic surveys of experimental CPUE have been conducted in the Meghna river, and some 
authors noted a slight decline between 1998 and 2011 (BOBLME 2011b; Rahman et al. 2012b). 
Yet, these surveys shed no light on the status of marine populations, nor are they directly 
comparable. More recently, Sharma (2012) used time-series marine catch and effort data to 
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estimate overall biomass with dynamic surplus production models and determined stock to be 
15-30 per cent below optimal yield targets – ‘marginally overfished to overfished.’ Mome & 
Arnason (2007), on the other hand, conducted a bioeconomic assessment indicating that 
current estimates of marine effort were 33 per cent higher than the level of effort for MSY 
(Mome & Arnason 2007). Both of these studies used officially catch and effort data that are 
known to be unreliable (Ullah et al. 2014). The sensitivity of hilsa to exploitation is analysed in 
more depth in Chapter 4. 
Summary 
Hilsa range from the BoB to the rivers of Bangladesh, India and Myanmar, but this range may 
have been reduced. Understanding of migratory routes and the habitat types suitable for each 
life history stage is incomplete, and marine and inland populations have received limited 
individual research attention; whereas commercial CPUE data are available for marine 
populations but not inland populations, marine populations have received much less 
experimental research attention than inland populations. From the data available there appears 
to have been an increase in natural mortality, fishing mortality and exploitation rates, and a 
decline in size, maximum yield per recruit, and marine CPUE. However, much of this 
information is conflicting or limited in reliability, so trends in abundance are still unclear, and 
no data have been published beyond 2009. While some stock assessments have concluded that 
hilsa are overfished, exploitation rates are highly uncertain, and other risk assessments suggest 
that populations – although vulnerable to overfishing – may not yet be in decline.  
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Table 3.5: Growth, mortality, and exploitation parameters for the hilsa fishery in Bangladesh. Only in 1998** were samples from marine and inland waters analysed 
separately and adjusted for gillnet selectivity. ‘?’ indicates unclear trend. Adapted from Sharma (2012)* and Rahman & Cowx (2008)**. Mortalities are instantaneous 
rates and thus can exceed a value of one. 
 
1992* 1995* 1996* 1997* 1998* 1998** 1999* 2000* 2002* 2003* 2009* 
Overall 
trend 
     
 Inland Marine Mean 
    
  
Asymptotic length (l∞ in cm) 61.10 58.30 60.00 61.50 66.00 58.80 61.00 59.90 60.00 62.50 53.70 54.60 53.00 -? 
Growth constant (k)  0.74 0.74 0.99 0.83 0.67 0.82 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.72 0.86 0.67 0.83 +? 
Growth performance index  - 3.40 3.55 3.46 3.46 3.45 3.47 3.46 3.47 3.45 3.40 3.30 3.37 ? 
Length at first capture (lc in 
cm) 
35.0 30.0 30.3 29.81 27.06 - - - 22.80 13.12 19.87 21.21 26.00 - 
Total mortality (Z) 2.41 2.61 3.19 3.29 3.43 2.38 2.30 2.34 3.77 2.79 3.51 3.07 3.23 +? 
Natural mortality (M)  1.16 1.18 1.41 1.28 1.25 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.28 1.17 1.36 1.15 1.36 + 
Fishing mortality (F)  1.25 1.43 1.78 2.01 2.18 1.38 1.32 1.35 2.49 1.62 2.16 1.92 1.87 + 
Exploitation rate (E)  0.52 0.55 0.56 0.61 0.63 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.66 0.58 0.61 0.62 0.58 + 
Maximum yield per recruit 
(Emax) 
- - 0.71 0.69 0.60 0.61 0.65 0.63 0.59 0.46 0.58 0.63 0.57 - 
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3.3.7 The frame of reference 
Having considered the above components in isolation, I can now combine them into a frame of 
reference. The data and understanding collated above constitute the baseline for the study – one 
of a complex, understudied and vulnerable fishery in a rapidly developing country, which 
suffers from technical and institutional gaps and numerous environmental threats (Table 3.6). I 
now analyse the trends and potential interactions between factors key to hilsa conservation 
interventions in Bangladesh (Fig. 3.8) to identify a set of potential counterfactuals (i.e., 
projected trends under positive and negative scenarios; Table 3.7).   
Interactions 
Current understanding of hilsa ecology indicates that any fluctuation in hilsa populations could 
result from a combination of institutional, economic, social and physical factors, which may 
compound each other and interact in myriad ways (Fig. 3.8). Aside from fishing, key drivers of 
change in hilsa appear to be the physical factors which interact to determine juvenile and adult 
habitat quality and availability, both of which appear to be declining (BOBLME 2010). For 
example, climate change, water diversion activities and related siltation may interact to block 
migratory routes, and pollution may interact with deforestation, climate and water diversion 
activities to reduce primary production and water quality. Most of these factors have multiple 
routes of potential impact. For example, in addition to direct mortality or reduction in habitat 
quality, pollution could also undermine current management interventions – if sanctuary areas 
are polluted (and Chapter 5 provides evidence to suggest that the Andharmanik river sanctuary 
might be), then the efficacy of temporal closures will be severely reduced. Another example is 
the reduced freshwater discharge and increased siltation resulting from water diversion 
activities; at the same time as reducing spawning grounds and reducing the suitability of habitat 
in terms of depth, salinity and turbidity, it may be concentrating migrations, making hilsa more 
vulnerable to being caught (Miao et al. 2010; Rahman & Bhaumik 2012a). While these diversion 
activities may reduce downstream siltation in some areas, sediment loading is closely coupled 
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with monsoon inundation, so it is possible that intensification of this monsoon could be 
contributing to increased sediment loads elsewhere, reducing habitat suitability for hilsa (SRDI 
1998; Goodbred & Kuehl 2000). On the other hand, dredging activities could be reopening some 
river channels for migration. 
There are a number of positive and negative feedback loops at work involving socioeconomic 
change. In addition to direct impacts of climate change on hilsa feeding, spawning, and 
migratory behaviours, via changes in chemical and physical parameters of habitat, climate 
change could negatively impact hilsa populations via an increase in human vulnerability and 
poverty and therefore dependence on jatka in coastal areas (Adger et al. 2003; Dasgupta et al. 
2014), or via an influence on water diversion activities. However, positive impacts may also 
arise through urbanisation and human migration away from coastal areas, which could reduce 
artisanal fishing pressure (BBS 2009; GED 2012). With urbanisation and industrialisation will 
probably come more livelihood options for hilsa fishers, although they may not necessarily be 
able or interested enough to adopt them (Wright et al. 2016). Although industrialisation has led 
to a reduction in poverty, this does not seem to have led to a reduction in numbers of artisanal 
hilsa fishers. In fact, increased mechanisation of vessels may have increased pressure on the 
fishery, and with urbanisation and industrialisation there comes pollution. A rise in the 
numbers of vessels and oil spills on the coast is causing petrochemical pollution (Rahman 
2006), and as the recent oil spill on the south west coast of Bangladesh demonstrated, the 
country has little contingency for such disasters (BOBLME 2011a).  
The interactions between hilsa fishing, institutional context and ecological trends are not 
discussed in depth here because this is the focus of Chapter 5. If the rationale underpinning 
current hilsa management and its implementation is sound, it should in theory protect against 
the overfishing of jatka and adults and thereby influence trends in hilsa abundance and 
distribution. However, the scientific basis for current management is often weak and there is 
evidence to suggest that implementation suffers from enforcement and compliance issues 
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(Chapter 5). Depending on its trajectory, fisheries management has the potential to either 
mitigate or exacerbate the impacts of climate change on hilsa (Fernandes et al. 2015). 
Table 3.6: Trends and current baseline conditions for hilsa in the context of drivers of change and recent 
history (bioeconomic drivers refer to hilsa fishing and are discussed within Section 3.3.3). 
Driver Trends over recent history Current baseline 
Institutional  Introduction of various management 
measures to increase hilsa production 
and protect habitat, with a focus on 
jatka conservation.  
 Management by state institutions 
 Poor monitoring and enforcement of 
fishing regulations 
 Biological justification for management 
limited by lack of reliable stock 
assessment  
 No international regional management  
 
Economic 
 
Bioeconomic 
 Rapid industrialisation and 
urbanisation  
 
 Contribution of hilsa to total fishery 
production has increased, largely 
through an increase in marine 
production 
 Marine CPUE has declined but inland 
CPUE is unclear 
 Foreign exchange earnings from hilsa 
reduced to zero due to export 
restrictions and ban 
 
 Uncertain impacts, but pollution is 
probably affecting hilsa populations 
 
 Fishery has a low annual net profit 
 Production is dominated by marine 
sector 
 Jatka are caught mainly inland, often 
with monofilament nets 
 
Social  Human population has grown  
 Average poverty levels have declined, 
though more slowly in relevant 
regions 
 
 Widespread illegal fishing activities 
linked to poverty  
 Hilsa have a strong cultural importance 
 
Physical  Habitat loss and degradation has 
disrupted migratory routes and led to 
a decline in range and abundance  
 
 Hilsa prefer deep, clear, fast-running 
water with high phytoplankton 
availability 
 Majority migrate from marine to 
freshwater, but are not strictly 
anadromous 
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Figure 3.8: Conceptual map of potential factors key to hilsa conservation interventions in Bangladesh. 
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Counterfactuals 
Bangladesh is likely to continue to experience climate change, with an overall reduction in 
precipitation and an increase in monsoon precipitation (Adger et al. 2003; Agrawala et al. 2003; 
Rahman et al. 2012c). Assessments of the potential impact of climate change on cyclone 
frequency and intensity in Bangladesh are tentative (Karim & Mimura 2008), but the IPCC has 
estimated a 5-10 per cent increase in peak intensity and a 20-30 per cent increase in associated 
precipitation rates (IPCC 2013), the effects of which would be compounded by projected global 
sea-level rise (Huq 2001; Karim & Mimura 2008). Model projections show a steady rise in sea 
surface temperatures in Bangladesh over the next century, with a potential increase in net 
primary production (Fernandes et al. 2015). Climate change is expected to cause a decline in 
fish production potential in South Asian countries that are highly dependent on fisheries, and 
specifically in Bangladesh (Barange et al. 2014; Habib et al. 2014). Modelling indicates that 
these changes will cause a decline in marine hilsa production potential in Bangladesh over the 
course of the century (Fernandes et al. 2015), although, within Bangladesh there may be some 
habitats that become more suitable for hilsa and others that become less suitable. Changes in 
water temperature, turbidity, nutrient levels and salinity are likely to impact migratory 
behaviour and therefore restrict hilsa distribution – especially when considered in combination 
with the possible effects of water diversion activities, associated siltation, land reclamation and 
pollution. Without habitat restoration, and depending on future rates of deforestation, 
submerged islands in downstream areas are likely to continue blocking migratory paths (DoF 
2002) and spawning behaviour might also be affected by warming and changes in freshwater 
flow. Although marine and inland populations are inextricably linked, inland populations are 
assumed to be more vulnerable to the impacts of physical drivers and this is where depletion 
will likely occur first.  
The human population of Bangladesh is projected to continue growing until around 2060 and 
the current majority rural population is expected to shift to majority urban (UN 2014, 2015). 
The Government’s target for an annual economic growth rate of 10 per cent, based on 
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accelerated growth in exports and remittances, would take Bangladesh across the middle 
income country threshold by 2021 and lead to a national decline in poverty (GED 2012; UN 
2015b). Yet, it should be noted that continued political unrest and projected climate change 
(through increased frequency and intensity of natural disasters) could hinder economic growth 
(EIU 2015). Without the introduction and enforcement of more effective pollution prevention 
practices in Bangladesh, water pollution is expected to worsen with continued industrialisation 
and population growth (BBS 2012; Hoque & Clarke 2013). Rivers will be subject to increased 
waste generation, effluents from the garment industry – which is projected to continue growing 
(CIA 2014) – and eutrophication caused by the intensification of agriculture and aquaculture 
(BOBLME 2011a). Petrochemical pollution is expected to negatively impact hilsa populations in 
the BoB through increased numbers and continued mechanisation of vessels, growth of the 
shipbuilding and shipbreaking industries, and potential expansion of the oil and gas sector.  
Together with economic drivers of urbanisation, projected changes in climate are expected to 
trigger continued migration of human populations away from coastal areas towards cities (BBS 
2009). But climate change also increases poverty and vulnerability (Adger et al. 2003; Dasgupta 
et al. 2014) and, since rural coastal communities in the west of Bangladesh are expected to be 
the slowest to rise above poverty, dependence on fishing may remain high and jatka fishing may 
continue or even increase. These impacts will depend partly on local adaptation responses 
(Hobday et al. 2016). 
In the absence of any institutional improvements, modelling suggests that increased levels of 
fishing effort on adult or jatka populations could lead to a collapse of hilsa stocks in Bangladesh 
within one to two decades (Mome & Arnason 2007; Sharma 2012; Bala et al. 2014; Fernandes et 
al. 2015). Given the Government’s aim to increase hilsa production and given industry trends, 
the marine fishery – both artisanal and industrial sectors – looks set to continue expanding (DoF 
2002). This expansion would require improvements in post-harvest technology and 
infrastructure, which could lead to overexploitation in the BoB (Habib et al. 2014). Even with 
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these improvements, it is unlikely that the export ban will be lifted, and so expansion of the 
export market is unlikely. Total aquaculture production will almost certainly continue its 
upward trend, although the Government is mindful of maintaining its capture fisheries 
(Fernandes et al. 2015). Even if substantial progress is made with economically viable hilsa cage 
culture, it would be unlikely to take much pressure off the hilsa fishery, given the social and 
cultural importance of and demand for hilsa. Recommendations have been made for effort 
restrictions on the artisanal fishery, but given the weak enforcement capacity these are 
probably much less realistic than the current spatial and temporal fishing bans (Mome & 
Arnason 2007; BOBLME 2010). If a major threat to jatka and spawning adults is indeed 
overfishing, then improved monitoring and enforcement of current management rules could 
prevent collapse and potentially lead to increased hilsa abundance (Chapter 5). Sharma (2012) 
pointed out that since intrinsic growth rates are high, hilsa should respond quickly to 
conservation interventions. Projections indicate that with more sustainable management, some 
climate change impacts on marine hilsa production could be mitigated, although it would not 
halt a long-term decline (Fernandes et al. 2015). However, in light of the projected development 
of the marine fishery, the efficacy of these rules, which are enforced largely inland, is uncertain. 
The proposed development of a regional hilsa fishery management programme should reduce 
the impacts of physical drivers or fishing pressure from adjacent countries, but it is ‘only an 
idea’ (M. Khan 2014, Bangladesh Fisheries Research Institute, personal communication, 19th 
May).  
If hilsa abundance does increase, this should in theory have a knock-on impact on profitability 
of the hilsa fishing industry. In turn, this profit could partially determine how much money is 
made available for hilsa conservation by the public or private sectors, although Mome & 
Arnason (2007) predicted that without substantial effort reductions, profits will remain low or 
even sink to zero. At the time of writing, a Conservation Trust Fund (CTF) was going through the 
ratification process, with the aim of generating financial resources for hilsa conservation 
(Majumder et al. 2015b). Although the CTF does not conform to best practice standards in terms 
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of governance structure, it could be used to finance increased coverage of the jatka fisher 
rehabilitation programme and other conservation interventions, and pave the way for a more 
effective public-private partnership in the future (see Chapter 7).  
Based on this evidence, a negative counterfactual for hilsa could be the collapse of hilsa 
populations in Bangladesh within one to two decades, due to a combination of overfishing, 
climate change and environmental change. But it is possible to develop an alternative positive 
counterfactual, where political will for institutional change, based on improved understanding 
of hilsa biology, effectively limits or reduces fishing pressure on hilsa populations, and mitigates 
some of the impacts of other anthropogenic activities, so that populations stabilise (Table 3.7). 
Outstanding questions  
Having developed two possible counterfactuals I highlight specific questions that would allow 
the most likely counterfactual to be established (Table 3.8). A key question is whether or not 
current management has the potential to protect hilsa populations. Due to the paucity of reliable 
time-series data, it is unclear whether the biological basis for these rules is sound – a question 
that will be explored in depth in Chapters 4 and 5. It is also yet to be seen whether jatka fisher 
compensation can incentivise compliance with rules, and whether the DoF will increase 
coverage or improve targeting effectiveness (Chapters 5 & 6). Further questions surround the 
extent of institutional change that might be introduced. The need for regional transboundary 
management, human resource development, new financing mechanisms, improved monitoring 
and enforcement, community-based management, equality of fishing rights, habitat restoration 
and adaptive management are all recognised in the HFMAP (DoF 2002), and although over a 
decade later most of these recommendations have not yet been implemented, areas in which 
progress have been made are financing and regional management. The creation of a CTF could 
be pivotal in terms of institutional change and sustainability of conservation interventions, but 
this will depend on the extent to which best practice is followed (see Chapter 7). In terms of 
fishing pressure, although poverty decline could result in a decline in illegal fishing activities, it 
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should be noted that the social and cultural importance of hilsa and of fishing as a livelihood 
activity may counter any decline. Moreover, it is unclear whether urban economic development 
and industrialisation will actually drive down poverty in remote coastal areas. The potential 
impacts of climate change, polluting industries and water diversion activities are also uncertain, 
with implications for the appropriate placement of fishery closures, for the appropriate focus of 
conservation interventions, and for how adaptive they need to be.  
Research needs 
I now highlight key research needs for the hilsa fishery (Table 3.9). There is a clear need to 
improve hilsa stock assessment by conducting fishery-independent surveys of biomass on an 
international regional scale, in order to help managers understand the proportion of hilsa that 
should be protected for sufficient spawning biomass and which life stages to target. If the 
current catch assessment survey continues to be used, more data on age structure and size 
composition are required, and the survey should be extended from major rivers and estuarine 
areas to cover the whole country, including marine areas. Any assessments should employ a 
standardised modelling framework so that they can support a regional management plan. 
Collection of commercial catch and effort data should be extended to the inland fishery, if 
possible, where pressure on hilsa populations and the distribution of fishing activities are 
unclear, and a spatial analysis of fishing activities across all marine, riverine and estuarine areas 
would better allow optimisation of fishery closures. More ecosystem research and modelling are 
needed to establish the effects of potential physical drivers of change, particularly climate 
change, pollution and water diversion activities. Finally, a rigorous impact evaluation of 
management is required. The hilsa literature is full of claims of positive impacts since 2007, but 
none are convincing and their attribution to specific management interventions is not possible 
(Rahman & Bhaumik 2012b). 
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Table 3.7: Projected counterfactuals for hilsa in the context of drivers of change.  
Driver Negative counterfactual Positive counterfactual 
Institutional  No effective change in institutional 
arrangements  
 Protection of hilsa increases through 
improved monitoring and 
enforcement 
   Development of regional hilsa 
management plan  
   Fishery closures adapt to keep pace 
with environmental change 
 
Social  Poverty is slow to decline in coastal 
areas and illegal fishing continues, 
with no reduction in dependence on 
fishing 
 Jatka fisher rehabilitation 
programme and job creation help to 
reduce illegal fishing and dependence 
on fishing 
 
(Bio)economic  Expansion of the artisanal fishery 
causes a decline in production and 
stock collapse within one decade 
 Stable or reduced effort in the 
artisanal fishery slows a decline or 
stabilises production  
  Expansion of industrial fishery 
limited by lack of enforcement 
capacity  
 Expansion of industrial hilsa fishery 
sustainable due to reduced artisanal 
fishing 
  No advances in hilsa cage culture or 
captive breeding 
 Development of cage culture and 
captive breeding techniques reduces 
pressure on wild populations 
  Expansion of polluting industries   Pollution prevention programmes  
mitigate some negative impacts of 
industry on hilsa in the long term 
  Climate change and political unrest 
limits economic development 
 Economic development leads to job 
creation and urban migration 
  Existing power structures remain 
and continue to limit profitability to 
fishers 
 
 Improved access to financial 
products increases profitability to 
fishers  
 
Physical  Water diversion activities, climate 
change, siltation and pollution 
disrupt migratory routes and reduce 
habitat quality 
 
 
 Improved implementation of 
fisheries and environmental policies 
mitigates some disruption of 
migratory routes in the short term, 
but the long term impacts of climate 
change on habitat quality are 
unavoidable 
  Climate change may affect feeding, 
spawning and migratory behaviour 
via physical and chemical parameters  
 No significant shift in behaviour is 
caused by climate change 
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Table 3.8: Outstanding areas of uncertainty relevant to establishing projected counterfactual, and their 
associated management implications. 
Driver Uncertainty Management implication 
Institutional  Will institutional capacity be 
sufficient to maintain compliance 
with management rules? 
 Determines whether fishing regulations 
and conservation payments can have 
impact 
  Do management rules have a 
sound biological basis? 
 Determines whether management focused 
on the protection of jatka can have impact 
  Will a regional hilsa fishery 
management plan be developed? 
 Determines whether management could be 
undermined by activities of other countries 
  To what extent will the 
Conservation Trust Fund follow 
best practice? 
 Will affect sustainability of conservation 
interventions 
Social  Will poverty decline in coastal 
areas? 
 May influence fishing dependence, illegal 
fishing activities, and therefore the 
appropriateness of conservation 
interventions 
  Will jatka fisher compensation 
incentivise compliance? 
 Influences potential for ecological impact 
(Bio)economic  Will industrialisation provide 
employment and reduce poverty? 
 May influence fishing pressure, particularly 
on jatka, and thus appropriateness 
conservation interventions 
  How much will the industrial 
hilsa fishery expand? 
 Determines the level of coast guard 
enforcement required 
  Is hilsa overexploited? 
 
 Determines requirement for effort control 
  Is jatka overexploited?  Determines appropriateness of 
management focus 
  Will industry trends have a 
significant impact on hilsa 
populations? 
 Determines whether interventions should 
focus on protecting habitat or controlling 
fishing pressure 
Physical  Will climate change block 
migratory routes and affect 
feeding, spawning or migratory 
behaviour? 
 
 Determines whether interventions should 
focus on protecting entire migratory route 
or just the spawning grounds that remain, 
and how adaptive interventions need to be 
  Will water pollution have a 
significant impact on hilsa 
populations and where?  
 Determines whether fishery closures will 
provide effective protection 
  Will siltation and water diversion 
activities block migratory routes? 
 Determines whether interventions should 
focus on protecting entire migratory route 
or just the spawning grounds that remain, 
and how adaptive interventions need to be 
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Table 3.9: Key research needs for the hilsa fishery in Bangladesh. 
Regional stock assessment There is a need for regional fishery-independent estimates of spawning 
stock biomass and juvenile recruitment, which could be used to 
support an international regional fishery management plan. Age 
structure and size composition of Bangladesh hilsa populations would 
also help to develop current fishery-dependent assessments.  
Improve catch and effort data 
collection 
Catch assessment survey should be extended from the major rivers to 
cover the country more comprehensively. Currently commercial CPUE 
data is available only for the marine sector, but the inland sector 
provides about one third of estimated catch and so monitoring of these 
vessel numbers would shed light on the status of inland hilsa 
populations. Spatial analysis of actual fishing activities, as opposed to 
landings, would give a clearer picture of the fishery and could be used 
to optimise placement of fishery closures. 
Impact of climate change on 
hilsa populations 
Existing reports of climate change impacts on hilsa populations are 
largely anecdotal. A clear link and mechanism for change must be 
established and the types of habitats that should be protected for 
increased resilience should be explored. 
Impact of water diversion 
activities on hilsa 
populations 
Current reports of the impacts of damming on hilsa populations, 
though convincing, are still conjecture. Research linking quantitative 
habitat quality data to activities is needed.  
Impact of deforestation on 
hilsa populations 
Given the role that mangroves tend to play in fish production, this gap 
in research should be addressed. 
Impact of pollution on hilsa 
populations 
Quantitative studies of water quality, in relation to spawning and 
nursery areas, would help to ascertain whether pollution is 
undermining fishery closures. 
Rigorous evaluation of 
current management, and in 
particular the rehabilitation 
programme 
Currently there is no evidence to attribute any changes to either the 
fishery closures or any element of the jatka fisher rehabilitation 
programme, and a rigorous impact evaluation is required. 
Aquaculture Advances in captive brood-stock development, breeding and grow-out 
of hilsa may help to supplement or reduce pressure on wild hilsa 
populations. 
Economic valuation of hilsa 
fishery 
This could help to generate political will and investment in sustainable 
hilsa management. 
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3.4 Discussion 
The task of developing and evaluating successful conservation interventions is always 
constrained by uncertainties arising from, for example, stochastic environmental variation, or 
from limited understanding of system dynamics – particularly resource user behaviour 
(Nicholson & Possingham 2007; Fulton et al. 2011). Environmental modelling approaches to 
dealing with this uncertainty are available (Refsgaard et al. 2007), but they have received 
limited attention in the conservation literature and are still rarely used in conservation 
decision-making (Nicholson & Possingham 2007; Milner-Gulland 2011, 2012). In fisheries, there 
is a widespread unwillingness among decision-makers to embrace uncertainty (Walters 2007). 
They have long expected from scientists single, clear predictions and management prescriptions 
from models parameterised with historical data, but the depth and complexity of understanding 
required for useful modelled predictions that reduce uncertainty to an acceptable level is often 
lacking, particularly in small-scale, developing-world fisheries. Learning from the failures and 
successes of weather and climate science, particularly the dangers of failing to effectively 
communicate uncertainties to decision-makers and other stakeholders, alternative approaches 
to incorporating uncertainty into fisheries management decisions are surely required (Clark 
2001; Pidgeon & Fischhoff 2011; Davies 2015).  
This study demonstrates how a useful frame of reference, comprising a baseline and 
counterfactual, can be developed and used to guide decision-making in complex, data-poor 
systems, even in the absence of reliable, predictable models. Similar in approach to scenario 
planning, this process can help to anticipate change, even when the projections themselves are 
based on incomplete information (Clark 2001). Although no quantitative counterfactual could 
be established for the hilsa fishery, the qualitative framework used here provides a way to 
break down all drivers of potential change in a system – institutional, social, economic and 
physical – and their complex interactions, reducing the potential for unexpected outcomes 
(Milner-Gulland 2012). The most likely counterfactual may not be an accurate prediction of the 
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future, but critical evaluation of contradictions between studies and the reliability of 
understanding allowed the identification of key areas of uncertainty and their implications for 
management. This frame of reference thus provides a basis to explore the scope for potential 
additionality of current hilsa management (Chapter 5), and to consider the needs and 
opportunities for improvements (Chapter 7). Moreover, the identification of outcomes that were 
likely in more than one counterfactual scenario highlighted areas (e.g. climate change) that 
should be the focus of future research, if robust management interventions are to be designed 
and evaluated.  
In conclusion, all fisheries are managed in the face of uncertainty, but management decisions 
should not be deferred by calls for further data collection or modelling when a reasonable 
reference frame can be developed. Building on the No Net Loss conservation policy literature in 
which the concept was developed (Bull et al. 2014, 2015, 2016; Bull 2014), this study is novel in 
its application of the frame of reference approach to fisheries. It is, however, in line with new 
thinking that affords uncertainty greater importance in fisheries management planning, even 
where model-based predictions are unreliable or impossible (Davies 2015). Analysis of this 
kind is rapid and inexpensive, and could thus be used on a regular basis to help guide an 
adaptive management approach to evaluation against a projected counterfactual (Bull 2014). 
Finally, following this framework is one way to ensure that uncertainty is considered from the 
very beginning of an intervention design process (Refsgaard et al. 2007).  
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Chapter 4 
 
Characterising the impacts of selective fishing on the Bangladesh hilsa 
population  
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4.1 Introduction 
Targeting very small and very large fish is common in developing-world fisheries. In small-scale, 
coastal fisheries, small and immature fish are often caught in easy-access intertidal nursery 
habitats such as mangroves and seagrass beds, and destructive or indiscriminate fishing gears 
are often used (Pomeroy et al. 2009; Hauzer et al. 2013). For instance, mosquito nets – the fine 
mesh of which entraps even very small fish – are widely used in malarial regions, particularly by 
fishers who lack the capital to invest in other fishing gear (Bush 2013; Gurung 2015). At the 
same time, many of these fisheries are open access and so may also be heavily overexploited 
(Mora et al. 2009; Purcell & Pomeroy 2015).  
Targeting small and immature fish has long been associated with growth overfishing (Froese 
2004); under yield-per-recruit (YPR) theory (Beverton & Holt 1957), which has dominated 
fisheries management discourse for decades, catching fish at sizes below their size at first 
maturity can reduce total YPR and therefore profit. The second form of overfishing – which 
interacts with growth overfishing – is recruitment overfishing, where spawning stock biomass 
is reduced to a level at which reproduction is substantially reduced. Under the spawn-at-least-
once principle, allowing juveniles to mature and therefore reproduce should protect stocks from 
recruitment overfishing, even when exploitation rates are high (Myers & Mertz 1998). These 
impacts have been demonstrated in meta-analyses of empirical stocks and single species 
population modelling (Mori et al. 2001; Froese et al. 2008; Vasilakopoulos et al. 2011, 2015).  
Measures to reduce the catch of small individuals – whether through fish size limits, mesh size 
limits, or other gear restrictions – are thus a focus of traditional fisheries management 
(Armstrong et al. 1990; MacLennan 1992; Halliday & Pinhorn 2002). These measures are 
particularly common in small-scale, artisanal fisheries because they are simpler, more easily 
monitored and often less controversial than measures to control effort, such as quotas and no-
take zones (McClanahan & Mangi 2004). However, they have also been challenged from the 
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perspectives of both traditional, single-species management and ecosystem-based fisheries 
management (EBFM).  
Firstly, the assumption that all protected immature fish will contribute to future catches is 
rarely true; recruitment is heavily influenced by extrinsic factors such as environmental 
variability and the age range of the spawning population (Gilbert 1997; Cardinale & Arrhenius 
2000; Szuwalski et al. 2015). Secondly, strong size selectivity can have evolutionary 
consequences. The selective removal of large, old individuals over small ones means that earlier 
maturation and smaller adult body size become evolutionarily advantageous, resulting in 
truncated age (size) structures, and potentially skewed sex ratios (Law 2000; Kuparinen et al. 
2009; Law et al. 2013). Large, old spawners – often referred to as megaspawners or BOFFFs 
(big, old, fat, fecund females) – have long been recognised for their importance to healthy fish 
stocks. Large females are not only more fecund, but their eggs tend to be larger and thus hatch 
larvae with a greater chance of survival, and they tend to pass on genes for overall individual 
fitness (Longhurst 2002; Froese 2004; Hsieh et al. 2010). Mesh-size and gear restrictions 
therefore have potential to cause undesirable changes in the size structure of entire fish 
communities, which can in turn amplify temporal variations in biomass, reducing the resilience 
of populations to exploitation and environmental change (Anderson et al. 2008; Hsieh et al. 
2010; Rochet & Benoit 2012; Kuparinen et al. 2016). This effect becomes particularly 
problematic at low abundance. 
Furthermore, the rule that mesh size should be larger than a fish’s size at first maturity was 
formulated for trawl fisheries, but gear selection curves differ between gear types: Wolff et al. 
(2015) recently demonstrated for gillnet fisheries that small mesh sizes promote sustainable 
production by allowing a high proportion of spawners to remain in the population. Not only do 
small fish grow more quickly through their window of vulnerability to being caught, but gillnets 
are passive gears and so have unimodal selectivity, i.e., small fish pass through the mesh and 
large fish rarely become entangled.  
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The selective fishing paradigm has also been questioned by proponents of EBFM (Garcia et al. 
2012), since when trophic dynamics are taken into account, models suggest that the selection of 
larger fish can actually decrease total biomass yield, biodiversity loss and alter community 
structure (Pope 1991; Law et al. 2013, 2014). In single- and multi-species size-spectrum 
models, harvesting a particular size of fish will reduce predation mortality for smaller-sized fish, 
which tend to be more productive, and reduce prey availability for larger-sized fish (Law et al. 
2013, 2014). These observations are particularly relevant for the developing world, where small 
fish play an important role in food security. The current focus of management on yields of large, 
high value but low productivity species is inefficient in terms of overall biomass and food 
security (Kolding & van Zwieten 2011; Charles et al. 2015; Kolding et al. 2015). The models have 
led to the concept of ‘balanced harvesting’, which proposes that moderate fishing across the 
widest possible range of species, stocks, and sizes in an ecosystem, in proportion to their natural 
productivity, should maintain relative size and species composition and thus increase total 
biomass and yields (Zhou et al. 2010; Garcia 2015). This theory can be observed in some real, 
small-scale, multi-gear and multi-species fisheries that use relatively unselective methods of 
fishing and yet maintain stocks (Kolding & van Zwieten 2011; Kolding & Van Zwieten 2014). 
Although it has come under heavy criticism as an unrealistic and even untenable strategy for 
management (Jacobsen et al. 2014; Charles et al. 2015; Froese et al. 2015; Pauly et al. 2016; Reid 
et al. 2016), the concept of balanced harvesting and its potential role in EBFM is still being 
debated (Andersen et al. 2016; Breen et al. 2016).  
In the small-scale and largely artisanal Bangladesh hilsa (Tenualosa ilisha) fishery, both adults 
and juveniles – locally known as jatka – are harvested. Although adult hilsa are more desirable, 
jatka have historically been a more affordable and easily obtainable option for low income 
groups. Since mature hilsa mostly migrate upstream to spawn, jatka are targeted in inland and 
coastal areas during their downstream migrations, and can be caught in large volumes at night 
with small-meshed nets – the cost of which can be earned back in one night (Chapters 3 & 5). 
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Jatka fishing is therefore an activity that marginal farmers and labourers often switch to when 
income is very low (Haldar & Ali 2014).   
Hilsa management is focused on sustaining and increasing production through the protection of 
spawning adults and, particularly, jatka (DoF 2002). Regulations include a) a seasonal ban on 
hilsa fishing for the protection of spawners; b) seasonal bans on all fishing in nursery grounds; 
c) a seasonal ban on all activities involving jatka; d) a complete ban on monofilament gillnets; 
and e) a rehabilitation scheme for hilsa fishers (rice compensation, alternative livelihood 
support and awareness-building activities) that aims to incentivise compliance with regulations 
for the protection of jatka (Chapter 5). This management approach is largely based on the 
normative argument that capturing juveniles will deplete stocks, although there are major gaps 
in the scientific evidence supporting the assumptions that underpin the approach. Not only are 
there insufficient data available for a reliable quantitative stock assessment, but the actual 
ecological impacts of different selectivity regimes on hilsa have not been studied. Moreover, the 
relative importance of selectivity and the exploitation rate in determining the sustainability of 
the fishery are unclear. It is therefore also unclear which fishers pose the most substantive 
ecological threat to the hilsa fishery: those targeting jatka or those fishing on larger individuals. 
In any case, there has been little documentation of the characteristics and activities of fishers in 
each sector. 
Setting and meeting conservation and management objectives can be difficult when data are 
limited. However, rapid assessments of stocks and estimates of potential yields and biological 
reference points can be carried out using life history parameters (LHPs), which are much more 
available than survival and mortality estimates – or can be inferred from allometric 
relationships and related species (Beddington & Kirkwood 2005; Le Quesne & Jennings 2012; 
Zhou et al. 2012). For example, Beddington & Kirkwood (2005) developed techniques to 
estimate potential yields and sustainable fishery capacity directly from size and growth 
parameters and Beverton-Holt invariants, while Le Quesne & Jennings (2012) conducted a rapid 
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risk assessment of fishing impacts on biodiversity in the Celtic Sea by assessing the sensitivity of 
species to fishing in relation to various conservation- and yield-based fishery reference points, 
using life history data.  
In this chapter, I will a) provide context by characterising the Bangladesh hilsa fishery at the 
household level; b) use LHPs to model the potential relative ecological impact of different 
harvesting strategies on hilsa biomass at the overall fishery level; and c) model the spatial 
distribution of this ecological impact and its correlates across individual fishing households 
according to their reported harvesting strategies.  
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Household survey 
Nine hundred fishing households were interviewed in a survey described in detail in Appendix 
B.1. Households were sampled from within and outside sanctuary areas, within the area where 
the compensation scheme operates, and from control sites outside the area where the scheme 
operates. Data used in this study came largely from the first two sections of the questionnaire 
(household characteristics and reported fishing activities; see Appendix B.1). I first 
characterised the hilsa fishery with a basic descriptive analysis of household fishing activities, 
using Chi-squared tests (or Fisher’s exact where sample sizes were small), Wilcoxon signed rank 
tests and Wilcoxon rank sum tests. Since women do not engage in hilsa fishing (only processing, 
trading and other ancillary activities; Islam et al. 2016), I excluded 136 households with female 
respondents from the analysis. I also removed an outlier generated by a reported average catch 
volume that was far out of proportion to the rest of the distribution.  
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4.2.2 Modelling ecological impact 
In order to assess the relative potential impacts of various size selectivity regimes on hilsa 
population biomass, I developed an age-structured population model with a Beverton-Holt 
stock recruitment (S-R) relationship, using LHP values taken from the literature (Fig. 4.1). I 
chose to measure impact in terms of equilibrium overall biomass rather than spawning stock 
biomass because, in largely artisanal developing-world fisheries, overall biomass is generally a 
management priority, and since this fishery targets juveniles as well as adults, spawning stock 
biomass is less relevant. To identify a fishing mortality (F, the instantaneous rate) reference 
point at which to assess the impacts of selectivity, I used yield-per-recruit (YPR) analysis – an 
approach that is useful when fishery selectivity data and growth and mortality parameters are 
available (Le Quesne & Jennings 2012; Zhou et al. 2012). I considered the F at which the 
maximum YPR (YPRmax) was achieved as a suitable reference point with which to explore 
ecological impact in the hilsa fishery (Fmax), given the life history of hilsa (Section 4.2.3), the 
apparently high levels of exploitation in Bangladesh (Chapters 3 & 5), and the goal of 
maximising fisheries productivity (Chapter 5). But since evidence for overexploitation of the 
hilsa fishery is equivocal (Chapter 5), and taking into account the possibility that fishing at Fmax 
can lead to recruitment limitation (Deriso 1982), I tested the sensitivity of the analysis to the 
assumption of Fmax by assessing population biomass under half and double Fmax. Under each of 
these three F scenarios, I then multiplied the relative ecological impact of each household’s 
selectivity regime by their reported average catch volume to produce an overall index of 
potential relative ecological impact on hilsa of a household's fishing regime at a given value of 
overall F for the fishery as a whole. As a result of data restrictions and because the hilsa fishery 
is a large fishery of which the study households are only a small part, the household-level 
analysis of actual reported harvesting regimes was conducted in the context of separate 
assumptions made at the fishery level (i.e., that all households follow the same harvesting 
regime under a reference F). 
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Figure 4.1: Flow diagram showing strategy for the development of a selectivity-based index of ecological 
impact on the hilsa population and for the development of a household (HH)-level index of potential 
ecological impact on the hilsa population, under the assumption of an overall reference fishing mortality 
(F). 
 
4.2.3 Hilsa life history 
It is typically understood that hilsa spend most of their lives feeding in the Bay of Bengal, with 
the majority of mature adults migrating in shoals upstream to spawn in freshwater (Fig. 4.2). 
Pelagic eggs hatch larvae within 23-26 hours of spawning, and after 6-10 weeks (12-20 cm) the 
fry become juveniles, locally known as jatka (Ahsan et al. 2014). These are officially defined as 
hilsa of up to 25 cm in length (Islam et al. 2014), but sizes at first maturity – which should be 
reached at about 1 year – range from 15 to 32 cm in the literature (Amin et al. 2000; Mome & 
Arnason 2007). After 5-6 months moving downstream, jatka continue migrating seawards to 
feed and mature, beginning the cycle again.  
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However, hilsa are not strictly anadromous; some spawning also occurs in estuarine waters, 
indicating that movements are complex and varied, and there may be some permanent riverine 
and marine populations (Blaber et al. 2003a; Rahman et al. 2010, 2012a; Bhaumik 2015). 
Spawning and migration are regulated not only by sexual maturity but by various physical and 
chemical factors (water depth, turbidity, pH, dissolved O2, salinity and temperature; see Chapter 
3). Although spawning occurs year round, peak upstream migration starts with the onset of the 
monsoon and associated flooding, with a peak in spawning in September and October (Hasan et 
al. 2016; Rahman et al. 2012a; Ahsan et al. 2014; Bhaumik 2015). There is some evidence to 
suggest that there may also be a distinct and smaller winter (January) spawning stock, which 
has a smaller migratory size and lower fecundity (Quddus 1982; Rahman et al. 2012b; Ahsan et 
al. 2014), but Hasan et al. (2016) challenge this. There is likewise some uncertainty about 
whether hilsa are iteroparous, or whether they demonstrate both iteroparity and semalparity 
(Blaber 2008; BOBLME 2011c).  
Hilsa are very fecund; gravid females carry 0.1 million to 2 million eggs (Chapter 3; Rahman et 
al. 2012a), which together with their low age at maturation gives them a high intrinsic growth 
rate (r = 0.4 - 0.6; Sharma 2012). It is widely accepted that hilsa can live for up to 6.5 years, or 
about 58 cm in length – although larger fish have been recorded (Haldar 2004; Mome & Arnason 
2007). Estimates of natural mortality from length-frequency data are highly variable with time 
and geography, ranging from M = 0.98 - 1.36 (see Chapter 3). An overall sex ratio of 
approximately 1:2 males to females is usually observed, with a bias towards females in larger 
fish (> 50 per cent) and towards males in smaller fish (> 50 per cent; Blaber et al. 2003a; Haldar 
2004; Haldar & Amin 2005; Ahsan et al. 2014) – although some studies have identified 
populations with much higher female domination (Amin et al. 2005). There is no evidence of sex 
change. 
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Figure 4.2: Migratory movements of hilsa (solid arrows indicate direction), adapted from Ahsan et al. 
(2014). The majority of hilsa migrate upstream to spawn, before returning to marine waters (route 
marked grey), but movements are complex and varied; there may be permanent riverine and marine 
populations.  
 
4.2.4 Life history data 
Since hilsa life history is not well understood and the availability of ecological data is limited 
(Chapter 3), translation of this life history into a population model was kept as simple as 
possible. Spawning seasonality and migration between marine and freshwater environments 
were not therefore incorporated. Although it varies between sources, length-at-age data 
supports the expectation that jatka are best represented in the model by fish < 1 year old (see 
Table 4.1). Fish were therefore assumed to mature at >= 1 year. The population model was 
structured by 6-month age classes up to 6.5 years; given hilsa’s fast growth and high natural 
mortality rate, year classes were too crude to capture population dynamics (Mome & Arnason 
2007).  
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Table 4.1: Length-at-age data for hilsa in Bangladesh (BFRI 2000), with the inferred stages of jatka 
(juveniles) and adults shown. 
Age (years) Length (cm) Stage 
0.5 15-16 
Jatka 
1 27-28 
1.5 36-37 
Adults 
2 42-43 
2.5 47-48 
3 51-52 
3.5 53-54 
4 54-55 
4.5 55-56 
5 56-56.5 
5.5 56-57.5 
6 57-57.25 
6.5 57.25-58 
 
I used LHP values taken from population dynamics studies of hilsa in Bangladesh, based on 
commercial catch length-frequency data (Table 4.2). When possible, I used values from the 
same study (Amin et al. 2004). Values for the length-weight constant (𝑎𝑤) and exponent (𝑏𝑤) 
ranged widely between literature sources (Amin et al. 2005; Ahsan et al. 2014) and those 
reported by FishBase (www.fishbase.org). However, substituting these values in and out did not 
affect final results, and so I used FishBase. Values for Beverton-Holt parameters and steepness 
could not be identified for hilsa. Therefore – and since there is much uncertainty regarding 
steepness – I used the median steepness for clupeids from a meta-analysis (Myers et al. 1999). 
This parameter characterises the steepness of the S-R relationship at low stock sizes (i.e., the 
recruitment obtained at 20 per cent of virgin biomass), and can be useful in assessing 
developing-country fisheries where the Beverton-Holt parameters are unavailable and difficult 
to estimate (Mace & Doonan 1988; Beddington & Kirkwood 2005). For virgin biomass I started 
with a recent landings estimate (351,223 t; DoF 2015), but having checked that the value makes 
little difference to the relationship between spawning stock and recruitment, I reduced the 
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value to 2000 t for simplicity. The natural mortality parameter value was an average of 
instantaneous rates from three years of data (Amin et al. 2004).  
Table 4.2: Secondary data used in this study, with sources. 
Parameter Value Source 
Steepness, h 0.71 Myers et al. (1999) 
Asymptotic length, l∞  62.5  Amin et al. (2004) 
Growth coefficient, k  0.77*  Amin et al. (2004) 
Length-weight constant 𝑎𝑤  0.0112 FishBase 
Length-weight exponent 𝑏𝑤  3.0400 FishBase 
Virgin biomass, B0 (t) 2000 - 
Instantaneous rate of natural mortality, M  1.27* Amin et al. (2004) 
Sex ratio (male:female) 1:2  IUCN (2014) 
Proportion mature, r 
<=1 years 
 
0 
Haldar (2004) 
>1 years 1  
*Halved from the values in original studies for application to half year classes 
 
4.2.5 Household survey data 
From the household survey the following data were relevant to the development of the 
ecological impact index (one data-point per household):   
 Reported average catch volume (kg per fishing trip) in peak and lean fishing 
seasons; 
 Reported size of fish in average catch (small/medium/large) in peak and lean 
fishing seasons; 
 Reported presence of eggs/fry in average catch (many/few/none) in peak and 
lean fishing seasons; 
 Whether or not the household targets jatka.  
Peak fishing season is defined as the period from mid-August to October when the majority (60-
70 per cent) of hilsa are reportedly caught (Rahman et al. 2012b). In lean season (November to 
July) relatively few hilsa are caught, particularly during the monsoon from June to mid-August 
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when weather conditions are unfavourable. Reported average hilsa catch per fishing trip was 
significantly higher in peak season than in lean season (Wilcoxon signed rank test V = 275653, p 
< 0.001). Due to small sample sizes in some categories, reported size of fish and presence of 
eggs/fry in the catch could not be used as proxies for potential ecological impact in the 
development of the index. Instead, jatka fishing was used as a measure of selectivity, while catch 
volume was used as a proxy for household-level exploitation rate. Fifty-two per cent of 
households reported that they target jatka. There was no significant association between 
reports of targeting jatka and reported fish size in peak or lean season (Fisher’s exact test, p > 
0.05), which was to be expected, given that so few households said that they catch small fish 
(0.6 per cent in peak season and 2.3 per cent in lean season). This can be taken as evidence that 
respondents were not interpreting ‘small’ fish to be synonymous with jatka in this survey. 
Because jatka fishing is illegal, there may have been some strategic bias in whether a fisher self-
identified as a jatka fisher, but respondents seemed willing to offer the information.  
There were significant associations between reported fish size and egg/fry presence in catches 
(binary variable; 1 = many, 0 = few/none) in both fishing seasons. The majority of households 
who reported eggs/fry in peak season also reported catching large fish, but those who reported 
few or no eggs/fry reported catching smaller fish (Fisher’s exact test, p < 0.0001). In lean 
season, reporting few or no eggs/fry was significantly associated with catching medium fish 
(Fisher’s exact test, p < 0.0001). Although sample sizes were small (only 13 individuals reported 
eggs in their peak season catches), the association between reports of egg/fry presence in 
catches and peak fishing season provides some validation of the use of fisher knowledge in this 
study, given that peak spawning season does fall in peak fishing season (Chapter 5). Since larger 
fish are generally expected to be more fecund (Froese 2004), the association of reports of larger 
fish with egg/fry presence provides similar validation.  
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4.2.6 Model construction 
Calculating the stock-recruitment relationship 
The Beverton-Holt S-R relationship (Fig. 4.3) can be presented as follows, where S is spawning 
stock size, a is the maximum number of recruits produced and b is the spawning stock needed 
to produce recruitment, R, equal to half maximum:  
 
𝑅 =
𝑎𝑆
𝑏 + 𝑆 
 
( 1.1 ) 
 
In the absence of a and b values, this equation was re-parameterised in terms of the steepness of 
the stock recruitment curve, h, the initial recruitment, R0, and virgin biomass, B0  (Haddon 
2011). Assuming that recruitment in the virgin stock derives from the virgin biomass, then: 
 
𝑅0 =
𝑎𝐵0
𝑏 + 𝐵0 
 
( 2.2 ) 
 
And: 
 
ℎ =
0.2(𝑏 + 𝐵0)
𝑏 + 0.2𝐵0
 
( 3.3 ) 
 
 
As estimates of growth parameters 𝑙∞ (asymptotic length in cm) and k (growth coefficient) were 
available, I was able to use the von Bertalanffy (1938) growth equations to estimate average 
length at age, 𝑙𝑖 in cm, and thus average weight at age, 𝑤𝑖 in kg, where 𝑎𝑤 is the length-weight 
constant and 𝑏𝑤 is the exponent, and i is age class (see Table 4.2). Age, i, was taken to be the 
upper bound of each age class. 
 𝑙𝑖 = 𝑙∞[(1 − 𝑒
−𝑘)𝑖 − 𝐵0] ( 4.4 ) 
 
 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑎𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑏𝑤  ( 5.5 ) 
 
Given 𝐴0, the mature biomass per recruit from the stable age distribution, where 𝑛0,𝑖 is the 
virgin number of fish per recruit at age i, 𝑤𝑖 is weight at age i, m is the age at maturity (assumed 
to be equal to age of recruitment) and Mi is the instantaneous rate of natural mortality rate at 
age i, then R0 can be calculated: 
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𝐴0 = (∑ 𝑛0,𝑖𝑤𝑖
𝑚
) 𝑒−𝑀𝑖  
( 6.6 ) 
 
 
𝑅0 =
𝐵0
𝐴0
 
( 7.7 ) 
 
Parameters α and β can then be defined: 
 
α =
𝐵0  (1 − ℎ)
4ℎ𝑅0
 
( 8.8 ) 
 
 
β =
5ℎ − 1
4ℎ𝑅0
 
( 9.9 ) 
 
 
𝑎 =
1
β
 
( 10.10 ) 
 
 𝑏 =
α
β
 
( 11.11 ) 
 
 
The secondary empirical length- and weight-at-age data provide some validation for the 
estimates calculated in this study using the Beverton-Holt S-R relationship (Fig. 4.4a & b). The 
empirical data appear to be 3-6 months ahead of the estimates, with the largest differences in 
the mid-range years, but given that the empirical data were collected in just one year, the fit is 
quite good. The differences could be related to claims that size-at-first-capture has declined 
since the length and weight data were collected in 2000 (Haldar 2004), or to temporal 
variability in hilsa recruitment. The length-at-age data (Fig. 4.4a) are more similar to the model 
predictions than the weight-at-age data (Fig. 4.4b), which is probably because weight tends to 
be more environmentally determined than length. 
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Figure 4.3: Beverton-Holt stock-recruitment relationship for hilsa, calculated using growth parameter 
data from the literature. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Histogram showing (a) length-at-age; and (b) weight-at-age estimated using the Beverton-
Holt (B-H) stock-recruitment relationship, compared to empirical data collected during one year (BFRI 
2000). 
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Calculating fishing mortality 
In the absence of reliable estimates of fishing mortality, a reference point for the overall 
instantaneous rate of fishing mortality, F, at which to run the population model was identified 
through YPR analysis. The numbers at any age i+1 were calculated using the equation for 
exponential decline, where 𝑀𝑖 is the instantaneous rate of natural mortality and 𝐹𝑖  is the 
instantaneous rate of fishing mortality: 
 𝑁𝑖+1 = 𝑁𝑖𝑒
−(𝑀𝑖+𝐹𝑖)   ( 2.1 ) 
 
The numbers caught in a given age class, Ci, were calculated, where ni is the number of fish from 
the cohort remaining in a given age class, 𝑀𝑖 is the instantaneous rate of natural mortality in a 
given age class and 𝐹𝑠 is the instantaneous rate of fishing mortality in selected age classes 
(where Fs = 0 in non-fished age classes). 
 
𝐶𝑖 = (
𝐹𝑠
𝑀𝑖 + 𝐹𝑠
) 𝑛𝑖(1 − 𝑒
−(𝑀𝑖+𝐹𝑠)) 
( 2.2 ) 
 
Thus biomass yield, Y, from the cohort as a whole at time t, could then be calculated, where I is 
the maximum number of age classes and 𝑤𝑖 is weight in a given age class: 
 
𝑌 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=𝐼
𝐶𝑖  
( 2.3 ) 
 
To generate YPR, Y was divided by initial cohort size, 𝑁0: 
 
𝑌𝑃𝑅 =
𝑌
𝑁0
 
( 2.4 ) 
 
By running the YPR model under a range of values of F, I estimated the maximum yield obtained 
under non-selective fishing, Ymax, which corresponded to an Fmax of 0.8 (Fig. 4.5).  
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Figure 4.5: Yield-per-recruit curve for hilsa under a regime of fishing across all age classes. 
 
The operating model 
I followed the steps in Fig. 4.6 to develop the age-structured population model. 
 
Figure 4.6: Conceptual representation of the hilsa population model. Subscripts i and t represent age 
class and year. Parameters M, H and R represent the instantaneous rate of natural mortality, number of 
fish harvested, and recruitment. In order to avoid making assumptions about when M is highest, I 
assumed that the first half of M took place before harvesting and recruitment and the second half after. 
Parameter D represents age class mortality. The final age class, I, was assumed to die each year (D = 1). 
Final arrow indicates that the process is repeated. 
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 𝑁′𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑁𝑖,𝑡𝑒
−0.5𝑀 ( 3.1 ) 
To then apply F without confounding total mortality with selectivity, I divided the total number 
of fish harvested at time t, 𝐻𝑡, proportionately across selected age classes, i, where 𝑁′𝐻 is the 
total population of harvestable fish after instantaneous natural mortality, M, at time t, F is the 
instantaneous rate of fishing mortality and d is a dummy variable = 1 if the age class is selected, 
or = 0 if not: 
 𝑁′𝐻  =   𝛴𝑑𝑁′𝑖,𝑡  ( 3.2 ) 
 𝐻𝑡 = 𝑁′𝐻(1 − 𝑒
−𝐹) ( 3.3 ) 
 
𝐻𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐻𝑡 (
𝑁′𝑖,𝑡
𝑁′
)  𝑑 
( 3.4 ) 
 𝑁′′𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑁′𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐻𝑖,𝑡   ( 3.5) 
I calculated recruitment at time t, 𝑅𝑡, using the following equations, where 𝑆𝑡 is spawning stock 
size at time t, a and b are constants from the Beverton-Holt S-R relationship (Table 4.2), ri,t is 
proportion mature in age class i at time t, 𝑁′ is the sum of 𝑁′𝑖, I is maximum number of age 
classes. Total 𝑆𝑡 was multiplied by the proportion of females represented by the sex ratio (0.6), 
to account for only females spawning. 
 
𝑆𝑡 = (∑ 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝐼
𝑖=𝐼
𝑁′′) 0.6 
( 3.6 ) 
 
𝑅𝑡 =
𝑎𝑆𝑡
𝑏 + 𝑆𝑡  
 
( 3.7 ) 
Then I applied the second half of M: 
 𝑁′′′𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑁′′𝑖,𝑡𝑒
−0.5𝑀 ( 3.8 ) 
After which all age classes were assumed to age one year, apart from the final age class which 
was assumed to die. 
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4.2.7 Calculating the ecological impact index 
With the YPR analysis as justification, I ran the population model with F = 0.8 under non-
selective fishing and under two selectivity regimes: one that just targets jatka and one that 
targets only adult fish. I used the equilibrium population size (t = 30 years) for each fishing 
regime to calculate the difference between regimes in the ecological impact on the population’s 
productivity, E, relative to the regime with the lowest impact, using the following equation, 
where Np is the least damaging and Na is the alternative regime: 
 
𝐸 =
𝑁𝑝 − 𝑁𝑎
𝑁𝑝
 
( 4.1 ) 
I tested the sensitivity of the analysis to the assumption of Fmax = 0.8 by running the model with 
double (1.6) and half (0.4) Fmax, which gives an indication of the relative impact of these fishing 
activities under higher and lower levels of exploitation. I scaled the index to 1 for Np. 
When multiplied by reported hilsa catch volume (kg), these values gave an overall index of 
potential relative ecological impact for each household, dependent on the reported age of fish 
caught by that household and the household’s reported average catch volume in peak and lean 
fishing seasons, in the context of the overall F assumed to pertain in the fishery as a whole. 
4.2.8 Linear mixed effects modelling 
Linear mixed effects models (LMMs) were used to model household threat to hilsa under Fmax, 
which was assumed to reflect reality in the overall fishery. This analysis was conducted in R 
version 3.2.3 (R Development Core Team 2016) with the R package lme4 (Bates et al. 2015).  
The response variable (potential relative household ecological impact) was log transformed for 
normalisation and reduction of heteroskedasticity. LMMs were fitted as random intercept 
models with district and village as grouping factors in the random effects, according to the 
sampling design (see Appendix B.1). In order to accurately estimate the corrected Akaike’s 
Information Criterion (AICc) and Akaike weights for each model, all possible combinations of 
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explanatory variables were fitted using Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation procedures with 
the R package MuMIn (Barton 2011). The top candidate models were selected according to their 
AICc, and those with ΔAICc < 4 were re-run using Restricted Maximum Likelihood (REML) 
estimation procedures for accurate parameter estimates (Zuur et al. 2009). If candidate models 
had a ΔAICc value of less than two, the most parsimonious model was selected; otherwise the 
model with the lowest AICc was selected (Burnham & Andersen, 2002). Final models were 
checked for residual normality, heteroskedasticity and correlations between fixed effects and 
the residuals. The best random effects structures were selected using likelihood ratio tests and 
validation plots (Bolker et al. 2009). To analyse spatial effects, I estimated best linear unbiased 
predictors (BLUPs) from the top models, which measured the residual effect associated with 
each random effect (district and village within district). Marginal and conditional R2 statistics 
were calculated following Nakagawa & Schielzeth (2013); the marginal R2 represents the 
variance explained by the fixed effects, whereas the conditional R2 represents that explained by 
the whole model.  
Fishing location, fishing dependence, boat ownership16, gear diversity, sanctuary area and 
compensation area were investigated as fixed effects (Table 4.3) in three separate global models 
(Table 4.4). Fishing location, boat ownership and gear diversity were all expected to influence 
ecological impact through their potential effects on selectivity and catch volume. Sanctuary area 
and compensation area were also expected to influence ecological impact because the 
availability of hilsa and jatka may vary between these environments. Similarly, ecological 
impact was expected to vary spatially between village and district. Receiving compensation 
would be expected to influence ecological impact if the compensation were effective, but if 
compensation is targeted towards jatka fishers and it is not effective in reducing jatka fishing, 
then a positive influence on ecological impact might be expected. Fishing dependence was 
represented by an index developed in Chapter 6, which primarily contrasts households with a 
                                                             
16 It is common for fishers to fish in groups on one boat owned by a relatively wealthy individual who 
does not fish but retains a large proportion of the catch or profit. 
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high dependence on fishing (those who own boats, use multiple fishing gears, fish illegally, have 
higher proportions of income from fishing, no agricultural land or other livelihoods) with less 
dependent households (those who have agricultural land and other livelihoods, do not own 
boats, use a single gear type, do not fish illegally and have lower proportions of income from 
fishing). Fishing dependence might be expected to have a positive effect on ecological impact 
because jatka fishers, who are generally viewed to have the greatest impact on hilsa 
populations, also tend to be more dependent on fishing than non-jatka fishers, according to 
results in Chapter 6. However, dependence is not necessarily positively associated with catch 
volume. In fact, households who are highly dependent may not have the means to catch large 
volumes of hilsa, and households who do catch large volumes are not necessarily highly 
dependent (Marshall et al. 2007). Collinearity among explanatory variables was explored using 
pairwise plots, chi-squared tests, and phi coefficients. Although there were some significant 
associations (see Section 4.3.1), correlations were weak (-0.5 > ɸ < 0.5, p < 0.05) or the 
variables were deemed to be different enough to have independent meaning. No meaningful 
interactions were found between explanatory variables. Exclusions due to missing data left 
sample sizes of 669 for Models 1 and 3, and 738 for Model 2.  
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Table 4.3: List, type and description of variables investigated through LMMs for potential relative ecological impact.  
Variables Type Description Expected 
influence 
Rationale 
Fixed effects     
Boat ownership Binary Households owns a boat (1) or does 
not own a boat (0) 
+ Households who own boats are likely to have the capacity to catch a 
greater volume of hilsa. 
Fishing location Binary Fishes in sea and river (1) or fishes 
only in river (0) 
+/- Catch characteristics may differ between those who fish in the sea and 
those who do not, due to hilsa life cycle, as may the impact of management 
(which is primarily targeting inland areas). 
Sanctuary area Binary Household lives within a sanctuary 
(1) or outside a sanctuary (0)  
+/- Households living in sanctuary areas may catch larger volumes of hilsa 
and target jatka more because these areas are thought to be most 
important for hilsa and may have benefited from management. On the 
other hand, targeting jatka may be less likely in these areas because 
enforcement efforts are focused here. 
Compensation 
area 
Binary Household lives in area where the 
compensation scheme operates (1) 
or in a control area (0) 
+/- Households outside of the compensation area may catch larger volumes of 
hilsa and target jatka more than those inside because there is less 
management in these areas. On the other hand, there may be lower 
availability of hilsa and jatka in these areas. 
Compensation 
recipient 
Binary Household receives compensation 
(1) or not (0) 
+/- Compensation is officially targeted towards jatka fishers, but recipients 
should be less likely to target jatka if the compensation is having its 
intended impact 
Gear diversity Binary Household uses 1 gear type (1) or > 
1 gear type (0) 
+/- Households who focus on one gear type may target jatka, but those that 
use many gear types may catch more fish 
Fishing 
dependence 
Continuous Index developed in Chapter 6 +/- Households who are very dependent on fishing tend to target jatka, but 
they also tend to be poor and are unlikely to have the capacity to catch the 
greatest volume of hilsa. 
     
Random effects     
District Categorical 6 level factor (models 1 & 3); or 8 level factor 
(model 2) 
19 level factor (models 1 & 3); or 23 level factor 
(model 2) 
 
Village Categorical  
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Table 4.4: Fixed effects included in each LMM for potential relative ecological impact of fishing 
households. Compensation area and sanctuary area were included in separate models for ease of 
interpretation: it is not possible for a household living outside of an area covered by the compensation 
scheme to also be living inside a sanctuary. Fishing dependence was included in a separate model because 
no values for fishing dependence were available for households outside of the compensation area, and 
because it incorporates boat ownership and gear diversity.  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Sanctuary area Compensation area Fishing dependence 
Compensation recipient Boat ownership  
Boat ownership Fishing location  
Fishing location Gear diversity  
Gear diversity   
 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Characterising the fishery 
Forty-seven per cent of hilsa fishing households in the study area reported use of only one gear 
type, 36 per cent reported use of two gear types and 15 per cent reported use of three gear 
types. In total, 22 different gear types were reported, but very few households reported use of 
more than three types (2 per cent). The most commonly reported gear was large-mesh chandi 
jal, a gillnet used mainly to catch hilsa (65 per cent of households); followed by current jal, an 
illegal monofilament gillnet used to target jatka (37 per cent of households); behundi jal, a set 
bagnet that targets a wide range of juvenile fish and small species that cannot move against the 
current (16 per cent of households); and poa jal, a gillnet that targets hilsa and some other fish 
(15 per cent of households). Fifty-four per cent of respondents only reported catching hilsa 
and/or jatka, while the remainder reported targeting other species as well. For self-identified 
jatka fishers, the most commonly reported gear was current jal (70 per cent of households), 
followed by chandi jal (50 per cent of households). Sixty-six per cent of households reported 
boat ownership, and 33 per cent reported fishing in both rivers and the sea, as opposed to the 
67 per cent who reported fishing only in rivers.  
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Significant associations were found between some household characteristics and fishing 
activities (see Table 4.5). For instance, living inside the compensation area was positively 
associated with river fishing (as opposed to sea fishing), with using more than one gear type, 
and with boat ownership. Living inside a sanctuary area was also positively associated with 
river fishing, and with more diverse gear. More diverse gear was positively associated with boat 
ownership and sea fishing, and sea fishing and boat ownership were also positively associated. 
Sea fishers reported significantly larger catches in peak and lean seasons. In peak season, 
households owning boats reported significantly larger catches. Reported catch was significantly 
higher by households outside the compensation area than inside, and inside sanctuary areas 
than outside, in both seasons. As would be expected from the hilsa life cycle, jatka fishing was 
positively associated with river fishing (Fig. 4.7). Jatka fishing was also positively associated 
with diverse gear (Fig. 4.8) and boat ownership. 
 
Figure 4.7: Bar plot showing the association between fishing location (dark grey = rivers, light grey = sea 
and rivers) and jatka fishing. 
No jatka Target jatka
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
s
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
139 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Bar plot showing the relationship between gear diversity (dark grey = 1 gear type, light grey = 
>1 gear type) and targeting jatka. 
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Table 4.5: Summary statistics of household characteristics and results of significant associations between them. 
Variables Summary statistics Significant associations 
Sanctuary area (1 = inside, 0 = outside) 1 = 65% Gear diversity (+) 
Sea fishing (-) 
Peak season catch volume (+) 
Lean season catch volume (+) 
 
χ2 = 6.15, df = 1, p < 0.05 
χ2 = 12.17; p < 0.001 
Wilcoxon rank sum test W = 49418, p < 0.0001 
Wilcoxon rank sum test W = 46146, p < 0.0001 
Compensation area (1 = inside, 0 = outside) 1 = 85% Gear diversity (+) 
Boat ownership (+) 
Sea fishing (-) 
Peak season catch volume (-) 
Lean season catch volume (-) 
 
χ2 = 11.27, df = 1, p < 0.0001 
χ2 = 38.37, df = 1, p < 0.0001 
χ2 = 13.28, df = 1, p < 0.001 
Wilcoxon rank sum test W = 13875, p < 0.0001 
Wilcoxon rank sum test W = 11444, p < 0.0001 
Compensation recipient (1 = recipient, 0 = non-
recipient) 
 
1 = 48% Sea fishing (-) 
Boat ownership (+) 
See also Chapter 6 
 
χ2 = 8.03, df = 1, p < 0.01 
χ2 = 6.79, df = 1, p < 0.01 
 
Gear diversity (1 = > 1 gear type, 0 = 1 gear 
type) 
 
1 = 52% Boat ownership (+) 
Jatka fishing (+) 
Sanctuary area (+) 
Compensation area (+) 
 
χ2 = 7.32, df = 1, p < 0.01 
χ2 = 44.53, df = 1, p < 0.0001 
χ2 = 6.15, df = 1, p < 0.05 
χ2 = 11.27, df = 1, p < 0.0001 
 
Boat ownership (1 = boat, 0 = no boat) 1 = 66% Sea fishing (+) 
Jatka fishing (+) 
Peak season catch volume (+) 
Compensation area (+) 
Compensation recipient (+) 
Gear diversity (+) 
 
χ2 = 6.15, df = 1, p < 0.05 
χ2 = 53.87, df = 1, p < 0.0001 
Wilcoxon rank sum test W = 51257, p < 0.001 
χ2 = 38.37, df = 1, p < 0.0001 
χ2 = 6.79, df = 1, p < 0.01 
χ2 = 7.32, df = 1, p < 0.01 
 
Fishing location (1 = sea and river, 0 = river 
only) 
1 = 33% Jatka fishing (-) 
Peak season catch volume (+) 
χ2 = 87.89, df = 1, p < 0.001 
Wilcoxon rank sum test W = 52387, p < 0.01 
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Lean season catch volume (+) 
Sanctuary area (-) 
Compensation area (-) 
Compensation recipient (-) 
Boat ownership (+) 
 
Wilcoxon rank sum test W = 51681, p < 0.01 
χ2 = 12.17; p < 0.001 
χ2 = 13.28, df = 1, p < 0.001 
χ2 = 8.03, df = 1, p < 0.01 
χ2 = 6.15, df = 1, p < 0.05 
Jatka fishing (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
 
1 = 52% Boat ownership (+) 
Sea fishing (-) 
Gear diversity (+) 
χ2 = 53.87, df = 1, p < 0.0001 
χ2 = 87.89, df = 1, p < 0.001 
χ2 = 44.53, df = 1, p < 0.0001 
 
Average hilsa catch volume per fishing trip in 
peak season (kg) 
 
Mean = 2.33; median 
= 2.00; SE = 0.06 
Sanctuary area (+) 
Compensation area (+) 
Sea fishing (+) 
Boat ownership (+) 
 
Wilcoxon rank sum test W = 49418, p < 0.0001 
Wilcoxon rank sum test W = 46146, p < 0.0001 
Wilcoxon rank sum test W = 52387, p < 0.01 
Wilcoxon rank sum test W = 51257, p < 0.001 
 
Average hilsa catch volume per fishing trip in 
lean season (kg) 
Mean = 0.90; median 
= 0.50; SE = 0.03 
Sanctuary area (+) 
Compensation area (+) 
Sea fishing (+) 
 
Wilcoxon rank sum test W = 46146, p < 0.0001 
Wilcoxon rank sum test W = 11444, p < 0.0001 
Wilcoxon rank sum test W = 51681, p < 0.01 
Fishing dependence Mean = 0.17; median 
= 0.10; SE = 0.02 
See Chapter 6 
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4.3.2 Ecological impact  
The potential relative impact of each selectivity regime on hilsa biomass under Fmax ranged from 
1 to 1.177 (Table 4.6). Targeting jatka was consistently the least damaging selectivity regime, 
under each level of F, and fishing across all age classes was consistently the most damaging, 
with the relative differences ranging from 6.1 per cent at the lowest F to 24.7 per cent at the 
highest F.  
Table 4.6: Relative levels of impact on hilsa population equilibrium biomass for each selectivity regime, 
and equilibrium biomass under the least damaging regime (targeting jatka) as a percentage of virgin 
biomass, under low (Fmax x 0.5), medium (Fmax) and high (Fmax x 2) levels of F, where F is the 
instantaneous rate of fishing mortality, and Fmax is the F at which maximum YPR was achieved. 
Fishing mortality  Selectivity regime impact 
 
 
Biomass under least 
damaging regime as 
percentage of virgin 
biomass 
 Targeting 
jatka 
Targeting 
adults 
All age classes  
Fmax x 0.5 (0.4) 1.000 1.061 1.111 94 
Fmax (0.8) 1.000 1.094 1.177 90 
Fmax x 2 (1.6) 1.000 1.119 1.247 83 
 
The range of the household-level ecological impact index was much larger (0.5-16.4 in peak 
season and 0-5.5 in lean season; Fig. 4.9). There was a strong positive correlation in household-
level ecological impact between fishing seasons, reflecting overall exploitation regimes in each 
season under Fmax (Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficient = 0.92, p < 0.0001). 
Because much greater volumes of fish are caught in peak season, subsequent analyses are 
presented only for peak season. 
The index was dominated much more by catch volume than selectivity. Because the jatka fishing 
variable was binary, only two of the selectivity regimes were represented in the household-level 
index (targeting adults and targeting jatka), and so the relative difference in selectivity under 
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Fmax was only 9.4 per cent. In contrast, the range of reported hilsa catch volumes was much 
wider (Fig. 4.10).  
 
Figure 4.9: Correlation of household-level potential relative ecological impact between peak and lean 
fishing seasons.  
                                 
Figure 4.10: Overlaid histogram showing the range of average volumes of hilsa caught per fishing trip 
(kg) in peak season, as reported by fishing households who self-identified as jatka fishers and those who 
did not. The darker blue is where the two groups overlap. 
0 5 10 15
0
1
2
3
4
5
Peak season ecological impact
L
e
a
n
 s
e
a
s
o
n
 e
c
o
lo
g
ic
a
l 
im
p
a
c
t
144 
 
4.3.3 Correlates of household-level ecological impact threat 
Boat ownership and fishing location were included as fixed effects in the final selected model for 
Model 1 (Table 4.7). The linear coefficients estimated by the model indicated that the 
households with the greatest potential ecological impact are those who own boats and fish in 
the sea. Living in sanctuary areas, gear diversity and receiving compensation were not 
significant explanatory variables (See Table B.2 for model selection). The top models (with and 
without sanctuary area) had very similar AICc values, but the sanctuary area had a high 
standard error, and so was not informative. The most parsimonious model was therefore 
selected. 
Plotting the BLUPs for each district (Fig. 4.11a) also showed an effect of geography on ecological 
impact, once fixed effects were taken into account. They indicated that households in Chandpur 
district have the greatest potential ecological impact, while those in Barisal have the lowest. An 
effect can also be seen of village on potential ecological impact (Fig. B.3a), but such fine-scale 
variation is beyond the scope of the study. 
When sanctuary area and compensation recipient were removed from the global model to look 
instead at the effect of compensation area (Model 2), the effects of boat ownership and sea 
fishing remained similar, but the coefficient estimated for compensation area indicated that 
households living inside a compensation area have a lower potential ecological impact than 
those in control areas (Table 4.7; see Table B.3 for model selection). The BLUPs showed a 
similar pattern in terms of the district effect on ecological impact, and the most extreme 
districts were those outside the compensation areas (Fig. 4.11b). Households in Cox’s Bazar 
district now appeared to have the greatest ecological impact, and those in Rajbari district the 
lowest (Fig. 4.12a). The conditional R2 was much higher than the marginal R2 for all models, 
indicating that the random effects explain the most substantial portion of variance. 
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When fishing dependence was tested as a fixed effect, it was not a significant explanatory 
variable, and so it was not included in the final model for Model 3 (Table 4.7; see Table B.4 for 
model selection). BLUPs are not presented for Model 3 due to the lack of fixed effects. 
Comparing the distribution of the BLUPs for the random effect of district on overall ecological 
impact (Fig. 4.12a) with those on the individual elements of selectivity (Fig. 4.12b) and catch 
volume (Fig. 4.12c), clearly demonstrates that the index of overall ecological impact is 
dominated more by catch volume than selectivity. 
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Table 4.7: Coefficient estimates (with standard errors) for LMMs with household-level ecological impact index as the response variable, where (Model 1) 
sanctuary and compensation recipient were included as fixed effects in the global model instead of compensation area; (Model 2) compensation area was included 
as a fixed effect instead of sanctuary and compensation recipient; and (Model 3) where only an index of fishing dependence was included rather than individual 
variables which make up the index (includes boat ownership). Random effects estimates of variance are also presented [with standard deviation]. Model1: R2m = 
0.149; R2c = 0.510; based on 669 households from 19 villages in 6 districts. Model 2: R2m = 0.163; R2c = 0.735; based on 738 households from 23 villages in 8 
districts. Model3: R2m = 0; R2c = 0.280; based on 669 households from 19 villages in 6 districts. 
Model 1: Sanctuary and compensation recipient   Model 2: Compensation area  Model 3: Fishing dependence 
Fixed effects Estimate t value  Fixed effects Estimate t value  Fixed effects Estimate t value 
Intercept 0.336 (0.125) 2.693   Intercept 0.342 (0.215 )      1.588  Intercept 0.612 6.711 
Boat ownership 0.381 (0.036)  10.672   Compensation area - 0.778 (0.431)  1.806     
Fishing location 0.243 (0.055)  4.397   Boat ownership 0.373 (0.033)    11.156     
     Fishing location 0.254 (0.055)    4.652     
Random effects     Random effects    Random effects   
Village 0.026 [0.160]    Village  0.022 [0.147]  Village  0.101 [0.101]  
District 0.034 [0.185]    District 0.264 [0.514]  District 0.055 [0.234]  
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Figure 4.11: BLUPs for the random effect of district for (a) Model 1, where bold names represent 
districts that are outside sanctuary areas; and (b) Model 2, where bold names represent control areas 
outside compensation areas. The x axes show the effect of living in a particular district in terms of the 
difference in ecological impact from the intercept. Error bars show the 95% confidence interval based on 
the conditional variance for each random effect.  
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Figure 4.12a: Map showing the distribution of household-level ecological impact between districts, 
where -0.75 is low impact and +0.75 is high impact. Distribution derived from the BLUPS of Model 2. 
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Figure 4.12b: Map showing the distribution of household-level impact (according to size selectivity only) 
between districts, where -0.038 is low impact (more jatka fishers) and 0.419 is high impact (fewer jatka 
fishers). The values were derived from a binomial  generalised linear mixed effects model with the 
probability of targeting jatka as the response variable and district and village as grouping factors in the 
random effects, from which I extracted the best linear unbiased predictors for the district random effect 
(Table B.5). 
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Figure 4.12c: Map showing the distribution of household-level impact (according to catch volume only) 
between districts, where -0.510 is low impact (smaller catch volumes) and 1.264 is high impact (greater 
catch volumes). The values were derived from a linear mixed effects model with catch volume (log 
transformed) as the response variable and district and village as grouping variables in the random effects, 
from which I extracted the best linear unbiased predictors for the district random effect (Table B.5). 
 
 
 
4.4 Discussion 
4.4.1 Fishery-level ecological impact  
The relative impacts of harvesting jatka vs. adults on hilsa population biomass suggest that the 
current focus of hilsa management on the protection of jatka may not be the most effective 
approach. Under Fmax, the impact of fishing adults was 9.4 per cent higher than that of fishing 
jatka, and the impact of fishing across all age classes was 17.7 per cent higher. The relatively 
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low impact of fishing jatka can be explained by the steep S-R curve of hilsa, which is indicative of 
recruitment with very low density-dependence (Beddington & Kirkwood 2005). Under double 
Fmax, the relative impacts of fishing adults and of fishing all age classes increased to 11.9 per cent 
and 24.9 per cent, respectively, and under half Fmax, they decreased to 6.1 per cent and 11.1 per 
cent. This pattern indicates that hilsa populations are more sensitive to the rate of their 
exploitation than to size selectivity. Meta-analyses of large empirical datasets for North East 
Atlantic fish stocks have shown the effect of exploitation rates on stock status to be stronger 
than that of size selectivity (Vasilakopoulos et al. 2011, 2012), while slightly different methods 
have shown selectivity to be more influential for spawning stock biomass and yield 
(Vasilakopoulos et al. 2015). Ultimately, the relative impacts of exploitation rate and size 
selectivity will depend on Fmax/M for a species, which tends to increase with recruitment 
steepness (Beddington & Kirkwood 2005; Zhou et al. 2012). For abundant, short-lived species 
like hilsa, where lots of juveniles are dying anyway, exploitation rate is expected to be more 
important.  
An interaction can be seen between exploitation rate and size selectivity in hilsa: the doubling of 
F exacerbates the size of effect of size selectivity on hilsa biomass, although the pattern of the 
effect remains fairly constant. The effect might have been expected to get much larger at high F, 
but even at double Fmax targeting jatka only reduced equilibrium biomass to 83 per cent of virgin 
biomass. This suggests that, as a result of early maturation, high intrinsic growth rate and high 
reproductive rates, hilsa are very resilient to high levels of F. These results are consistent with 
studies that show evidence of high resilience in clupeids (Hutchings 2000; Thorpe et al. 2015) 
and of higher sensitivity to exploitation, and thus lower fishing mortality reference points, in 
larger species of fish (Le Quesne & Jennings 2012; Fung et al. 2015).   
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4.4.2 Household-level ecological impact  
Household-level relative potential ecological impact, as defined by reported hilsa catch volume 
and size selectivity, follows a spatial pattern clearly reflected in the random effect of district. 
Modelling indicated that households in Cox’s Bazar have the greatest ecological impact, followed 
by those in Chandpur, whereas those in Rajbari, Barisal, and Barguna have the lowest impact. 
Breaking the index of ecological impact down into its individual components of selectivity and 
catch volume showed that these district-level differences were driven largely by catch volume. 
Households in Cox’s Bazar and Chandpur reported the greatest hilsa catch volumes, and Barisal, 
Barguna and Rajbari the least. Cox’s Bazar is a district with both private and Government-
owned marine landings centres, and Chandpur is a major inland hilsa landings site, so it follows 
that fishing effort is high in these districts where households have easy access to stocks. The 
distribution of size selectivity was quite different (more jatka fishing households in Rajbari, 
Barisal, and Bhola than in Cox’s Bazar, Patuakhali, and Laxmipur), but this was not reflected so 
much in the index because selectivity only puts a 9.4 per cent weighting on catch volume. 
Modelling also showed that households who own boats and fish in the sea have a greater 
potential ecological impact than those without boats and fishing only in rivers, although these 
factors were much less important than spatial factors. Given the positive associations of boat 
ownership and sea fishing with greater catch volumes, and the clear dominance of catch volume 
in the impact index, it follows that these effects are largely driven by their influence on catch 
volumes. This could be a reflection of the state of stocks in marine vs. riverine environments, or 
it could be a reflection of levels of fishing effort: coastal fishers are more likely to use larger 
mechanised boats and therefore have a greater fishing capacity. River fishers, on the other hand, 
are more likely to be jatka fishers, and so have less influence on the index. Although boat 
ownership was also significantly associated with more diverse gear use (as was jatka fishing) 
there was no significant association between gear diversity and catch volume, and modelling did 
not show a significant effect of gear diversity on ecological impact.  
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Living inside a compensation area was a significant negative correlate of ecological impact. This 
can be explained by the two extremes represented by the control districts. Cox’s Bazar is 
characterised by large hilsa catch volumes and few jatka fishers, whereas Rajbari is 
characterised by low hilsa catch volumes but lots of jatka fishing. This could be interpreted as 
evidence of an inappropriate spatial focus of the compensation scheme, not just socially 
(Chapter 6) but also in ecological terms (Chapter 5). On the other hand, households living in 
areas where the compensation scheme operates may be less likely to target jatka as a result of 
the scheme and associated management, as is intended – but there is limited evidence for this 
(Chapter 5). Although the existence of a sanctuary area was not found to be a significant 
correlate in this study, it would be worth further investigation. Management is more intensive 
inside sanctuary areas, which could be having a positive impact on catch volume. On the other 
hand, this impact could be masked by the fact that any compliance with the sanctuary fishing 
bans should actually reduce catch volumes during peak season. 
The fact that fishing dependence was not a significant correlate of ecological impact indicates 
that the households most in need of compensation, in terms of vulnerability reduction (see 
Chapter 6), are not the same ones who are catching the most hilsa, and hence who have the 
greatest potential to contribute to ecological additionality. This is the same result that would be 
expected if households had already reduced their ecological impact as a result of compensation, 
but receiving compensation had no significant effect on ecological impact and evidence from 
Chapter 5 suggests that such an effect is unlikely.  
4.4.3 Study limitations 
The simplicity of the population model used in this study imposed some limitations: for 
example, it assumed that all selected age classes are equally vulnerable to capture when, in fact, 
different gears have different selection patterns; it assumed constant M across all age classes; 
and it assumed a jump from 0 to 100 per cent maturity from the first age class to the second, 
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which is not realistic. As a deterministic model it also assumed constant recruitment, ignoring 
stochastic fluctuations, but deterministic analyses can provide reasonable guides to average 
behaviour of stocks (Beddington & Kirkwood 2005). Moreover, the model did not take into 
account that large, old hilsa may have a much higher fecundity than smaller and younger fish. If 
the data were available, further investigation might show more severe biomass impacts of 
targeting adult fish, potentially in specific spawning areas. For analysis of impact at the 
household level, measures to improve the quality of the household survey data on size 
selectivity would therefore be useful, allowing an exploration of the impact on biomass of 
catching small, medium and large fish (rather than just jatka vs. adults) and thus of the potential 
impact of selecting or protecting megaspawners, which could be just as, or more, important 
(Froese 2004). Ideally, further investigation should be based on actual fishing behaviour, rather 
than reported average selectivity and catch volumes, which can be unreliable. More precision on 
where, exactly, households fish, beyond the district in which they live and whether they fish in 
the sea or not, might also shed more light on the spatial distribution of household-level impact.   
It is important to acknowledge the potential uncertainties in the LHP values used in this study – 
particularly steepness, which is much less easy to estimate than other parameters and was not 
specifically estimated for hilsa (Beddington & Kirkwood 2005; Zhou et al. 2012). Within the 
Clupeidae family, estimates of steepness range from 2.1 to 31.9, and it is not known how close 
the median value actually is to the specific value for hilsa (Myers et al. 1999). Furthermore, the 
analysis of household-level impact depends on the assumption of F = 0.8, but predicting 
reference points – whether from established relationships among life history traits or directly 
from life history parameter (LHP) data – entails uncertainties (Le Quesne & Jennings 2012; 
Garcia-Carreras 2015; Thorpe et al. 2015). Per-recruit models are very sensitive to changes in 
input parameters, and the value of Fmax in particular, as opposed to, say, F0.1, is sensitive to small 
changes in these parameters (Hordyk et al. 2014, 2015; Garcia-Carreras 2015). However, the 
sensitivity analysis showed final results to be minimally affected by doubling and halving F. It is 
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unclear to what extent these rates actually reflect the reality of the hilsa fishery, but given that 
estimates of F for hilsa range from 1.25 up to 2.49 (Chapter 3), it is probable that reference 
points used in this study are reasonably conservative.  
Finally, the analysis of overall fishery-level impact assumed that all households follow the same 
fishing regime (i.e., fishing jatka or adults) under a reference F, while the analysis of household-
level impact applied that overall selectivity impact, relative to the situation in which everyone is 
following the least damaging fishing activity, in a context where a wide range of selectivity and 
catch volume combinations actually exist. This is of course an oversimplification, but a useful 
first step to understanding the hilsa fishery in the absence of a proper stock assessment. The 
study adds to a growing body of literature showing that rapid assessments and prediction of 
biological reference points are possible even when only minimal LHP data are available, and 
that some form of management advice can still be provided in such circumstances (Beddington 
& Kirkwood 2005; Zhou et al. 2011; Le Quesne & Jennings 2012; Garcia-Carreras 2015; Thorpe 
et al. 2015).  
4.4.4 Conclusions 
The implications of this research for fisheries policy in Bangladesh are two-fold: firstly, it does 
not support the current focus of management on the protection of jatka; and, secondly, it 
provides evidence of the potential benefits of effort reduction. Calls have been made for an 
increased focus on input controls such as entry regulations, as opposed to output controls such 
as size limits, in small-scale, developing-world fisheries (Purcell & Pomeroy 2015). 
Recommendations for increased effort control in the hilsa fishery have been made before and 
rejected on the basis that it would not be practical when monitoring and enforcement are so 
poor, and that it would simply result in increased competition between vessels (Mome & 
Arnason 2007). However, the potential value – both in terms of hilsa biomass and the 
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socioeconomic wellbeing of hilsa fishers – of focusing on moderating rates of exploitation 
should be considered.   
It should also be noted that the impacts of a particular selectivity regime depend on what scale 
one is working at: the target population, the fish community or the entire ecosystem (Fauconett 
& Rochet 2016). As in most commercial fisheries, full implementation of balanced harvesting as 
part of EBFM may not be viable in Bangladesh, where human preferences and markets drive 
demand for hilsa over other species, and where the capacity and detailed knowledge for the 
approach have not yet been developed (Breen et al. 2016; Reid et al. 2016). However, given the 
weaknesses of single-species management (Chapter 5), development of this work to explore 
ecological impact more broadly, using multi-species models, would be valuable in steering 
management towards a more sustainable ecosystem-based approach.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Exploring the ecological additionality of hilsa fishery management in 
Bangladesh 
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5.1 Introduction 
Conservation interventions should have ecological additionality; i.e., measureable conservation 
benefit over and above what would have happened anyway (Maron et al. 2013). Uncertainties 
surrounding this additionality raise questions around cost-effectiveness (Wunder et al. 2008; 
Narloch et al. 2011), which, given the limited resources available, is essential in developing-
world fisheries management. But, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, additionality is difficult to 
measure and commonly ignored. Impact evaluations in the conservation literature have started 
to incorporate counterfactual scenarios (e.g. Sánchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007; Andam et al. 2008; 
Pagiola & Rios 2008; Gurney et al. 2015), but it is only the use of ex-ante counterfactual 
scenarios which allows attribution of additionality to specific actions or behaviours, and since 
these are rarely developed early in the design process, attribution is often problematic (2013; 
Maron et al. 2013).  
Nevertheless, when the data required by rigorous impact evaluations are unavailable, 
potentially useful studies of additionality can still be conducted by piecing together 
understanding from patchy and disparate primary data, and from a range of secondary sources. 
Although these approaches cannot provide assessments of true net benefit, they can provide an 
indication of confidence in or scope for additionality. For instance, in data-poor fisheries, 
extrapolation methods of evaluation such as the Robin Hood Approach (which steals 
information  and understanding from data-rich fisheries to give to the data-poor) are sometimes 
the only tools available to managers, and can provide them with a starting point for the 
development of precautionary management methods (Honey et al. 2010). Understanding or 
data from similar species or neighbouring populations can also be used to help inform 
management decisions – an approach that has been explored in Australian multi-species trawl 
fisheries (Smith et al. 2009). Similarly, fisheries modelling studies often substitute data from 
similar species and stocks elsewhere when local data are unavailable (Pilling et al. 2008). For 
159 
 
example, an exploration of marine mammal-fishery interactions in the Barents Sea transferred 
data from the North Sea, which is more data rich (Blanchard et al. 2002). 
Expert or experiential knowledge and perceptions can also be useful when data are limited 
(Fazey et al. 2006; Bennett 2016). Fishers’ ecological knowledge can complement the use of 
scientific knowledge in decision-making, and can be used to test hypotheses formulated using 
more conventional scientific knowledge (Neis et al. 1999; Johannes 2000; Wilson et al. 2006; 
Silvano & Valbo-Jørgensen 2008; Daw et al. 2011b; Gaspare et al. 2015). Because of their 
dependence on local resources, small-scale artisanal fishing communities can be highly aware of 
their impacts on the populations from which they harvest and provide valuable insights into 
their behaviour and ecology (Aswani & Hamilton 2004; Silvano & Begossi 2005, 2009; Drew 
2005; Ramires et al. 2015). Stakeholder perceptions, which might be based on this knowledge, 
can support rapid impact assessments when environments for evaluation are challenging 
(Carey et al. 2003; Sainsbury et al. 2015). Often overlooked in the pursuit of scientific evidence 
of additionality, local perceptions are ultimately just as important in determining whether an 
intervention fails or succeeds (Bennett 2016). 
The Bangladesh hilsa fishery is typical of the developing world in its limited availability and 
reliability of data. Through an analysis of the available literature, ecological data, local 
knowledge and perceptions, and understanding from other fisheries, this chapter will explore 
whether a package of carrot-and-stick management interventions in the Bangladesh hilsa 
fishery: a) has scope for additionality in the future; and b) has had any additional impact to date. 
I will first explore the potential for additionality through the development of a post hoc theory of 
change for hilsa management. Since hilsa management seeks to produce behavioural and 
ecological change (DoF 2002), an understanding of potential ecological impact must take into 
account not only ecological context but also institutional, economic and social contexts. Drawing 
on the field of evaluation (Rogers & Weiss 2007), theory of change is increasingly used in the 
design, implementation, and impact evaluation of initiatives intended to support development 
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outcomes (Anderson 2005; Vogel 2012, 2013). The approach involves mapping out anticipated 
pathways between management interventions, the assumptions underlying these anticipated 
pathways, the issues and context they are seeking to influence, and the longer-term social, 
economic and ecological outcomes. As such, it is both a process and a product supporting critical 
analysis of the contextual conditions that influence the interventions and of the assumptions 
which underpin the logical pathways (Vogel 2013). Using the counterfactuals developed in 
Chapter 3 as a guide, I will explore the validity of my reconstructed theory of change by 
assessing the evidence behind the underpinning assumptions. 
Next, I will explore recent spatial and temporal trends in the fishery and perceptions of current 
management, with a view to identifying any impacts which the management could potentially 
have had. Because data are not available for formal evaluation and perceptions are subjective, I 
cannot make a causal link between ecological trends (or perceived ecological trends) and 
management interventions, but correlative evidence can still be useful in fisheries management 
when experimental evidence is unavailable, as long as the full range of possible causal 
mechanisms are considered (Hilborn 2016). Even if additionality is not demonstrated in 
practice, I expect to see an indication of whether there is scope for current management to have 
had additionality. This should inform the development and improvement of hilsa fishery 
management interventions and provide an indication of whether an increased focus on either 
carrots or sticks would be more effective. 
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Data collection 
Primary data was collected through key informant interviews (KIIs; i.e., interviews with 
individuals selected on the basis of their expert knowledge of the hilsa fishery) and a fishing 
household survey. I conducted unstructured interviews based around a list of key topics (e.g. 
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the constraints, limitations, and strengths of hilsa fisheries management, and the impact of the 
compensation scheme; see Appendix C.1) with 36 key informants (KIs) in Bangladesh. I selected 
KIs from local and international NGOs, Government officials from different tiers (central 
Government, local administrations, Department of Fisheries, and Bangladesh Fisheries Research 
Institute), academic institutions, and the hilsa supply chain in Chandpur – an important district 
for hilsa fishing and the one where the compensation scheme has been operating the longest 
(see Table 5.1). I placed emphasis on allowing the KIs to speak, only redirecting or encouraging 
them when they went off topic or had something particularly notable to say (Newing 2011). I 
conducted initial interviews in May 2014, but continued some conversations intermittently up 
until July 2015. The theory of change reconstruction was based on my understanding of current 
fishing regulations and associated management, as set out in the Hilsa Fisheries Management 
Action Plan (HFMAP; DoF 2002), on discussions with KIs, and on context from Chapter 3. 
Table 5.1: Breakdown of key informants (KIs) by sector. Interviews are referred to in the text using 
codes. 
Sector Number of KIs Code 
Department of Fisheries (DoF) representatives17  6 D1-6 
Local Government officials (non-DoF) 2 L1-2 
Central Government officials18 (non-DoF) 1 C1 
Bangladesh Fisheries Research Institute (BFRI)* scientists 2 R1-2 
Local NGO representatives 6 LN1-6 
International NGO representatives 6 IN1-6 
Industry stakeholders (middlemen)  5 M1-5 
Industry stakeholders (members of fishers and boat owners associations) 3 F1-3 
Academics working in Bangladesh 5 A1-5 
*Autonomous organisation under administration of Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock 
900 fishing households were interviewed in a survey described in detail in Appendix B.1. 
Households were sampled from within and outside sanctuary areas and from control sites 
outside the area where the compensation scheme operates (Fig. 5.1). Sections of the 
questionnaire used in this study asked about household characteristics, fishing activities, hilsa 
                                                             
17 The DoF has representatives at each level of Government administration down to sub-district (see 
Chapter 3). 
18 See Chapter 3 and Appendix A.1 for a summary of the administrative hierarchy. District- and division-
level administrations are led by central Government. 
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trends and status, and the compensation scheme (see Appendix C.2). The questionnaire did not 
address alternative livelihood support because coverage of this management approach is so 
low. The decision was made as a research team to use the last five years as a time frame, where 
questions required one, because there are no scientific data currently available for the fishery 
post-2009, and because little is known about the quality of information provided in interviews 
with long recall periods (Jones et al. 2008). 
 
Figure 5.1: Map of study area, showing study site districts (grey) in relation to sanctuary sites (red). 
Control study sites are outside of the area where the compensation scheme operates. Each study site 
represents the approximate location of a cluster of surveyed villages, denoted by the relevant district 
name (precise village coordinates were not available). In Barisal and Bhola districts two village clusters 
were sampled and can be distinguished by the sub-district names (in brackets); in the other districts just 
one village cluster was sampled.  
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5.2.2 Statistical analysis 
Where possible, binomial generalised linear mixed effects models (GLMMs) were used to test 
potential associations between perceptions and contextual variables. A GLMM allows data to 
exhibit correlation and non-constant variance, and so accommodates a range of types of 
response and explanatory variables, as well as random effects (Zuur et al. 2009).  Models were 
fitted with: a) the probability of a fisher saying that hilsa catch was increasing from year to year; 
and b) the probability of a fisher saying that egg/fry presence was increasing from year to year 
as binary response variables (1 = increases; 0 = decreases or stays the same). There was not 
enough variation in answers to the question on fish size for statistical analysis. The GLMMs 
were fitted as random intercept models with district and village as grouping factors in the 
random effects and a logit link function. The best random effects structures were selected using 
likelihood ratio tests and validation plots (Bolker et al. 2009), and models were run with 
Laplace approximation using the package lme4 (Bates et al. 2015) in R version 3.2.3 (R 
Development Core Team 2016). 
A summary and description of fixed effects can be found in Table 5.2. Continuous fixed effects 
were standardised by two standard deviations for direct comparison of coefficients following 
model averaging (Gelman 2008; Grueber et al. 2011). I included compensation area because if 
the compensation is having an impact on rule compliance or hilsa populations, or affecting 
answers, it might be expected that these effects would be seen more in areas covered by the 
scheme than control areas. I tested sanctuary area for a similar reason – if the fishing bans in the 
sanctuary areas are effective and having an impact on hilsa populations, the impacts are most 
likely to have been seen by households in these areas. The other fixed effects were included due 
to their potential influence on fisher perceptions, although the expected direction of influence 
was unclear for most of these.  
Collinearity among explanatory variables was explored using pairwise plots, chi-squared tests, 
and phi coefficients. None of the variables were significantly correlated (p > 0.05) or only 
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weakly correlated (-0.5 > ɸ < 0.5, p < 0.05). An information-theoretic approach to model 
selection was taken; all possible combinations of explanatory variables were fitted using 
Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation procedures with the R package MuMIn (Barton 2016), 
and top candidate models were selected according to the corrected Akaike Information 
Criterion (AICc; Burnham & Anderson 2002; Bolker et al. 2009). No models were clearly 
superior (weights of top models were < 0.9), so those with ΔAICc < 4 were re-run using 
Restricted Maximum Likelihood (REML) estimation procedures for accurate parameter 
estimates (Zuur et al. 2009), which were then averaged across these models, allowing relative 
variable importance to be determined (Burnham & Anderson 2002; Grueber et al. 2011). 
Coefficients were presented for the full average, rather than the subset or conditional average, 
which has a tendency of biasing the values away from zero (Barton 2016). Models were checked 
for residual normality, heteroskedasticity and correlations between fixed effects and the 
residuals. To analyse spatial effects on the probability of receiving compensation, I estimated 
best linear unbiased predictors (BLUPs) from the global models, which measured the residual 
effect associated with each random effect (district and village within district). BLUPs, or 
conditional modes, can be conceptualised as the equivalent of the linear coefficients found for 
the explanatory variables (noting that they are not, strictly speaking, parameters). For all 
models, BLUPS were checked for bias in the order in which villages were visited and no pattern 
was found. Since women do not engage in hilsa fishing, 136 households with female 
respondents were excluded from analysis. 25 further households had missing data and were 
excluded from analysis. 
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Table 5.2: List, type and description of variables investigated through GLMMs for the probability of saying hilsa catch (kg) or egg/fry presence was increasing from 
year to year.  
                                                             
19 These variables were included in separate models due to convergence issues: compensation area was not included where sanctuary and compensation were 
included, because it is impossible for a household living outside of an area covered by the compensation scheme to also be receiving compensation or living inside a 
sanctuary. 
20 Juvenile hilsa, officially defined as hilsa of up to 25 cm in length (Islam et al. 2014). 
Variables Type Description Expected influence Rationale 
Fixed effects     
Sanctuary 
area19 
Binary Household lives within a 
sanctuary (1) or outside a 
sanctuary (0)  
+ If fishing bans are effective then households fishing inside or near 
sanctuaries should be more likely to perceive an increase in catch 
than those fishing outside. 
Jatka20 fishing Binary Household targets jatka (1) or not 
(0) 
+/- Jatka fishers probably use different gears which could influence 
catch volume. 
Compensation 
recipient3 
Binary Household receives compensation 
(1) or not (0)  
+ Compensation recipients might be expected to say they see an 
increase in order to show support for the scheme. 
Compensation 
area3 
Binary Household lives in area where the 
compensation scheme operates 
(1) or in a control area (0) 
+ If the compensation scheme is effective then households living in an 
area where the scheme operated may be less likely to perceive an 
increase than those outside these areas. 
Age Continuous Years +/- Age, and therefore length of time a recipient has been fishing, may 
affect the time-frame in which a respondent considers their 
observations. 
Awareness  Binary Aware of all management 
interventions (1) or not (0) 
+/- Awareness may influence perceived trends; either through wishing 
to express support for the intervention or because they live in an 
area where the intervention has been effective. 
Fishing location Binary Fishes in sea and river (1) or 
fishes only in river (0) 
+/- Catch characteristics may differ between those who fish in the sea 
and those who do not, and so may the impact of management (which 
is primarily targeting inland areas). 
Random effects     
District Categorical 8 level factor   
Village Categorical 23 level factor   
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5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Theory of change for hilsa management  
In Bangladesh, the Department of Fisheries (DoF) has established the HFMAP, which is a suite of 
management actions for the sustainable management and development of hilsa fisheries 
(Chapter 3; DoF 2002). Although the word ‘conservation’ is used in the HFMAP, it should be 
noted that the recommendations that have been taken forward are focused on sustaining and 
increasing hilsa production (DoF 2002). They aim to control exploitation patterns (i.e., gear, 
location, and season) rather than exploitation rates, as is the case in many small-scale fisheries 
where resources for monitoring and enforcement are limited. These actions, and therefore their 
potential for ecological additionality, are based on a set of assumptions about hilsa life history, 
management implementation, and social-ecological context. Here I reconstruct an implied 
theory of change, based on the regulations that have been implemented from the HFMAP (DoF 
2002), showing the theoretical causal pathways between management actions and outcomes, 
and describing the key assumptions on which they appear to be based (Fig. 5.2). Using the 
baseline and positive counterfactual from the frame of reference (Chapter 3), KIIs, and fishers’ 
perceptions, I explore the validity of this theory of change by assessing qualitatively the 
available evidence for each of these underlying assumptions. Following these individual 
evaluations, I summarise the strength of support for each assumption and the level of 
importance of each assumption in determining the potential for a given management action to 
contribute to sustainability (Table 5.5). 
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Figure 5.2: Reconstructed theory of change for hilsa fisheries management in Bangladesh. Sharp squares 
are management regulations that have been implemented, rounded squares are theoretical management 
outcomes, dotted lines are potentially negative side-effects of management and circled numbers 
represent the assumptions supporting the logical connections between boxes. AL = alternative livelihood. 
168 
 
Assumption 1: Overfishing is a substantive threat to hilsa stocks 
Current hilsa fisheries management is driven by concerns about growth and recruitment 
overfishing (DoF 2002; Haldar 2004). Chapter 3 presented the limited and often conflicting 
literature behind these concerns, much of which is based on unreliable national catch and effort 
statistics. For instance, estimates of catch per unit effort (CPUE) from the artisanal marine hilsa 
fishery declined between 1984 and 2006 (Mome & Arnason 2007; Sharma 2012). One local NGO 
KI (LN1) said that ‘the Government increases production every year by pen and paper’, while an 
international NGO KI (IN1) said that catch statistics are ‘probably quite conservative’. The latter 
statement is validated by a catch reconstruction of marine fisheries in Bangladesh, which 
indicates that national catch statistics are grossly underestimated (Ullah et al. 2014). Total hilsa 
catch is thought by these authors to have been underestimated by 19 per cent since 1950. 
However, since the majority of hilsa fishing activities occur inland (100,000 vessels estimated 
inland as opposed to 25,000 in the marine; see Chapter 3) conclusions should not be drawn 
from marine data only. Although accurate inland effort data is unavailable (inland vessels do not 
require registration or licensing), the proportion of total hilsa catches coming from the inland 
fishery has declined dramatically (Chapter 3). It is of course true that, in isolation, a decline in 
catch rates is not evidence of overfishing (Kolding & van Zwieten 2011). However, the observed 
and projected growth in human populations in coastal and inland areas will undoubtedly be 
placing heavy fishing pressure on hilsa populations (Chapter 3; Fernandes et al. 2015).  
Length-frequency data analysis has also been used to estimate exploitation levels over time 
(Amin et al. 2002, 2004, 2008; Haldar 2004; Rahman & Cowx 2008; BOBLME 2010). Although 
highly uncertain and variable, these studies did show a gradual overall increase in fishing 
mortality from 1992 to 2009, a decline in size at first capture, and quite consistent evidence of 
overexploitation (see Chapter 3). Haldar (2004) also found evidence for the overexploitation of 
jatka. Only one of these studies, however, analysed marine and inland populations separately 
(Rahman & Cowx 2008). This study concluded that both were still under the limit of maximum 
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acceptable effort, but that the inland fishery was more vulnerable to overexploitation than the 
marine. A productivity-susceptibility analysis (PSA) of hilsa stocks in the Bay of Bengal (BoB) 
identified a declining trend in most of its productivity parameters (fecundity, catch rates, 
growth rates, age composition, mortality index, probability of breeding), concluding that despite 
evidence of recruitment overfishing in Bangladesh, stocks are not depleted or in need of 
rebuilding (BOBLME 2010, 2011a). Systems dynamics simulation modelling based on 
population parameters from length-frequency data analysis also suggested that, although stocks 
are under severe stress and vulnerable to overfishing, they are not in decline under current 
harvesting practice (Bala et al. 2014). Nevertheless, their projections showed that an increase in 
fishing pressure on jatka and adults could lead to a collapse by 2020. A recent study of marine 
hilsa production also found estimates of fishing mortality rate in the literature to be much 
higher than that modelled for MSY, and projected a collapse of the marine hilsa fishery by 2030 
without more sustainable management (Fernandes et al. 2015)  
Concerns about overfishing are supported by periodic inland surveys of experimental CPUE, 
with some authors noting a slight decline between 1998 and 2011, although these surveys are 
not directly comparable and should not be interpreted as time-series (BOBLME 2011b; Rahman 
& Bhaumik 2012b). Similarly, declines in jatka abundance have been reported following 
government surveys of experimental CPUE (Haldar 2004), although reliability is again 
questionable; one fisheries scientist (KI R1) even admitted to a culture of downplaying jatka 
abundance to fishers in an attempt to reduce fishing pressure. 
Even without reliable stock assessments, it is clear that hilsa are subject to intense and 
increasing fishing pressure, and KI fisheries scientists from a range of sectors were of the view 
that this pressure is a great threat to the fishery (R1; R2; IN1; IN3; A2; A3; A4; A5). On the other 
hand, population modelling in Chapter 4 indicates that hilsa are extremely resilient to this 
pressure. However, there are numerous environmental factors which may also be driving 
change in the fishery (Chapter 3; Fernandes et al. 2015). Because of their life history (Chapter 
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4), hilsa are susceptible to the perturbations in not just marine, but also estuarine and 
freshwater environments, caused by climate change, pollution, deforestation, siltation and 
water diversion activities. Although the effects of these perturbations are not well understood in 
hilsa, species with similar life cycles tend to have strong environmental signals. American shad 
(Alosa sapidissima), for example, have a strong behavioural response to environmental 
fluctuations; the timing of their spawning migrations varies with latitude and inter-annual 
variation is correlated with river temperature (Mansueti & Kolb 1953; Quinn & Adams 1996). 
Because American shad spawn within their migratory pathways and have a brief larval period, 
the environments experienced by returning adults and their spawn are very similar, and so 
adults behaviourally adjust the timing of their migration and spawning in order to optimise 
conditions for their young, in response to environmental variation. Larval survival is thus 
strongly affected by environmental conditions (Crecco & Savoy 1987). Given the similarities 
between the early life history of American shad and hilsa, inter-annual fluctuations in 
abundance of hilsa could be just as much due to environmental change as stock size.  
Indeed, a significant inter-annual variability has been observed in projections of hilsa 
production under projected climate change and associated river flow, nutrient loadings and 
ocean conditions (Fernandes et al. 2015). Although no causal links have yet been established 
between drivers of environmental change and changes in hilsa abundance or distribution, 
production is projected to decline with climate change, even under sustainable levels of fishing 
mortality (Fernandes et al. 2015). Assuming that fishing is not currently sustainable, the authors 
concluded that a reduction in fishing mortality to sustainable levels should nonetheless mitigate 
the impacts of climate change. Yet, without fully understanding the potential impacts of other 
threats such as industrial pollution and water diversion on hilsa, the extent of habitat loss and 
degradation that populations could withstand is uncertain.  
American shad have experienced declines throughout the United States since the 20th century, 
which cannot be attributed to one problem, but to a combination of overfishing, habitat 
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degradation, and flow alterations (Klauda et al. 1991). Following several moratoriums, 
restoration efforts based on fish passage construction and hatcheries have sustained remnant 
populations but failed to achieve large-scale restoration (Bilkovic et al. 2002; Hasselman & 
Limburg 2012; Brown et al. 2013). Brown et al. (2013) argued that this restoration depends on 
the provision of access to historical spawning habitat, which can only really be achieved through 
removing migration barriers such as dams. Similarly, protection and restoration of hilsa 
spawning habitat may be a necessity for the long-term sustainability of the hilsa fishery in 
Bangladesh.  
A common theme of all the KIIs was that hilsa needs to be managed holistically in order to 
address pollution, siltation and climate change. One of the recommendations of the HFMAP was 
protection and restoration of hilsa habitat through activities such as tree planting, dredging in 
major river channels, and reducing water pollution (DoF 2002), but according to KIs (D1; R2; 
A5) these habitat-focused activities are not taking place at the scale required. Efforts to enhance 
stocks through regulations on fishing may be ineffective if suitable habitat is not available, and 
so addressing non-fishing-related stresses is crucial. For example, Brown et al. (2013) 
highlighted the lessons to be learned from dammed coastal rivers in the United States for 
developing countries like Bangladesh. Even though actions like dam removal might have short-
term social, economic and political costs, they can be essential for significant restoration of hilsa 
habitat in the long term.  
Assumption 2: Hilsa can be sustainably managed as a single species  
The extent to which single-species management can achieve sustainability depends partly on 
how sustainability is defined. Historically the sustainability of fisheries was based solely on the 
species of interest. Now the concept is understood to depend not only on long-term yields of 
that species, but also on factors such as a healthy ecosystem, the socioeconomics of fishing 
communities and the needs of future generations (Quinn & Collie 2005; Hilborn et al. 2015). 
This perspective has paved the way for the development of ecosystem-based fisheries 
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management (EBFM), and there is a now a large body of literature supporting the need to move 
beyond single-species fisheries management towards an ecosystem approach (Pikitch et al. 
2004; Hilborn 2011; Berkes 2012; Jennings et al. 2014). Globally, fisheries are still 
predominantly managed as single stocks (Skern-Mauritzen et al. 2016), although progress has 
been made in developing reference points for single stocks in a multi-species context (Law et al. 
2014). 
In Bangladesh, some KIs (D1; R1; IN3; LN6) voiced assumptions or hopes that the protection of 
hilsa will have wider impacts on aquatic biodiversity but, as discussed above, limited actions 
have been implemented for the protection of the ecosystem as a whole. Furthermore, 
management of hilsa as a single species may not be the most sustainable approach for 
Bangladesh in terms of maximising total fishery yields for long-term food security. Under 
current management, a combination of increased fishing pressure and environmental change is 
projected to lead to the collapse of marine hilsa and replacement by lower value species like 
chacunda gizzard shad (Anodontostoma chacunda), toli shad (Tenualosa toli), and various 
species of tilapia, which are better suited to the projected climate (Fernandes et al. 2015). Multi-
species management would therefore be more sustainable in terms of overall biomass 
production (Kolding & van Zwieten 2011; Kolding et al. 2015), despite potentially incurring 
some economic losses. KIs (LN4; M2) pointed out that morphological similarities between hilsa, 
chacunda, and toli shads mean that the latter two species are often confused for and sold as 
hilsa in markets, and so these species should be managed together, regardless.  
Assumption 3: Protecting jatka maximises production 
The selective fishing paradigm has long been a cornerstone of fisheries management, guiding 
spatial and temporal restrictions on fishing, and gear and mesh size regulations, which intensify 
the already selective nature of fishing (Garcia et al. 2012). In Bangladesh the DoF aims to 
increase and sustain the production of hilsa, largely through actions focused on the protection 
of jatka (Fig. 5.2). It has banned the monofilament gillnets used to catch jatka, has introduced 
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spatial and temporal fishing bans for their protection, and provides rice compensation, 
alternative livelihood support, and awareness building for jatka fishers. This convention of 
limiting exploitation of small and immature fish is underpinned by both yield-per-recruit theory 
and the spawn-at-least-once principle (Froese 2004) but, as explained in Chapter 4, when multi-
species interactions are considered this convention becomes questionable, particularly for 
developing countries where small fish frequently play a prominent role in food security (Pope 
1991; Kolding & van Zwieten 2011; Law et al. 2014). Furthermore, its implicit assumption that 
all protected immature fish will contribute to future catches is rarely true; recruitment is 
heavily influenced by extrinsic factors such as environmental variability and the age range of 
spawning populations (Cardinale & Arrhenius 2000; Wieland et al. 2000; Szuwalski et al. 2015). 
In the Connecticut River, for example, American shad year class strength is established before 
the juvenile phase, and recruitment is thought to be regulated more by river flow and 
temperature than stock size (Crecco 1985; Crecco & Savoy 1987). The impact of environmental 
conditions on egg and larval survival might also be playing a more critical role in determining 
hilsa recruitment than jatka survival. Observed and projected warming temperatures, reduced 
freshwater flow, and water pollution therefore have the potential to undermine any regulations 
designed to increase production through the protection of jatka (Chapter 3).  
Systems dynamics simulation modelling has provided some validation for the approach of 
focusing management on the protection on jatka in Bangladesh. Results indicate that the 
overfishing of jatka leads to a gradual decline in stock, and that the juvenile life stage is the most 
critical in terms of fishing mortality – although the study did not account for external 
environmental factors (Bala et al. 2014). In contrast, running a simple age-structured 
population model for hilsa under a range of fishing mortalities indicated that targeting jatka 
(represented by fish aged < 1 year) is actually consistently less damaging to population biomass 
than targeting mature adults or fishing across all age classes (see Chapter 4). Although 
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differences in impact between the selectivity regimes were small, the results indicate that hilsa 
are more sensitive to exploitation rate than to size selectivity. 
A further problem with selective fishing is that it alters the composition of a population or 
community (Hsieh et al. 2010; Zhou et al. 2010; Garcia et al. 2012). As discussed in Chapter 4, 
the selective removal of large and old individuals over small means that earlier maturation and 
smaller adult body size become evolutionarily advantageous, with potentially long-term 
consequences for age (size) structures and sex ratios (Law 2000; Kuparinen et al. 2009; Law et 
al. 2013). Given the superior breeding potential of large and old individuals, it follows that 
regulations focused on the protection of juveniles may therefore have negative impacts on 
abundance (Anderson et al. 2008; Kolding & van Zwieten 2011; Rochet & Benoit 2012) – 
although some authors maintain that truncations in age (size) structure are caused by excessive 
fishing rather than minimum-size limits (Froese et al. 2016). While a decline in size at first 
capture has been observed in the hilsa fishery (Haldar 2004), this has not been causally linked 
to any specific fishing or management activity.  
Studies of balanced harvesting propose that moderate fishing across the widest possible range 
of species, stocks, and sizes in an ecosystem, in proportion to their natural occurrence, should 
maintain relative size and species composition, and increase total yields and biomass (see 
Chapter 4). Empirical evidence supporting the concept is limited and it has been criticised as an 
unrealistic strategy for management (Jacobsen et al. 2014; Breen et al. 2016; Froese et al. 2016). 
Yet, size-spectrum models have been used to usefully explore the ecosystem consequences of 
different management strategies, and indicate that management focused on the protection of 
juveniles may not maximise overall production, or indeed minimise the negative impacts of 
fishing (Law et al. 2014; Andersen et al. 2016).  
Assumption 4: Protecting spawners maximises production 
Management actions do not focus on the protection of jatka alone. The DoF has also banned 
hilsa fishing for 15 days during peak spawning season, with the aim of minimising disturbance 
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to spawning (Chapter 3). Again, this action is supported by the spawn-at-least-once principle, in 
which letting all fish reproduce is expected to maximise subsequent recruitment (Froese 2004). 
Modelling indicates that if fish are not harvested until the completion of their first spawning 
season, and if every spawner produces at least one replacement spawner then, assuming 
successful recruitment, a stock will not collapse at any fishing mortality (Myers & Mertz 1998). 
The same criticisms of this theory apply here; recruitment is not always successful and may be 
heavily influenced by environmental conditions, which play an important role in recruitment for 
species with similar life cycles (Crecco 1985; Crecco & Savoy 1987). The impact of these 
environmental conditions on egg and larval survival might play a more critical role in 
determining hilsa recruitment than the size of spawning stock and so observed and projected 
warming temperatures, reduced freshwater flow, and water pollution have the potential to 
undermine this impact of this regulation (Chapter 3). For many species the age structure of the 
current spawning population also complicates the stock-recruitment relationship, since 
younger spawners usually have the lowest fecundity and larval survival (Cardinale & Arrhenius 
2000; Marteinsdottir & Begg 2002) – although this has not been demonstrated specifically in 
hilsa. 
Nevertheless, there are evidence-based arguments supporting the need to recognise fish 
spawning aggregations as a focal point for management and conservation (Erisman et al. 2015). 
The timings and perhaps even locations of spawning hilsa aggregations are predictable for local 
fishers (Ahsan et al. 2014), making them attractive times and sites for fishing with an increased 
risk of overexploitation, but also easier to enforce. In theory, banning hilsa fishing completely 
during the peak spawning season does reduce this risk, and in comparison to year-round 
restrictions on fishing, avoiding an area for a shorter period of time can be very efficient. On the 
other hand, the reduction in availability of or access to suitable spawning grounds for hilsa in 
Bangladesh may reduce the potential for this management action to have impact (Chapter 3). 
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Assumption 5: The hilsa fishing ban (for spawners) coincides with peak spawning season 
The hilsa fishing ban for the protection of spawners was, until 2015, implemented annually for 
the 5 days before and 5 days after the full moon of Bara purnima, in the Bengali month of Ashvin 
(which falls in October; Chapter 3). The assumption that this ban coincides with peak spawning 
season firstly depends on it falling within peak spawning season, and secondly on it being long 
enough to allow sufficient spawning. Investigations of spawning seasonality using the 
gonadosomatic index method21 indicate that spawning occurs year round with a peak in 
September and October (Hasan et al. 2016; Rahman et al. 2012a). There is some evidence to 
suggest that there may also be a distinct and smaller winter (January) spawning stock, which 
has a smaller migratory size and lower fecundity (Quddus 1982; Rahman et al. 2012a; Ahsan et 
al. 2014), and one KI (D5) suggested that the ban might need to be replicated in January, but 
Hasan et al. (2016) challenged the existence of any secondary peaks. There is evidence from 
other fish species that female age or size can affect the timing and duration of spawning (Hsieh 
et al. 2010). 
The placement of the ban around the full moon had previously been justified with the 
traditional understanding that spawning peaks in each lunar month during the spring tide 
(Rahman et al. 2012a). Again, however, Hasan et al. (2016) found no evidence for this. One local 
NGO KI (LN2) also noted that the ban period was systematically designed to be aligned with 
traditional beliefs of the fisher communities, and linked the original 11-day ban with the Hindu 
festival Durga puja, which falls during the same period. The placement of the ban could have 
been motivated more by potential to reduce political conflict than by scientific evidence. A range 
of KIs (D1; A4; A5) reported that the peak is shifting towards winter – a trend which is not 
surprising, given warming temperatures in Bangladesh (Chapter 3). However, 100 per cent of 
interviewed fishers said that the ban period (11 days at time of interview) fits the spawning 
                                                             
21 (gonad weight/body weight)*100 
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season. There also claims that the timing and duration of the ban often varies locally, indicating 
a lack of communication between scientists and authorities (Islam et al. 2016).  
On the basis of research by Hasan et al. (2016), in 2015 the ban was extended to 15 days and 
shifted to the 3 days before and 11 days after the full moon. This should further minimise 
disturbance to spawning during peak season – although since recommended extensions from 
KIs ranged from 15 days (R1) to 30 days (A4; A5), it may still be too short. One KI said that 
‘there needs to be some grace period’; i.e., the ban period should extend either side of the peak 
spawning period (IN4). This will be particularly important if there is substantial inter-annual 
variability in spawning period, as has been observed in American shad (Crecco & Savoy 1987). 
Furthermore, no scientific basis has been provided for the DoF’s decision to shift the timing of 
the ban in relation to the full moon, so it is unclear whether it is scientifically motivated. 
Assumption 6: Enforcement of the hilsa fishing ban (for spawners) is targeted to the right area 
Research indicates that hilsa spend most of their adult lives in the Bay of Bengal, with the 
majority migrating upstream to spawn in freshwater (Chapter 4). Although the 15-day hilsa 
fishing ban is officially implemented throughout the country to avoid confusion (KI D2), due to 
resource limitations monitoring for compliance is targeted within a 7000 km2 area (see Fig. 5.3) 
that is thought to cover four important spawning grounds, identified through experimental 
fishing (the Moulvir char, Monpura, and Dhalchar areas of Meghna River and Shahbazpur 
Channel; Haldar 2004). But hilsa are not strictly anadromous; eggs and larvae have been found 
in coastal waters too (Blaber et al. 2003a; Rahman et al. 2010, 2012a) outside the area of 
enforcement. There is also evidence to suggest that fish of different age classes spawn in 
different areas (Hsieh et al. 2010), and so the spatial distribution of hilsa spawning aggregations 
may be much more complex than current research indicates; for instance it may be that 
megaspawners could be protected by focusing on a specific area. It has also been reported that 
spawning grounds are shifting seawards (DoF 2002), a shift probably driven by a combination 
of climate change and anthropogenic activities that are likely to be reducing the quality and 
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accessibility of inland spawning grounds (Chapter 3). More research is needed to validate the 
concentration of enforcement effort in spawning grounds that were identified as important over 
one decade ago. 
Assumption 7: Hilsa sanctuaries hold nursery grounds 
When larvae become jatka, they are traditionally understood to find nursery grounds in the 
rivers and coastal areas, where they stay for 5-6 months, before migrating back to the BoB 
(Chapter 4). Four hilsa sanctuaries were therefore designated in the Meghna River and inshore 
marine area, in 2005, in which all fishing is banned seasonally for the protection of jatka (Fig. 
5.3). They were designated on the basis of a study that identified them as major nursery 
grounds from the abundance of jatka found in experimental fishing surveys (Haldar 2004). A 
fifth sanctuary was designated in the lower Padma River in 2011, on the basis of continued 
study (Rahman & Bhaumik 2012b), and a BFRI scientist revealed that discussions around 
adding a sixth sanctuary in Barisal are ongoing (R1). Since the marine phase of hilsa is much less 
well studied than the freshwater, it is unclear whether there are significant unprotected nursery 
grounds further offshore. 
Key themes that emerged from KIs were deterioration of water quality in the sanctuaries and 
shifting distribution of jatka (D2; R1; R2; LN2; IN2; IN4; IN6; A3). One KI scientist (R1) said that 
sanctuary designation is keeping pace with this shift, and indeed the addition of a fifth and 
potentially sixth sanctuary indicates that some monitoring and adaptive management of the 
sanctuaries is taking place. However, there has been no degazetting, and there are concerns in 
the literature that the sanctuaries are not keeping pace with environmental change (Islam et al. 
2016). For example, water diversion activities, constantly changing river morphologies and 
recent upward trends in sedimentation may be restricting access to sanctuary areas and 
reducing water quality (Chapter 3). Islam et al. (2014) reported that a sandbar near Chandpur 
(Fig. 5.1) has restricted hilsa migration, resulting in low hilsa numbers in surrounding areas 
that are still within sanctuary boundaries. Pollution is another threat to the sanctuary areas, 
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through its influence on water quality (Chapter 4). In the Andharmanik River (Fig. 5.3), site of 
the Patuakhali sanctuary (Fig. 5.1), one KI (LN2) said water quality is so low that it is now 
known as the ‘dead river’. A recent assessment of physical, chemical and biological parameters 
of hilsa habitat also found the river to have significantly higher levels of nitrogenous 
compounds, higher levels of sedimentation and lower levels of chlorophyll a than other sites 
sampled within the study area of this thesis, as well as a different plankton community 
composition (Hasan et al. 2015). Although the study concluded that these parameters were still 
within acceptable limits, it provides some validation for anecdotal claims that the sanctuary is 
no longer suitable hilsa habitat. Potential drivers of change in these sanctuaries – pollution, 
water diversion activities, siltation, climate change and deforestation – are all trending upwards 
(Chapter 3), and have the potential to undermine any protection that the sanctuaries may 
theoretically offer. One DoF KI (D1) said that the Andharmanik river sanctuary should certainly 
be moved, but implementation of such a measure would be unpopular with local fishers and 
therefore politically challenging. An NGO KI (LN6) said that a more realistic management option 
would be to introduce measures to improve the quality of the water, though it might be more 
expensive and controversial with other industries.  
Assumption 8: Fishing bans for the protection of jatka coincide with peak jatka abundance 
All fishing is banned in the hilsa sanctuaries from March to April (originally February-March), 
apart from in the Andharmanik River, where it is banned from November to January (Fig. 5.3). 
There is also a nationwide jatka-fishing ban, first enacted between November and April each 
year, later extended to May and then to June, when it was also extended to all activities related 
to jatka (catching, transportation, marketing, selling and possession), and then to July (9 months 
long). The desired outcome of these bans is increased recruitment into the fishery (DoF 2002), 
but this depends on whether the timings fit the life cycle of hilsa.  
Although jatka are present throughout the year, experimental fishing and analysis of 
commercial catch found them to be most abundant from January to May in rivers, with a peak 
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from March to April, and from December to January in coastal areas, when larger-than-usual 
jatka are caught (Haldar 2004). This is the only evidence available to justify the timing of the 
bans on all fishing in sanctuary areas. One KI (R1) pointed out that there are very few jatka seen 
in November (reportedly due to pollution) and so the Andharmanik River ban needs shifting 
forwards, but this process will take two to three years. A range of KIs (R1; LN2; IN4) referred to 
a temporal shift in jatka availability towards later in the year, which is consistent with the shift 
of the March to April ban from February to March. Given the suspected climate-driven shifts in 
spawning seasonality, it is possible that environmental change is affecting the timing of jatka 
availability (Chapter 3), in which case the bans on fishing in sanctuaries may not be protecting a 
substantial proportion of jatka and therefore require reinvestigation. 
Figure 5.3: Map showing sanctuary areas (red) and rivers flowing into the Bay of Bengal (blue). All 
fishing is banned in the sanctuaries from March to April, apart from the southernmost sanctuary, a 40 km 
stretch of the Andharmanik River where fishing is banned from November to January. Black polygon 
demarcates important spawning area where enforcement of 15-day hilsa fishing ban is targeted during 
peak spawning season. 
The widely accepted continuous presence of jatka in rivers and coastal areas is backed up by the 
almost continuous pattern of recruitment observed through length-frequency data analysis 
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(Haldar 2004; Rahman & Cowx 2008) – although these studies are conflicting. Haldar (2004) 
found a major peak in recruitment in June and July (although the peak for males was May to July 
and for females March to May and July to September), and this pattern continues to be reported 
by Government scientists (e.g. Rahman et al. 2012a). Rahman & Cowx (2008) analysed marine 
and inland populations separately and found major and minor peaks: in rivers, the major peak 
was from March to May and the minor from November to January, and in the marine 
environment they were shorter (March to April and January to February). The length of the ban 
on all jatka activities reflects the fact that they are present throughout the year, and the 
extensions that have been made indicate that management is adapting to changes in abundance 
and new knowledge. Some KIs from academia and NGOs (LN5; A4; A5) said that there should be 
a complete ban on jatka activities throughout the year, but this may not be a realistic 
proposition given the high dependence of the poor on jatka (Chapter 6). 
Assumption 9: Focus of management on inland fisheries is sustainable 
Hilsa management is strongly focused on the inland fisheries (riverine and estuarine areas). 
This focus probably grew from traditional understanding about jatka, which – through ease of 
implementation and the historical focus of fishing in inland areas – has mostly been developed 
through inland research. Although the inland fishery is estimated to have four times the 
capacity of the marine fishery in terms of numbers of fishing vessels, the marine fishery now 
produces the majority of hilsa (Chapter 3). Nevertheless, the only piece of legislation directly 
affecting hilsa fishers and implemented in the marine environment is an amendment of the 
Marine Fisheries Ordinance and Rules, which bans all fishing by all vessels in the marine 
fisheries between May 20th and July 23rd each year (MoFL 1983). Even those regulations that 
apply nationwide (jatka rules and the 15-day hilsa fishing ban) are not enforced offshore 
(Chapter 3). Given the fact that jatka, eggs and larvae have been found in the marine 
environment, and given the limited understanding of hilsa life history (Chapter 4), focusing 
management on inland fisheries may not be providing sufficient or efficient protection. 
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Assumption 10: Regulations are effectively enforced   
Effective enforcement is defined here as enforcement that promotes near-complete compliance, 
which should be conducted in a socially just way. There is very little evidence for effective 
enforcement of regulations; in fact, the limited literature highlights a lack of enforcement and 
low levels of compliance (Islam et al. 2016), issues that also arose as key management 
constraints in KIIs (L1; L2; D4; D2; LN1; LN3; LN4; IN1; IN2; IN3; F1; F2; A2; A4). One local 
academic said that the management approach is good, but there is no enforcement and the 
situation is devastating for inland fisheries (KI A1). Even a local Government KI (L2) said ‘There 
are regulations, but in a practical sense these are not happening’.  
Despite the ban on monofilament gillnets, their use is still widespread (Islam et al. 2016). 
According to local KIs (D5; LN1; LN5; F1; F2; M1; M3), jatka fishing continues throughout the 
jatka ban, particularly at dawn and dusk when the authorities are not on the water, and 
although markets do close, jatka continues to be sold on the riverside instead, with coastal 
surveillance pushing landing sites further inland. These reports do nevertheless indicate that 
enforcement is having some impact on behaviour and thereby imposing some small costs on 
fishers.  
When hilsa fishers were asked about compliance with sanctuary fishing bans, the majority said 
that few fishers comply (66 per cent said that few or no compensation recipients comply, while 
78 per cent said that few or no non-recipients comply) and none said that all fishers comply 
(Fig. 5.4). Furthermore, 40 per cent of respondents said that they fish illegally as their main 
coping strategy during closed seasons. One industry KI in Chandpur district (M3) said that there 
is about a 70 per cent level of compliance, while Islam et al. (2014) reported a 92-95 per cent 
level of compliance in the same area.  
Local KIs (LN1; LN2; M1; M3; M4; M5; F2) said that, in contrast, the nationwide hilsa fishing ban 
for spawners is generally complied with, despite the lack of compensation during this period. 
This could be due to the short time-period or better enforcement, or it could be related more to 
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its roots in the traditional beliefs and activities of Hindu fishing communities at that time than 
to enforcement of legislation (although it should be noted that hilsa fishers are now majority 
non-Hindu). Another possibility is that the cyclone season (October to November) deters fishers 
during this time anyway (DoF 2002). 
Numerous factors limit the effective enforcement of regulations. Enforcement of jatka 
regulations is targeted to 152 upazilas22 where jatka are abundant, particularly areas thought to 
be important nursery grounds (Chapter 3). However, there is a lack of human and financial 
resources for proper surveillance (DoF 2002; Islam et al. 2016), which is even admitted within 
the DoF itself (D3; D4; D5). The DoF is supported by police, local administrations, and – on the 
coast – the Air Force, Border Guard, Navy, coast guard, and Rapid Action Battalion, but NGO KIs 
(LN4; IN3) said that there are not enough patrol boats and there is a lack of surveillance inland. 
Mobile courts are operated to deal with offences on site (between 800 and 1000 were reported 
per year between 2011 and 2014) but effective operation is still limited by resources (Islam et 
al. 2016). Islam et al. (2016) also noted that sanctions (numbers of prison sentences, fines, court 
cases etc.) have increased from 8,262 (for jatka offenses) and 16,525 (for hilsa offenses) in 
2011/2012, to 22,077 and 33,050 in 2013/2014, but it is not clear whether this reflects a 
decrease in compliance or an increase in enforcement efforts.  
Secondly, the sanctions are described as an ineffective deterrent by a range of KIs, including 
local Government officials (L1; L2; LN1; LN4; IN1; F1; F3). Local NGO KIs (LN1; LN4; LN5) said 
that inflicting heavy fines or long jail sentences on fishers simply perpetuates the cycle of debt 
that leads them to break the rules in the first place, and when nets and catches are burned, 
fishers are forced to take new loans to repay their debts or buy new nets. A central Government 
official (KI C1) said that they try to give jail time instead of fines because most fishers cannot 
pay the fines anyway, but an NGO KI (LN4) said that the Government has a blind administration 
which confuses enforcement with harassment. This leads on to the issue of corruption, which is 
                                                             
22 Subdistrict 
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deeply rooted in the institutional framework of Bangladesh (Chapter 3); authorities were 
widely reported by KIs, including local Government and DoF KIs, to take bribes from fishers in 
exchange for ignoring illegal activities (L1; L2; D3; F2; F3). Furthermore, some industry KIs (M1; 
F2; F3) pointed out that fishers are usually financed by middlemen who are unaffected by the 
sanctions and continue to send labourers out to catch jatka during the bans. They also said that 
the sanctions do not deter seasonal or occasional fishers (i.e., those who are not fully dependent 
on fishing) because the cost of a net can easily be earned back with one night of jatka fishing. 
There is also an external barrier to effective enforcement, which is the lack of access to 
appropriate financial products for fishers. Although microcredit is becoming more accessible, 
fishers still borrow from informal sources and are required by all sources to pay interest during 
the bans on all fishing in the hilsa sanctuaries, leaving them with little choice but to go fishing 
anyway (Uraguchi & Mohammed 2016). On the other hand, even if bribes are being paid and 
new nets and debts and being taken on, this is evidence of at least some cost being imposed on 
fishers by enforcement. 
Assumption 11: Rice compensation incentivises compliance with the sanctuary fishing bans 
In recognition of the socioeconomic hardships imposed by the fishing bans, in 2004 the DoF 
introduced the jatka fisher rehabilitation programme (see Chapters 3 and 6 for details). This is 
largely based on the provision of rice compensation to the poorest fishers affected by the bans 
in hilsa sanctuaries. By reducing the vulnerability of these fishers, in theory the compensation 
should incentivise compliance with fishing bans (Chapter 2). There are, however, a number of 
flaws in the scheme which may limit effects on compliance. Firstly, there are issues with the 
distribution of compensation that probably limit the perceived fairness and legitimacy of the 
scheme – factors which usually play a role in determining compliance with rules (Chapter 6). 
Much of this can be attributed to limited resources and to political interference (Siddique 2009; 
Haldar & Ali 2014), which can in turn be linked to a rise in constituency-based politics and 
associated competitive pressure (Hossain 2007). Moreover, despite the fact that all fishing is 
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banned in the sanctuary areas, only jatka23 fishers are compensated, which could create a 
perverse incentive for other people to claim to be jatka fishers or to start targeting hilsa, some 
of whom may otherwise have fished other species or not fished at all (Corrêa et al. 2014; Islam 
et al. 2016). An identification card scheme is currently being phased in to reduce the potential 
for non-jatka fishers to claim compensation (D1), but it is unclear how these are allocated and 
their distribution could entail the same problems. A local NGO KI (LN4) voiced concerns about 
political bias in their allocation. Similarly, even though some sanctuary areas appear to be 
becoming environmentally unsuitable for jatka, fishers living in these areas continue to receive 
compensation for not fishing (Islam et al. 2016). This problem is again deeply rooted in 
constituency-based politics; if a Government official were to retract compensation from fishers 
in a particular area, the decision would be met with resistance from communities in that area 
and possibly lose him political support (Hossain 2007).  
Islam et al. (2014) noted that the exclusion of boat owners and other middlemen from the 
scheme might limit the impact of the scheme on compliance because they are the individuals 
with the influence and control over fishers. The boat owner KI (F1) was of a different opinion, 
however, claiming that they never employ fishers during fishing bans because they understand 
the benefits. KI F1 said that because they are the ‘brothers of fishers’, fishers will listen to them 
more than they do to the Government, but they do not have the capacity to exert the influence 
they desire. Whether or not these are genuine statements, and whether they reflect other boat 
owners’ opinions, is of course unknown. 
There are also issues with the nature of the compensation that may damage attitudes towards 
the scheme and affect its impact on compliance. The rice was widely regarded by non-
Government KIs as inadequate and in some ways inappropriate (LN1; LN4; LN5; IN1; A4; A5). 
Not only are household sizes not taken into account, the lack of resources for distribution and 
political interference means that households do not receive the full 40kg which they are 
                                                             
23 This term is often used in Bangladesh to refer to very poor hilsa fishers, rather than strictly fishers who 
target jatka. 
186 
 
allocated (Haldar & Ali 2014; Islam et al. 2016). A key limiting factor identified by local and 
international NGOs (LN2; LN4; LN5; IN4) was that most poor fishers are stuck in cycles of debt 
which pass from generation to generation, so even if they receive rice compensation they are 
still forced to fish to repay their debts, reducing the opportunity for compensation to enable 
compliance. Furthermore, rice does not address the lack of protein which households may 
experience during the ban, which may force them to fish anyway (Islam et al. 2016). A local 
academic (KI A4) said that a fisher can catch two to three months’ worth of earnings in one 
night if they target jatka, and that ‘people are not greedy; they have to do it.’ Timing may also be 
a limitation; whereas the jatka ban lasts from November to July, compensation is only provided 
from February to May, and there is little evidence to support the expectation that this covers the 
peak period of jatka abundance (Haldar 2004). Jatka are available all year round, and despite 
receiving compensation in February, a fisher may still feel compelled to catch jatka in January. 
Finally, the incentives are undermined by the poor enforcement of regulations described above 
(Islam et al. 2016), which means that there is a lack of conditionality on behaviour (see Chapter 
2). One international NGO KI (IN4) said that the rice is excess from the pre-existing Vulnerable 
Group Feeding (VGF) programme, describing the scheme as ‘nothing more than a social safety 
net’. Nevertheless, fishers reported that they perceived levels of compliance with sanctuary 
closures to be significantly higher among compensation recipients than non-recipients (χ2 = 
26.5, df = 3, p < 0.001; Fig. 5.4). It is therefore possible that despite the lack of conditionality, the 
scheme could be having a small impact on compliance. One academic KI (A5) said that the 
scheme is contributing to a gradual decline in the numbers of illegal fishers in recipients and 
non-recipients, both groups slowly becoming more aware and looking for alternatives. A local 
NGO KI (IN5) said ‘even if it is only 50 per cent effective it is good.’ 
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Figure 5.4: Graph showing level of compliance with sanctuary closures by compensation recipients 
(n=673) and non-recipient fishers (n=747), as perceived by all respondents. Sample sizes were not the 
same because not all respondents answered each question. 
 
Assumption 12: Alternative livelihood support incentivises compliance with regulations 
In 2008 the jatka fisher rehabilitation programme was extended to provide a smaller 
proportion of households with alternative livelihood training and support (e.g. rickshaws, vans, 
livestock, and grants) to enable them to diversify their income sources. The aim was to improve 
the livelihoods of fishers affected by jatka regulations, with the rationale that this should make 
fishers more able and willing to comply with regulations. Unlike the rice compensation, it 
should provide an alternative means of making money, not just during the ban period, but for 
the entire year.  
Very little information is available for the validation of this assumption, which is probably 
related to the fact that the number of households receiving alternative livelihood support is very 
low; only 0.5 per cent of the numbers of households currently receiving compensation receive 
alternative livelihood support, and numbers receiving alternative livelihood support have been 
declining (see Chapter 3). This decline is probably due to the fact that it requires the allocation 
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of extra financial resources – unlike the rice compensation scheme, which runs through the VGF. 
Nevertheless, there have been calls for an increase in coverage, and it has been described as 
‘highest priority’ in the literature (Siddique 2009; Rahman et al. 2014b; Islam et al. 2016). A DoF 
KI (D2) said that they would like to increase coverage, but that it will ‘take time and more 
money than we have’. In a recent choice experiment, compensation recipients showed a higher 
preference for alternative livelihood support than rice compensation, while non-recipients 
showed no preference for one over the other – a finding that has been linked to the 
dissatisfaction with the amounts of rice that are currently received (Dewhurst-Richman, 
Mohammed, Ali, et al., 2016). However, a number of local NGO KIs (LN3; LN4; LN5) said the 
support is not useful to fishers since they lack the skills required to use it – a failing that has 
been attributed to a lack of needs assessment and stakeholder engagement with fishers (Haldar 
& Ali 2014; Islam et al. 2016). An understanding of people’s needs, aspirations, and the factors 
influencing livelihood choice is a necessity for the use of any livelihood-focused intervention as 
a direct behaviour-change tool (Wright et al. 2016). Although an in-depth exploration of this 
assumption is beyond the scope of this chapter, Wright et al. (2016) provide evidence to suggest 
that the kind of alternative livelihood support given in Bangladesh may not necessarily reduce 
the need and desire to exploit hilsa, and certainly not if the ‘alternative’ is an inappropriate 
substitute. 
Assumption 13: Awareness of fishery status and regulations enhances compliance 
Through boat rallies, mass media and the distribution of leaflets and posters, the DoF raises 
awareness about a) the importance and status of the hilsa fishery, with an emphasis on jatka; 
and b) jatka regulations (DoF 2002; Chapter 4). One slogan used is ‘jatka are the future, so if 
jatka are caught, hilsa are lost’. Members of a boat owners association and a national fisher 
association said in KIIs (F1; F3) that they are involved in these awareness-raising activities, 
helping to circulate the rules and regulations down to the community level. A DoF KI (D2) 
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described awareness as a ‘principal requirement for sustainability [of the fishery]’ and local 
NGO KIs (LN4; LN5) stated a need for more awareness raising activities. 
Awareness of regulations and an understanding of the rationale behind them have been 
empirically demonstrated to influence compliance in fisheries and marine protected areas 
(McClanahan et al. 2005; Read et al. 2011; Velez et al. 2014; Thomas et al. 2015). Non-
compliance can be unintentional (if an individual is unaware of the rules) or uninformed (if an 
individual is unaware of the consequences of breaking the rules), but it may also be intentional 
and informed (Read et al. 2011). What reduces the risk of intentional non-compliance is 
acceptance of the regulations, which depends not only on awareness and understanding of their 
importance, but also on their perceived fairness and legitimacy (Sutinen & Kuperan 1999; 
McClanahan et al. 2012). 74.5 per cent (567) of respondents in the household survey were 
aware of all management interventions in the questionnaire, with 100 per cent aware of the 
jatka ban and 15-day hilsa fishing ban, and 74.5 per cent aware of the hilsa sanctuaries. All of 
the 25.5 per cent of respondents who were not aware of the hilsa sanctuaries lived outside 
sanctuary areas. It is clear therefore that fishers are aware of the existence of relevant 
regulations, but the rationale behind and importance of the regulations might be less well 
communicated. Since literacy rate is poor, education through the medium of leaflets and posters 
could be failing to reach all fishers (DoF 2002). Even if the rationale is communicated, then its 
influence on compliance is probably limited by the socioeconomic position of the fishers. Since 
many are stuck in cycles of debt, an understanding of the long-term benefits of protecting jatka 
may not be enough to stop them fishing during ban periods. As one local NGO KI said, ‘they have 
to break laws because they are vulnerable…awareness is one thing, but they need to have other 
options’ (LN4). It is interesting that awareness of the hilsa ban for spawners is so high when 
awareness-raising activities are focused on jatka, and perhaps this is evidence to support the 
claim that this regulation was tailored to local fishing traditions. 
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5.3.2 Perceptions of recent trends and management impact  
Following an increase in exploitation and fishing mortality rates through the 1990s, a decline in 
both was observed between 2003 and 2009, together with an increase in length at first capture, 
while officially reported catches continued to increase (Chapter 3). Although these trends 
cannot be directly attributed to any management intervention, they do indicate a possible 
reduction in fishing pressure from around the time of their introduction. Furthermore, the 
majority of KIs (C1; L1; D1; D2; D3; D5; R1; R2; LN2; LN4; IN1; IN2; IN3; IN4; IN5; IN6; A1; A2; 
A4; A5) were of the view that the current management approach is having a positive impact on 
hilsa production. Reported trends in production did vary however: KI D5 stated that hilsa 
production has increased in the last 10 years, whereas KI M5 stated that ‘10 years ago there 
were more hilsa’. One international fisheries expert (KI A2) said ‘the top-end approach appears 
to be working for hilsa’. A local NGO KI (LN4) said that ‘the benefit from the [sanctuary fishing] 
ban is clear’. In-country scientists have also claimed that protection of adult and juvenile stocks 
has led to increased CPUE in the hilsa fishery, but there are no published data to support this 
(Rahman & Bhaumik 2012b) and KIs from academia and NGOs (LN4; IN4; A2) said they 
expected these claims were probably fabricated. Despite the blocked migratory pathways and 
degradation of inland hilsa habitat reported in the literature, a DoF KI (D6) said that hilsa 
migrations are now being seen further upstream than usual, for example in Syhlet and Kushtia 
(north of Dhaka) – evidence that its distribution may be expanding again. But, again, these 
observations have not been documented, and could be a result of environmental change rather 
than management.  
Ninety-seven per cent of households said that both hilsa catch and abundance had increased 
over the last five years. When asked about current trends in hilsa catch, without a time frame, 
84 per cent of respondents still said it was increasing from year to year, while 12.1 per cent said 
it had stayed the same and 3.4 per cent said it was decreasing. Modelling revealed a small 
positive effect of living inside a compensation area on whether or not fishers perceived an 
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increase in hilsa  – although it had a low relative importance (0.38) and weak support for 
inclusion in top models (Table C.1a; Table C.2). Support for inclusion of sanctuary area in top 
models was much stronger (Table C.3) and its relative importance was 0.93 (Table 5.3); fishers 
living in or around sanctuary areas were significantly more likely to report an increase in catch 
volume than those who live outside sanctuary areas. Compensation had a very low relative 
importance in these models (0.22), and none of the other fixed effects were very important, 
apart from age (relative importance 0.51); older fishers were less likely to report an increase in 
catch (Table 5.3). Plotting the BLUPs for each district and each village within district showed a 
significant effect of geography on the probability of reporting an increase in catch, once fixed 
effects were taken into account. Households in Bhola and Laxmipur districts were most likely to 
report an increase, whereas those in Chandpur and Patuakhali were least likely (Fig. C.1). 
Variation between villages within a district was even stronger: households in Baushia and 
Gourabdia (Barisal district) were significantly more likely to report an increase, whereas 
households in Nizampur and Mewrapara (Patuakhali district), Kutubpur (Barisal district) and 
Uttar Gobindia (Chandpur district) were significantly less likely (Fig. 5.5a).  
Table 5.3: Results for GLMMs of probability of reporting an increase in hilsa catch volume from year to 
year, showing the full model-averaged coefficient estimates (standard error) and relative importance of 
each variable from the candidate set of models where ΔAICc <4, based on 739 households from 23 
villages in 8 districts. Coefficient estimates are presented as contrasts from the intercept, standardised on 
2 standard deviations following Gelman (2008). Where the relative importance of a variable is < 0.5, only 
the direction of the effect is presented. Random effects estimates of variance [standard deviation] were 
taken from the global model.  
Fixed effects  Estimate (SE) Relative importance 
Intercept 3.19 (0.74)  
Sanctuary 2.65 (1.44) 0.93 
Age -0.17 (0.24) 0.51 
Awareness (1 = aware of regulations, 0 = not aware) - 0.42 
Target jatka (1 = target jatka, 0 = no jatka) + 0.30 
Fishing location (1 = sea, 0 = only river) - 0.28 
Compensation recipient (1 = recipient, 0 = non-recipient) + 0.22 
# of models in candidate set 31  
Random effects   
Village  2.34 [1.53]  
District  0.97 [0.99]  
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Ninety-seven per cent of respondents also said that fish size was increasing from year to year, 
2.8 per cent said it stayed the same, and only 0.4 per cent said it was decreasing. 44.2 per cent of 
respondents said that egg/fry presence was increasing from year to year, 54.2 per cent that it 
had stayed the same, and 0.9 per cent that it was decreasing. Modelling revealed a significant 
negative effect of living outside a compensation area on the probability of reporting an increase 
in egg presence (Table C.1b; Table C.4). When compensation area was replaced as a fixed effect 
by sanctuary and compensation, however, sanctuary became the most important fixed effect 
(relative importance 1) in top models; fishers living inside sanctuary areas were significantly 
more likely to report an increase in egg presence (Table 5.4; Table C.5). There was also a weak 
effect of fishing location (relative importance 0.37); fishers who fish in the sea were more likely 
to report an increase in egg presence than those who only fish in rivers. Age and awareness 
were less important in these models than in those for the probability of perceiving an increase 
in catch (relative importance 0.27 and 0.34). Plotting the BLUPs for each village within district 
(Fig. 5.5b) showed an effect of geography on the probability of perceiving an increase in egg 
presence, once fixed effects were taken into account. Households in Baushia (Barisal district) 
and Lalpur (Chandpur district) villages were significantly more likely to perceive an increase, 
whereas those in Golbunia and Nizampur (Patuakhali district), Gosherchar (Barisal), and Uttar 
Gobindia (Chandpur district) were significantly less likely. District was confounded by 
sanctuary and therefore had no effect (Table 5.4), probably due to the low variability in the 
dependent variable, and so the model was run again with only the village random effect to check 
that results did not change (Table C.1c). 
When fishing households in compensation areas were asked directly about the impact of the 
compensation scheme on hilsa stock regeneration and catch levels, 99.6 per cent of respondents 
said that it has had a positive impact. Ninety-seven per cent of respondents in compensation 
areas also said that there has been an increase in hilsa stocks over the last five years as a direct 
result of the compensation scheme. 
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Table 5.4: Results for GLMMs of probability of reporting an increase in hilsa egg/fry presence from year 
to year, showing the full model-averaged coefficient estimates (standard error) and relative importance 
of each variable from the candidate set of models where ΔAICc <4, based on 739 households from 23 
villages in 8 districts. Coefficient estimates are presented as contrasts from the intercept, standardised on 
2 standard deviations following Gelman (2008). Where the relative importance of a variable is < 0.5, only 
the direction of the effect is presented. Random effects estimates of variance [standard deviation] are 
taken from the global model.  
Fixed effects  Estimate (SE) Relative importance 
Intercept -0.13 (0.17)  
Sanctuary 1.08 (0.38) 1.00 
Fishing location (1 = sea, 0 = only river) - 0.37 
Awareness (1 = aware of regulations, 0 = not aware) - 0.34 
Age - 0.27 
Target jatka (1 = target jatka, 0 = no jatka) - 0.21 
Compensation recipient (1 = recipient, 0 = non-recipient) + 0.20 
# of models in candidate set 19  
Random effects   
Village  0.44 [0.66]  
District  0.00 [0.00]  
 
(a) (b) 
  
Figure 5.5: BLUPs for the village random effect. The x axes show the effect of living in a particular village 
in terms of (a) the difference in probability of reporting an increase in catch from the intercept; and (b) 
the difference in probability of perceiving an increase in eggs/fry from the intercept. Error bars show the 
95% confidence interval based on the conditional variance for each random effect. Village names are 
prefixed by district. 
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Bhola: Kalapur
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Barisal: Gourabdia
Barisal: Baushia
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5.4 Discussion 
5.4.1 Potential for additionality 
There is scope for individual elements of the hilsa management package to have had 
additionality, but the potential for overall additionality is very unclear. Evidence for the 
assumptions which underpin the reconstructed theory of change is often equivocal, and there 
are numerous uncertainties and contradictions (Table 5.5). Levels of support for the 
assumptions vary, but the degree to which this matters depends on its likely impact on 
sustainability (referred to here as importance; i.e., low importance describes a situation where 
even if an assumption was completely flawed, management could still be sustainable).  
It is clear that overfishing is a substantive threat to hilsa stocks, although the evidence for their 
current status is patchy and sometimes conflicting, and they appear to be a very resilient to 
exploitation. It is possible that environmental factors such as pollution, damming and climate 
change may pose a more serious threat, but controlling fishing activities should mitigate at least 
some of these impacts through an increase in abundance. The validity of this assumption is 
therefore of moderate importance; the management approach of focusing on hilsa overfishing 
should still be beneficial even if other environmental factors pose substantive threats to hilsa, 
but this depends on the level of threat. The impact of fishing regulations may be limited, 
however, if environmental factors limit the availability of suitable hilsa habitat. Hilsa 
management is certainly flawed in terms of its focus on maximising individual species yield, 
which is not a sustainable approach for either the long-term food security or ecosystem health 
of Bangladesh, and might therefore limit the goal of socioeconomic improvement. The invalidity 
of the assumption that single-species management is adequate is deemed to be of high 
importance because projected environmental change has the potential to cause a collapse in 
hilsa populations, in which case the whole management strategy would need reworking. There 
is also evidence to indicate that focusing management on inland fisheries is not a sustainable 
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approach although, given our limited understanding of hilsa in the marine environment, this 
carries great uncertainty.  
The evidence for the rationale behind the protection of jatka is equivocal, and since multiple 
management actions (including the compensation scheme) are underpinned by the assumption 
that protection of jatka will maximise hilsa production, it is an important one. Although the 
assumption is supported by the theories of traditional fisheries science and some species-
specific modelling, there is just as much evidence to the contrary. In addition, there is 
uncertainty surrounding the placement of the hilsa sanctuaries and the timing of the fishing 
bans within them. Since compensation is reportedly provided only for four months of the year 
and only to households within or near sanctuaries, the temporal and spatial consistency of this 
distribution with the availability of jatka is very important. Although there does appear to be 
some adaptive management taking place, it is clear from ecological surveys (Hasan et al. 2015) 
and from KIIs that at least one of the hilsa sanctuaries is no longer a suitable nursery ground, 
and that management is not keeping pace with environmental change. There is also some 
anecdotal evidence for a temporal shift in jatka availability. It is therefore unclear whether 
fishing bans for the protection of jatka are likely to be having an additional impact on jatka 
abundance. Because of its long length, however, the timing of the nationwide ban on jatka 
activities is perhaps less important than the timing of the sanctuary bans, and could potentially 
have an impact even if the timing is imperfect. 
It is also clear that regulations for the protection of jatka (eight-month jatka ban, monofilament 
net ban, and sanctuary fishing bans) are not effectively enforced. Changes in behaviour – such as 
fishing at night, landing catches further inland and bribing officials – indicate that the threat of 
sanctions is making rule-breaking more difficult, and some fishers have been punished for 
breaking rules. However, there is unequivocal evidence that enforcement is nowhere near 
leading to 100 per cent compliance, and certainly not in a socially just manner. Fishers 
themselves admitted to breaking rules as a coping strategy during fishing bans, and also 
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reported a lack of compliance amongst other fishers. Perceived and reported compliance have 
been related to ecological performance of MPAs in some regions, suggesting that they are strong 
indicators of actual compliance behaviour (Pollnac et al. 2010; Daw et al. 2011a; Bergseth et al. 
2013). The perception of others not complying weakens the moral obligation to comply, 
ultimately leading to a breakdown of compliance and therefore ecological performance (Sutinen 
& Kuperan 1999). 
The 15-day hilsa fishing ban for spawners seems to have stronger evidence behind it than other 
management actions. It has been questioned whether the ban is long enough to minimise 
disturbance to spawning, whether it is appropriately timed for peak spawning season, and 
whether it is enforced in the right areas, and so long-term monitoring – particularly to establish 
the level of inter-annual variability in timing of spawning – would help to resolve these 
questions.  On the other hand, the ban appears to have a higher level of acceptance and more 
effective enforcement than the others, and so the assumptions surrounding this ban are 
probably of low importance, given that not many fishers are likely to be fishing during this time 
anyway. The recent extension and shift of the ban could, however, be interpreted as a socially 
and politically controversial statement against traditional belief, and it could be argued that 
compensation should be extended in turn. The rationale behind targeting spawning fish – that it 
should maximise recruitment and therefore production – is theoretically sound, and there is 
little empirical evidence to suggest otherwise. In any case, this assumption is of lower relative 
importance than the rationale for protecting jatka, because there are no other management 
actions based upon it. 
As a package, it is possible that the rehabilitation programme (rice compensation, alternative 
livelihood support and awareness-raising activities) has potential to influence jatka fishing 
behaviour. The coverage of alternative livelihood support is too low for it to be having any 
ecological impact right now, and caution should be exercised in scaling it up as is (Wright et al. 
2016). But, with the appropriate stakeholder consultation, local opinion indicates that increased 
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coverage of a livelihood-focused intervention has more potential to incentivise compliance with 
rules than the compensation scheme, which does not address the issues of debt repayment or 
animal protein shortage during fishing bans.  
There are numerous other issues that limit the opportunity for the compensation scheme to 
enhance compliance. There is anecdotal evidence of perverse incentives and empirical evidence 
of political interference in distribution, which are surely damaging perceptions of fairness and 
legitimacy. The scheme could thus be having some positive social impact, but without the 
desired influence on compliance, and therefore potential for ecological impact. Furthermore, in 
order for the compensation to have ecological additionality in the way that is intended, it must 
be conditional on compliance and, without effective enforcement, the evidence to the contrary is 
strong. Yet, even if the compensation allowed or prompted a very few fishers to change their 
behaviour, that behaviour change could eventually affect the whole population through 
community encouragement and peer pressure, especially if some form of community-based 
monitoring were to be introduced (Chapter 7). Through this process of social diffusion, in the 
long-term the compensation scheme could potentially be more efficient than it first appears 
(Goldman-Benner et al. 2012). Indeed, fishers’ perceptions of the scheme were overwhelmingly 
positive, with 97.0-99.6 per cent reporting that they have seen a positive impact on hilsa stock 
and catch levels. Given the evidence above, this figure is surprising, but it could be a result of the 
local Government’s claims, made as part of their awareness-raising activities, that numbers of 
hilsa are increasing. It could also be a sign of strategic bias, i.e., respondents may have been 
tempted to provide biased answers in the hope of receiving compensation or in support of the 
scheme. In future surveys more measures should be taken to reduce the risk of this bias, for 
example by using specialised indirect questioning techniques to estimate compliance (Nuno et 
al. 2013; Nuno & St John 2015), and building trust in the independence of the research team to 
reduce strategic responses (Bernard 2011). On the other hand, the support could be real and 
interpreted as evidence of social acceptance of the scheme (Bennett 2016). 
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Although there is an established relationship between awareness of regulations and an 
understanding of the rationale behind them (McClanahan et al. 2005; Read et al. 2011; Velez et 
al. 2014; Thomas et al. 2015), there is no useful evidence to support or refute the effect of 
awareness-raising activities on compliance in Bangladesh. In theory they have the potential to 
influence compliance, but could be limited by the level of vulnerability and therefore 
desperation that many fishers still experience. The impact of these activities in the future will 
therefore depend partially on the level of social impact that the rice compensation and 
alternative livelihood support have. 
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Assumption Evidence for Evidence against Level of 
support  
Level of 
importance 
1. Overfishing is a 
substantive threat to 
hilsa stocks 
 Commercial CPUE,  length-frequency data 
analysis, productivity-susceptibility analysis 
and systems dynamics simulation modelling 
for artisanal marine fishery (literature) 
 Inland surveys of experimental CPUE 
(literature) 
 Observed and projected human population 
growth (Chapter 3) 
 Anecdotal reports (KI fisheries scientists) 
 Environmental conditions and habitat 
availability can have a strong influence 
on abundance (evidence from similar 
species) 
 Recent positive trends in fishery 
(literature, KIIs and fisher knowledge) 
Positive Medium 
2. Hilsa can be sustainably 
managed as a single 
species 
None  Sustainable fisheries management 
requires an ecosystem approach (theory) 
 Climate projections indicate single-
species management is unsustainable in 
terms of overall biomass (literature) 
 Morphologically similar to other species 
and interchangeable on market (KIIs)  
Negative High 
3. Protection of jatka 
maximises production 
 Systems dynamics simulation modelling in 
hilsa (literature) 
 Theories of traditional fisheries science 
(literature) 
 
 
 Age-structured population modelling 
indicates that targeting juveniles is less 
damaging than targeting adults (Chapter 
4) 
 Balanced fishing hypothesis (literature) 
Equivocal High 
4. Protection of spawners 
maximises production 
 Spawn-at-least-once principle (literature) 
 Systems dynamics simulation modelling in 
hilsa (literature) 
 Evidence for fish spawning aggregations as a 
valuable conservation focus (literature) 
 Stock-recruitment relationship is 
complicated by environmental 
conditions (literature) 
Positive (with 
uncertainty) 
Low 
Table 5.5: Evidence for and against each assumption (with type of evidence), strength of support, and level of importance of this support. Level of support can be 
positive (strong evidence for), negative (strong evidence against), equivocal (evidence in both directions), or uncertain (no useful evidence). Importance is 
measured on a scale of low-medium-high, where low = if the assumption was completely flawed, management could still be sustainable. 
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5. The 15-day hilsa fishing 
ban coincides with peak 
spawning season 
 Empirical evidence for peak spawning 
season in correct month (literature) 
 (Fishers’) reports 
 Placement of ban may have been 
motivated by potential to reduce political 
conflict (KIIs) 
 Peak may be shifting (KIIs) 
 May not be long enough (KIIs) 
Equivocal Low 
6. Enforcement of 15-day 
hilsa fishing ban is 
targeted to the right 
area 
 Important spawning grounds identified 
through experimental fishing (literature) 
 Environmental change may have led to a 
shift in spawning grounds or a reduction 
in accessibility (KIIs) 
Negative (with 
uncertainty) 
Low 
7. Hilsa sanctuaries hold 
nursery grounds 
 Areas identified through experimental 
fishing (literature) 
 Quality of and access to sanctuary areas, 
one in particular, is in decline (literature 
and KIIs) 
Negative (with 
uncertainty) 
High 
8. Fishing bans for the 
protection of jatka 
coincide with peak jatka 
abundance 
 Experimental fishing and commercial catch 
analysis justify timing of sanctuary fishing 
bans (literature) 
 Temporal shift in peak jatka availability 
(KIIs) 
Equivocal High 
9. Focus on inland fisheries 
management is 
sustainable 
 Important nursery and spawning grounds 
identified inland (literature) 
 Jatka is easy to target during migration 
downstream (literature) 
 Hilsa are not strictly anadromous and so 
marine areas may also provide important 
nursery and spawning grounds 
(literature) 
 Marine fishing effort is increasing 
(Chapter 3) 
Negative (with 
uncertainty) 
High 
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10. Regulations are 
effectively enforced   
 Some change in jatka fishing behaviour 
(KIIs) 
 DoF reports of sanctions have increased 
(literature) 
 Reports of bribes and harassment (literature 
and KIIs)  
 
 Lack of resources for enforcement 
(literature and KIIs) 
 Enforcement reported as ineffective 
(literature and KIIs) 
 Perceived and reported lack of 
compliance with sanctuary bans 
(Fishers)  
 DoF reports of sanctions have increased 
(literature) 
Negative High 
11. The compensation 
scheme incentivises 
compliance 
 Level of compliance with sanctuary closures 
is perceived to be significantly higher for 
compensation recipients than non-
recipients (fishers) 
 Lack of conditionality on behaviour 
(literature, KIIs) 
 Perceived fairness and legitimacy of the 
compensation scheme is low (Chapter 6) 
 Perverse incentives and misallocation 
(KIIs and literature) 
 Coverage of  alternative livelihood 
support is probably too low (literature) 
 Rice compensation alone is inadequate 
and inappropriate (KIIs and literature) 
Negative High 
12. Alternative livelihood 
support incentivises 
compliance 
 
None  Low coverage (literature) 
 Evidence to suggest the theory is flawed 
(literature) 
 Inappropriate support (KIIs) 
Negative Low 
13. Awareness of fishery 
status and regulations  
enhances compliance 
 Empirical evidence for influence in other 
fisheries (literature) 
 
 Socioeconomic situation may limit 
opportunity for impact (KIIs) 
 High level of awareness without 
compliance (fishers) 
 
Uncertain High 
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5.4.2 Perceptions of recent trends and management impact  
The various sources used in this study can be pieced together to give some idea of recent trends 
in the fishery. Ecological trends, KIIs and fisher’s reported perceptions all indicate that 
management may have had a positive impact on hilsa in terms of an increase in production and 
a reduction in fishing mortality, although it should also be noted that these trends cannot be 
attributed to any specific management action and could equally be due to environmental 
variation (Bennett 2016). When fishers were asked about trends in hilsa abundance and catch 
characteristics, both currently and in the last five years, answers were overwhelmingly positive, 
to the point where limited statistical analysis could be done. Although they are subjective, these 
data could be interpreted as complementary to recent trends in ecological data (Gaspare et al. 
2015), but there is again a risk that this uniform positivity is a result of strategic bias; 
respondents may have provided biased answers in the hope of influencing management.  
When asked about current trends in hilsa catch volume and the presence of eggs or fry, fishers 
living in or around sanctuaries were significantly more likely to report an increase, which 
indicates that sanctuary management could be having an ecological impact. The higher 
probability of reporting an increase in eggs or fry in and around sanctuaries is surprising, given 
that these sanctuaries were established to protect nursery rather than spawning grounds, and 
indicate that spawning grounds and nursery grounds may overlap – further evidence of 
complicated migratory movements. On the other hand it could be a result of awareness-raising 
activities (which are probably concentrated around sanctuary areas) promoting the idea that 
the sanctuaries are having a positive impact. The fact that compensation was not an important 
explanatory variable for this response provides some evidence that answers were not 
influenced by strategic bias in support of the compensation scheme. In the case of catch volume, 
older fishers were significantly less likely to perceive an increase, which could be evidence of a 
shifting baseline effect (Pauly 1995; Bender et al. 2013). Younger fishers might be more likely to 
perceive an increase because they have experienced different baseline catch volumes to those 
experienced by older fishers, and the specification of a time-frame might therefore have been 
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preferable. It is unclear why those fishers who fish in the sea were more likely to report an 
increase in eggs or fry, but an exploration of the types of fishing gears used might provide some 
answers (Chapter 4). 
There was also a strong spatial pattern in reported perceptions of catch characteristics. KI A2 
reported frequent conflicts between small-scale and industrial fishers in coastal areas, which 
could be driving the district-level differences in perceptions of catch volume; industrial fishing 
could be limiting the impacts of management in some areas more than others. Recipients were 
consistently more likely to perceive an increase in both catch volume and eggs/fry in Baushia 
village, and consistently less likely in Uttar Gobindia and Nizampur. Nizampur (Patuakhali 
district) is on the Andharmanik River, where water quality is low and may no longer be suitable 
for hilsa (Hasan et al. 2015). The village effect could also be an indication of social desirability 
bias, where respondents answer questions in a manner that they think will be viewed 
favourably by others; i.e., some villages might be more supportive of management interventions 
than others for political reasons. Furthermore, it could be linked to observer effect; although no 
evidence of order bias was found, in three villages an additional enumerator conducted some of 
the questionnaires (Rayrabad and Charkachopia in Bhola district, and Baushia in Barisal 
district; see Appendix B.1). This inconsistency in enumerators might explain some of the village 
effect, particularly in the case of Baushia village, which had the most consistently different 
perceptions of catch characteristics. Further research would be required to interpret these 
perceptions at the community level.  
Other limitations to interpretation of the fishers’ perceptions include the fact that some of the 
respondents who do not actually fish themselves might not have had a reliable perception of 
household catch characteristics. It would have been preferable to have identified which of the 
respondents fish and which do not – although it is likely that most do, since women were 
excluded from analysis. Respondent age could have acted as a rough proxy for this, since it is 
probably the very young and very old males who do not fish in households who identify as 
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fishing households. More rigorous questioning to ascertain acceptance of and compliance with 
management regulations would have allowed a more in-depth analysis of their potential to 
contribute to additionality. There is also a lack of ecological data and published studies available 
after 2009, other than landings data, with which to validate any of the fishers’ perceptions.  
5.4.3 Conclusions 
This research clearly demonstrates major gaps in the ecological and social science underpinning 
hilsa management. The current management regime is based more on economic and normative 
considerations than on an understanding of hilsa life history and habitat, and there seems to be 
a strong political push to demonstrate impact without a clear evaluation policy or the 
publication of rigorous science to back it up. In particular, the lack of ecological monitoring and 
publication or even sharing of data is generating huge uncertainties surrounding the spatial and 
temporal placement of fishing bans, particularly in the hilsa sanctuaries. The application of 
methods to measure habitat suitability when data are limited, perhaps using a combination of 
remote sensing and on-site data collection, would help to identify optimal spawning and 
nursery areas, which could be used to re-evaluate current zoning of sanctuaries and 
enforcement focus  (Chapter 3; Bilkovic et al. 2002).  
It is impossible from this study to tease apart the potential impacts of the carrot vs. stick 
elements of hilsa management. Any intervention that provides payments for specific actions or 
behaviour should be underpinned by robust ecological and social science that links actions to 
additional outcomes (Bladon et al. 2014b; Chapter 2). In order to justify the continued use of the 
compensation scheme and alternative livelihood support as hilsa management tools, the 
development of a rigorous long-term social and ecological monitoring and evaluation system is 
required (Calvet-Mir et al. 2015; Palmer-Fry et al. 2015). This should not only enable 
attribution, but also an adaptive approach to management. Management strategy evaluation is 
recommended as a framework that would allow for adaptive management under the extreme 
uncertainty which hilsa fisheries present (Bentley & Stokes 2009; Butterworth et al. 2010). 
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This research does, however, demonstrate a need to improve enforcement of regulations, 
and/or to increase the prevalence of voluntary compliance through the rehabilitation activities. 
These management approaches so far appear to have been quite heavily shaped by the political 
economy of Bangladesh (Campling et al. 2012), and it is possible that the compensation scheme 
in particular is simply a welfare scheme that is being reframed as a conservation scheme – 
perhaps inappropriately. Nevertheless, the expectation of a significant improvement in the 
quality of top-down enforcement would be unrealistic at this stage and so, given the 
institutional context, the most effective way forward will be to adapt and develop the carrot-
based elements of hilsa management, which may in turn reduce the requirement for top-down 
enforcement (Chapter 7).  
More broadly, this chapter demonstrates that even when rigorous impact evaluations are not 
possible, useful studies can still be conducted to evaluate scope for or confidence in 
additionality. Further research to test empirically the causal mechanisms in the theory of 
change underlying hilsa management would be valuable. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Does compensation for hilsa fishers reach the ‘right’ people? 
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6.1 Introduction 
Although poverty reduction has in the past focused on minimising current shortfalls in various 
dimensions of wellbeing, the concept of vulnerability (i.e., the threat of future shortfalls) is now 
recognised as a crucial component of poverty (Ligon & Schechter 2003; Calvo 2008). Specific 
frameworks and terms differ across disciplines (Eakin & Luers 2006; McLaughlin & Dietz 2008), 
but vulnerability is generally defined as the degree to which a system or individual is 
susceptible to and unable to cope with the adverse effects of a stress or change (Adger 2006). 
Research on poverty in small-scale fisheries now emphasises vulnerability as a central 
dimension, particularly in developing countries (Béné et al. 2007, 2010; Béné & Friend 2011; 
Ferrol-Schulte et al. 2015). Targeting vulnerable fishers is thought to be as important for 
poverty reduction as focusing on those poorest in monetary or material-asset terms 
(MacFadyen & Corcoran 2002; Thorpe et al. 2007; FAO 2012).  
A key determinant of vulnerability is dependence; households who are less dependent on one 
occupation or resource are likely to be less sensitive to, and more able to cope with, stress on an 
occupation or resource (Marshall et al. 2007; Junio et al. 2015; Ferrol-Schulte et al. 2015). An 
understanding of fishing dependence can therefore be useful in the design and effective 
targeting of fisheries management interventions (Jacob et al. 2010). Minimising the negative 
impacts of an intervention (or maximising the positive) for the most vulnerable or most 
dependent groups should not only enable equitable social impacts, but also improve 
perceptions of fairness. These perceptions can in turn promote community acceptance, 
compliance with regulations and thereby overall intervention effectiveness (Sutinen & Kuperan 
1999; Gelcich et al. 2009; Sommerville et al. 2010a; Harrison et al. 2015).  
Conservation payments are increasingly advocated as a way to meet both social and ecological 
objectives, particularly Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) in developing countries (Milder 
et al. 2010; Clements & Milner-Gulland 2014; Ingram et al. 2014). Schemes often have an 
implicit or explicit side objective of poverty or vulnerability alleviation, and government-
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financed schemes often use measures of poverty and vulnerability as specific targeting criteria 
(Pagiola 2008; de Koning et al. 2011; Bremer et al. 2014). Even when schemes lack specific 
social objectives, it is now recognised by the conservation community that benefit distribution 
should always be fair and equitable (Sommerville et al. 2010a; Gross-Camp et al. 2012; Wynberg 
& Hauck 2014). 
When interventions are specifically targeted for poverty reduction and other social objectives, 
benefits may still fail to reach the poorest or most vulnerable individuals (Coady et al. 2004; 
Domelen 2007). Unless a payment has blanket coverage, the social-ecological effectiveness and 
efficiency of any scheme will depend first and foremost on targeting effectiveness (i.e., to what 
extent the ‘right’ people receive payment) or, if it is voluntary, on the degree of participation by 
the target groups (Pagiola et al. 2005; Zeller et al. 2006; Uraguchi 2013; Poudyal et al. 2016). 
The literature on targeting in PES has focused largely on optimisation in terms of ecological 
additionality and cost-effectiveness (Wunder 2007; Kroeger 2013). Increasingly, social 
targeting goals are also considered (Alix-Garcia et al. 2008; Jack et al. 2009; Gauvin et al. 2010), 
but lessons from both conservation and development projects increasingly highlight the risk of 
ineffective social targeting through inclusion or exclusion errors and elite capture of benefits 
(Sommerville et al. 2010a; Uraguchi 2010, 2013; Pascual et al. 2014; Poudyal et al. 2016). This 
risk is likely to be amplified in fisheries, where governance challenges are complex and where 
unclear resource tenure may lead to benefit distribution issues (Wynberg & Hauck 2014; 
Bladon et al. 2014b). For example the Brazilian defeso scheme, which provides compensation to 
fishers for lost earnings during temporal fishery closures, may have acted as a perverse 
incentive and compensated free-riders who did not depend on fishing for their livelihoods in the 
first place (Begossi et al. 2011a; Corrêa et al. 2014).  
This research focuses on the compensation scheme for hilsa fishers in Bangladesh, as previously 
described in Chapters 2, 3, and 5. Under the Hilsa Fisheries Management Action Plan (HFMAP), 
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jatka (juvenile hilsa)24 fishing and related activities are banned from November to July across 
the country. In addition, all fishing is banned in five hilsa sanctuaries for two months within this 
period, also for the protection of jatka. Hilsa fishers generally experience high levels of poverty 
and vulnerability (Leterme et al. 2004; Ali et al. 2010; Jentoft & Onyango 2010; Islam 2011; Deb 
& Haque 2011) and there are low levels of compliance with, and poor enforcement of, the 
fishing bans in Bangladesh (Chapter 5; Siddique 2009; Islam et al. 2016). As part of a suite of 
approaches for the ‘rehabilitation’ of jatka fishers, compensation is provided in the form of rice 
during the perceived peak period of jatka presence (February to May) to help fishers cope with 
their loss of livelihood. The primary goal of this scheme is the conservation of hilsa and 
associated biodiversity, but as it is funded through the national Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) 
programme, which aims to reduce food insecurity (Ahmed et al. 2009; Uraguchi 2011), it is also 
intended to reduce the vulnerability of affected fishers living inside and around the sanctuary 
areas (DoF 2002; Haldar & Ali 2014).  
Since resources are limited, the compensation scheme is not open to all affected fishers, but is 
directed towards the poorest and most vulnerable (DoF 2002; Haldar & Ali 2014). There are no 
prescribed selection criteria, but the Department of Fisheries (DoF) claims to target ‘real jatka 
fishers’25, those who are ‘fully dependent’ on fishing for their livelihoods, and those without 
assets such as agricultural land or boats (M. Mome 2014, DoF, personal communication, 1st 
September). Each local council (see Fig. 3.2 for administrative hierarchy) is invited to put 
forward a list of jatka fishers, which is finalised through a complex process at various levels of 
Government (Haldar & Ali 2014). But concerns have been raised regarding political interference 
in the distribution of compensation, and thus its equitability (Siddique 2009; Haldar & Ali 
2014). Indeed, social safety net schemes in Bangladesh, including the VGF, tend to be 
characterised by elite capture and high levels of inclusion and exclusion error (Matin 2000; 
Matin & Hulme 2003; Hossain 2007; Uraguchi 2010). A recent assessment of these jatka fisher 
                                                             
24 Officially defined as hilsa of up to 25 cm in length (Islam et al. 2014). 
25 This meaning of this term is unclear, since it is often used in Bangladesh to describe very poor hilsa 
fishers, rather than strictly fishers who target jatka. 
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‘rehabilitation’ approaches, based on stakeholder perspectives, identified issues in the 
compensation scheme selection process and made recommendations for improvements, but 
shed little light on targeting effectiveness (Rahman et al. 2014a).  
This chapter will therefore examine the targeting effectiveness of the compensation scheme for 
hilsa conservation in Bangladesh. As a post-hoc study, it will focus not on whether the scheme 
was fit for purpose at its inception, but rather on who are the current recipients. This will allow 
an evaluation of whether and how the targeting of the scheme could be redesigned. It will a) 
rank and compare relative household fishing dependence and explore the components of this 
dependence; b) profile the jatka fishers; c) investigate the correlates of compensation 
allocation; d) investigate the perceptions of fairness of the distribution of compensation; and e) 
explore how the spatial distribution of compensation would change under potential alternative 
targeting scenarios, asking how the strategy could be altered in order to target fishing-
dependent households more effectively.  
Expectations for the current distribution of compensation were made on the basis of the 
officially reported rationale behind the scheme (Table 6.1). Assuming that the targeting of the 
scheme is effective, jatka fishers and those with a high level of fishing dependence would be 
expected to be more likely to receive compensation than less dependent fishers who do not 
target jatka. It would also be expected that fishers living inside or very near sanctuary areas 
would be more likely to receive compensation than those living outside, due to the fact that they 
experience complete disruption to their livelihoods during the fishing ban, or have to travel 
elsewhere to fish. Households with a low income and those that had taken loans were expected 
to be more likely to receive compensation, since income and debt are locally-used indicators of 
poverty and vulnerability (Brouwer et al. 2007; Rahman et al. 2014a,b). Although assets were 
specifically mentioned by the DoF as characteristics for consideration, the asset measures that 
were available (ownership of agricultural land, boat and livestock) were incorporated into an 
index of fishing dependence (see Section 6.2.2) rather than being considered independently. 
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Household size and composition were also expected to influence compensation allocation, as 
relatively visible indicators of vulnerability; large households can have a lower average 
consumption and therefore be more vulnerable, but they can also have more members to bring 
into the labour force, which can reduce variance in future consumption (Lanjouw et al. 1995; 
McCulloch & Calandrino 2003; Christiaensen 2005). The ratio of economic earners to 
dependents in a household was expected to have a positive influence on receipt of 
compensation; a household with a high dependency ratio tends to be more sensitive to 
livelihood disruption and food insecurity (Christiaensen 2005). Households who consume less 
food, or less preferred food, as a coping strategy during ban periods were expected to suffer 
from food insecurity (Béné et al. 2007) and therefore be more credible candidates for 
compensation. Members of fisher associations were also expected to be more likely to receive 
compensation because fishers involved in these types of local association tend to have more 
influence over policy and regulations (Cinner et al. 2012; Blythe et al. 2014). Due to the 
subjective approach to compensation allocation and suspicions of political interference, some 
geographical clustering was also expected (Siddique 2009). 
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Table 6.1: Summary of hypothesised correlates of the probability of receiving compensation. 
 Hypothesis  Explanation 
Fishing 
dependence 
Fully dependent fishers are more 
likely to receive compensation  
The scheme is officially aimed at fully 
dependent fishers 
Jatka fishing Jatka fishers are more likely to 
receive compensation 
The scheme is officially aimed at jatka fishers 
Income Low income households are more 
likely to receive compensation 
Low income is an indicator of poverty and 
vulnerability (Brouwer et al. 2007) 
Debt Households who have taken loans 
are more likely to receive 
compensation 
Loan taking is a typical coping strategy of the 
poorest fishers in Bangladesh and an 
indicator of vulnerability (Ali et al. 2010; 
Rahman et al. 2014a) 
Food insecurity Households who consume less or 
cheaper food as a coping strategy 
during ban periods are more likely to 
receive compensation 
Households who consume less or cheaper 
food as a coping strategy during ban periods 
suffer from food insecurity, which is a 
dimension of poverty (Béné et al. 2007) 
Household size Larger households are more or less 
likely to receive compensation 
Large households may be more or less 
vulnerable depending on the balance 
between production and consumption 
(Lanjouw et al. 1995; McCulloch & 
Calandrino 2003; Christiaensen 2005) 
Household 
dependency 
ratio 
Households with a high proportion 
of dependents are more likely to 
receive compensation 
A high dependency ratio increases 
vulnerability (Christiaensen 2005) 
Fisher 
association 
membership 
Members are more likely to receive 
compensation 
Members have more social capital and 
influence (Tuler 2008; Cinner et al. 2012; 
Blythe et al. 2014) 
Sanctuary area Households inside sanctuary areas 
are more likely to receive 
compensation 
The scheme is officially aimed at fishers 
living inside sanctuaries because they 
experience a complete fishing ban and so are 
likely to lose the most earnings 
District Fishers in some districts may be 
more likely to receive compensation  
Geographic clustering of targeting (Siddique 
2009) 
Village Fishers in some villages may be more 
likely to receive compensation  
Geographic clustering of targeting (Siddique 
2009) 
213 
 
6.2 Methods 
6.2.1 Data collection 
800 households were interviewed between May and October 2014, by enumerators from the 
Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies (BCAS), across 19 villages in 6 districts of southern 
Bangladesh (Fig. 6.1; see Table D.1 for detailed breakdown). This was part of a larger survey 
described in detail in Appendix B.1, but here I only analyse the villages within the area in which 
the compensation scheme operates, both inside and outside hilsa sanctuaries (Fig. 6.2). Sections 
of the questionnaire relevant to this study included questions on household characteristics, 
fishing activities, the compensation scheme, and coping strategies (see Appendix D.1). Recent 
estimates of the total number of hilsa fishers in Bangladesh range from 300,000 (A. Wahab, 
2015, WorldFish, personal communication, 21st March) to 500,000 (M. Mome 2015, Department 
of Fisheries, personal communication, 20th March) and according to M. Mome, 224,102 
households received compensation in 2014, which is around 45-75 per cent of affected 
households, or 65 per cent according to Rahman et al. (2014a). In the study sites 60 per cent of 
households received compensation, and 54 per cent of surveyed households received 
compensation, indicating that the sample is roughly representative of the recipient and non-
recipient groups (Table D.1). 632 respondents (79 per cent) were household heads and 126 
respondents (15.8 per cent) were women, of whom 125 were not household heads.  
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Figure 6.1: Household sampling design. 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Map of study area, showing study site districts (grey) in relation to sanctuary sites (red). Each 
study site represents the approximate location of a cluster of surveyed villages, denoted by the relevant 
district name (precise village coordinates were not available). In Barisal and Bhola districts two village 
clusters were sampled and can be distinguished by the sub-district names (in brackets); in the other 
districts just one village cluster was sampled. 
Total sample 
size 800 
households 
600 within 
sanctuaries 
303 
compensation 
recipients 
297 non-
recipients 
200 around 
sanctuaries 
132 
compensation 
recipients 
68 non-
recipients 
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6.2.2 Development of an index for fishing dependence 
Dependence is a multidimensional concept and therefore difficult to measure. Dependence on a 
resource or occupation is not necessarily reflected by level of use because there may be equally 
good alternatives (Marshall et al. 2007). Instead, dependence implies that there is no equivalent 
substitute for the resource or occupation without a loss in wellbeing. In order to explore 
whether there is any relationship between fishing dependence and compensation allocation, I 
constructed an index for fishing dependence. The development of the index was data-driven, but 
I used only variables which a priori were known to play a meaningful role in fishing 
dependence, based on the literature (Table 6.2). I presumed a household to be dependent on 
fishing when it was their primary livelihood in terms of both income and number of livelihoods; 
a household with high livelihood diversity may still derive the majority of their income from 
fishing, and a household with low livelihood diversity may derive similar levels of income from 
each livelihood (Hill 2011).  
I used number of livelihoods together with ownership of livestock and agricultural land to 
develop a picture of livelihood diversity. I also expected boat owners to be more dependent on 
fishing; if capital is invested in fishing, this is expected to reduce adaptive capacity to move 
away from fishing and therefore increase dependence (Blythe et al. 2014). Gear diversity is 
expected to have a similar effect: although using multiple gears reduces the level of 
specialisation within fishing (Marshall et al. 2007; Cinner et al. 2012), it is still assumed to 
increase dependence on fishing in general through capital investment. Finally, I expected 
households who said they fish anyway as their main coping strategy during fishing bans to be 
more dependent on fishing than those which did not.  
216 
 
Table 6.2: Summary of variables used to develop an index of fishing dependence through FAMD. 
Variable Type Description Expected 
influence  
Explanation 
Income 
dependence 
Percentage The proportion of 
total household 
income which 
comes from fishing 
+ The greater the share of fishing income in 
a household’s total income, the more 
dependent the household is on fishing 
(Narain et al. 2008; Béné 2009; Hill 2011; 
Chen et al. 2014) 
Other 
livelihoods 
Binary Households may 
have other 
livelihoods (1) or 
only fishing (0) 
- The more livelihood options a household 
has, the more able it will be to adapt to or 
cope with loss of fishing access (Béné 
2009; Hill 2011; Cinner et al. 2012; Junio 
et al. 2015) 
Agricultural 
land 
Binary Households may 
have agricultural 
land (1) or not (0) 
- Households with land may be more able 
to cope with loss of fishing access (Ali et 
al. 2010) 
Livestock Binary Households may 
have livestock (1) 
or no livestock (0) 
- Households with livestock may be more 
able to cope with loss of fishing access 
(Ali et al. 2010) 
Boat Binary Households may 
own a boat (1) or 
not (0) 
+ It is often the fishers who have invested 
in the fishery who are least able to adapt 
to loss of access as they have sunk their 
capital into fishing (Blythe et al. 2014)  
Gear 
diversity 
Binary Households may 
use one gear type 
(0) or multiple gear 
types (1) 
+ Less highly specialised fishers, with 
multiple gears, are likely to be more 
resilient within their fishing livelihood 
but less able to adapt to complete loss of 
fishing access (Marshall et al. 2007; 
Cinner et al. 2012) 
Illegal 
fishing 
Binary Fish illegally as 
main coping 
strategy during 
fishery closure (1) 
or other coping 
strategy (0) 
+ Fishers who admit fishing illegally over 
other coping strategies may have few 
alternatives (Rahman et al. 2010; 
Harrison et al. 2015). 
 
Principal component methods are commonly employed in the development of indices for 
multidimensional concepts, particularly wealth, to aggregate multiple variables into a 
unidimensional concept (Filmer & Pritchett 2001; McKenzie 2005; Zeller et al. 2006; Vyas & 
Kumaranayake 2006; Lalloué et al. 2013; Darling 2014). Application of Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) has allowed the quantification of relative household and community 
vulnerability to shocks such as climate change, with implications for conservation and 
development policy interventions (Cutter et al. 2003; Nelson et al. 2010; Tesso et al. 2012). 
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Moreover, the validity of PCA in the measurement of vulnerability, resilience, and fishing 
dependence within fishing communities has recently been demonstrated (Marshall et al. 2007; 
Jacob et al. 2010, 2013). However, PCA is designed for use with continuous, normally 
distributed data (Kolenikov & Angeles 2009) and as such has been criticised for use in the 
construction of indices using discrete data (Kolenikov & Angeles 2004, 2009; Howe et al. 2008). 
Instead, I used factor analysis for mixed data (FAMD), a principal component method which can 
balance the influence of continuous and categorical variables (Pagès 2004, 2014), in the R 
package FactoMineR (Le et al. 2008; Husson et al. 2014). Following the methods of Vyas & 
Kumaranayake (2006), I carried out descriptive analyses to inform final variable selection, only 
selecting variables that were significantly correlated (p < 0.05) with the majority of the others. 
The index ranged from -3.44 to 2.63, so I rescaled it (-1 to +1) for more intuitive interpretation. 
To check for internal coherence of the index I performed an agglomerative hierarchical cluster 
analysis on the first dimension of the FAMD, with Euclidian distance and Ward’s criterion – a 
preferable approach to defining arbitrary cut-off points (Lalloué et al. 2013). This differentiated 
households into broad groups by their level of dependence, which also allowed for more 
intuitive interpretation. Again, I performed the clustering in FactoMineR (Husson et al. 2014). 
Five households had missing data and were excluded from the analysis. 
6.2.3 Data analysis 
Compensation distribution 
In order to identify the correlates of compensation distribution, binomial generalised linear 
mixed effects models (GLMMs) were fitted with the probability of receiving compensation as a 
binary response variable (1 = compensation recipient, 0 = non-recipient). The GLMMs were 
fitted as random intercept models with district and village as grouping factors in the random 
effects and a probit link function, in R version 3.1.2 (R Development Core Team 2014). The best 
random effects structures were selected using likelihood ratio tests and validation plots (Bolker 
et al. 2009), and models were run with Laplace approximation using the package lme4 (Bates et 
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al. 2015). A summary and description of the explanatory variables can be found in Table 6.3. I 
included respondent identity (whether or not the respondent was the household head) to 
account for confounding variables, since respondent identity was highly correlated with age, 
gender, and years of education, which might in turn be expected to influence compensation 
allocation among household-head respondents. I also repeated the analysis using dependence 
cluster as an ordinal explanatory variable instead of the index, to check for consistency, but 
results were similar so only the analysis using the index is reported.  
Collinearity among explanatory variables was explored using pairwise plots, Spearman’s rank 
correlation coefficient, and phi coefficient. None of the variables was significantly correlated (p 
> 0.05), or at least not strongly correlated (-0.5 > ɸ or rs < 0.5, p < 0.05). An information-
theoretic approach to model selection was followed (Burnham & Anderson 2002; Bolker et al. 
2009), as described in Chapter 5. All possible combinations of explanatory variables were fitted 
using Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation procedures with the R package MuMIn (Barton 
2011), and top candidate models were selected according to the corrected Akaike Information 
Criterion (AICc; Burnham & Anderson 2002; Bolker et al. 2009). No models were clearly 
superior (weights of top models were < 0.3), so those with ΔAICc < 4 were re-run using 
Restricted Maximum Likelihood (REML) estimation procedures for accurate parameter 
estimates (Zuur et al. 2009), which were then averaged across these models, allowing relative 
variable importance to be determined (Burnham & Anderson 2002; Grueber et al. 2011). 
Coefficients were presented for the full average, rather than the subset or conditional average, 
which has a tendency of biasing the values away from zero (Barton 2016). Continuous 
explanatory variables were standardised by two standard deviations for direct comparison of 
coefficients following model averaging (Gelman 2008; Grueber et al. 2011). 
Models were checked for residual normality, heteroskedasticity and correlations between fixed 
effects and the residuals. Eight households had missing data and were excluded from analysis. 
To analyse spatial effects on the probability of receiving compensation, I estimated best linear 
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unbiased predictors (BLUPs) from the global models, which measured the residual effect 
associated with each random effect (district and each village within district). 
To explore how the spatial distribution of compensation would change under potential 
alternative targeting scenarios, I calculated the current proportions of households receiving 
compensation in each district against the proportions which would receive compensation if a) 
all jatka fishers were targeted and b) if the most fishing dependent households were targeted. 
Budget restrictions meant that 60 per cent of households in the study area were compensated in 
the year of study (Table D.1), so I selected either a) all jatka fishers (53 per cent of total 
respondents); or b) the top 60 per cent of households, in order of their fishing dependence. 
Jatka fishing 
Jatka fishers are reportedly the poorest and most vulnerable social group, with no other 
livelihoods, but previous surveys have experienced difficulty in eliciting truthful responses 
about jatka fishing (DoF 2002). Since jatka fishing is illegal for much of the year, fishers may not 
want to admit that they do it; but on the other hand, familiarity with the compensation scheme 
may lead fishers to exaggerate their role in jatka fishing. In order to gain an understanding of 
what socioeconomic characteristics define jatka fishers and to justify its inclusion as an 
explanatory variable in the compensation models, I explored the correlates of jatka fishing by 
fitting binomial random intercept GLMMs, following the same methods, with a logit link 
function. The response variable was binary (1 = household admits targeting jatka, 0 = household 
does not admit targeting jatka) and explanatory variables are listed in Table 6.3.  
Fairness of compensation distribution 
Perceived fairness is a critical determinant of acceptability in payment systems (Sommerville et 
al. 2010a; Clements 2012). To explore perceptions of fairness or unfairness in the distribution of 
compensation I fitted binomial random intercept GLMMs where the response was binary (1 = 
fair, 0 = not fair), and included the explanatory variables summarised in Table 6.3. I expected 
non-recipients, dependent fishers, low income fishers, and jatka fishers to be less likely to 
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perceive compensation distribution to be fair, but I did not test the effect of jatka fishing due to 
its collinearity with dependence. I expected households with a high level of awareness of hilsa 
management interventions (defined as ‘aware of all three interventions discussed in the 
questionnaire’) to be more likely to report fairness, because awareness and understanding of 
why regulations are in place has been related to compliance, which is in turn influenced by 
perceptions of fairness (Agardy et al. 2011; Velez et al. 2014). Research on fairness in payment 
systems has found it to vary with spatial variation in governance and with local association 
membership (Sommerville et al. 2010a). I therefore expected fisher association members to 
perceive fair distribution, and variation in perceptions between villages and between districts. 
Again, I expected respondent identity to account for confounding variables due to its 
correlations with age, gender and years of schooling. 
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Table 6.3: List, type and description of variables investigated through GLMMs for (a) the probability of receiving compensation; (b) the probability of targeting 
jatka; and (c) the probability of perceiving fair compensation distribution. Blanks in expected influence columns indicate where fixed effects were not included in 
models. 
Explanatory variables Type Description Expected influence 
   Model (a) Model (b) Model (c) 
Fixed effects      
Sanctuary area* Binary Households may live within a sanctuary (1) or outside a sanctuary (0)  + ?  
Jatka fishing*** Binary Fishers may target jatka (1) or not (0) +   
Compensation****  Binary Households may receive compensation (1) or not (0)   - + 
Fishing dependence Continuous Index measuring household dependence on fishing + + - 
Respondent identity  Binary Household head (1) or other (0) ? ? ? 
Awareness**  Binary Aware of all management interventions (1) or not (0)   + 
Fisher association 
membership 
Binary Fishers may be members of associations (1) or not (0) + ? + 
Household size* Continuous Number of household members + ?  
Household dependency ratio* Continuous Household dependency ratio (number of economic earners/non-
earners†) 
+ ?  
Food insecurity* Binary Households may use food-based coping strategies during fishing ban (1) 
or not (0) 
+ ?  
Debt* Binary Households may have taken a loan (1) or not (0) + ?  
Household income  Continuous Total monthly income per capita (BDT) - - + 
Random effects      
District Categorical 6 level factor    
Village Categorical 19 level factor    
*Not included in model (c) 
**Not included in models (a) or (b) 
***Not included in models (b) or (c) 
****Not included in model (a) 
†As defined in questionnaire 
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6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Respondent profile 
The respondents had a mean age of 39, household size of 5.6, household dependency ratio of 3.2 
dependents per economically active household member, and 2.4 years of education. 15.8 per 
cent (126) of respondents were female, and only one of these was a household head. These 
statistics are similar to that of another recent survey of hilsa fishers carried out in the sanctuary 
areas (Rahman et al. 2014a) – although these authors found the household dependency ratio to 
be much lower at 1.49. This may be due to differences in how ‘economically active’ was defined 
(in this survey respondents were asked to state how many members of the household were 
earning, rather than using the number of members of working age – of which there may be 
those who are not working).  
Seven hundred and ninety-three respondents (99.7 per cent) stated hilsa fishing to be their 
main income-generating activity, but this very high proportion is probably a result of strategic 
bias; some respondents may have overstated their involvement in hilsa fishing because of their 
awareness of the compensation scheme and the purpose of the survey. Local knowledge 
indicates that the proportion is nearer 70 per cent (B. Hossain 2015, Bangladesh Centre for 
Advanced Studies, personal communication, 21st January). Four hundred and twenty 
respondents (52.6 per cent) said that they target jatka, and nearly the same proportion of non-
recipients to recipients said that they target jatka (54.1 per cent compared to 54.7 per cent). Six 
hundred and ten respondents (76.3 per cent) had livelihoods other than fishing, though only 8.3 
per cent had more than one alternative. The main alternative to fishing was day labour, followed 
by agriculture (non-livestock), then business (Fig. 6.3). Seventy per cent of respondents owned 
homestead land, 29.8 per cent were landless, and the remainder owned agricultural land. 
Within this group the mean number of agricultural acres was 0.57. Households with livelihoods 
other than fishing had significantly more acres of agricultural land than those without 
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(Wilcoxon rank sum test W = 54561.5; p < 0.05), indicating that non-livestock farming plays a 
more prominent role in less fishing-dependent households. Over half (58.1 per cent) of 
respondents owned livestock, but ownership was not significantly associated with having other 
livelihoods (χ2 = 0.09; df = 1; p = 0.77) or with percentage income from fishing (Wilcoxon rank 
sum test W = 77739; p = 0.9631), indicating that owning livestock does not play a strong role in 
fishing dependence.  
 
Figure 6.3: Bar plot showing the number of households who participate in various livelihoods. The total 
household number is greater than the total sample size because some households have more than one 
livelihood.  
 
Sixty-eight per cent of respondents owned a boat and there was a significant negative 
association between boat ownership and having other livelihoods (χ2 = 7.76; df = 1; p < 0.01). As 
expected, boat owners also had significantly higher proportions of income from fishing 
(Wilcoxon rank sum test W = 48509; p < 0.001). Although the owners of large trawlers are likely 
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to have other sources of income, the small and medium boat owners in this sample appeared to 
be constrained in their flexibility to engage in other livelihoods by their financial investment. 
The mean proportion of income from fishing was 82.3 per cent, showing a widespread high level 
of income dependency. Households without other livelihoods also had significantly higher 
proportions of income from fishing than their other livelihoods (Wilcoxon rank sum test W = 
109223; p < 0.001). Furthermore, 40.4 per cent of respondents stated that their main coping 
strategy during fishing bans is to fish anyway, rather than to take another job or adopt a food-
based or monetary coping strategy. It is not possible from this to conclude whether these 
households fish out of necessity or choice. However, since this particular response was not 
offered as an option by the enumerators, the high level of response supports its importance, and 
so its use as an indicator of dependence. Households who said they fish in ban periods had 
significantly higher proportions of income from fishing than others (Wilcoxon rank sum test W 
= 31244.5; p < 0.001) and there was a significant negative association between having other 
livelihoods and fishing as a coping strategy (χ2 = 129.54; df = 1; p < 0.001). The income, asset 
and coping strategy profiles are quite consistent with those found by Rahman et al. (2014a), 
although they found the proportion who fish illegally to cope during fishing bans to be much 
lower (27 per cent). 
6.3.2 Components of fishing dependence  
The first dimension of the FAMD explained 30.2 per cent of total variation. It primarily contrasts 
households with a high dependence on fishing (who own boats, use multiple fishing gears, fish 
illegally, have higher proportions of income from fishing, and have no agricultural land or other 
livelihoods) with households who are less dependent on fishing (who have agricultural land and 
other livelihoods, do not own boats, use a single gear type, do not fish illegally, and have lower 
proportions of income from fishing; Table 6.4). I used the first dimension as a multivariate 
indicator of dependence, as is the convention in the construction of socioeconomic indices (Vyas 
& Kumaranayake 2006; Howe et al. 2012). Although the proportion of variation explained by 
225 
 
the first dimension is not very large, it exceeds the 30 per cent threshold necessary to avoid 
misclassification (Sharker et al. 2014). Furthermore it can easily be interpreted as a measure of 
fishing dependence, whereas the second dimension is more difficult to interpret.  
 
Table 6.4: Variables used in FAMD to calculate a fishing dependence score for all surveyed households, 
with the principal component coefficients for the first three dimensions. 
 
Variable Units Dim 1 Dim 2 Dim 3 
Illegal fishing  1 = yes, 0 = no 1.3 -0.1 0.1 
Boat ownership 1 = yes, 0 = no 0.3 0.4 -0.1 
Gear diversity 1 = > 1 type , 0 = 1 type 0.5 0.2 0.7 
Agricultural land  1 = yes, 0 = no -0.6 2.2 1.0 
Livestock  1 = yes, 0 = no -0.0 0.6 -0.4 
Other livelihoods  1 = yes, 0 = no -0.6 0.1 0.1 
Fishing income BDT 0.8 -0.0 -0.1 
Eigenvalue  2.1 1.3 1.0 
Cumulative variance explained (%) 30.2 48.0 61.6 
 
Hierarchical clustering defined a three-cluster solution (Fig. 6.4). Fishing dependence differed 
significantly between these clusters (ANOVA; ƞ2 = 0.86; p < 0.001) and the difference between 
mean dependence was highest between the medium and high clusters (Table 6.5).  
 
Figure 6.4: Histogram showing the distribution of fishing dependence across households, where 1 is 
most dependent and -1 is least dependent. The different shading differentiates groups of dependence 
identified through cluster analysis. 
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Table 6.5: Proportion of households in each cluster of fishing dependence and mean fishing dependence 
scores for the entire sample. 
Cluster Low dependence Medium 
dependence 
High dependence 
Proportion of households (%) 46.4 32.6 21.0 
Mean dependence score -0.2 0.3 0.9 
 
Table 6.6: Summary statistics and description of clusters of fishing dependence by constituent variables. 
The standard deviation (SD) is presented in brackets.  
   Means by cluster 
 Units Mean (SD) Low 
dependence 
Medium 
dependence 
High 
dependence 
      
Fishing income BDT 82.3 (16.8) 71.7 87.6 99.7 
Agricultural land 1= yes, 0 = no 0.05 (0.2) 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Other livelihoods 1= yes, 0 = no 0.8 (0.4) 1.0 1.0 0.02 
Boat ownership 1= yes, 0 = no 0.7 (0.5) 0.5 0.8 0.8 
Multiple gear types 1 = > 1, 0 = 1  0.5 (0.5) 0.3 0.7 0.7 
Illegal fishing  1= yes, 0=no 0.4 (0.5) 0.02 0.7 0.9 
Livestock 1= yes, 0=no 0.6 (0.5) 0.6 0.6 0.6 
 
A comparison of means for each constituent variable of the dependence index between clusters 
demonstrates internal coherence (i.e., each variable is linked to the cluster it is in; Table 6.6). All 
the constituent categorical variables were significantly linked to cluster (chi squared tests; p < 
0.001), apart from livestock, which followed no clear trend and did not appear to contribute 
much to the index. Percentage income from fishing was also significantly linked to cluster 
(ANOVA; ƞ2 = 0.52; p < 0.001). There was a weak but significant negative correlation between 
dependence and average monthly household income (Pearson’s r = -0.17, p < 0.001), which 
provides some validation for the use of the index as a measure of fishing dependence. Low 
income can increase the level of dependence on a given livelihood (Ambastha et al. 2007; 
Marshall et al. 2007; Narain et al. 2008).  
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6.3.3 Jatka fishing 
The probability of targeting jatka was best explained by fishing dependence, which was 
included in all of the top models (ΔAICc < 4); jatka fishers appeared to be marginally more 
dependent on fishing (Table 6.7). Household income was the next most important explanatory 
variable; income was lower among jatka fishers. The other variables investigated had very little 
support for inclusion in the top models (Table D.2).  
Table 6.7: Result for GLMMs of probability of targeting jatka, showing the model-averaged coefficient 
estimates (standard error) and relative importance of each variable from the candidate set of models 
where ΔAICc < 4, based on 792 households from 19 villages in 6 districts. Coefficient estimates are 
presented as contrasts from the intercept, standardised on 2 standard deviations following Gelman 
(2008). Where the relative importance of a variable is < 0.5, only the direction of the effect is presented. 
Random effects estimates of variance [standard deviation] are taken from the global model.  
Fixed effects  Estimate (SE) Relative importance 
Intercept 0.10 (0.41)  
Index of fishing dependence 0.81 (0.13) 1.00 
Household income (BDT) -0.19 (0.14) 0.55 
Household dependency ratio - 0.43 
Respondent identity (1 = household head, 0 = other) + 0.26 
Household size + 0.26 
Fisher association membership (1 = yes, 0 = no) - 0.25 
Sanctuary area (1 = yes, 0 = no) - 0.23 
Loan (1 = yes, 0 = no) + 0.15 
Food insecurity (1 = yes, 0 = no) - 0.15 
# of models in candidate set 77  
Random effects   
Village  0.58 [0.76]  
District  0.77 [0.88]  
 
The estimates for the random effects were much larger than those for the fixed effects, other 
than fishing dependence (Table 6.7). Plotting the BLUPs for each district (Fig. 6.5a) and for each 
village (Fig. 6.5b) shows that there was a significant effect of geography on the probability of 
targeting jatka. For example, households were much more likely to say that they target jatka in 
Barisal district and much less likely in Patuakhali district.  
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(a) 
                 
(b) 
 
Figure 6.5: BLUPs for (a) the district random effect and (b) the village random effect. The x axes show 
the effect of living in a particular district or village in terms of the difference in probability of catching 
jatka from the intercept. Error bars show the 95% confidence interval based on the conditional variance 
for each random effect. Village names are prefixed by district. 
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6.3.4 Compensation allocation 
Three households (0.4 per cent) who, according to recipient lists, were receiving compensation 
reported in the household survey that they did not receive it. The reasons given fell under the 
umbrella of corruption by local Government officials, a widely cited problem in Bangladesh’s 
small-scale fisheries (Islam 2011; Haldar & Ali 2014; Rahman et al. 2014b). Another five 
respondents (0.6 per cent) said they received compensation even though they did not generate 
any income from fishing. A further two (0.3 per cent) respondents said they received 
compensation even though they did not fish hilsa.  
The most important fixed effect for the probability of receiving compensation was household 
size, which had a positive effect and a relative importance of 0.85 (larger households were more 
likely to receive compensation; Table 6.8), though support was weak (Table D.3). Fisher 
association membership also had some support for inclusion in top models (relative importance 
0.68) but, contrary to expectations, households involved with fisher associations were less 
likely to receive compensation. Food insecurity had some support for inclusion in top models 
(relative importance 0.50), with a positive effect on the probability of receiving compensation, 
as expected. The other fixed effects had relative importance values of < 0.5 and received very 
little support for inclusion in the top models (Table D.3). 
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Table 6.8: Result for GLMMs of probability of receiving compensation, showing the model-averaged 
coefficient estimates (standard error) and relative importance of each variable from the candidate set of 
models where ΔAICc < 4, based on 792 households from 19 villages in 6 districts. Coefficient estimates 
are presented as contrasts from the intercept, standardised on 2 standard deviations following Gelman 
(2008). Where the relative importance of a variable is < 0.5, only the direction of the effect is presented. 
Random effects estimates of variance [standard deviation] were taken from the global model.  
Fixed effects Estimate (SE) Relative importance 
Intercept -0.38 (0.50)  
Household size 0.25 (0.12) 0.85 
Fisher association membership (1 = yes, 0 = no) -0.50 (0.29) 0.68 
Food insecurity (1 = insecure, 0 = secure) 0.26 (0.18) 0.50 
Household dependency ratio - 0.43 
Income (BDT) + 0.41 
Respondent identity (1 = household head, 0 = other) + 0.15 
Jatka fishing (1 = yes, 0 = no) + 0.12 
Index of fishing dependence - 0.12 
Loan (1 = yes, 0 = no) - 0.12 
Inside sanctuary (1 = yes, 0 = no) - 0.12 
# of models in candidate set 87  
Random effects   
Village 0.37 [0.61]  
District 1.27 [1.13]  
 
There was clear spatial variation in the probability of receiving compensation, and the estimates 
of the random effects, particularly district, were larger than any of the fixed effects. Plotting the 
BLUPs for each district (Fig. 6.6a) and for each village within district (Fig. 6.6b) shows the 
significant difference in the effect that different geographic locations have on compensation 
allocation, having taken the fixed effects into account. Households in Chandpur district appear 
to be significantly more likely to receive compensation, while households in Bhola and 
Patuakhali are less likely. 
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(a) 
                     
(b) 
 
Figure 6.6: BLUPs for (a) the district random effect and (b) the village random effect. The x axes show 
the effect of living in a particular district or village in terms of the difference in probability of receiving 
compensation from the intercept. Error bars show the 95% confidence interval based on the conditional 
variance for each random effect. Village names are prefixed by district. 
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Currently, the highest coverage of fishing households by the compensation scheme is in the 
districts of Barisal, Barguna and, in particular, Chandpur (Fig. 6.7a). If the 60 per cent of 
households most dependent on fishing were targeted, coverage in Bhola, Patuakhali, Laxmipur 
and Barisal would increase (50 per cent, 31 per cent, 11 per cent and 5 per cent more) at the 
expense of Chandpur and Barguna, where coverage would drop by 65 per cent and 11 per cent 
respectively (Fig. 6.7b). Similarly, if only jatka fishers were targeted (53 per cent of 
households), Chandpur coverage would drop by 56 per cent and Barguna by 33 per cent, while 
Patuakhali coverage would increase by 44 per cent and Barisal by 28 per cent (Fig. 6.7c). This 
indicates that if the scheme were to be targeted more carefully according to its goals, there 
would be a shift in focus from Chandpur and Barguna to other districts, most noticeably to 
Patuakhali and Barisal. 
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Figure 6.7: Maps showing the relative proportions of study households who would be compensated in 
each district under three targeting scenarios: (a) the current targeting scenario; (b) a scenario in which 
the most fishing dependent 60% are targeted; and (c) a scenario in which all jatka fishers (total 53%) are 
targeted. 
 
 
6.3.5 Fairness of compensation distribution 
Thirty-six per cent of respondents said they think that the distribution of compensation is fair. 
When asked who is currently receiving compensation, the majority of respondents said the 
households most dependent on fishing (99.5 per cent) and the poorest households (59.1 per 
cent), but 73.2 per cent also chose well-connected people and 20 per cent chose those belonging 
to fisher associations (Fig. 6.8) – a result which contradicts the analysis of actual compensation 
(a) Current strategy (c) Jatka fishers 
(b) Fishing dependence 
Compensated 
Not compensated 
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allocation. Most (99.7 per cent) agreed that the most dependent households should be receiving 
compensation, and a small remainder (0.3 per cent) said that every fisher should receive 
compensation.  
 
Figure 6.8: Graph showing the groups of people that the respondents (n=799) reported to be and thought 
should be receiving compensation. The total percentage is more than 100 because some respondents 
gave multiple answers.  
 
The most important fixed effect for the GLMM for perceived fairness was compensation; 
recipients were significantly more likely to perceive fair compensation distribution (Table 6.9). 
Support for the model was quite weak (Table D.4) and the standard error on this effect size was 
very large, but the latter was due to convergence issues caused by the absence of any non-
recipients who thought the scheme was fair. Modelling also revealed a weak significant effect of 
fishing dependence, although this was much smaller than the random effects; less-dependent 
households were more likely to say the distribution of compensation was fair (Table 6.9). 
Plotting the BLUPs for each district (Fig. 6.9a) and each village within district (Fig. 6.9b) showed 
a significant effect of geography on reported fairness, once fixed effects are taken into account. 
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The effect of village was much stronger than that of district, where the overlap of confidence 
intervals with zero indicates that it is of limited importance.  
 
Table 6.9: Result for GLMMs for the probability of perceiving fair compensation distribution, showing the 
model-averaged coefficient estimates (standard error) and relative importance of each variable from the 
candidate set of models where ΔAICc < 4, based on 791 households from 19 villages in 6 districts. 
Coefficient estimates are presented as contrasts from the intercept, standardised on 2 standard 
deviations following Gelman (2008). Where the relative importance of a variable is < 0.5, only the 
direction of the effect is presented. Random effects estimates of variance [standard deviation] were taken 
from the global model.  
Fixed effects Estimate (SE) Relative importance 
Intercept -11.11 (703.20)  
Compensation (1 = yes, 0 = no) 20.95 (154.09) 1.00 
Index of fishing dependence -0.40 (0.35) 0.74 
Fisher association member (1 = yes, 0 = no) + 0.26 
Respondent identity (1 = household head, 0 = other) - 0.22 
Awareness (1= high, 0 = low) + 0.21 
Household income  - 0.21 
# of models in candidate set 16  
Random effects   
Village 2.80 [1.68]  
District 1.09 [1.04]  
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(a) 
                       
(b) 
 
Figure 6.9: BLUPs for (a) the district random effect and (b) the village random effect. The x axes show 
the effect of living in a particular district or village in terms of the difference in probability of reporting 
fairness of compensation distribution from the intercept. Error bars show the 95% confidence interval 
based on the conditional variance for each random effect. Village names are prefixed by district.  
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6.4 Discussion 
6.4.1 Compensation allocation 
Currently the pattern of compensation allocation in the area under study does not strongly 
reflect the social goals of the compensation scheme for hilsa conservation, indicating that it is 
not operating as efficiently or effectively as it could be. Although the DoF claims to target jatka 
fishers and those who are completely dependent on fishing, no evidence was found to support 
this. There was some evidence that larger households with a higher level of food insecurity were 
more likely to receive compensation, which is coherent with the goals of the VGF programme, 
but support for these effects was weak. Contrary to expectations, involvement in fisher 
associations had a significant negative influence on compensation allocation. This result should 
be interpreted with caution since fishing households are known to be largely disorganised in 
south east Bangladesh (Islam 2011), overall involvement with fisher associations in the study 
area was low (5.8 per cent), and there is evidence to suggest that those which do exist are non-
functional (Chapter 7; Rahman et al. 2014a).  
The lack of clarity in the scheme’s targeting criteria makes it difficult to draw any conclusions 
on actual levels of inclusion or exclusion error. The proportions of non-fisher and non-hilsa 
fisher respondents receiving compensation, and the proportions of respondents who were on 
the recipient list but said that they did not receive compensation, were very low. But if the error 
rates were to be measured using other factors in line with the rationale of the scheme (fishing 
dependence, income level, or jatka fishing), their lack of influence in statistical models indicates 
that the error is much higher. For example, although the scheme is aimed at jatka fishers, 44 per 
cent of non-recipients said that they target jatka and 56 per cent of recipients said that they do 
not. There is, however, a risk that strategic bias may be driving responses. It is possible that 
many more households did not fish, or did not fish hilsa, but may not have volunteered the 
information due to their awareness and understanding of the scheme. Moreover, people rarely 
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give honest answers to questions about sensitive behaviours such as illegal resource use (Nuno 
& St John 2015), and so it is possible that bias was introduced by concern about the 
consequences of admitting to the practice of jatka fishing. In this case though, respondents 
seemed very willing to volunteer the information.  
What this study did reveal is a strong spatial pattern in compensation allocation. Within the 
area in which the compensation scheme operates, households were significantly more or less 
likely to receive compensation in some districts than others. Households in Chandpur had the 
greatest probability of receiving compensation, once other variables were taken into account. 
This might be explained by the fact that Chandpur – the district where the scheme was first 
established – is considered to be an important landing site for hilsa and so receives a great deal 
of attention from the media and relatively good monitoring. It is also the site of the largest 
riverine nursery ground for hilsa (Mohammed & Wahab 2013), so it could be argued that by 
focusing on this district ecological objectives are prioritised – assuming that the scientific basis 
for this nursery ground is reliable (see Chapter 5). It is also possible that households in the 
coastal districts of Bhola and Patuakhali are less likely to receive compensation because they 
have less political influence (B. Hossain 2015, Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studied, 
personal communication, 21st January). Due to the subjectivity of the allocation process, officials 
are free to use the process for political gain and the final lists are reported often to contain non-
target recipients, or more than one record of one recipient (Haldar & Ali 2014; Richman & 
Mohammed 2016). The variation in compensation allocation between villages can probably be 
explained by the fact that villages with more organised and more powerful local councils have 
more influence in the allocation process (G. C. Haldar 2015, hilsa expert, personal 
communication, 30th January). 
6.4.2 Alternative targeting strategies 
A potential alternative strategy is to compensate all jatka fishers. According to the figures for 
the study area, this would be possible under current budget constraints, and would result in 
239 
 
increased allocation to villages in Patuakhali and Barisal districts, with a decrease to those in 
Chandpur and Barguna (although of course the study villages are not necessarily reflective of 
the entire districts). This could be viewed as beneficial in terms of both ecological and social 
objectives: firstly, protection of the juvenile life stage is thought to be essential for hilsa stock 
recovery (although the scientific basis for this understanding may be flawed; see Chapter 4), 
and secondly, jatka fishers in this study had lower levels of household income and marginally 
higher levels of fishing dependence. However, support for these correlates was weak and, 
although local knowledge suggests that the proportions of jatka fishers and non-jatka fishers in 
the sample are representative (B. Hossain 2015, Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies, 
personal communication, 21st January), it is possible that the distinction between jatka fishers 
and non-jatka fishers was blurred by strategic bias. The challenge of eliciting true information 
from a respondent highlights a potential challenge in the strategy of targeting jatka fishers: how 
to identify these households. Although local councils might be able to provide accurate 
information on which households are very poor or depend most on fishing for their livelihoods, 
it may be too difficult to distinguish between those who target jatka and those who do not (DoF 
2002). Firstly, jatka fishing has been described as an activity that marginal farmers and 
labourers switch to when income is very low, and so many jatka fishers are probably seasonal 
or occasional fishers (Haldar & Ali 2014). Secondly, although Chapter 4 indicates that jatka 
fishers are typically more likely to own boats, use a greater number of gear types, and use 
monofilament nets than those who do not target jatka, the DoF says that there is no visible 
distinction between jatka fishers and other fishers in inland areas; all artisanal fishers operating 
in areas where jatka are available will be catching them (M. Mome 2014, Department of 
Fisheries, personal communication, May 29th).   
Targeting fishing dependence may be a more practical strategy for achieving equitable social 
impacts through vulnerability reduction (Béné & Friend 2011; Islam 2011; Mohammed 2011). 
The implementation of fishing bans disrupts patterns of access to fishing, restricting household 
flexibility to cope with shocks and thereby contributing to vulnerability (Marshall et al. 2007). 
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Dependence on hilsa fishing is universally high in and around the sanctuary areas (Rahman et 
al. 2014a), but this study was able to define three clusters of dependence, and households with 
different levels of dependence will be differentially affected by loss of fishing access. Under 
current budget allocation within the study areas, about 60 per cent of the most dependent 
households could be targeted. This would lead to large shifts in the allocation of funds, 
particularly from villages in Chandpur and Barguna to those in Bhola and Patuakhali. A 
compensation scheme that targeted dependence may also be biased towards jatka fishers and 
low-income households, since jatka fishers were found to be marginally more dependent on 
fishing and income negatively correlated with dependence.  
There are some conceptual and methodological limitations to the index of fishing dependence 
used in this study. Due to data availability it does not represent a complete measure of fishing 
dependence; previous studies have used many more indicators to develop an index that 
explains over 70 per cent of variation – much higher than the 30 per cent in this study (Marshall 
et al. 2007). It would also have been preferable to also test the influence of specific non-income 
measures of poverty and wellbeing, incorporating dimensions such as health and housing, on 
compensation allocation – had they been available (Bhuiya et al. 2007).  
Most of the components used to develop the index of fishing dependence in this study would be 
possible to verify by those administering the compensation scheme, and some of them – such as 
household size and boat ownership – are already noted by the DoF as factors in their selection 
process. One of the most influential variables in the index was the household’s main coping 
strategy; the most dependent households tended to fish anyway as their main coping strategy 
during fishing bans. This would not be useful as a characteristic for the identification of 
compensation recipients, since it relates to illegal behaviour and so may not be willingly 
disclosed to the authorities. There would also be a danger here of damaging perceptions 
towards the scheme, through preferentially compensating those who are engaging in illegal 
behaviour.  
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6.4.3 Fairness of compensation distribution 
Improved targeting effectiveness may go some way to improving perceptions of legitimacy and 
fairness of the scheme (Jentoft 2000; Cosens 2013; Micheli et al. 2014), which are currently 
poor and may be undermining the potential ecological impacts of the scheme (Pascual et al. 
2014). Nearly 70 per cent of respondents reported perceptions of unfairness in current 
compensation distribution, which may in turn be reducing its potential to incentivise 
compliance with the fishing bans. Although the majority of respondents said that they think the 
most dependent and poorest fishers receive compensation, over 70 per cent said that the well-
connected are also favoured. Procedural legitimacy (i.e., that derived from an open and 
transparent process of decision-making and an explanation of the choices made) is closely 
linked to perceptions of fairness, and both play an important role in compliance with 
regulations (Sutinen & Kuperan 1999). Aside from the expected association between perceiving 
unfairness and not receiving compensation, the strongest pattern in perceptions was between 
villages. This could be related to the differences in governance that can be inferred from the 
spatial pattern in compensation distribution (Sommerville et al. 2010a), but it could also be 
linked to potential observer effects, as discussed in Chapter 5. It should be noted, also, that there 
may always be perceptions of unfairness when there are winners and losers involved and 
attitudes are not always strong predictors of actual actions (Chaigneau & Daw 2015; 
McClanahan & Abunge 2015).  
6.4.4 Conclusion 
Although the complex political economy of the Bangladesh hilsa fishery cannot be ignored, this 
study provides evidence of the need for a) a more focused and transparent targeting strategy; 
and b) improved targeting effectiveness, which would require changes to the current system of 
administration (Chapter 7; Haldar & Ali 2014). Not only does it highlight the risk of ineffective 
targeting of, particularly, government-led conservation payments in developing countries 
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(Wunder et al. 2008), it also adds to the body of literature that recognises the need for 
assessments of fishing dependence, resilience, and overall vulnerability to be incorporated into 
fisheries management interventions (Jacob et al. 2010, 2013; Chen & Lopez-Carr 2015). An 
understanding of which communities and which households are likely to be most sensitive to, or 
adversely impacted by, new fishing regulations or future shocks plays an important role in the 
success of any intervention. Policy efforts to manage vulnerability tend to focus on providing 
new sources of resilience (i.e., reducing sensitivity to shocks) but may need a stronger focus on 
adaptive capacity (Tuler 2008; McClanahan et al. 2015). Following calls to improve the 
rehabilitation programme for jatka fishers (Siddique 2009; Alam 2012), the DoF have promised 
a future emphasis of compensation on increased provision of alternative livelihood support 
(Chapter 5), which is expected to contribute more to building adaptive capacity than food can. 
On the other hand, Ferrol-Schulte et al. (2015) argue that interventions addressing coastal 
livelihood vulnerability tend to be too heavily based on developing adaptive capacity and 
resilience, without adequately addressing exposure to risk. Although this compensation scheme 
is only one dimension of a broader hilsa fisheries management plan, it is worth emphasising the 
importance of addressing the complete range of drivers of marine resource degradation 
(Chapter 3).  
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Chapter 7 
 
Can Conservation Trust Funds provide a sustainable framework for 
conservation payments in developing-world fisheries?  
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7.1 Introduction 
Conservation interventions can only be effective if they are sustainable in the long term. 
Sustainability encompasses ecological, social and financial aspects, and requires institutional 
arrangements that enable effective governance of the social-ecological system (Orr 2002; 
Barrett et al. 2005; Robinson 2011). Institutions can be defined as a set of rules that constrain 
human agency – in a fisheries context, the rules guiding human interaction with marine and 
freshwater resources (North 1990; Jentoft 2004)26. These rules can be formal (e.g. laws, policies 
and regulations) or informal (e.g. social norms). 
According to institutional theory, there are three types of governance structure: 1) hierarchies, 
which are systems of command such as a government regulation; 2) markets, which are systems 
of voluntary exchange; and 3) community management, which is self-regulation by communities 
and user groups (Vatn 2010). In practice these structures usually co-exist, and are always 
nested within or contain institutions at another level (Jentoft 2004). After decades of discourse 
around a false dichotomy between community and central government governance, it is now 
widely accepted that a multi-level and institutionally diverse approach to governance is most 
likely to lead to effective common pool resource management (Dietz et al. 2003; Jentoft 2004; 
Barrett et al. 2005; Muradian & Rival 2012; Muradian & Gómez-Baggethun 2013; Jones et al. 
2013). 
Although institutional sustainability is important for any form of conservation payment, I focus 
here on Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES). Not only does PES have the strongest literature 
base, in theory it should link ecosystem service (ES) buyers with providers through a 
sustainable cycle of payments (Farley & Costanza 2010). Furthermore, its requirement for 
conditionality and additionality means that when well designed and implemented, it should 
inherently be more effective in delivering conservation outcomes than other kinds of 
                                                             
26 I follow Jentoft (2004) by including organisational structure in this definition. While institutions are 
theoretically separate from organisations, in practice a set of rules is intrinsically inseparable from the 
organisation that implements them. 
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conservation payments that lack these elements. PES requires strong institutions to structure, 
govern and coordinate the generation of funds from buyers; the conditional transfer of funds to 
providers; and also inevitable interactions with other institutions governing the broader SES, 
such as laws, property rights, social norms and power relations (Corbera et al. 2009; Muradian 
et al. 2013; Pascual et al. 2014). The conditionality of payments on actions or outcomes puts an 
emphasis on the requirement for monitoring and enforcement of rules, for which there must be 
financial and technical capacity (Chapter 2). PES is typically described by theory as a market 
solution, and often seen as an alternative to failed hierarchical and community governance 
structures, but in reality it requires state and/or community engagement and does not 
necessitate the involvement of markets (Engel et al. 2008; Vatn 2010; Muradian 2013; Muradian 
et al. 2013; Hahn et al. 2015). In developing countries with weak institutions and poor 
governance capacity, a hybrid institutional approach that reconciles government policies with 
local and international interests is likely to be most effective, and the importance of community 
participation has been clearly demonstrated (Fauzi & Anna 2013; Ingram et al. 2014; Kim et al. 
2015).  
Institutional analyses have identified various sets of enabling conditions for effective and 
sustainable PES – most notably trust, low transaction costs27, and secure tenure (Brouwer et al. 
2011; Escobar et al. 2013; Sattler & Matzdorf 2013; Wunder 2013; Huber-Stearns et al. 2015). 
However, building an institutional framework for the governance of natural resources is 
complicated by the fact that they are usually common pool or public goods, from which 
potential beneficiaries cannot easily be excluded and for which free-riding or opportunistic 
behaviour is likely to emerge (Muradian & Rival 2012). External intermediaries (e.g. NGOs, local 
organisations, consultancies or government agencies) are therefore frequently required to help 
establish some of these enabling conditions (Vatn 2010; Kemkes et al. 2010; Huber-Stearns et al. 
                                                             
27 Transaction costs arise from the organisation or transfer of goods and services between two parties, 
and can be divided into three types: information costs (associated with the collection and organisation of 
information), coordination costs (associated with negotiating, monitoring and enforcing rules) and 
strategic costs (resulting from asymmetries in power and information such that some individuals or 
groups obtain benefits at the expense of others; Imperial & Yandle 2005). 
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2013; Wunder 2013; Kim et al. 2015; Schomers et al. 2015). Intermediary facilitation may often 
be vital in a fisheries context, where the transboundary and mobile nature of resources and 
stakeholders magnifies the complexity of resource governance (Bladon et al. 2014b; Chapter 2).  
In addition to strong governance, PES also needs a mechanism in place to support financial 
sustainability. User-financed PES schemes, where environmental externalities are internalised 
in a closed-system loop between users and providers (the Coaesean conceptualisation of PES), 
should in theory be financially sustainable – particularly if they involve provisioning or 
supporting services (Engel et al. 2008). In government-financed schemes, financial 
sustainability usually depends on continued budget allocations (Wunder et al. 2008), and when 
payments are for the more abstract concept of biodiversity conservation, the loop between 
buyers and providers is less tangible. As discussed in Chapter 2, in these circumstances ongoing 
payments are less secure and, if payments are withdrawn, then sustainable behaviour is 
unlikely to continue (Swart 2003; Wunder et al. 2008; Fisher 2012) so long-term financial 
mechanisms need to be established (Corbera et al. 2009). For example, earmarked user fees 
(e.g. for the use of an MPA) or taxes (e.g. on fishing licenses) can potentially generate 
government revenues for long-term continuity of conservation (Pagiola 2008), or some form of 
buyer reserve fund (over and above that which is used for the payments) can help to finance 
costly monitoring and enforcement activities and thus maintain conditionality (Bladon et al. 
2014b). 
Some PES schemes, notably a group of watershed PES known as water funds, use a 
Conservation Trust Fund (CTF) model (Goldman-Benner et al. 2012), as conceptualised in Fig. 
7.1. CTFs, also called Conservation Funds and Environmental Funds, are commonly defined as 
legally independent grant-making institutions that provide sustainable financing for 
biodiversity conservation and related sustainable development (Spergel & Taieb 2008). A 
number of authors have advocated for CTFs’ potential to support economic incentive 
mechanisms such as PES (Spergel & Taieb 2008; Spergel & Wells 2009; RedLAC 2010a; 
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Goldman-Benner et al. 2012). Not only can a CTF provide sustainable financing and financial 
administration services for PES, it can also act as a multi-stakeholder intermediary between ES 
buyers and providers, facilitating collaboration, information exchange, transparency and fair 
governance. Experience from water funds indicates that this model can provide the extra 
flexibility needed for PES to operate in unconventional institutional contexts (Goldman-Benner 
et al. 2012). 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Conceptual framework for role of Conservation Trust Funds in Payments for Ecosystem 
Services. Payment flows from buyers to providers, conditional on behavioural change or additional 
conservation impact.  
 
The broad role of CTFs in marine resource management has recently been explored (Bladon et 
al. 2014a). In this chapter I ask whether and how the CTF model can provide a framework for 
sustainable PES in developing-world fisheries, using the Bangladesh hilsa (Tenualosa ilisha) 
fishery as a case study. I begin by identifying enabling conditions for sustainable PES in 
developing-world fisheries, before exploring whether CTFs can support or enhance these 
conditions. I then assess the extent to which the current compensation scheme for hilsa fishers 
in Bangladesh fulfils the framework, asking how a CTF could complement, or even supersede, 
current institutional arrangements and thus whether it could catalyse the development of a 
more sustainable payment scheme. 
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7.2 Methods 
This study combines two elements: a general exploration of the potential for CTFs to provide a 
sustainable framework for conservation payments in developing-world fisheries; and a specific 
case study of the hilsa fishery in Bangladesh, which grounds the framework in a real-world 
situation. 
7.2.1 Case study: Bangladesh hilsa fishery 
This chapter uses the Bangladesh hilsa fishery as a case study (see Chapter 3 for details) to 
explore the potential for a CTF to support PES in developing-world fisheries. It is a small-scale 
coastal marine and freshwater fishery, which is largely artisanal with a small industrial trawl 
subsector. Current management interventions include seasonal fishing bans for the protection 
of juvenile and spawning hilsa and a rehabilitation programme for fishers who target jatka 
(juvenile hilsa28). As part of this programme, the Bangladesh Government’s Department of 
Fisheries (DoF) provides rice compensation to fishing households during fishing bans. The 
management approach has numerous weaknesses, both in concept and implementation, and it 
is unclear whether it actually has scope for ecological additionality (Chapter 5). Yet there is 
political interest in and support for moving away from a compensation scheme towards a PES, 
and for the creation of a hilsa CTF (Majumder et al. 2015a). It is therefore a useful case study to 
explore both the potential for and the challenges of implementing CTFs in developing-world 
fisheries. 
7.2.2 Data collection 
The general exploration of CTFs was based on a comprehensive literature review (published 
and grey literature) and key informant interviews (KIIs; i.e., interviews with individuals 
selected on the basis of their expert knowledge). I reviewed 12 existing CTFs, selected to give a 
                                                             
28 Officially defined as hilsa of up to 25 cm in length (Islam et al. 2014). 
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range in terms of scale, geography, length of existence and source of finance, but with an 
emphasis on marine resource management (see Appendix E.1 for full list and case study 
summaries). I conducted semi-structured telephone interviews with 11 representatives from 
eight of these CTFs (representatives from the remaining four CTFs were unavailable for 
interview, and so these were analysed on the basis of literature alone). I also conducted 
interviews on the topic of CTFs with seven experts in conservation finance. All 18 interviews 
were conducted in November and December 2013 (Table 7.1; see Appendix E.2 for key 
questions). 
For the Bangladesh case study analysis I used the same 36 face-to-face unstructured interviews 
as were used in Chapter 5, together with six additional interviews conducted at the same time 
(May 2014, with some conversations continuing up until January 2016; Table 7.1). Questions 
were focused on the sustainability of hilsa compensation scheme, Trust Funds and other public-
private partnerships (PPPs) in Bangladesh, CTFs in Bangladesh, and the prospect of setting up a 
hilsa CTF (see Appendix E.2), but emphasis was placed on allowing the KIs to speak, only 
redirecting or encouraging them when they went off topic or had something particularly 
notable to say (Newing 2011).  
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Table 7.1: List and summary of key informants (KIs) for general study (11 representatives from eight 
Conservation Trust Funds and seven conservation finance experts) and for the Bangladesh case study 
(36). 
 Number of KIs Codes 
General study KIs   
Mexican Nature Conservation Fund (FMCN) 2 FMCN1; FMCN2 
Arannayk Foundation, Bangladesh 1 AF1 
Fondo Acción, Colombia 1 FA1 
Mesoamerican Reef Fund (MAR Fund) 1 MAR1 
Banc d’Arguin & Coastal & Marine Biodiversity Trust Fund 
Limited (BACoMaB), Mauritania 
2 BACoMaB1; 
BACoMaB2 
Protected Areas Conservation Trust (PACT), Belize 1 PACT1 
Caribbean Biodiversity Fund (CBF) 2 CBF1; CBF2 
Phoenix Islands Protected Area (PIPA) Trust, Kiribati 1 PIPA1 
Conservation finance experts 7 CF1-7 
Bangladesh case study  KIs   
Department of Fisheries (DoF) representatives29  6 D1-6 
Local Government officials4 (non-DoF) 2 L1-2 
Central Government officials30 (non-DoF) 2 C1-2 
Bangladesh Fisheries Research Institute scientists 2 R1-2 
Local NGO representatives 6 LN1-6 
International NGO representatives 6 IN1-6 
Industry stakeholders (middlemen)  5 M1-5 
Industry stakeholders (members of fishers and boat 
owners associations) 
3 F1-3 
Academics working in Bangladesh 5 A1-5 
Bangladeshi Trust Fund representatives 5 T1-5 
 
 
                                                             
29 The DoF has representatives at each level of Government administration down to sub-district (see 
Chapter 3). 
30 See Chapter 3 and Appendix A for a summary of the administrative hierarchy. 
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7.3 Results 
7.3.1 A framework for sustainable PES in developing-world fisheries  
Here I identify the enabling conditions for sustainability in the context of PES in developing-
world, coastal fisheries. I base this analysis on enabling conditions in the common pool resource 
(CPR) governance literature, adapted for watershed PES institutions by Escobar et al. (2013; 
Table 7.2). The diversity in social-ecological systems makes it impossible to identify a perfect 
institutional design for PES (Ostrom 2007), but CPR research has identified sets of conditions 
that promote enduring institutions, and the relevance of these in a PES context has been 
usefully explored (Clements et al. 2010; Fisher et al. 2010; Muradian et al. 2010). I added to and 
adapted the framework already developed for watershed PES (Escobar et al. 2013), with a 
wider review of the PES and fisheries management literature.   
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Table 7.2: Critical enabling conditions for the sustainability of Payments for Ecosystem Services in 
developing-world fisheries, adapted from Escobar et al. (2013).  
Enabling conditions References 
Resource system 
 
 Feasibility of improving resource 
 Indicators of resource conditions 
 Traceability of resource improvement 
 Manageability of the system 
 
 Potential for profitable exploitation at a 
sustainable rate 
Wunder (2005); Bladon et al. (2014b) 
Sommerville et al. (2011); Tacconi (2012) 
Sommerville et al. (2011); Tacconi (2012) 
Corbera et al. 2009; Fisher et al. (2010); Bladon et 
al. (2014b); Grima et al. (2016) 
Salafsky et al. (2001) 
 
Group characteristics 
 
 Small resource user group 
 
 Prior organisational experience in resource 
user group 
 Appropriate leadership in resource user 
group 
 Social cohesion in resource user group 
 
 Trust between stakeholders, particularly 
between buyers and providers 
Agrawal (2001); Jack et al (2008); Fisher et al. 
(2010); Muradian et al. (2010) 
Pham et al. (2010); Wunder (2013); Mann et al. 
(2015) 
Agrawal (2001); Gutiérrez et al. (2011); 
Carbonetti et al. (2014) 
Gutiérrez et al. (2011); Bremer et al. (2014); Mann 
et al. (2015) 
Marshall (2005); Vatn (2010); Corbera et al. 
(2007a); Fisher et al. (2010); Wunder (2013); 
Sarkki & Karjalainen (2015) 
Relationship between resource and group characteristics 
 Capacity to change relationship 
 Fair and transparent benefit distribution 
 
 Resource tenure clarity and security 
 
Pagiola et al. (2005); Sarkki & Karjalainen (2015) 
Pascual et al. (2014); Leimona et al. (2015); Pham 
et al. (2015) 
Grieber (2009); Fauzi & Anna (2013); Sattler & 
Matzdorf (2013); Wunder (2013); Leimona et al. 
(2015) 
Institutional arrangements 
 
 Rules are simple and transparent  
 Effective enforcement 
 Self-monitoring 
 
 Swiftly applied, graduated, fair sanctions 
 Low transaction costs 
 
 Mechanism for sustainable financing 
Pagiola et al. (2005); Read et al. (2011) 
Wunder (2005); Bladon et al. (2014b) 
Jentoft (2005); Cinner & Aswani (2007); Reynolds 
(2011); Sarkki & Karjalainen (2015) 
Ostrom (1990); McClanahan et al. (2013) 
Muradian et al (2010); Sattler & Matzdorf (2013); 
Wunder (2013) 
Corbera et al. (2009); Grima et al (2016) 
External factors 
 
 Central government provides a supportive 
environment without undermining local 
autonomy 
 Appropriate articulation with external 
markets 
Vatn (2010); Huber-Stearns et al. (2013); 
Muradian (2013); Muradian et al. (2013); Ingram 
et al. (2014); Loft et al. (2015) 
Short (2012; 2014); Fujita et al. (2012); Bos et al. 
(2015) 
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Resource characteristics 
Feasibility of improvement, or the requirement for the resource (or ES) to be under a moderate 
level of threat (in a state of decline but not so severe that nothing can be done to reverse it), has 
been identified as an important precondition for the additionality of PES (Chapter 2; Wunder 
2005; Escobar et al. 2013; Bladon et al. 2014b). In order to detect changes in a resource, reliable 
indicators of resource condition are required and, for traceability or attribution of any 
improvement to the payment, there must be a robust system of monitoring and evaluation in 
place that incorporates counterfactual scenarios (Sommerville et al. 2011; Tacconi 2012; Bladon 
et al. 2014b; Pham et al. 2015).  
Small-scale resource systems are usually easier to manage in a sustainable way than large-scale 
ones, and implementation on a local or regional scale is more conducive to community 
participation (Corbera et al. 2009; Grima et al. 2016). External boundaries are easier to define 
and improvements easier to trace when systems are small (and particularly if users are in close 
proximity to the resource), facilitating ease of monitoring (Fisher et al. 2010; Escobar et al. 
2013). In the marine environment, spatially constrained or sedentary resources are more 
suitable for PES than large transboundary and high-seas fisheries, but even on a small scale 
marine resources can be transboundary, reducing manageability (Bladon et al. 2014b).  
For an effective PES, there must also be potential for profitable exploitation of the resource (or 
the ES it provides) at a sustainable rate into the long-term (Salafsky et al. 2001; Wunder et al. 
2008). For ES providers, the benefits of the sustainable resource use that the PES incentivises, 
plus the payment, should exceed the benefits of exploitation in the absence of the PES; and for 
ES buyers, the payment must be lower than the benefits they receive from the resource, 
whether exploited or non-market (Fletcher et al. 2016). Without this, both potential providers 
and buyers would have little incentive to participate. This requirement for profitability may 
require bundling of ES if individual ES are unlikely to be profitably exploitable (Bladon et al. 
2014b).  
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Group characteristics 
Though of course ‘small’ is a relative term, small group size is generally considered to improve a 
group’s ability to self-manage and self-monitor (Agrawal 2001). The larger the number of 
resource users, the greater the transaction costs are likely to be (Jack et al. 2008; Fisher et al. 
2010; Muradian et al. 2010). Large and dispersed user groups are common in marine and 
coastal fisheries, and can be divided into smaller sub-groups for ease of management. Prior 
organisational experience contributes to a group’s ability to coordinate monitoring and 
regulation (Pham et al. 2010; FAO 2011; Escobar et al. 2013; Wunder 2013; Bladon et al. 
2014b). Also key to collective action is appropriate and legitimate local leadership, guided by 
collective interest rather than self-interest, with good communication skills and the ability to 
motivate individuals to coordinate actions (Agrawal 2001; Gutiérrez et al. 2011; Carbonetti et al. 
2014). Social cohesion – which builds upon trust, norms and communication – has been 
identified as a strong determinant of success in fisheries co-management, affecting community 
agreement on management decisions (Gutiérrez et al. 2011). It can also determine PES 
outcomes through its impact on willingness to participate and comply (FAO 2011; Bremer et al. 
2014; Mann et al. 2015).  
Trust between stakeholders enhances institutional legitimacy, efficiency, and reduces the need 
for monitoring and enforcement of rules (Marshall 2005; Vatn 2010; le Coq et al. 2015), for 
which there is often limited capacity in developing-world fisheries (Bladon et al. 2014b). Trust 
between buyers and providers is particularly important, both in terms of the level to which 
buyers trust providers to deliver the ES and the level to which providers trust buyers to actually 
pay, which influences willingness to participate and comply (Corbera et al. 2007a; Fisher et al. 
2010; Vatn 2010; Escobar et al. 2013; Wunder 2013). Although some studies have suggested 
that the involvement of intermediaries in PES reduces trust in local communities (Grima et al. 
2016), usually one or more external intermediaries will be required to facilitate trust-building 
(Huber-Stearns et al. 2013).  
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Relationship between group and resource characteristics 
High dependence on a resource has been identified as a condition that is important for the 
initiation of PES, fostering community interest and strengthening willingness to pay (Escobar et 
al. 2013). However, high dependence could just as well reduce the willingness of providers to 
participate in a PES and comply with rules, especially if they are also very poor (Pagiola et al. 
2005; Sarkki & Karjalainen 2015). For sustainability, the user group should be dependent 
enough that they care about the resource, but not so dependent (or poor) that they have no 
capacity to change their relationship with the resource. On the other hand, it could be argued 
that, by targeting the poorest groups, PES has the potential to unite the goals of poverty 
alleviation and conservation in fisheries management (Chapter 6; Pagiola et al. 2005; Milder et 
al. 2010; Pattanayak et al. 2010; Bladon et al. 2014b). The distribution of benefits in a PES 
should be fair, transparent and accountable, and it should have equitable outcomes (Calvet-Mir 
et al. 2015; Pham et al. 2015). This fairness affects social acceptance and therefore compliance 
with rules (Sutinen & Kuperan 1999; Escobar et al. 2013; McClanahan & Abunge 2015), and so it 
is crucial for sustainability – both socially and ecologically (Pascual et al. 2014; Leimona et al. 
2015).  
A condition commonly cited as one of the most restrictive in PES is security and clarity of 
resource tenure, or resource system tenure, among providers (Greiber 2009; Fauzi & Anna 
2013; Sattler & Matzdorf 2013; Wunder 2013; Leimona et al. 2015; Sarkki & Karjalainen 2015). 
This is crucial if providers are to be accountable for behaviour within that fishery or affecting 
the ES in question, and necessitates some kind of institutional framework (FAO 2011; Solazzo et 
al. 2015). Common pool resources and especially coastal fisheries tend to lack clear formal 
property rights, but some form of tenure or use rights can still be established through collective 
action, keeping transaction costs to a minimum (Clements et al. 2010). These use rights can be 
based on customary rights, where appropriate, and be made conditional on sustainable 
management in the PES system (Suyanto et al. 2007; Fauzi & Anna 2013; Kerr et al. 2014).  
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Institutional arrangements 
The first step in establishing effective institutional arrangements for natural resource 
management is to set and enforce rules (Barrett et al. 2005). Enforcement of the rules requires 
monitoring for compliance and a sanctioning mechanism which, if applied, should include 
careful consideration of why rules have been broken. The sanctioning mechanism should be 
swiftly applied and graduated (i.e., the punishment should fit the crime and allow the offender 
to re-engage), factors that influence perceptions of fairness (Ostrom 1990; McClanahan et al. 
2013; Escobar et al. 2013). In PES there should be enforceable conditionality on clear 
behaviours or outcomes that are achievable by the providers (Wunder 2005). However, a 
common limitation in developing-world fisheries is a lack of capacity for this enforcement 
(Bladon et al. 2014b). In these circumstances, hybrid institutions for collaborative management 
can facilitate self-monitoring (Jentoft 2005; Cinner & Aswani 2007; Sarkki & Karjalainen 2015). 
Transparency and simplicity of rules improve ease of implementation, avoid unintentional or 
uninformed non-compliance, and reduce barriers to participation (Pagiola et al. 2005; Read et 
al. 2011; Escobar et al. 2013). Local participation in design can contribute to this transparency, 
and enhance durability (Agrawal 2001; Fisher et al. 2010; Muradian et al. 2010; Reynolds 2011; 
DeCaro & Stokes 2013; Pascual et al. 2014). In a public PES scheme, transparency should be 
monitored by an independent authority, in order to avoid potential corruption or 
mismanagement of resources (FAO 2011).  
Transaction costs play an important role in determining the sustainability of PES, and can be 
prohibitively high (Sattler & Matzdorf 2013; Wunder 2013). Intermediaries (particularly buyer 
and provider institutions), are usually required to help reduce these costs, especially when 
schemes are small-scale (Muradian et al. 2010; Wunder 2013). Sustainable financing should be 
available for a period of at least 10-20 years (Corbera et al. 2009; Grima et al. 2016). Given the 
fact that PES rarely conforms to its Coasean conceptualisation, some mechanism for this 
sustainable financing needs to be established, whether to cover operational costs or as 
insurance should buyers withdraw.  
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External factors 
Pre-existing institutions and policies can enhance or impede sustainable PES (Corbera et al. 
2009; Huber-Stearns et al. 2015; Mann et al. 2015). It is widely recognised that resource users 
should have some autonomy from central government to determine rules through formal or 
informal mechanisms (Ostrom 1990; Escobar et al. 2013). Government-financed and user-
financed PES alike need a hybrid and multi-level form of governance in which providers have 
rights to organise (Vatn 2010; Huber-Stearns et al. 2013; Muradian 2013; Muradian et al. 2013; 
Ingram et al. 2014; Loft et al. 2015). Centralised interventions often fail to enable all local ES 
providers to participate (Clements et al. 2010). If PES is to facilitate truly adaptive and 
sustainable management, these providers need the power, capacity and flexibility to make and 
modify rules (Hayes et al. 2015; Mann et al. 2015). There is also an abundance of more general 
evidence to suggest that this kind of hybrid governance structure strengthens small-scale, 
developing-world fisheries management (Imperial & Yandle 2005; Cinner & Aswani 2007; 
McClanahan et al. 2009; McClanahan et al. 2013; Gianelli et al. 2015). 
High articulation with external markets (i.e., where there is an external market for the resource, 
to which providers are well connected) is typically understood to have a detrimental impact on 
resource use, but the potential effects of competition on prices can also have positive impacts on 
willingness to participate in PES or comply with rules (Jack et al. 2008; Escobar et al. 2013), and 
so PES is sometimes articulated with external markets (Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010; Boisvert 
et al. 2013). For instance, price premiums and increased price stability may attract a fisher to 
participate in a PES, and so where PES promotes sustainable fishing practices, articulation with 
the external markets that are offering these premiums can be beneficial for sustainability (Short 
2012, 2014; Fujita et al. 2012; Bos et al. 2015). 
7.3.2 Can Conservation Trust Funds support sustainability in PES? 
Although CTFs vary in purpose, legal and political context, human resource capacity, and donor 
requirements, here I define a CTF as any institution that: a) is governed by an independent 
258 
 
board (of directors, trustees or otherwise) with stakeholder representation; b) mobilises (and 
often invests) funds and keeps them separate from other sources of finance; and c) re-grants 
these funds for designated conservation activities (Bladon et al. 2014a). Although some CTFs 
are becoming more directly involved in the implementation of these activities (KI CF2), they can 
be distinguished from other kinds of conservation NGOs by their role as a ‘bridge’ between 
donors and implementing organisations. The first CTFs emerged in the early 1990s as 
mechanisms to absorb and disburse the capital that was becoming available through bilateral 
debt-for-nature swaps, whereby foreign debt owed by a developing nation is forgiven in 
exchange for local investments in conservation (Bayon & Deere 1998). More than 70 CTFs have 
since been established to finance conservation at national and regional levels, with a 
concentration in Latin America and the Caribbean, many of which support marine conservation 
objectives (see Table 7.3). For example, a KI from the Latin American and Caribbean Network of 
Environmental Funds (RedLAC; KI CF2) reported that of the 22 member CTFs, 64 per cent 
support marine conservation – particularly marine protected areas (MPAs). 
CTFs have the potential to advance PES initiatives in a number of ways (see Table 7.4), although 
it is important to note that – as with any institution – this potential can only be fulfilled if best 
practice is followed (Spergel & Mikitin 2013; Bladon et al. 2014a). A key advantage is the 
effective financial model that they can provide (Spergel & Taieb 2008; RedLAC 2010b; Goldman-
Benner et al. 2012). CTFs often bring together a catalytic range of donors and streams of 
financing in a manner that is rare in conservation, providing a reliable flow of funds that is not 
subject to the vagaries of project funding and can be consistent with the absorptive capacity of 
grantees (Klarer & Galindo 2012; TNC 2012). Funds can be structured as endowments, sinking 
funds, revolving funds, or any combination thereof (Table 7.5). Investment strategies tend to be 
conservative, minimising risk while focusing on capital growth; revenue is usually divided into 
that to be withdrawn and spent on operations and that which is reinvested, providing insulation 
from annual variations in revenue flows (Norris 2000; Spergel & Taieb 2008; Grafton et al. 
2008; Mathias & Victurine 2012). Nevertheless, KIs pointed out that initial capitalisation of CTFs 
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can be difficult (KIs FMCN1; MAR1; CBF1; CBF2; CF3; PIPA1; e.g. Case Studies 5 and 6, Appendix 
E.1), and that donors are in general becoming less interested in giving endowments, unless 
there is a great deal of leverage associated with the donation – for example through political co-
financing commitments (CF5; CF7; e.g. Case Study 11, Appendix E.1). For this reason, more and 
more CTFs are incorporating alternative financing mechanisms such as PES, user fees, taxes, 
REDD+, biodiversity offsets, and environmental compensation, which generate revolving funds 
on a continuous basis (CF1; CF2; CF5; CF6; Spergel & Taieb 2008; RedLAC 2010a). For instance, 
a major source of revenue for Belize’s Protected Area Conservation Trust (PACT) has been an 
earmarked tourism tax, while Mauritania’s Banc d’Arguin Coastal and Marine Biodiversity Trust 
Fund (BACoMaB) was partially capitalised with finances from the nation’s EU fisheries 
agreement (see Case Studies 11 and 4, Appendix E.1). When a CTF acts as a trustee or 
administrator of PES revenues, a diversified financial structure should mean that it can provide 
a sustainable source of financing even if one or more buyers were to withdraw (e.g. Case Study 
4, Appendix E.1; Goldman-Benner et al. 2012). Furthermore, it may be able to offer microcredit, 
grants or non-financial incentives to cover otherwise prohibitive PES start-up costs and 
encourage PES development, especially if the CTF is mature (RedLAC 2010b). Throughout the 
operational phase it could also directly reduce transaction costs by helping to finance costly 
monitoring and enforcement activities (Spergel & Taieb 2008). On the other hand, operational 
costs are a challenge for many CTFs (FMCN1; FMCN2; BACoMaB1; MAR1; CF1) and keeping 
these costs low requires the same careful financial analysis entailed by the planning of any 
conservation instrument (Norris 2000; Bos et al. 2015). 
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Table 7.3: Examples of Conservation Trust Funds (CTFs) that support marine conservation objectives. This table is based on full Case Study summaries in 
Appendix E. 
CTF Country / region Year est. Institutional structure Fund generation Fund delivery 
Phoenix Islands 
Protected Area 
(PIPA) Trust 
Republic of Kiribati 2009 NGO governed by a 3-
member board under the 
laws of Kiribati, with 2 
permanent staff 
USD 5 million PIPA Trust Endowment Fund 
capitalised by Conservation International and 
Kiribati Government and some sinking funds 
from multilateral aid and regional 
governments 
Funds allocated to PIPA and national 
Government for MPA management 
Banc d’Arguin 
Coastal and 
Marine 
Biodiversity Trust 
Fund (BACoMaB) 
Mauritania 2009 Foundation governed by  
a 7-member board under  
UK law, with 2 permanent 
staff 
€10 million endowment capitalised through 
bilateral aid, philanthropic foundations & EU 
Fishing Agreement 
Funds disbursed for MPA 
management but plan to extend 
support to oceanographic institute 
and communities in MPAs 
Mesoamerican 
Reef (MAR) Fund 
MAR ecoregion 
(Honduras, Belize, 
Mexico, Guatemala) 
2009 Charitable foundation 
governed by a 12-member 
board (can be up to 17 
members) under US law, 
with 9 permanent staff 
USD 23 million endowment  Funds disbursed to national NGOs, 
community institutions, 
governmental and scientific 
organisations for marine and coastal 
ecosystems of and watersheds 
draining into MAR  
Caribbean 
Biodiversity Fund 
Caribbean 2012 UK charity governed by a 2-
member board, Secretariat 
based in Bahamas  
USD 42 million endowment capitalised by GEF, 
TNC and KfW. 
Funds disbursed to national level 
CTFs for marine and terrestrial PAs 
in the region 
The Protected 
Areas 
Conservation 
Trust (PACT), 
Belize 
Belize 1996 Foundation governed by an 
11-member board under 
Belize law with  
17 staff 
Revolving fund financed through a 
conservation tax, a BZUSD 6 million 
endowment and a sinking fund financed 
through a debt swap 
Funds disbursed to national public 
institutions, municipalities and NGOs 
for national PA network 
Mexican Fund for 
the Conservation 
of Nature (FMCN) 
Mexico 1994 Civil association governed 
by a 19-member board and 
32-member general 
assembly with 44 staff 
USD 120 million endowment capitalised by US 
and Mexican Governments and sinking funds 
from various sources including philanthropic 
donors. USD 76 million of this is managed 
separately as the Fund for Natural Protected 
Areas (FANP), segregated from other 
programmes 
Funds disbursed to NGOs, organised 
rural communities and conservation 
professionals for national PAs, 
watersheds and forests, oceans and 
coasts and ‘special programs’ 
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Table 7.4: Summary of whether a best practice Conservation Trust Fund (CTF) could help to catalyse the 
improvement (if already fulfilled) or development (if not yet fulfilled) of critical enabling conditions for 
the sustainability of Payments for Ecosystem Services.  
Enabling conditions 
Potential for CTF to 
support condition 
Resource system 
Feasibility of improving resource 
Indicators of resource conditions 
Traceability of resource improvement 
Manageability of the system  
Potential for profitable exploitation at a sustainable rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Group characteristics 
Small resource user group  
Prior organisational experience within resource user group 
Appropriate leadership within resource user group 
Social cohesion within resource user group 
Trust between stakeholders, particularly between buyers and 
providers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relationship between resource and group characteristics 
Capacity to change relationship 
Fair and transparent benefit distribution 
Resource tenure clarity and security 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional arrangements 
Rules are simple and transparent  
Effective enforcement 
Self-monitoring 
Swiftly applied, graduated, fair sanctions 
Low transaction costs 
Mechanism for sustainable financing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
External factors 
Central government provides a supportive environment without 
undermining local autonomy 
Appropriate articulation with external markets  
 
 
 
 
 
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Table 7.5: Summary of types of fund and their advantages and disadvantages. It is common for the 
financial structure of a CTF to combine these features. Table adapted from Bladon et al. (2014a). 
 Advantages Disadvantages 
Endowment fund 
Where the financial assets of a 
fund are invested and only the 
income from this investment is 
used to finance activities 
 
 Suitable for PA and national 
park financing, which 
require a long-term source of 
financing. 
 Can cover a CTF’s basic 
operational costs 
 Can be useful to leverage 
additional sources of funding 
 
 
 Ties up substantial amounts 
of resources with relatively 
low returns 
 Take time to start producing 
income 
 Least attractive to donors 
Sinking fund 
Where activities are financed 
using both principle and 
investment income over a fixed 
period of time (usually 6-15 
years), or until the fund sinks to 
zero 
 
 Suitable when large amounts 
of money are required on a 
one-time basis 
 More attractive to donors as 
they like to see the effects of 
money being spent 
 
 
 Lack of permanence 
Revolving fund 
Where a fund is replenished or 
augmented on a continuous 
basis, for example through 
earmarked taxes, user fees or 
PES 
 
 Can last in perpetuity if the 
source is financially 
sustainable 
 Can cover a CTF’s basic 
operational costs 
 Can connect ES beneficiaries 
with providers 
 
 If used in isolation, 
withdrawal of the source of 
replenishment could cause 
the collapse of the fund 
 
Through coordination with, or even involvement of, the corporate sector, a CTF could also help 
to articulate PES with external markets, where appropriate. Research suggests that the seafood 
sector is a potentially significant source of investment for PES, which could support the 
transition to sustainable fisheries (Vallejo et al. 2009; Short 2012; Blasiak et al. 2014; Micheli et 
al. 2014; Chaplin-Kramer et al. 2015). Corporate sector partnerships are becoming increasingly 
common among CTFs (see Case Studies 5, 10, 11 and 12, Appendix E.1; CF1; CF6); for instance, 
Ecuador’s FONAG has received funds for PES from a water-bottling company, a brewery and an 
electrical utility (Case Study 11, Appendix E.1). By increasing access to premium seafood 
markets that are potentially more interested in the full provenance story of relevant products 
than standard markets, a CTF could generate funds for PES that are more likely to have an 
additional social impact and improve accountability for sustainability within the seafood supply 
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chain. This would be particularly valuable for developing-world fisheries, most of which are 
currently financially limited from gaining access to these markets (Blackmore et al. 2015). 
But a CTF is more than a conduit for funding. Best practice standards direct that a CTF should be 
governed by an independent and participatory board (Spergel & Mikitin 2013). Board members 
are usually from diverse sectors – national and international policy-makers, organisations 
capable of assisting with capacity-building, grantees, NGOs, other CTFs and institutions with 
financial expertise – and so CTFs are often referred to as PPPs. In theory, this governance 
structure positions CTFs to play an important intermediary role between ES buyers and 
providers (e.g. Case Studies 3 and 10, Appendix E.1), in which they can help to identify potential 
buyers and to achieve economies of scale by negotiating agreements between multiple buyers 
and providers, or for the bundling of multiple ES (CF2; CF4; Spergel & Taieb 2008). This 
brokerage role is particularly vital in remote developing-country areas where providers can be 
disparate and lacking social cohesion. The independent nature of a CTF should also allow it to 
create the dialogue and build the trust that is required between buyers, providers and other 
interest groups, which often have divergent interests (le Coq et al. 2015). Although other 
intermediaries – particularly local institutions – can also play this trust-building role (Corbera 
et al. 2007b; Petheram & Campbell 2010), their relationships can be complex and competition 
may arise (Pham et al. 2010). Furthermore, local institutions have limited power in countries 
where they are strongly influenced by government, as Pham et al. (2010) observed in Vietnam.   
Whether user- or government-financed, PES contracts can restrict decision-making rights and 
fail to engage providers in their design and implementation (Hayes et al. 2015). Through 
independence of the board from any single organisation, CTF governance should remove the 
opportunity for central government to overrule or undermine local management decisions in a 
PES, and under best practice there should be resource-user representation. The governance 
structure also facilitates permanence; a PES administered by a CTF is more likely to withstand 
changes in both local and central government and political priorities than a state-managed 
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mechanism (see Case Study 1, Appendix E.1), and is more likely to persist than a PES that is 
directly driven by the priorities of an NGO. Although this independent and participatory 
governance might also allow for more adaptation of priorities and strategies over time than a 
state-managed scheme would, flexibility ultimately depends on the length of the PES contract. 
The potential for a CTF to be established in an offshore location could be advantageous for PES 
in countries with political or financial instabilities (e.g. Case Study 5, Appendix E.1), lack of 
transparency and/or confidence in the country’s governance (e.g. Case Study 6, Appendix E.1), 
and no laws allowing for tax exemption (e.g. Case Study 4, Appendix E.1; CF2; Norris 2000; Klug 
et al. 2003; Spergel & Taieb 2008).  
Although its governance structure is, on paper, a great strength of the CTF model, many KIs 
(CF2; CF5; CF7; FMCN1; BACoMaB2; MAR1) said that the development of an effective 
governance structure is a key challenge in the creation of a CTF (e.g. Case Study 4, Appendix 
E.1). All CTF representative KIs also noted that it is still essential to establish government 
support for a CTF at an early stage – a requirement shared with PES – and that this can also be a 
challenge. Not only is it essential for there to be national support and acceptance of the CTF, but 
government backing can increase funding opportunities and, in the case of multilateral donors 
such as the World Bank, it is often a prerequisite for involvement. This government buy-in is 
often achieved by choosing a high-level government representative for the board (see Case 
Studies 1, 3 and 11, Appendix E.1). But to an extent, said KI FMCN1, ‘the political will is either 
there or not’ (e.g. in Case Study 6, Appendix E.1, support was there from the start). If a CTF has 
successfully garnered political buy-in, it may pave the way for a PES, but if the timing is wrong 
and the government is not receptive, then a CTF may be no more able than any other institution 
to catalyse support for a PES. Political support should also be approached with caution; a CTF 
needs the commitment and support of people without strong political agendas. This 
requirement was demonstrated by the failure of the Yasuni-ITT Trust Fund, in which the 
ownership of the President of Ecuador and the suspect integrity of his administration is likely to 
have played a fundamental role in its demise (Case Study 9, Appendix E.1). Furthermore, too 
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much government involvement can limit funding opportunities due to perceived risk of fund 
diversion (Case Study 11, Appendix E.1). 
CTFs have potential to advance PES through their role as grant-making institutions. CTF 
procedures tend to be less complex than those of government and, as a result, a CTF may be able 
to disburse funds more efficiently and more according to needs (e.g. Case Study 2, Appendix 
E.1). Best practice CTFs have a clear vision and strategy for grant-making in place from the 
outset, established through a consultative process that takes into account the relevant political, 
legal and governance contexts, and all potential sources of funding (CF2; FMCN1; Spergel & 
Mikitin 2013). Some CTFs are established to support national environmental plans or strategies 
(e.g. Case Study 8, Appendix E.1), some to support the management of PAs or PA networks (e.g. 
Case Studies 3, 4, 5, and 11, Appendix E.1), and others to fulfil broader conservation missions 
(e.g. Case Study 1, Appendix E.1). Within its broad strategic plan, a CTF could make grants to 
projects that either create or profit from a PES, putting out calls for proposals with defined 
objectives. Funds can be granted to any capable implementing organisation (government 
agencies, NGOs or community organisations) through an open and competitive process of the 
CTF soliciting and evaluating implementation proposals based on transparent criteria (Spergel 
& Taieb 2008). This would contribute to trust in the fairness of the resultant PES programme, 
which should in turn help to attract additional funding from private and international donors 
who may not otherwise have been interested buyers, particularly in countries with unstable 
political systems (e.g. Case Study 6, Appendix E.1). However, some CTFs (particularly the older 
ones) have suffered from lack of a clear grant-making strategy, which can result in the CTF 
being inundated with proposals and acceptances made on the basis of a ‘recommendation’ 
rather than a transparent process, leading to mistrust in the fairness of the process (e.g. Case 
Studies 2 and 8, Appendix E.1; CF2; CF3).  
CTFs are evolving from being primarily grant-making institutions to taking a more active role as 
facilitators and policy advocates (CF2; Spergel & Taieb 2008). For example, Belize’s PACT has 
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divided its grant-making strategy in project grants and capacity-building grants (Case Study 11, 
Appendix E.1). Commonly they work to both build capacity within existing institutions and to 
facilitate the development of new civil society institutions, which in turn can promote public-
private coordination (e.g. Case Study 1, Appendix E.1). Through these activities, a CTF should 
over time substantially lower the transaction costs of PES operation (RedLAC 2010b). For 
instance, CTFs have potential to help to address the widespread limiting factor of weak 
enforcement in developing-world fisheries PES. They can help to build capacity for monitoring 
and enforcement within local organisations and government agencies (e.g. Case Studies 8 and 
11, Appendix E.1), or facilitate the development of community-based institutions and hybrid co-
management structures (Case Study 11, Appendix E.1), which should improve management and 
reduce transaction costs by increasing the congruence between local and national interests (Sen 
& Nielsen 1996; Carlsson & Berkes 2005; Berkes 2009, 2012; Carbonetti et al. 2014). These 
hybrid structures are commonly found in fisheries, but often lead to a shift in responsibility 
without this being reflected in updated regulations. When they lack empowerment capacity, 
hybrid institutions can actually serve to reinforce local elite powers or strengthen state control 
(Jentoft 2000, 2005; Nielsen et al. 2004). With independent CTF facilitation and capacity-
building, this issue could be ameliorated.  
Although CTFs rarely make grants directly to individuals, CTF grantees often reallocate funds to 
local communities and individual households (e.g. Case Study 2, Appendix E.1). As a result of 
their capacity-building and facilitation activities, CTFs were noted by some KIs (AF1; MAR1; 
CF3) for their potential to serve as efficient and effective mechanisms for channelling payments 
down to local communities through PES (see Case Studies 2 and 10, Appendix E.1). In a 
community-based PES, a CTF could facilitate open and equitable negotiations on how to invest 
or spend the payment. By shielding the CTF from individual or political agendas, a diverse and 
participatory governance structure should enable the CTF to resist the elite capture sometimes 
typical of state and market mechanisms and increase fairness in benefit distribution (CF1; CF5; 
Spergel & Wells 2009). Although developing-country fishing communities often lack prior 
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organisational experience, a CTF could facilitate their organisation into smaller sub-groups 
more suited to self-management (AF1). For example, the Mesoamerican Reef (MAR) Fund runs a 
Community Fisheries Programme in support of the active participation of self-organised groups 
of fishers in PA management (see Case Study 6, Appendix E.1). In one of its focal countries, 
Guatemala, fishers organised themselves into co-management associations, in response to the 
lack of financial resources within Government for control and surveillance in no-take zones, and 
now receive support from MAR Fund for their own control and surveillance activities. In 
another – Honduras – fishing communities have created an association and co-management 
agreement and identified training and capacity-building needs for which they are given 
assistance from MAR Fund. There is a limit to the extent to which a CTF could address 
weaknesses in the characteristics of users within these groups, but it could potentially provide 
support for training, assistance in the identification of appropriate leadership, and facilitation of 
improved social cohesion. The ability of a CTF to influence the capacity of providers to change 
their relationship with a resource depends upon the level of this capacity in the first place; it 
might enable them to change their behaviour through providing compensation, alternative 
livelihood assistance, or microcredit, but if they are too poor and dependent upon the resource, 
this assistance may have limited impact. If providers lack secure tenure or use rights, a CTF 
could play a role in lobbying governments for these rights and facilitating their clarification, 
especially if influential politicians or corporate leaders are represented on the board (Spergel & 
Taieb 2008). The MAR Fund, for instance, has supported the implementation of fishing rights in 
one PA in Brazil. Furthermore, the CTF model allows continued support and assistance beyond 
the usual short project funding cycles (CF1; CF4), which should enable greater institutional 
sustainability than if an NGO was acting in this intermediary capacity (e.g. Case Study 2, 
Appendix E.1). 
Best practice standards also direct that a CTF should coordinate reporting, monitoring and 
evaluation at four levels – grantee, CTF, donor and government – in the countries where the CTF 
is registered or operates (Spergel & Mikitin 2013). It should monitor and evaluate the impacts 
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of its grants in relation to its mission and strategic plan, and in relation to national or site-level 
management plans and biodiversity indicators, targets and strategies. Through this 
requirement, grantees must develop goals and indicators for biodiversity conservation in their 
proposals, collect relevant baseline data and submit this multiple times during implementation 
and after grant completion, while maintaining strong financial accountability through internal 
and external audits (Spergel & Taieb 2008). The CTF must therefore provide clear financial 
reporting and social and ecological monitoring protocols to the grantees; make sure the 
protocols are transparent for both buyers and providers; and if the grantees lack technical or 
financial capacity for these activities, the CTF should help to build capacity (Case Studies 6 and 
12, Appendix E.1). For a PES, a CTF should thus provide the means to bring all of the relevant 
stakeholders together, not only for the design of the PES contract, but for the design of a 
rigorous monitoring and evaluation programme from the very beginning (CF4). Its multi-
stakeholder nature should also provide more opportunity for collaboration and information 
sharing than a state- or user-run PES, and more opportunity to harness international expertise 
(Case Study 10, Appendix E.1). Ultimately, though, establishing additionality and tracing this 
back to management will depend on whether ex-ante counterfactual scenarios are incorporated 
into evaluation – a process that is still rare in PES (Pagiola & Rios 2008, 2013). FONAG’s PES, for 
instance, has suffered from a lack of science linking payment distribution to ES provision (CF2; 
Case Study 10, Appendix E.1). 
It should also be noted that although CTFs tend to do a good job of monitoring institutional 
performance, monitoring and evaluation of actual conservation impact is still a challenge (CF2; 
RedLAC 2008; Spergel & Taieb 2008), and a common criticism from KIs (FMCN1; FMCN2; CF1; 
PACT1) was a lack of due diligence and rigorous assessment of grant impacts (e.g. Case Studies 
8 and 12, Appendix E.1). For large CTFs, particularly those with objectives broader than PA 
management, it can be difficult to aggregate results from individual grants, and mature CTFs 
suffer from not having designed projects with monitoring and evaluation in mind. The newer 
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CTFs (e.g. Case Study 11, Appendix E.1) are, however, taking a more systematic approach (CF2; 
RedLAC 2012).  
A CTF cannot address many of the key challenges in PES that arise from the resource system 
itself (feasibility of improving the resource, manageability of the resource, or potential for 
profitability at a sustainable rate). KIs (CF3; CF6) also noted that CTF engagement in PES will 
not always be appropriate, but is dependent on the CTF’s strategic plan and capabilities. Others 
(FMCN1; CF1; CF2) emphasised that the creation of a new CTF is time-consuming, tedious and 
expensive, and therefore not always the best option, especially if a limited amount of capital is 
available and if there are existing legally established mechanisms or institutional frameworks 
available for PES. The PIPA Trust, for instance, took a long time to establish itself in the absence 
of a legal framework for marine conservation and CTFs, and when Arannayk was established, 
eight years passed before it was able to start making grants (see Case Studies 2 and 3, Appendix 
E.1). Given that some larger CTFs administer more than one fund (e.g. Case Study 1, Appendix 
E.1) it may in some circumstances be preferable to use a pre-existing CTF to administer a PES, 
rather than creating a new one.  
7.3.3 Sustainability of the hilsa fisher compensation scheme in Bangladesh 
Here I examine the extent to which the enabling conditions for sustainability are present in the 
current compensation scheme for hilsa fishers in Bangladesh (Fig. 7.2; Table 7.6). The ecological 
status of the Bangladesh hilsa fishery is unclear, but there is evidence to suggest that stocks 
have declined and that they will continue to do so with projected climate change, under current 
management (Chapter 3; Fernandes et al. 2015). As a valuable commercial fishery, there is 
potential for profitable exploitation at a sustainable rate. However, in Bangladesh there is a lack 
of fishery-independent stock assessments and an absence of adequate and reliable baseline data 
against which to evaluate management interventions (Chapters 3 & 5; DoF 2002). This is a 
result of limited financial and technical capacity for monitoring within government agencies, 
combined with weak coordination and information sharing amongst stakeholders (Chapter 5; 
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Islam et al. 2016), and makes it very difficult to attribute any apparent trends in the hilsa fishery 
to management, or even to assess the scope for impact of a PES (Chapter 5). Although the hilsa 
sanctuaries (see Chapter 3) might be described as ‘small’, their manageability is low since the 
hilsa within them travel far beyond their boundaries. As a migratory species the hilsa stock 
spans a vast area of marine and freshwater within Bangladesh, India and Myanmar (Salini et al. 
2004), complicating the attribution of trends.  
The institutional arrangement is currently one of top-down governance, both in terms of design 
and implementation, but a common theme in KIIs was the importance of creating institutions 
that facilitate self-management by the fishers, with support from the Government (A2; D3; D4; 
D5; LN2; IN4). The hilsa fishery comprises a large and dispersed group of fishers – between 
300,000 and 500,000 (Haldar 2004; Rahman et al. 2014a; Islam et al. 2016) – whose fishing 
grounds overlap. Despite the top-down governance, it is largely open access (licenses are 
required only in the marine sector and effort restrictions only affect trawlers) with a long 
history of customary rights in some areas (A. Bladon 2015, personal observation; Dastidar 
2009).  
It is feasible that the fishers could be split into smaller subgroups for self-management. Indeed, 
some of the flaws in the current compensation scheme may stem from the fact that it is being 
centrally managed across such a large area. What may be more sustainable is a scenario where 
multiple locally-managed projects are in place, which could then inform regional or national 
management (Greiber 2009). Village leaders tend to make community decisions (Islam et al. 
2016), and some local associations also exist in hilsa communities (F1-3; Rahman et al. 2014a). 
However, these associations were described as ‘non-functional’ by local NGO KIs (LN3; LN5); 
they said the leaders lack trust from the communities  and, with no technical or financial 
support, they lack the capacity or legal status to perform any useful organisational or 
governance role. A community-based fisheries management project has had success in some 
inland water bodies in Bangladesh, regarding the development of local institutions and 
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management capacity within them and the empowerment of poor fishing households, but 
outcomes have been limited by complex power relations, politicisation of NGOs, limited 
resources, capacity of the Department of Fisheries (DoF) at the field level, and limited 
motivation of local administrations (Béné & Neiland 2006; Rab 2009). Rab (2009) noted that 
the community-based management approach was much more challenging in flowing rivers than 
closed water bodies, in terms of distinct boundaries, clear tenure and proximity of resource 
users to the resource. Coastal areas would present similar challenges; managing a community 
fishing from a distinct lake or pond is very different from managing a coastal community or a 
landing site where the catch could have come from much further away. A KI scientist (A2) said 
that these challenges are ‘not insurmountable’, and that progress in community-based 
management of rivers and open water has been limited so far by funding opportunities rather 
than practical potential – an opinion backed up by a local NGO KI (LN4). Community-based 
management of hilsa sanctuary areas has been proposed in the hilsa fishery management plan, 
where management committees would be composed of 10-15 members from each level of local 
Government, public and fishers (DoF 2002) – although this does not appear to have been 
implemented yet.  
Inland fisheries management experience suggests that the development of appropriate local 
leadership for hilsa management would also be challenging. There are numerous local and 
international NGOs working with hilsa communities that could provide leadership and facilitate 
the engagement of marginalised populations (Huber-Stearns et al. 2013; Escobar et al. 2013), 
but the complexity of power relations means that internal factions can develop when NGOs try 
to promote transparent and accountable leadership (Béné & Neiland 2006). Similarly, there is 
some heterogeneity within fishing communities that could limit the opportunity for collective 
action. For instance, KI A2 noted major conflict in the Bay of Bengal between artisanal hilsa 
fishers and the industrial fleet. Moreover, although poor fishers form the majority of residents, 
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there are often traditional fishers31, full-time but non-traditional fishers32, seasonal or 
opportunistic fishers, relatively wealthy fishers and middlemen who own boats and nets and 
lend money, all living in the same communities and each with different interests (LN1; Rab 
2009). Local elite boat owners and other middlemen are widely reported to exploit fishers and 
drive unsustainable and illegal fishing practices, and therefore fishers do not trust them (D4; 
LN2; LN3; Chapters 3 and 5). However, some NGO KIs (IN6; LN4) saw potential for these ‘big 
shots’ to harness the power and influence they have over fishers to encourage sustainable 
behaviour. As one fishers’ association member said, middlemen are ‘brothers of fishers’ and 
fishers are more likely to listen to them than to Government (F2). The development of flexible 
and inclusive local institutions may help different stakeholders to negotiate their interests and 
allow local elites to work with fishers in a more positive way.  
There is also a complete lack of trust between fishers and Government in Bangladesh, which is a 
significant institutional barrier to the sustainability of the current Government-financed 
compensation scheme (M1; M3; M4; M5; LN2; LN3; LN5; LN6; F2; F3). Compensation is 
distributed via local Government in a system that lacks transparency and accountability, and 
officials are notorious for corruption (Chapter 6; Haldar & Ali 2014). This lack of trust also 
extends to other enforcement authorities, which are reported to harass fishers and take bribes, 
reducing the potential for sanctions to provide an effective deterrent (L1; L2; D3; F2; F3; 
Chapter 6). A more sustainable PES would require substantial intermediary facilitation to build 
trust if the Government is to remain a major buyer, but hopefully this trust would improve if 
communities were given more autonomy. 
Hilsa fishers tend to be very poor and highly dependent on fishing for income and livelihoods 
(Chapter 6), which means that although there may be strong community interest in 
conservation, there may be low capacity to change the relationship between hilsa fishers and 
hilsa – a hypothesis validated by the widespread lack of compliance with rules (A4; Chapter 5). 
                                                             
31 Fishers from birth – usually Hindu. 
32 Usually Muslim. 
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The current compensation scheme was no doubt initiated through recognition of this 
dependence (Chapter 5), but compensation distribution is currently neither fair nor 
transparent, and is heavily politicised (Chapter 6; Haldar & Ali 2014b). Only 36.2 per cent of 
fishers interviewed in a recent survey said they think that the distribution of compensation is 
fair, and they perceive a high level of elite capture (Chapter 6). With community participation in 
scheme design and implementation, it is likely that perceptions of fairness would become more 
positive (Marshall 2005; le Coq et al. 2015).   
The form in which the incentives are received at the household or community level is beyond 
the scope of this chapter, although there is some evidence to suggest that the current form is not 
the most appropriate (Dewhurst-Richman et al. 2016; Chapter 5). Some KIs supported cash or 
alternative livelihood support as more appropriate payments (LN3; LN4; LN5; IN6), one 
pointing out that if it was monetary, the use of MobiCash33 would be the most transparent 
method of distribution (IN6). Another proposed that a low-interest loan conditional on 
compliance would be most suitable, but only if repayments were frozen during fishing ban 
periods (LN2). 
Given that artisanal hilsa fishers currently have no formal tenure or use rights, for a sustainable 
PES they would require organisation into formal Community-Based Organisations (CBOs), 
which may also entail the development of legal contracts for community-level fishing rights. 
Multiple KIs (A2; D4; IN4; IN5; LN3) voiced opinions that hilsa management would be more 
effective if fishers were to ‘own’ sections of river (although this would be much more 
complicated in marine waters). The river fisheries have in the past been through various 
systems of licensing, but access was repeatedly given to the highest bidders rather than 
genuinely dependent fishers, even when the DoF collaborated with NGOs (Rab 2009; Rahman et 
al. 2015), and so future efforts must be more equitable. Care should also be taken to consider 
pre-existing customary rights (Cinner & Aswani 2007). 
                                                             
33 A secure cashless mobile financial platform that anybody with a mobile phone can use, including 
unbanked citizens (http://www.mobicashonline.com/) 
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Overall, the hilsa fishing rules are simple and communicated through awareness-raising 
activities (Chapter 5), but it is unclear exactly which behaviours are the ones which are 
compensated for and which are not. Compensation is provided during the peak period of jatka 
presence – beyond the sanctuary fishing bans but not so long as to cover the entire jatka ban –  
and so it is unclear whether fishers are being compensated for abiding by the sanctuary fishing 
bans or for abiding more generally by the jatka ban (Chapter 5). In general, DoF activities are 
not transparent – one local KI (A2) criticised it for a fast turnover of staff that results in 
‘forgotten pockets of money’ – and this lack of transparency is apparent in the administration of 
the compensation scheme (Haldar & Ali 2014a). Another major institutional weakness is the 
poor enforcement of rules; anecdotal reports from a range of sectors, including the DoF itself, 
indicate a lack of monitoring, particularly in inland areas, and sanctioning mechanisms – which 
are quite rarely implemented – often involve delays in application and are ineffective as a 
deterrent (Chapter 5). The sanctions are also unfair; as one KI (LN4) put it, ‘it is the very poor 
fishers who are caught, but their fishing is financed by the rich who are never caught’. 
Furthermore, although the compensation scheme is often referred to as a PES (e.g. Islam et al. 
2016), the lack of enforcement and therefore of conditionality limits potential for the payment 
to act as an incentive. 
Under Government control and financing, the sustainability of the compensation scheme is 
dependent on the political climate and on financial resources available to the Government. The 
transaction costs of the compensation scheme are currently higher than they need to be, largely 
due to the complex way in which compensation is distributed (Haldar & Ali 2014b). The process 
of restructuring the scheme for improved sustainability (e.g. through establishing CBOs and 
building capacity for self-management, clarifying rights, improving fairness in benefit 
distribution and collecting information on hilsa) could substantially raise transaction costs, and 
it is unlikely that the Government alone would realistically cover these costs. As a KI DoF official 
admitted (D1), it does not expect to be able to maintain its budget allocations to the 
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compensation scheme beyond 2025. External intermediary involvement would therefore be 
vital to cover transaction costs.  
The pre-existence of the compensation scheme could provide some institutional basis for the 
development of a PES, but it could also cause problems (Corbera et al. 2009; Huber-Stearns et al. 
2015); it might have planted the seed and helped develop the political will for PES within the 
Bangladesh Government, but distrust of the Government among fishers may also taint future 
efforts. There is no articulation of the scheme with hilsa markets, and although the prospect of 
an eco-label for hilsa came up as a real possibility in one KII (IN6); others, including a member 
of the Government’s Export Promotion Bureau34 (A2; C2; IN2; A5; LN1), said that a consumer 
price premium has limited scope, given the current lack of traceability in the supply chain, the 
ban on hilsa exports from Bangladesh, and the relatively niche, although sizeable, export 
markets (India and areas of Europe and the Middle East where there are Bengali diaspora; see 
Chapter 3). However, the market in Bangladesh alone is commercial and large, and if some 
resources were directed into supply chain traceability, this could be an opportunity for 
improved sustainability in the future. 
 
                                                             
34 Government agency within the Ministry of Commerce and responsible for Bangladesh’s export 
industry. 
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Figure 7.2: Conceptual diagram showing the institutional framework of the current compensation 
scheme for hilsa fishers in Bangladesh. Italics and dotted lines represent the weaknesses currently 
limiting the outcomes that are desired from a sustainable PES. 
 
7.3.4 Could a CTF catalyse sustainable PES in the hilsa fishery? 
Here I explore whether a CTF could provide a framework for a more sustainable hilsa 
conservation payment scheme in Bangladesh (Table 7.6). It should be noted, however, that the 
extent to which it could do so depends largely on which financial and governance structures are 
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feasible for a CTF within the institutional context of Bangladesh, and how well the CTF is 
implemented (Fig. 7.3). Under best practice, the involvement of a CTF could address the current 
lack of a mechanism for financial sustainability. Through a diversified funding strategy and low-
risk investment, a CTF could guarantee stable revenues for the PES and associated hilsa 
management in the long term, allowing more funding to be allocated to capacity building and 
monitoring. The creation of a new CTF would first require seed capital from the Government 
and/or donors. Initial capital required has been roughly estimated at USD 29 million (Majumder 
et al. 2015a), but an experienced KI stated that the minimum threshold of capital required to 
establish a CTF generally lies between USD 5-10 million, and that it is rare that a national fund 
with such a narrow mandate would start with more than USD 10 million (FMCN1). Arannayk, a 
CTF established in 2003 (Case Study 2, Appendix E), for example, started with only USD 8.5 
million. Given previously cited CTF KI comments, it might be preferable for an existing CTF that 
is capable of managing multiple funds under a single legal and institutional structure to 
administer the PES, rather than creating a new one. If there is limited capital available, this 
would be more cost-effective, and should result in grants being disbursed for hilsa conservation 
earlier (FMCN1; CF1; CF2). The only truly independent CTF in Bangladesh is Arannayk, which 
primarily focuses on terrestrial conservation. A KI representative (AF1) did propose that it 
would be in a position to take on the role, but this was a hypothetical discussion and there may 
of course be disadvantages to administration by a CTF that does not have hilsa conservation as 
its primary goal.  
Ideally, the CTF would manage an endowment together with a revolving fund that could be 
financed through hilsa supply chain beneficiary fees (e.g. boat owners, middlemen, processors, 
local distributers, exporters, hotels and restaurants). It would not currently be feasible for 
external markets to become buyers due to the lack of traceability and, since PPPs are still a new 
concept in Bangladesh (T1; T3; T4), voluntary investment from supply chain companies was 
also deemed unlikely at this stage (IN6). This might, however, be a possibility for the future. 
When supply chain KIs were asked whether they would be willing to contribute, the boat owner 
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(F1) said he felt no responsibility to do so, but middlemen (M1; M2; M3; M4; M5) were more 
supportive of the prospect (in general they tend to be relatively more wealthy than boat 
owners) – some on the condition that corruption within the Government is reduced and others 
on the condition that the funds would not be handled at all by the Government.  
NGOs have proposed that export taxes could be utilised (Majumder et al. 2015a). The 
Government has in the past reported revenues of up to USD 45 million per year from hilsa 
exports (Chapter 3), and if 5-10 per cent35 of this were earmarked it could theoretically provide 
a sustainable funding stream for hilsa conservation. However, local KIs (C2; LN1; LN3; LN4; T5; 
D1) doubted the practicality of this approach since there is currently a politically-motivated 
export ban in place that is unlikely to be lifted (see Chapter 3). A representative of the Export 
Promotion Bureau (C2) said hilsa export earnings are currently ‘insignificant’ and that hilsa 
would simply be smuggled into India to avoid taxation, as it has been during the ban. There 
might be scope to tax the industrial trawl fleet through license fees or landings revenues (LN1), 
although its catch might not be large enough to generate a significant amount (LN1), and this 
‘would not go down well with the political businessmen’ (A2).  
Funds could also be solicited from existing climate change Trust Funds in the country, since 
hilsa are likely to be heavily impacted by climate change (Chapter 3) and therefore fall under 
their remit. Other potential funding mechanisms include debt service liability, where the 
Government would repay principal and interest for a loan from development partners 
(Majumder et al. 2015a), and impact investment – typically debt or equity investments that 
target social and, increasingly, environmental issues in developing countries (Bos et al. 2015). 
Impact investment in sustainable fisheries is a new strategy pioneered by a group of 
philanthropic organisations, NGOs and investment firms, some of which have developed 
hypothetical investment models that incorporate the use of financial rewards to fishers for 
                                                             
35 A ‘small amount’, as suggested by (Majumder et al. 2015a). 
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sustainable practices (Manta Consulting 2012; Encourage Capital 2015)36. Impact investment is 
an approach that could be useful at a later stage when initial plans have already been funded by 
donors and philanthropists and so risks are lower (CF7). 
In terms of governance structure, the independence of the CTF should require control of the PES 
to be decentralised from Government, and this would have numerous advantages. First and 
foremost, decentralisation should shield the PES from political whims, ensuring continuity 
under changing Government priorities. It should also create an environment that empowers 
fishing communities to self-organise and have some participation and autonomy in setting and 
enforcing rules, without being overruled or undermined by Government. This could help to 
avoid the current politicisation in social targeting and elite capture of benefits, thereby 
improving perceptions of fairness. The extent to which a CTF could address the issue of fairness 
may be limited in Bangladesh, however, where corruption is high and present in every sector 
(UNCAC 2011; Transparency International 2012).  
A CTF may also help to build trust between buyers and providers. As observed in conversations 
with hilsa supply chain and local NGO KIs (M1; M3; M4; M5; LN2; LN3; LN5; LN6; F2; F3), fishing 
communities do not trust the Government – a problem which is related to perceptions of 
fairness in benefit distribution and approaches to enforcement. By shifting power from the 
hands of the Government, a CTF should be able to build trust with providers, no matter who the 
buyers are. Similarly, decentralisation could potentially allow the CTF to engage with buyers 
who otherwise would not be interested. Donors in particular may be attracted by the increased 
transparency.  
In a decentralised PES, grants would ideally be channelled directly to providers, but given that 
hilsa fishing communities are largely unorganised and existing organisations generally lack the 
                                                             
36 These models from Encourage Capital (2015) range from small-scale fisheries investment (with a focus 
on supply chain infrastructure and operations, creating small- to medium-sized enterprises and 
implementing management improvements to support their sourcing needs) to industrial-scale fisheries 
(similar, but bundling fisheries improvement investments with investments in fishing assets and seafood 
companies, to generate cash flow tightly tied to stock recovery), to national scale public-private 
investment (with a focus on fishery-wide data collection and port infrastructure). 
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capacity to act as grantees, potential initial grantee candidates are more likely to be local NGOs 
or local Government units. According to a local Government KI (L4), NGO grantees would be 
preferable to local Government units, which lack the capacity to write good proposals and to 
keep track of fishing households for compensation distribution, whereas NGOs running disaster 
relief and social safety net programmes have transferable experience in channelling funds to the 
community level (T2; Pham et al. 2010). Through these local intermediaries, a CTF could 
facilitate the identification of hilsa fishers and their organisation into smaller sub-groups (CBOs) 
more suited to self-management – a process undertaken by Arannayk in remote terrestrial 
areas of Bangladesh (see Case Study 2, Appendix E.1) – and lower the transaction costs of doing 
so. Although the hilsa fishery is at a much larger scale than the communities organised by 
Arannayk, lessons could be transferred to small-scale pilots. 
Multiple KIs (T1; T5; AF1; A2) emphasised that CBOs require a legal basis to be fully functional 
and so should be registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. If monetary, collective 
payments could be managed as revolving funds, as is the case in the MAR Fund’s Community 
Fisheries Program (Case Study 6, Appendix E.1) and either channelled down to individual 
households in an appropriate form or used collectively by the community. Other Bangladesh 
Trust Fund KIs (AF1; T1; T5) directed that this should be done in a participatory way, and after 
a certain length of time villagers could be aggregated at district and sub-district level, so that 
when intermediaries withdraw their assistance the village-level institution can sustain 
payments and management. Some KIs (A2; IN5) pointed out that lessons could be taken from 
wetland management in Bangladesh, where the Government allocated endowment funds to 
multi-stakeholder groups who were helped by NGOs to establish wetland sanctuaries. CBOs 
were then formed around these sanctuaries and livelihood support was provided to resource 
users for not catching breeding fish.  
Under a CTF model, CBOs should be more sustainable than if they had been formed by NGOs or 
Government alone. Trust Fund KIs (T1; T5) pointed out that NGOs are, contrary to their name, 
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often profit-earning in Bangladesh, and tend to completely withdraw both funds and support at 
the end of project cycles, while Government funds are usually subject to long bureaucratic 
delays. For example, in 2003 a local NGO received funds from the DoF to pilot an alternative 
livelihoods project involving the formation of community groups for fishers in Chandpur 
district. Following a long delay by the DoF in transferring the remaining funds, said KI LN3, the 
groups have not yet been registered as CBOs with a long-term management plan and the project 
has stalled because there is no endowment fund for phasing out support. Yet, although they are 
relatively few, some bureaucratic delays have still been experienced by Arannayk (see Case 
Study 2, Appendix E.1), indicating that in Bangladesh no institution is completely free from such 
bureaucracy.  
The hilsa fishery management plan proposed over a decade ago that fishing rights should be 
granted to fishers participating in management of the hilsa sanctuaries (DoF 2002), 
demonstrating some political will for contracts of community-level fishing rights. A multi-
stakeholder CTF could potentially lobby for and empower CBOs to negotiate for this tenure, 
speeding up the process. Short-term property rights (three years) are endowed by the 
Government to CBOs in wetland fisheries, but the process of developing the collective action to 
form these CBOs is dependent on political connections and financial capacity, rather than on 
resource dependence (Rahman et al. 2015; IN5). Although in theory a CTF should facilitate more 
permanence and fairness in the process, there is little to suggest that the same thing wouldn’t 
happen under a CTF. 
Although the CTF approach cannot necessarily address the issues surrounding extreme poverty 
or high dependence on hilsa, by enabling improvements in the current compensation scheme, 
and perhaps generating more resources for tandem livelihood or social assistance, it could 
potentially contribute to a reduction in fishing dependence and poverty, thereby raising the 
capacity for change in resource use. 
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A CTF could help to address the current lack of technical and financial capacity for monitoring 
hilsa in Bangladesh, reducing the transaction costs of collecting information. As Arannayk has 
done in forest areas (Case Study 2, Appendix E.1), the CTF would assist CBOs in defining the 
scope of monitoring and evaluation, the level of engagement of local communities and the 
participatory identification of appropriate social and ecological indicators. Training and 
logistical support could be provided for the collection of baseline data, and the requirement for 
CTF grantees to have a strong system of monitoring, reporting, and, therefore, accountability 
should contribute to transparency for buyers and providers, and thus trust (McClanahan et al. 
2013). For instance, MAR Fund provides its community fisheries with financial training (Case 
Study 6, Appendix E.1), and Arannayk not only has an annual external audit, it reviews activities 
every three months, lowering the risk of misappropriation of funds (Case Study 2, Appendix 
E.1). 
Depending on the size of its endowment, a CTF could provide more financial and logistical 
assistance than the DoF is able to for the communication and enforcement of rules, allowing 
conditionality to be established in a PES. The community ownership could also play a role in the 
development of self-monitoring as a social norm, which in turn should reduce reliance on 
corrupt and ineffective Government enforcement. If CBOs could enforce their own sanctions (for 
instance, removal of fishing rights) then the power of Government officials to abuse the 
sanctioning system may be reduced. A CTF would not be in a position to directly address the 
limitations to PES in terms of provider group characteristics, but it could help to bring local 
intermediaries together to encourage social cohesion and identify local leadership. For example, 
AF2 pointed out that since NGOs in Bangladesh are heavily involved in microfinance, many 
would not welcome the idea of a community managing their own funds from a PES. Similarly, 
through PES, middlemen could lose the financial power that they have over fishers. But a CTF 
could mediate between these divergent interest groups, and by building institutions for 
collective action, trust and social cohesion should in turn improve. This could in turn allow 
elites and middlemen to take a more positive leadership role for collective action.  
283 
 
However, a CTF could not address some of the key challenges of community-based management 
of the hilsa fishery, in terms of overlapping fishing grounds, proximity of fishers to fishing 
grounds, and unclear boundaries. Even with the advantages that a CTF provides, self-monitoring 
is less likely to work in coastal areas than inland. Furthermore, a national CTF cannot directly 
address the fact that hilsa are not a small-scale resource, and that a PES could be undermined by 
transboundary movements of both hilsa and fishers. Since hilsa are a transboundary resource, a 
regional CTF (between Bangladesh, India and Myanmar) would be most appropriate. Yet, with 
no history of regional cooperation, KIs saw this as unnecessary, giving answers like ‘What is 
important is that we protect our territory’ (R1) and ‘India are the big brothers so [they are] 
difficult to manage’ (LN5). A regional arrangement might nevertheless be possible in the future 
and large-scale regional CTFs like MAR Fund have in fact benefited from the experience and 
coordination of pre-existing national funds (Case Study 5 and 6, Appendix E.1). 
An ex-Government KI (LN6) also pointed out that the concept of a Trust Fund is fairly new in 
Bangladesh, and although various kinds exist, with the exception of Arannayk they are all public. 
Since PPPs are also a new idea, a Trust Fund representative pointed out that the Government is 
unlikely to channel funds into a CTF in which it does not hold the majority position (T3). The 
absence of a PPP tradition can make it difficult for governments to accept the principle of mixed 
management where they do not hold the major power position (see Case Study 7, Appendix E.1) 
and difficulties are often encountered in these circumstances when CTFs intend to mobilise 
resources through public revenues such as taxes (see Case Study 11, Appendix E.1). As a result 
there are CTFs that stray from best practice, some of which have achieved their goals 
nonetheless (e.g. Case Study 8, Appendix E.1), but without government independence a CTF is 
unlikely to provide a sustainable institutional framework for PES. 
The overwhelmingly common Bangladeshi KI view on CTF governance structure (from a range 
of organisations at both national and local levels; T1; T2; T3; T4; T5; LN1; LN3; LN5; LN6; D3; 
D4; C1; IN2; IN3; A3; A4) was that Government ownership of and support is vital – ‘anything 
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with a long-term perspective must be embedded and tied up in a Government mechanism’ (T3). 
They did mostly also express that there should, nonetheless, be representation from the fishing 
communities in these circumstances; without some ownership themselves fishers will see any 
payment as relief from the Government, just as the compensation is seen now. However, this 
view indicates that a Government-dominated board might currently be the only viable 
approach, with a view to eventually becoming increasingly independent.  
At the time of writing, a CTF for hilsa conservation is going through the ratification process, 
which would be housed within the Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock and would have a 
Government-dominated board. It is proposed to provide a small fund to each upazila37, which 
would then be managed by local Government committees for use by community-based hilsa 
management organisations (Majumder et al. 2015a). Although this might be the most feasible 
institutional structure for a hilsa CTF currently, there is a risk that it would simply try to fund 
business-as-usual, without an improvement in sustainability of the compensation scheme (Fig. 
7.3b). 
 
  
                                                             
37 Subdistrict 
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Table 7.6: Enabling conditions for sustainability of a PES in developing-world fisheries, with ticks and 
crosses showing whether these are fulfilled in the case of the Bangladesh hilsa fishery, whether 
improvements are required, and whether a CTF could support these improvements, given the current 
institutional context of the hilsa.  
Enabling conditions Fulfilled 
in Case 
Study  
Improvements 
required 
Can a CTF 
support these 
improvements 
Resource system 
Feasibility of improving resource 
Indicators of resource conditions 
Traceability of resource improvement 
Manageability of the system  
Potential for profitable exploitation at a sustainable 
rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Group characteristics 
Small resource user group  
Prior organisational experience within resource 
user group 
Appropriate leadership within resource user group 
Social cohesion within resource user group 
Trust between stakeholders, particularly between 
buyers and providers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relationship between resource and group 
characteristics 
Capacity to change relationship 
Fair and transparent benefit distribution 
Resource tenure clarity and security 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional arrangement 
Rules are simple and transparent  
Effective enforcement 
Self-monitoring 
Swiftly applied, graduated, fair sanctions 
Low transaction costs 
Mechanism for sustainable financing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
External factors 
Central government provides a supportive 
environment without undermining local autonomy 
Appropriate levels of articulation with external 
markets  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Figure 7.3: Conceptual diagrams showing (a) how a best practice CTF could enable sustainable PES in 
Bangladesh; and (b) how this framework would differ without complete best practice, based on the 
analysis of the current situation for hilsa in Bangladesh (dotted lines and question marks represent areas 
of uncertainty introduced by probable gaps in best practice, given the current institutional context).  
 
  
(a) (b) 
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7.4 Discussion 
The sustainability of conservation payments is heavily dependent on their institutional 
structure and wider institutional context, and calls have been made for greater attention to be 
placed on how this structure and context influence the motivation and capacity of providers to 
manage their resources (Corbera et al. 2009; Vatn 2010; Primmer et al. 2013; Hayes et al. 2015). 
As seen in the Bangladesh hilsa fishery, social-ecological conditions in coastal developing-world 
fisheries can limit the development of sustainable PES institutions (Bladon et al. 2014b). In 
particular, they can lead to a lack of monitoring and enforcement, and therefore of compliance, 
which constrains the key elements of conditionality and additionality in PES (Sommerville et al. 
2011; Pham et al. 2015).  
To our knowledge, this chapter is the first piece of research to examine the potential role of 
CTFs in catalysing and supporting sustainable payment schemes, and specifically in advancing 
the conservation and sustainable management of developing-world fisheries. Some members of 
RedLAC (the Latin American and Caribbean Network of CTFs) are already active participants in, 
or developing the capacity to participate in, PES; but although the valuable role of PES in 
generating sustainable financing for CTFs is clear, the whole range of potential benefits have not 
been recognised (RedLAC 2010a). This research demonstrates that although a CTF model 
cannot provide all of the enabling conditions for sustainable PES, under best practice it can act 
as much more than a mechanism for disbursing payments, by helping to catalyse the majority of 
these enabling conditions. It could thereby provide a way to implement sustainable payments in 
a developing-world fisheries context, despite the inherent complexities, uncertainties, and 
limitations which these types of resource systems pose. The CTF model may be particularly 
advantageous where existing implementing institutions lack capacity, in politically unstable 
situations, and when current payment structures lack financial sustainability (Goldman-Benner 
et al. 2012). Most importantly, the CTF model could allow additionality and conditionality to be 
established in PES which lack resources for conventional monitoring and enforcement.  
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However, this potential all depends on actual implementation; if best practice is not followed 
then a CTF will be no more capable than any other institution of addressing limitations to 
sustainability in PES. Although there are numerous examples of effective best practice CTFs – 
some of which are administering PES schemes – there are also examples of CTFs with poor 
governance, lack of financial planning, weak systems of monitoring and evaluation, and 
capitalisation issues (Bladon et al. 2014a).  
In Bangladesh, institutional and financial conditions currently limit the potential for 
development of the hilsa fisher compensation scheme into a more sustainable PES (Table 7.7). 
As is the case in many developing countries (Pham et al. 2015) the existing institutions for hilsa 
management lack the capacity that PES requires. The involvement of a legally independent 
multi-stakeholder CTF would, in theory, require decoupling of the scheme from the control of 
central Government and, under best practice, this should facilitate capacity building within 
existing institutions and, where appropriate, the development of new or evolved civil society 
institutions (Fig. 7.3a). This could, in turn, empower communities and encourage collective 
action for decentralisation of management, building trust, lowering transaction costs, and 
potentially allowing conditionality and additionality to be established.  
Yet, in practice, truly independent governance of a hilsa CTF may be an unrealistic expectation. 
Given the institutional context and the Bangladesh Government’s interest in the hilsa fishery, 
initially at least, majority Government ownership might be required for the CTF to be feasible.  
The current CTF proposal (Majumder et al. 2015b) could provide an institutional framework 
that simply maintains the status quo of the compensation scheme, with limited improvements in 
sustainability (Fig. 7.3b), although it may nevertheless have potential for impact in the future 
(Table 7.7). If best practice governance standards cannot be followed initially, mechanisms 
should at least be in place to ensure that the governance structure can evolve with time, as seen 
in BTFEC (Case Study 8, Appendix E.1).  
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Table 7.7: Summary of the major challenges for a Conservation Trust Fund (CTF) in providing a 
sustainable framework for hilsa conservation payments in Bangladesh, and recommendations for how 
these challenges could be addressed. CBO = Community-Based Organisation. 
Major Challenges  How these challenges could be addressed 
 Independent governance 
 
 Ensure that there is a mechanism in place for the 
board to become increasingly independent from the 
Bangladesh Government 
 Collective action for the formation of 
CBOs and endowment of fishing rights 
could be heavily influenced by financial 
and social capital 
 Initially, grants should be focused on helping 
communities to form CBOs and reducing elite 
capture and other inequities in the process 
 Ensure governance of the CTF is not Government-
dominated 
 Take lessons from other Trust Funds in Bangladesh 
with experience in channelling payments to local 
communities 
 Capitalisation of the CTF 
 
 Use an existing CTF that is capable of administering 
multiple funds 
 Ensure best practice standards are followed in the 
creation of a CTF to maximise trust from potential 
buyers 
 Engage the private sector and incorporate creative 
financing strategies 
 Articulation with external markets will 
be limited by the ban on hilsa exports 
from Bangladesh, the lack of traceability 
in the supply chain, and no tradition of 
public-private partnerships 
 Engage with Government to lift export ban 
 Fund in-depth supply chain analysis 
 Reduce Government ownership of the CTF as private 
sector engagement becomes more realistic over time 
 Hilsa are a transboundary resource, 
lacking distinct boundaries, with distant 
and dispersed users, and so community-
based management will be a challenge 
 Coordination between Bangladesh, India, and 
Myanmar with the long-term goal of developing a 
regional CTF 
 A strong focus of grant-making should be on 
supporting self-monitoring and enforcement 
 
Within the discussion of institutional sustainability, some consideration should be given to 
whether a PES needs to continue in perpetuity (or at least for a very long time), as often 
directed, or whether it may be more important to have a more short-term vision with an exit 
strategy. If the fundamental goal is behavioural change towards a profitable, sustainable fishery, 
in theory there should be no need to continue payments indefinitely. In particular, short-term 
payments can be useful if the activities being paid for will continue to be profitable once they 
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have stopped (Wunder et al. 2008). However, PES schemes rarely have exit strategies, and more 
research is needed in order to be able to empirically determine when and how a PES scheme 
can be closed, i.e., at what point has a sustainable fishery been reached, such that payments do 
not have additional benefits? If a PES was determined to need a relatively short lifespan, a CTF 
could still play a useful role in brokering the partnerships that would be required to make it a 
transitional arrangement.   
CTFs are not a panacea for PES, and there are many circumstances in which their creation will 
not be feasible or appropriate; when an intervention requires an immediate injection of funds, 
when there is limited government support, too much government interest, or lack of an 
appropriate legal framework. Furthermore, if poorly implemented, just like any other 
intervention, a CTF will have limited potential to advance PES. But if properly implemented, 
CTFs and PES can be mutually beneficial mechanisms. Building on the analysis in this chapter, a 
systematic assessment of the effectiveness and sustainability of conservation payments under a 
CTF framework would be valuable both to fisheries management and conservation science 
more broadly. 
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8.1 Overview 
In tackling the problem of conservation payments in a developing-world fisheries context, three 
major research themes have emerged from this thesis. These themes constitute the major 
barriers to successful design and implementation of conservation payments in this context, and 
have implications for conservation science and fisheries management more broadly. The first 
theme is data poverty in fisheries and how to design, implement and evaluate payments in such 
circumstances; the second theme is trade-offs in conservation payments and the potential 
implications of poverty-targeting for ecological additionality; and the third is how to make 
conservation institutions such as PES and Conservation Trust Funds work in the real world. 
This thesis has contributed to progress in each of these three areas, and here I discuss each in 
turn. In doing so, I also provide policy recommendations for the management of hilsa in 
Bangladesh. 
8.2 Data poverty  
“It is better to be vaguely right than exactly wrong” 
Carveth Read, Logic: Inductive and Deductive (1920) 
Lack of data is one of the major challenges facing both fisheries managers and conservation 
practitioners, particularly in the developing world (Costello et al. 2012; Carruthers et al. 2014). 
To design or evaluate a conservation intervention, one first requires a clear baseline 
understanding of the social-ecological system, i.e., of ecological trends; of social, institutional, 
physical and economic factors; and of any interactions and feedbacks between them. To 
measure the true net benefit of the intervention, this frame of reference should incorporate not 
only baseline trends, but also counterfactual scenarios (Bull et al. 2014, 2015). In data-limited 
fisheries, uncertainties make it difficult to establish baselines and, particularly, to project 
counterfactuals. As Chapter 2 makes clear, this is a key hurdle to the translation of PES and 
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other conservation payments from the terrestrial realm to marine and coastal environments. 
However, I have demonstrated that it is possible – even in complex, data-limited systems – to 
create useful frames of reference that allow counterfactual scenarios to be projected, and to 
assess the scope for, or confidence in, ecological additionality. This can in turn be used to guide 
fisheries management and, where appropriate, the design of conservation payment schemes.  
In Chapter 3, I developed a qualitative frame of reference for the Bangladesh hilsa fishery, 
consisting of baseline trends and one positive and one negative counterfactual, using only 
understanding from the literature and limited secondary data. By comparing the positive and 
negative counterfactuals and critically evaluating the reliability of the sources of understanding, 
I identified key areas of uncertainty that could be used to guide hilsa management and future 
research; for instance, the sensitivity of hilsa to exploitation, the potential impacts of climate 
change on hilsa populations, and the biological basis for current hilsa management regulations. 
Building upon the No Net Loss conservation policy literature (Bull et al. 2014, 2015, 2016), this 
research is novel in its application of the frame of reference approach to fisheries, and 
contributes to the field of thought that places an emphasis on incorporating uncertainty into 
fisheries management decisions, even when modelling and manipulative experiments are 
impossible or unreliable (Davies 2015; Hilborn 2016).  
Despite lagging behind other policy fields in its monitoring and evaluation efforts, conservation 
science increasingly highlights the importance of counterfactuals for attribution of impact, and 
thus the value of quasi-experimental evaluation (Ferraro & Pattanayak 2006). But given how 
rare it is for counterfactuals to be developed early in the design of conservation interventions, 
these kinds of evaluations are still difficult in practice (Gurney et al. 2014, 2015), and very 
seldom applied to payment schemes (Pagiola & Rios 2013; Clements & Milner-Gulland 2014). 
Although the counterfactuals developed in Chapter 3 provide invaluable context to guide future 
hilsa management, the limited availability of quantitative ex-ante baseline data means that 
counterfactual evaluation of either the current management package as a whole, or of the 
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compensation scheme, is not yet possible. There are, however, numerous other evaluation 
approaches available, some of which are very new and have had limited application in 
conservation (Stern 2015). These approaches cannot be used to directly attribute impact to the 
interventions, but they can still be used for limited causal inference if the basis for causal claims 
is made explicit, and caveats are clearly expressed. In Chapter 5 I demonstrated the value of two 
of these approaches: one theory-based (relying on generative causality, i.e., the identification of 
mechanisms that explain effects) and one statistical (correlations between variables with 
controls for confounding variables).  
Theory-based approaches to evaluation can be a powerful way to assess whether and how an 
intervention has potentially made or could make a difference, and thus provide an indication of 
confidence in the additionality of interventions in data-poor circumstances. There are various 
kinds of theory-based approaches emerging largely from the social and political sciences, but 
they all take the same general form as used in Chapter 5. Firstly, they involve mapping out a 
conceptual theory of change for the intervention (in other words, the mechanisms presumed to 
lead to the intended outcomes and their underlying assumptions). In this study, the theory of 
change was relatively straightforward to reconstruct using management plans and interviews, 
but a theory of change is best developed with the active participation of local stakeholders, 
particularly when projects have multiple strands, feedbacks and trade-offs. This process can be 
valuable even when there is a pre-existing theory of change available, because it opens the 
process up to different perspectives and insights (Woodhouse et al. 2015).  
I examined the validity of this reconstructed theory of change by looking for empirical evidence 
to support or discredit its underlying assumptions, while at the same time considering the 
strength of this support and each assumption’s level of importance in influencing the overall 
intended outcomes of hilsa management. As proposed by Befani & Mayne (2014), the 
assessment of strength of evidence would benefit from the application of principles and tests 
from process tracing, a robust and established probabilistic methodology developed for the 
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analysis of historical events, which looks for evidence that increases confidence in the existence 
(or non-existence) of a theorised mechanism (Bennett 2008, 2010; Collier 2011; Mahoney 
2012). Although my approach borrowed elements from this methodology, instead of simply 
measuring the strength or weakness of pieces of evidence in isolation, process tracing looks at 
the combination or accumulation of empirical observations and other contextual factors, using 
Bayesian logic to assess confidence in mechanisms within the theory of change (Barnett & 
Munslow 2014). Process tracing has not been used in conservation to date, but adaptation of the 
methodology for conservation impact evaluation might help to drive progress in reducing 
uncertainty around the contribution of interventions when counterfactual evaluations are not 
possible. 
Together, Chapters 3 and 5 provide some insight into how and why current management might 
affect the hilsa fishery, and what might happen without institutional improvements. The frame 
of reference shows what might already be happening in the fishery, whereas the theory of 
change shows what kind of intervention might contribute to intended outcomes, given this 
context. The statistical and theory-based approaches in Chapter 5 are complementary; whereas 
the statistical analyses provide an indication that hilsa sanctuaries and compensation payments 
might have had some conservation impact, the theory of change provides insight into how 
individual components of management may be operating together to produce impact and why. 
Not only can these findings be used to guide future management decisions, they provide the 
basis for the development of a rigorous and long-term social and ecological monitoring and 
evaluation system, which should eventually allow attribution of outcomes. The theory-based 
evaluation involved the development of hypotheses and evaluation questions that should in 
turn help in the identification of controls and confounding factors in experimental and statistical 
designs, and in contextualising results. These methods hold promise for the design of 
conservation payment schemes, which thus far have largely been developed under the 
assumption of a connection between payments and outcomes (Pattanayak et al. 2010). The 
social impacts of these payments, in particular, have been poorly assessed, and the use of 
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grounded theories of change in combination with counterfactual evaluations, where they are 
possible, should help to address this gap (Calvet-Mir et al. 2015; Woodhouse et al. 2015).  
In a fisheries context, any monitoring and evaluation system would ideally include a reliable 
stock assessment. In the absence of such an assessment, management decisions are often based 
almost solely on biological norms from the literature, as is currently the case in the hilsa fishery. 
Yet, in these circumstances it is still possible to make more informed management decisions, 
whether by borrowing data from similar species or neighbouring populations (Smith et al. 
2009; Honey et al. 2010), using local knowledge and perceptions (Fazey et al. 2006; Wilson et al. 
2006), or through the application of novel data-poor methods for the assessment of stock status 
and sensitivity (Le Quesne & Jennings 2012).  
The methods used in Chapter 4 add to the growing body of literature demonstrating that rapid 
assessments of stocks and their sensitivity to fishing can be conducted using minimal life history 
parameter data, which are much more available than survival and mortality estimates, or can be 
inferred from allometric relationships and related species (Beddington & Kirkwood 2005; Le 
Quesne & Jennings 2012; Zhou et al. 2012; Thorpe et al. 2015). Using these data, I was able to 
model the potential relative impacts of different harvesting strategies on hilsa population 
biomass, and found that the current hilsa management strategy is not likely to be cost-effective. 
Although harvesting of juveniles is widely assumed to contribute to stock depletion, I showed 
that, for hilsa, exploitation rate is more influential than size selectivity. It follows, therefore, that 
targeting jatka fishers may not be a cost-effective strategy for a payment scheme. Moreover, I 
showed that hilsa are highly resilient to exploitation, which indicates that limited resources 
might be better spent targeting the physical drivers of change in the hilsa fishery – particularly 
pollution and the water diversion activities that are blocking migratory pathways (Chapter 5) – 
than fishing itself. These findings highlight the importance of grounding conservation payments 
in robust biological understanding. They are also likely to be transferable to other forage fish 
with similar life histories, such as American shad and herring. 
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Chapter 4 also demonstrates the potential for management recommendations to be made based 
on creative ways of using and combining unconventional data, when nothing else is available. 
Despite the numerous assumptions made in this study, the combined use of fishers’ knowledge 
and life history parameters was an important first step to understanding the distribution of 
household-level impacts of fishing on hilsa. Future studies could be improved if, for instance, 
actual landings data were available, but the value of fishers’ ecological knowledge – particularly 
that of small-scale fishers – should not be underestimated (Johannes 2000). Fishers’ knowledge 
has been used in fisheries assessments (Neis et al. 1999; Bender et al. 2013), in the design of 
conservation and fisheries management interventions (Drew 2005; Wilson et al. 2006), and in a 
number of studies that have demonstrated complementarity between fisher knowledge and 
conventional scientific knowledge (Silvano et al. 2008; Silvano & Valbo-Jørgensen 2008; Jackson 
et al. 2014; Gaspare et al. 2015).  
Expert and experiential knowledge (from fishers and a range of other individuals) and fishers’ 
perceptions of ecological trends also underpinned much of the theory-based and statistical 
evaluation of additionality in Chapter 5, and the assessment of compensation scheme 
sustainability in Chapter 7. Local perceptions (which can be based on, but are distinct from, 
knowledge) can provide insights on social impacts of conservation, ecological outcomes of 
conservation, legitimacy of conservation governance, and acceptability of management, which 
ultimately determine conservation success (Bennett 2016). As demonstrated in Chapter 5, 
perceptions can rarely be used to determine causality; even experimental and quasi-
experimental studies of perceptions are limited by their subjectivity (Gurney et al. 2014). 
Nonetheless, well-designed studies of perceptions provide a rapid way to establish baselines or 
understand effectiveness when quantitative experimental and quasi-experimental evaluations 
are not possible, and can provide vital support even when they are. And yet, as Bennett (2016) 
laments, this kind of evidence is rarely incorporated into monitoring and evaluation 
programmes. Research on perceptions deserves more attention as one way to improve adaptive, 
evidence-based management. 
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Of course, there are limitations to all knowledge derived from personal experience. Perceptions 
can vary widely between different groups and individuals, and there is a risk that responses will 
reflect what the individual thinks that they should say or what they think the researcher wants 
to hear (Fazey et al. 2006; Newing 2011). For instance, strategic responses are common when 
individuals perceive a risk of sanctions or a potential benefit. Fishers’ knowledge should 
therefore be validated by triangulation with information obtained from different respondents or 
different methods of questioning, and preferably by using it in combination with other types of 
data (Daw et al. 2011b; Newing 2011). Measures should also be taken to reduce the risk of 
strategic bias; for example, by using specialised indirect questioning techniques (Nuno & St John 
2015) and by building trust in the independence of the research team (Bernard 2011).  
8.3 Trade-offs in conservation payments 
 “For everything you have missed, you have gained something else, and for everything you gain, 
you lose something else” 
Ralph Waldo Emerson 
Conservation interventions increasingly seek to achieve both conservation impacts and positive 
social impacts, while minimising economic costs. Yet, when interventions are designed to meet 
multiple objectives, complex trade-offs are usually encountered. Win-win or triple-win solutions 
may be possible when objectives are positively correlated, or independent of one another, but 
improving outcomes in one dimension will usually compromise outcomes in another (Ferraro & 
Hanauer 2010; McShane et al. 2011; Salafsky 2011). The new conservation debate thus 
challenges conservationists to identify and openly examine these trade-offs, so that 
stakeholders may discuss and negotiate hard choices in decision-making (Minteer & Miller 
2011; Hirsch et al. 2011). Trade-offs are a key element of the ongoing debate around the 
potential for PES to contribute to poverty alleviation (Pagiola et al. 2005; Bulte et al. 2008; 
Wunder 2008). This research contributes to the debate by tackling the question of whether 
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explicit poverty-targeting, commonly used in public payment schemes, can generate win-win 
outcomes.  
Together, Chapters 4 and 6 demonstrate how trade-offs can limit the potential for win-win 
outcomes, especially when these trade-offs are not acknowledged. Currently, the compensation 
scheme for hilsa fishers in Bangladesh is failing to effectively target for either its social or 
ecological objectives; compensation allocation is spatially (and thus probably politically) driven, 
with limited association to indicators of household fishing dependence, poverty, vulnerability 
(Chapter 6) or jatka fishing activities (Chapter 4). Having established this, I went on in Chapter 
6 to consider the implications of two potential alternative targeting strategies. I considered 
compensating all jatka fishers to be the least favourable of these due to the general vagueness of 
the term ‘jatka fisher’, the related challenges of identifying who should receive compensation, 
and potential inequities imposed by the fact that some individuals who target jatka are reported 
to be seasonal or occasional fishers and therefore not highly dependent on hilsa. Moreover, the 
finding that potential household impact on hilsa population biomass is driven more by 
exploitation rate than size selectivity (Chapter 4) indicates that this targeting strategy would in 
fact have low potential for ecological additionality, given the lack of correlation between jatka 
fishing and high catch volumes.  
Instead, I recommended targeting the households who are most dependent on hilsa fishing as a 
more practicable and equitable strategy, which should be more cost-effective both socially and 
ecologically (Chapter 6). But, again, in light of Chapter 4, the potential for this strategy to have 
ecological additionality seems low. Although jatka households were found in Chapter 6 to have 
a marginally higher dependence on fishing than non-jatka households, in Chapter 4 I found that 
the households who are most dependent on hilsa fishing, and hence most in need of social 
support, are not the same ones who catch the greatest volumes of hilsa, and hence have the 
greatest potential for ecological additionality, indicating a strong trade-off between social and 
ecological objectives of the scheme. Even with implementation of the institutional changes 
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recommended in Chapters 6 and 7, the scheme’s ecological additionality has potential to be 
undermined by its social targeting goals, and vice versa.  
Although it is often described as a PES – and one more concerned with hilsa conservation than 
poverty alleviation (Islam et al. 2016; Porras et al. 2016) – currently, the compensation scheme 
more resembles a social safeguard compensating for costs incurred by fishing bans than a 
conservation payment. Not only is it based on the pre-existing Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) 
and (to a lesser extent) alternative livelihood support programmes, it lacks enforcement of 
conditionality. The VGF was introduced as a short-term form of relief for households considered 
to be at high risk of hunger, particularly natural disaster victims (Uraguchi 2011). Key 
informant interviews suggested that the top-down approach to distribution of compensation to 
fishers has limited the potential for it to be viewed as anything more than relief (Chapter 7). 
Moreover, attempting to reframe this programme by introducing conditionality on fishing 
behaviour – even if it were effectively enforced – could be viewed as problematic due to its 
potential to exclude very vulnerable households. Making relief available only to hilsa or jatka 
fishers could also generate a perverse incentive to participate in these activities. Similar 
concerns have been raised over a scheme in the Brazilian Amazon that distributes subsidies to 
artisanal fishers as compensation for a closed fishing season. Corrêa et al. (2014) demonstrated 
that this cash compensation has actually contributed to an increase in numbers of fishers.   
It is clear that the compensation scheme needs a clearer and more focused objective to guide 
implementation. The lack of synergy between the social and ecological targeting parameters 
could even be taken as evidence of a need to separate the issues of hilsa conservation and 
poverty alleviation. PES is widely advocated for its economic efficiency – a conceptualisation 
that focuses on the cost-effectiveness of reducing ecological impacts, i.e., by targeting the most 
effective providers of ES (in this context, fishers with the greatest ecological impact on hilsa) at 
the lowest cost (Wünscher et al. 2008). There is therefore a large body of literature 
investigating optimal payment design by trying to identify geographical locations or individuals 
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with synergies between high potential additionality, low opportunity costs and high poverty 
levels (Alix-Garcia et al. 2008; Gauvin et al. 2010; Zhang & Pagiola 2011; Jindal et al. 2013). 
Some of these investigations have found good synergies between these parameters, but trade-
offs between poverty alleviation and cost-effectiveness are often high. Many authors have thus 
warned against poverty alleviation becoming a primary goal of interventions with a 
conservation objective (Pagiola et al. 2005; Wunder 2008), and even called for it to be 
addressed separately (Kinzig et al. 2011).  
The focus of PES on efficiency and subsequent quests for optimal solutions has been criticised 
by others (Kroeger 2013; Pascual et al. 2014; Kolinjivadi et al. 2015). Optimisation studies 
frequently ignore uncertainty by using unidimensional conceptualisations and quantitative 
measures of poverty, and using opportunity costs as a bench-mark for efficiency or cost-
effectiveness, without full consideration of the underlying dynamics at a household level (Alix-
Garcia et al. 2008; Gauvin et al. 2010; Zhang & Pagiola 2011). In our household survey, we 
collected data on opportunity costs by asking respondents to estimate a) how much household 
income they lose as a direct result of to the fishing ban (and any extra income they get during 
that period from activities they would not have done outside of the fishing ban); and b) their 
monetary willingness to accept compensation. These data could have been incorporated into a 
trade-off analysis with fishing dependence and potential ecological impact. I decided not to use 
them when preliminary analysis showed little convergence between the two proxies of 
opportunity cost, and high heterogeneity; these kinds of questions are very leading and the 
proxies they generate are notoriously inaccurate (Gregersen et al. 2010). Moreover, they should 
not be used in isolation from the socioeconomic processes driving them (Adams et al. 2010; 
Kolinjivadi et al. 2015).  
Numerous researchers have called for a more explicit consideration of equity in targeting 
payments (Corbera et al. 2007; Kroeger 2013; Pascual et al. 2014). Equity has multiple 
dimensions, the relative importance of which are context dependent: procedural legitimacy (i.e., 
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degree of participation in decision-making); the distribution of costs and benefits of 
conservation; and the recognition of stakeholder rights, norms and values (Pascual et al. 2014). 
It is often assumed that increased equity comes at the cost of ecologically optimal solutions, but 
in fact this complex relationship is rarely established; the degree of equity in an intervention 
can affect social and ecological outcomes in myriad ways (Pascual et al. 2010). As a result, 
optimisation studies in the PES literature and wider spatial planning literature have begun to 
incorporate dimensions of equity (Gross-Camp et al. 2012; Halpern et al. 2013; Narloch et al. 
2013). Kolinjivadi et al. (2015), for instance, emphasise that targeting efforts should not only 
identify trade-offs, but also assess the extent to which those trade-offs are socially legitimate. I 
examined perceptions of fairness of compensation distribution in the hilsa fishery, and found 
the majority of respondents reported perceptions of unfair distribution, indicating a lack of 
social acceptance that is probably limiting conservation outcomes (Fehr & Falk 2002; 
Sommerville et al. 2010a). They also supported targeting the most dependent fishing 
households, which is evidence that a more socially-focused targeting strategy would be more 
socially acceptable. However, I was unable to address the other dimensions of equity – a gap 
that needs filling.  
With this in mind, I would argue that the potential for hilsa conservation payments to 
concurrently provide social and ecological benefits requires further investigation. The existence 
of trade-offs should not prevent conservation payments from having positive social impacts, if 
they are well designed and implemented and the trade-offs are made clear from the outset 
(Clements & Milner-Gulland 2014; Bremer et al. 2014; Porras et al. 2016). But when trade-offs 
between social and ecological goals are strong, explicit poverty-targeting mechanisms may not 
be appropriate (Wunder et al. 2008; Wunder 2008; Ingram et al. 2014). Instead of attempting to 
integrate social and ecological goals, it can be preferable to focus on conservation goals, which 
can be a means to achieving social goals in the long term (Salafsky 2011). If conservation 
payments are to help fisheries contribute to poverty alleviation on a global scale, perhaps the 
focus should be on scaling up ecologically additional schemes rather than on participation of the 
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poor. Ultimately, more quantitative empirical research investigating how payment schemes may 
account for complex trade-offs in data-poor circumstances is needed. 
One way to address the ineffective social targeting in the hilsa fishery might be to extend 
coverage of conditional compensation to all households within the compensation area (or the 
area deemed to have the greatest potential for ecological additionality). Research on targeting 
effectiveness of social safeguards to mitigate negative impacts of REDD+ in Madagascar has 
highlighted the challenges facing social assessments of households in very poor, remote 
communities, where assessors can be heavily influenced by local elites, and where households 
can be reluctant to reveal their dependence on a resource (Poudyal et al. 2016). They concluded 
that in systems like this, and where the majority of households are very poor and likely to be 
incurring costs, compensating all could be the optimal approach, avoiding the costs of 
ineffective social assessments. The situations are slightly different in that REDD+ social 
safeguards are designed to compensate local communities for access restrictions from which 
they do not clearly benefit, whereas conditional compensation for hilsa fishers is designed to 
incentivise compliance with fishing bans from which they should benefit in the long term 
through a more sustainable and productive fishery. The literature on targeting resource 
transfers in development also highlights the risks of dependence and perverse outcomes that 
can arise from ‘hand-outs’ (Slater 2011), which, in a system where conditionality of 
compensation is poorly enforced, would be high. Nevertheless, an assessment of the relative 
costs and benefits of removing the social targeting vs. a more effective social targeting strategy 
in the hilsa fishery – which would involve extensive social surveys and may not be achievable 
under current governance – might be worthwhile.  
The conservation potential of either strategy would still ultimately depend upon whether the 
regulations and thus the compensation area were appropriately spatially placed, and Chapters 4 
and 5 indicate that they may not be. Fig. 4.12a clearly illustrates that, at the district level, the 
households with greatest potential impact on hilsa are living outside of the area where the 
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compensation scheme currently operates, in Cox’s Bazar. Fishing regulations (focused on effort 
reduction) and any appropriate concurrent payments might therefore be better targeted 
towards marine fishers than river fishers.  
8.4 Making conservation institutions work in the real world 
“The devil is in the detail” 
Anon 
This research highlights just how difficult it can be to put abstract ideas into conservation 
practice. As new tools such as conservation payments and Conservation Trust Funds (CTFs) 
emerge it is wrong to assume that they are panaceas for complex problems (Ostrom 2007) – a 
mistake that has bred a cycle of conservation fads in recent decades (Redford et al. 2013). In 
fact, success fundamentally depends on how well a conservation institution fits the 
environmental, institutional, social and economic contexts in which it operates (Corbera et al. 
2009; Muradian et al. 2013; Sarkki & Karjalainen 2015). A crucial challenge in conservation 
science is therefore to understand the conditions under which a particular conservation 
institution can effectively govern a social-ecological system. 
Together, Chapters 2 and 7 identify conditions under which conservation payments are most 
likely to be successful in developing-world fisheries. In Chapter 2, I identified the preconditions 
that should help to ensure successful implementation of a PES scheme in these fisheries. 
Although I went on to demonstrate how rare it is that such a fishery will fulfil these 
preconditions a priori, the key here is capacity for improvement. In Chapter 7, I investigated one 
way of building this capacity: a CTF framework. Further to their financial stability and 
independent intermediary roles, CTFs have the potential to help build capacity for monitoring 
and enforcement, which should thereby allow conditionality and additionality to be established. 
Yet, my investigation of how a CTF might help to catalyse the development of a sustainable PES 
in Bangladesh highlighted how context-specific this potential is; there are circumstances when 
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the wider institutional context can limit best practice implementation, in which case a CTF 
might not provide the expected benefits. For instance, too much or too little government 
ownership of a CTF can limit effective governance, or an intervention might require funds more 
immediately than the CTF can generate them. Capitalisation of a CTF can be particularly difficult 
when best practice governance standards are not followed and when countries lack a tradition 
of public-private partnerships (Bladon et al. 2014a). I showed in Chapter 2 how PES could guide 
private sector investment in fisheries improvement, but the potential role of CTFs in realising 
this will depend on their level of private sector engagement (Chapter 7). The role of the private 
sector in marine conservation is an under-explored but promising route to closing the funding 
gap in developing-world fisheries, and one which deserves further research attention in the 
context of PES and CTFs (Bos et al. 2015).  
A major challenge for conservation payments in developing-world fisheries is the design and 
implementation of payments that actually incentivise behavioural change on the ground. 
Conditionality is an essential component of incentive-based approaches, and in systems facing 
monitoring challenges this conditionality will usually have to be based on behaviour rather than 
outcomes (Sommerville et al. 2009; Bladon et al. 2014b). When payments are used in tandem 
with fishing regulations, as is the case in the hilsa fishery, the payments should have some level 
of conditionality on compliance with the regulations. But, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, 
conditionality can be very difficult to establish in marine and coastal systems in developing 
countries, where monitoring and enforcement for compliance can have high transactions costs. 
In the hilsa fishery, weak monitoring and enforcement by government agencies has 
compromised the potential effectiveness of the carrot-and-stick approach; the compensation 
payments might be offsetting short-term costs, but they are rarely motivating compliance 
(Chapter 5).  
The focus of conservation payments should not be, in these circumstances, on establishing strict 
top-down conditionality, but on building community-level institutions for collective action 
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(Noordwijk & Leimona 2010; Kerr et al. 2014). In a collective scheme, individuals can work 
together to agree on the conditions of payment and participate in monitoring and enforcing 
conditionality, while payments can be designed to help cover the costs of doing so (Clements et 
al. 2010; Sommerville et al. 2010b). Individual payments can still be conditional on collective 
action, but collective payments can be more sustainable in socially cohesive groups due to lower 
transaction costs and the kinds of institutions that are created to manage them (Clements et al. 
2010; Travers 2014; Midler et al. 2015). Yet, community-level institutions should not operate in 
isolation; Chapters 2 and 7 clearly establish the necessity for conservation payments in a 
developing-world fishery context to be under a hybrid and multi-level form of governance. 
Building on previous suggestions that PES and co-management institutions could be mutually 
beneficial (Begossi 2014; Sarkki & Karjalainen 2015), more research at the interface of co-
management, PES and CTF institutions would support the effective implementation of collective 
payments in fisheries management.  
Collective or not, it is important to remember that conservation payments do not operate in a 
vacuum; individuals’ decisions are influenced by a whole range of other formal and informal 
rules and perceptions (Vatn 2010; Sommerville et al. 2010b; Bennett 2016). Without a thorough 
understanding of the wider social and institutional context in which a payment operates, there 
is a risk that payments will not incentivise compliance (Hayes et al. 2015). Indeed Vatn (2010) 
suggested that more research is needed to better understand the relationships and perceptions 
behind payments as incentives and payments as compensation. For instance, payments can 
crowd out pre-existing intrinsic motivations for conservation, or lead to perceptions that the 
intervention is unfair, which can affect compliance (Fehr & Falk 2002; Sommerville et al. 
2010a). In Bengali culture there is a custom of not eating hilsa during the presumed breeding 
season (Sharma et al. 2012; see Chapter 3), but I found no other evidence of pre-existing social 
norms for hilsa conservation, and so the risk of crowding out seems minimal in the hilsa fishery.  
307 
 
The format of a conservation payment – for instance, in kind vs. monetary – must also be 
appropriate for the social and institutional context. Although in-kind incentives can face greater 
challenges in terms of conditionality (Goldman-Benner et al. 2012), they have become more 
common with the rise in collective PES and are thought to be less likely to interfere with 
intrinsic motivations (Kerr et al. 2014). Food-based payments, however, are rare in 
conservation. In Chapter 5, I found evidence to suggest that both the rice compensation and 
alternative livelihood support schemes are limited in their potential to incentivise compliance in 
Bangladesh, partly due to limited institutional fit. By providing a short-term boost to food 
security, the rice compensation scheme does little to lift fishers from the cycles of debt in which 
they are trapped, and for which they still need to pay interest during the fishing bans (Chapter 
5). It seems that, for many of these fishers, the costs of the management regime are too high for 
rice compensation to incentivise compliance, even if conditionality were enforced. Local calls 
have been made for increased coverage of livelihood-focused payments, with careful 
stakeholder consultation, that should instead help fishers to build the adaptive capacity to 
escape debt (Chapter 5). Yet, there is evidence to caution against the use of alternative 
livelihood support to incentivise sustainable behaviour, since it does not necessarily reduce the 
need or desire to exploit resources (Wright et al. 2016). Instead, a conditional loan or cash 
transfer could help to lower opportunity costs and provide an entry point into the conservation 
payment (Porras et al. 2016). As suggested in Chapter 7, this could take the form of CTF 
microcredit with repayments tailored to the timings of the fishing bans (Mohammed et al. 
2014). 
Beyond incentivising compliance, unintended feedbacks triggered by human reactions to 
conservation payments can result in poor conservation outcomes (Larrosa et al. 2016). A major 
risk of the carrot-and-stick approach is perverse incentives, particularly when enforcement of 
regulations is very weak (Wunder 2007; Corrêa et al. 2014). I did not specifically look for 
evidence of perverse incentives in the hilsa fishery, but there is evidence of unintended 
feedbacks that could be driving entry into the hilsa fishery (Chapter 5). Firstly, since only hilsa 
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fishers are eligible for compensation, Islam et al. (2016) observed that other fishing households 
who are still affected by the fishing bans are entering the hilsa fishery in order to receive 
compensation. Secondly, the distribution of rice compensation causes a decline in local rice 
prices and demand during the fishing bans, while the fishing bans drive an increase in demand 
for informal loans, an increase in interest rates and – as fishers seek alternative income from 
casual labour – a decline in local labour wages (Mohammed et al. 2014; Uraguchi & Mohammed 
2016). Since jatka fishing is often an opportunistic activity that individuals switch to when their 
income is low (Haldar & Ali 2014), it is probable that these impacts on the local rice, 
microfinance and labour markets are actually leading to perverse conservation outcomes. This 
risk deserves further research attention, starting with the integration of these potential 
unintended feedbacks into a theory of change (Chapter 5), and the development of an improved 
vessel monitoring system (Chapter 3). 
Finally, I emphasise the importance of flexibility in conservation payment design (Chapter 2). If 
one focuses too much on the market rationale that underpins much of the PES literature (Engel 
et al. 2008), there is a danger of making overly simplistic assumptions about compensation 
payments. Market-based framing has led numerous researchers to reject PES for its 
commodification and neoliberalisation of nature (Büscher 2012; Dhandapani 2015). Sceptics 
view market-based approaches as inappropriate solutions that bind conservation to the global 
corporate interests that undermine it (Büscher et al. 2012) and argue that the commodification 
of nature fails to recognise the complexity of social-ecological systems (Kosoy & Corbera 2010). 
But the majority of real-world conservation payments do not follow a free market rationale at 
all. Like the compensation scheme in Bangladesh, most are subsidy-like government payments, 
not based on monetary valuation of nature but on opportunity costs, and which rarely price or 
trade ES according to the rules of supply or demand (Sommerville et al. 2009; Muradian et al. 
2013; Hahn et al. 2015; Vatn 2015). Going forward, we must recognise the distinction between 
incentives and market transactions, and focus the conservation payment research agenda on 
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adapting the theoretical foundations of PES for more socially-informed applications in varied 
contexts (Van Hecken et al. 2015).  
8.5 Conclusions 
Conservation payments offer an opportunity to address social and ecological failings in fisheries 
management by incentivising behavioural change. Weak institutions and data limitations pose 
significant challenges to payment design and implementation in the developing world, but these 
challenges are not insurmountable. It is important to recognise that there are methods available 
for the design and evaluation of conservation interventions in data-limited systems, and that it 
is better to use these than to do nothing at all. A flexible approach to conservation payment 
design and careful integration with other institutions should allow the institutional capacity-
building that will be required in most developing-world fisheries. Trade-offs between social and 
ecological objectives can be strong, so care should be taken not to lose sight of conservation in 
pursuit of poverty alleviation. There is, however, a limit to the role that conservation payments 
can play in fisheries management. There will be situations where conservation payments are 
inappropriate, infeasible or less cost-effective than a regulatory approach. With more empirical 
research there will come more opportunity to make decisions based on experience rather than 
ideology. 
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Appendix A: Supplementary material for Chapter 3 
 
Table A.1: Fishery production (metric tonnes) in Bangladesh from 1983-84 to 2011-12 (DoF 2014a).  
 
Year Inland 
capture 
Marine 
capture  
Total 
capture  
Aquaculture Country 
Total 
Inland 
hilsa  
Marine 
hilsa  
Total 
hilsa 
1983-84 471595 164882 636477 117025 753502 90082 56000 146082 
1984-85 462605 187563 650168 123811 773979 73328 71050 144438 
1985-86 441799 207401 649200 144723 793923 94794 96294 191091 
1986-87 431006 217579 648585 166100 814685 91167 103814 194981 
1987-88 423598 227582 651180 175925 827105 78551 104950 183501 
1988-89 424140 233281 657421 183505 840926 81641 110311 191952 
1989-90 423872 239063 662935 192592 855527 112408 113943 226351 
1990-91 443404 241538 684942 210993 895935 66809 115358 182167 
1991-92 479742 245474 725216 226863 952079 68356 120106 188462 
1992-93 532419 250492 782911 237743 1020654 74715 123115 197830 
1993-94 573376 253044 826420 264190 1090610 71370 121161 192531 
1994-95 591145 264650 855795 317073 1172868 84420 129115 213535 
1995-96 609151 269702 878853 379087 1257940 80625 126660 207285 
1996-97 599900 274704 874604 485864 1360468 83230 131204 214434 
1997-98 615949 272818 888767 574812 1463579 81634 124105 205739 
1998-99 649418 309797 959215 593202 1552417 73809 140710 214519 
1999-00 670465 333799 1004264 657120 1661384 79165 140367 219532 
2000-01 688920 379497 1068417 712640 1781057 75060 154654 229714 
2001-02 688435 415420 1103855 786604 1890459 68250 152343 220593 
2002-03 709333 431908 1141241 856956 1998179 62944 136088 199032 
2003-04 732067 455207 1187274 914752 2102026 71001 184838 255839 
2004-05 859269 474597 1333866 882091 2215957 77499 198363 275862 
2005-06 956686 479810 1436496 892049 2328545 78273 198850 277123 
2006-07 1006761 487438 1494199 945812 2440011 82445 196744 279189 
2007-08 1060181 497573 1557754 1005542 2563296 89900 200100 290000 
2008-09 1123925 514644 1638569 1062801 2701370 95970 202951 298921 
2009-10 1029937 517282 1547219 1351979 2899198 115179 198574 313753 
2010-11 1054585 546333 1054585 1460769 3061687 114520 225325 339845 
2011-12 957095 578620 1139388 1726067 3261782 114475 232037 346512 
371 
 
Table A.2: Boats operated per year and average catch (metric tonnes) per boat per year in the marine 
sector in Bangladesh from 1983-84 to 2005-06 (Mome & Arnason 2007). 
Year Number of boats Average catch/boat/year (mt) 
 Mechanised Non-
mechanised 
Total Mechanised Non-
mechanised 
Total 
1983-84 3347 - 3347 16.70 - 16.70 
1984-85 3000 - 3000 23.70 - 23.70 
1985-86 2887 3802 6682 30.60 2.08 14.40 
1986-87 2887 3800 6680 32.90 2.36 15.50 
1987-88 2882 3509 6389 31.90 3.76 16.40 
1988-89 2880 3509 6389 33.00 4.37 17.30 
1989-90 2880 3509 6389 33.10 5.32 17.80 
1990-91 2880 3509 6389 33.90 5.06 18.10 
1991-92 2880 3509 6389 35.40 3.14 18.80 
1992-93 2880 3509 6389 36.50 5.13 19.30 
1993-94 2880 3509 6389 36.10 4.94 19.00 
1994-95 2880 3509 6389 38.70 5.03 20.20 
1995-96 2880 3509 6389 37.90 4.95 19.80 
1996-97 2880 3509 6389 39.90 4.64 20.50 
1997-98 2880 3509 6389 38.30 3.72 1.40 
1998-99 2880 3509 6389 42.30 5.35 22.00 
1999-00 18982 7177 26169 6.30 2.94 5.40 
2000-01 18982 6377 25369 6.91 3.67 6.00 
2001-02 18982 6377 25369 6.93 3.24 5.90 
2002-03 18982 6377 25369 6.02 3.42 5.36 
2003-04 18982 6377 25369 8.30 4.28 7.29 
2004-05 18982 6377 25369 9.00 4.33 7.82 
2005-06 18982 6377 25369 9.00 4.48 7.84 
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A.1 Administrative hierarchy 
Bangladesh comprises eight administrative divisions, which are in turn subdivided into sixty-
four districts. Each district comprises sub-districts called upazilas, which are further divided 
into unions, and finally wards, which contain a number of villages (Ahmed et al. 2010). District 
and division level administration is led by central Government officials. Urban local governance 
operates through six city corporations (Dhaka, Chittagong, Rajshahi, Khulna, Barisal, and Sylhet) 
each led by a Mayor. Unions and upazilas in rural areas are governed by democratically elected 
local councils, called parishads (Fig. A.2). Union parishads are made up of representatives from 
each village and a chairman. Upazila parishads include union parishad chairmen, mayors, an 
elected chairman and two vice chairmen. Central Government bureaucrats also have influence 
at the upazila level via the upazila nirbahi officers and ministry representatives, and central 
Government bureaucracy is reported to impede local administration (Ahsan 2010). Local village 
leaders tend to make community decisions. 
 
Figure A.1: Key elements of rural local administration. Reproduced with permission from Christensen et 
al. (2012). 
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A.2 Marketing system 
Alam et al. (2012b) identified 4-6 main intermediaries in the hilsa supply chain, depending on 
the type of market. The marketing system varies from place to place, as do the local names of 
the intermediaries, but its basic three-level structure is described in Fig. A.3. The key players are 
the aratdars, who connect buyers and sellers of fish by handling the auctioning process at 
wholesale markets, taking a commission of up to 5 per cent. They often invest in fishing 
activities by giving loans to fishers, wholesalers/suppliers (known locally as paikars or beparis) 
and retailers. They usually have their own storage facilities (arat) and may employ staff. There 
are two types of aratdar: those who collect fish from local paikars, mobile collectors (farias), 
mohajons, or directly from fishers, and sell in local markets; and those who operate second 
auctions in urban areas or more distant markets. Paikars/beparis can play the role of local 
suppliers at the primary market level or as wholesalers supplying fish from local and distant 
wholesale markets to retailers, who then sell on to consumers at fish markets and as street 
vendors. Only LC (letter of credit) paikars are licensed to export hilsa overseas.  
  
Figure A.2: A simplified representation of the domestic and foreign market chains for hilsa in Bangladesh 
(Alam et al. 2012b). Three market levels exist. LC = letter credit. The terms paikar, bepari, faria have 
different meanings in different regions. 
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This marketing system requires icing and transportation and therefore employs a large number 
of day labourers, including women and children (Ahmed 2007). The intermediaries have 
complete control of the system, and with little to no Government regulation it has been 
criticised for exploitation of fishers (Islam 2003; Haque 2011; Alam et al. 2012b). Fishers lack 
market information and bargaining power, particularly in remote areas with poor transport 
links, where they have no choice but to sell to intermediaries (Ali et al. 2010). Furthermore, the 
presence of so many players in the supply chain raises the retail price and the costs to the fisher. 
Supply chain analysis conducted on hilsa caught in the coastal Patuakhali district indicate that 
marketing profits received by intermediaries are relatively high, with only 55 per cent of retail 
price going to the fishers (Ahmed 2007). Another analysis conducted in Chandpur district found 
fishers receiving 31 per cent of retail price, with the major share of profit going to the mahajons 
(Alam et al. 2012b). Dadandars (aratdars and mahajons) in particular play a key role in 
determining market prices, through the extension of credit (dadan) which requires fishers to 
sell their catch back to/through them below the market price (Kleih et al. 2003). Although the 
dadan is interest free, this price differential is an informal equivalent of interest.  
Block ice is used for preservation on trawlers and mechanised artisanal boats which fish for 
more than one day (Kleih et al. 2003). If the transportation time from primary market to retail 
market is in excess of six hours, it is usually iced (Ahmed 2007). Alam et al. (2012a) found post-
harvest loss to be minimal, except in peak fishing season when supply exceeds the availability of 
ice. Hilsa are preferred fresh, but dry and wet salting and salt-fermentation are used as methods 
of long-term preservation, particularly during peak fishing season (Alam 2010). It cannot be 
sun-dried due to its high lipid content. Low value hilsa may be frozen and sold more cheaply on 
the domestic market. High value hilsa for the export market are frozen whole using semi-IFQ 
(individual quick freezing), sometimes in shrimp processing plants (Alam et al. 2012). 
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A.3 Analysis of climate data 
Based upon data collected at 5 meteorological stations within the study area in Bangladesh 
(Barisal, Bhola, Chandpur, Patuakhali and Cox’s Bazar), I calculated mean total monthly 
temperature and mean monthly rainfall for the period of 1983 to 2014 (Fig. A.1). This period 
was chosen to coincide with the period over which catch monitoring of hilsa has taken place in 
Bangladesh. These data are not necessarily representative of the entire study area or of the 
entire country – rainfall and temperature data were variable between stations. However the 
trends in these data were consistent between stations.  
 
 
Figure A.3: Inter-annual variation in (a) mean temperature and (b) mean total monthly rainfall from 
1983-2014 across 5 meteorological stations in the study area. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals. 
Source: Bangladesh Meteorological Department (2014).  
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Appendix B: Supplementary material for Chapter 4  
 
B.1 Household survey methods 
This household survey was conducted as part of a project led by the International Institute for 
Environment and Development (IIED) in collaboration with the Bangladesh Centre for 
Advanced Studies (BCAS). I made substantial contributions to the survey design and 
participated in training of the enumerators and piloting of the survey, but final design decisions 
were made as a team and interviews were conducted by enumerators from BCAS38. 
900 households were interviewed across 23 villages in eight districts of southern Bangladesh 
(lower Meghna River region, mid-Padma near Rajbari and coastal/marine area in Cox’s Bazar 
district; Fig. B.1). Interviews were conducted between May and October 2014. 800 of these 
households were selected from clusters of villages in the six districts where the compensation 
scheme operates (Chandpur, Laxmipur, Bhola, Patuakhali, Barisal and Barguna; Fig. B.2). 600 of 
these households were selected from hilsa sanctuary areas (Chandpur, Laxmipur, Bhola, 
Patuakhali districts) and 200 from districts outside sanctuary areas (Barisal and Barguna). The 
remaining 100 households were selected from one inland district (Rajbari) and one coastal 
district (Cox’s Bazar) where the compensation scheme does not operate (controls).  
 
                                                             
38 Where possible, the same team of three enumerators went to all villages and divided up the selected 
households. In three villages (Rayrabad and Charkachopia in Bhola district and Baushia in Barisal 
district) an additional enumerator conducted some of the questionnaires. 
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Figure B.1: Map of study area, showing study site districts (grey) in relation to sanctuary sites (red). 
Control study sites are outside of the area where the compensation scheme operates. Each study site 
represents the approximate location of a cluster of surveyed villages, denoted by the relevant district 
name (precise village coordinates were not available). In Barisal and Bhola districts two village clusters 
were sampled and can be distinguished by the sub-district names (in brackets); in the other districts just 
one village cluster was sampled.  
 
 
Figure B.2: Household survey sampling design. 
Total sample 
size 900 
households  
800 from 
compensation 
areas 
600 within 
sanctuaries 
303 
compensation 
recipients 
297 non-
recipients 
200 around 
sanctuaries 
132 
compensation 
recipients 
68 non-
recipients 
100 from non-
compensation 
areas 
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Households were selected from each district through stratified random sampling (see Table 
B.1). Inside the compensation area, 150 households were sampled from each district. Due to 
resource constraints, sample sizes were smaller outside sanctuary areas (125 households in 
Barisal district and 75 in Barguna district) and outside the compensation areas (50 households 
in each district). We aimed to balance the proportions of recipients and non-recipients 
interviewed within the compensation areas; 435 (54 per cent) of compensation area households 
were recipients and 365 (46 per cent) were non-recipients.  
Within the selected districts, sub-districts (upazila) with a high concentration of fishers were 
identified through consultations with District Fisheries Officers (DFOs) and Upazila Fisheries 
Officers (UFOs). Due to difficulties achieving a random and conventional sample design, we 
aimed instead to interview a large enough proportion of the total fishers in each upazila, so that 
any problems associated with small and non-random sampling were not likely to influence 
results. For each selected upazila, villages with a high concentration of hilsa fishers and 
preferably located near the river were then selected, based on the list of fishers. Each upazila 
sample was then allocated proportionately to the selected villages, according to the total 
number of fishers in the village. All households in the selected village were serially numbered 
and every nth household was selected for interview, where n is the total number of fishers in the 
village divided by the total upazila sample size39. Within a household, enumerators interviewed 
the fisher, if available. If not, they chose a male household member over a female member, since 
they tend to be more involved in fishing activities. If the enumerators could not find anyone to 
speak to in the selected household, or if the ratio of recipients to non-recipients in 
                                                             
39 For example, in Chandpur District, two villages were selected; Lalpur and Gobindia villages. The total 
number of hilsa fishers in Lalpur and Gobindia were 143 and 737 respectively. The total number of hilsa 
fishers (880) was therefore divided by 150 (target sample size for Chandpur district). Therefore, an 
interval of 6 was used to select interviewees from the list of fishers. 
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compensation areas was becoming unbalanced, they selected the preceding or following fisher 
on the list.  
Estimates of the total number of hilsa fishers in Bangladesh range from 300,000 (A. Wahab 
2015, WorldFish, personal communication, 20th March) to 500,000 (M. Mome 2015, Department 
of Fisheries, personal communication, 20th March) and according to M. Mome, 224,102 
households received compensation in 2014 – around 45-75 per cent of affected households, or 
65 per cent according to Rahman et al. (2014). 58 per cent of households received 
compensation in the study sites (Table B.1), and 54 per cent of the households surveyed 
received compensation, indicating that the sample is roughly representative of the recipient and 
non-recipient groups.  
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Table B.1: Details of survey sites with the total numbers of fishing households in each, the numbers of compensation recipients and non-recipients, and sample 
sizes. Village statistics were obtained from DoF (2014). 
District Upazila Village Fishing households Recipients   Non- recipients Sample size 
      Recipients Non-
recipients 
Total 
Chandpur Chandpur 
Sadar 
Lalpur 143 143 0 25 0 25 
Uttar Gabindia 737 737 0 125 0 125 
Sub-total 880 880 0 150 0 150 
Laxmipur Ramgati Sabujgram 1186 782 404 25 48 73 
Char Laxmi 1480 1190 290 25 52 77 
Sub-total 2666 1972 694 50 100 150 
Bhola Bhola Sadar Dakhin Razapur 790 425 365 10 30 40 
Kalupur 659 24 635 20 15 35 
Lalmohan Char Kachopia 865 459 406 16 36 52 
Rayrabad 400 268 132 5 18 23 
Sub-total 2714 1176 1538 51 99 150 
Patuakhali Kalapara Charipara 320 160 160 5 13 18 
Nizampur 1475 737 738 25 50 75 
Golbunia 302 150 152 5 10 15 
Mewrapara 598 298 300 12 18 30 
Chinguria 280 140 140 5 7 12 
Sub-total 2975 1485 1490 52 98 150 
Barisal Hizla Baushia 899 727 172 37 20 57 
Hizla Gourbdi 325 263 62 13 5 18 
 Muladi Kutubpur 55 20 35 5 15 20 
Goswherchar 78 40 38 28 2 30 
  Sub-total 133 60 73 83 42 125 
Barguna Patharghata Padma 444 186 258 20 15 35 
 Gunpara 515 216 299 29 11 40 
Sub-total 959 402 557 49 26 75 
Cox’s Bazar Cox’s Bazar Kutubdiapara 253 0 253 0 26 40 
Nunia Chara 66 0 66 0 24 10 
Sub-total 319 0 319 0 50 50 
Rajbari Gaolondo Shajapur 92 0 92 0 40 26 
Sorab Mondol 
Para 
84 0 84 0 10 24 
Sub-total 176 0 176 0 50 50 
Grand total 12046 6965 5081 444 456 900 
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Ethics statement 
I followed the ethical principles for research outlined by my collaborators at the International 
Institute for Environment and Development, which are based on the key principles of respect, 
beneficence and justice (IIED 2014). All research assistants and participants were informed 
about the purposes, methods and intended use of research, participation was voluntary, and it 
was made clear that research was not linked to any immediate benefit for participants. Some 
KIIs were recorded, with the interviewees consent. Anonymity of participants and 
confidentiality of information provided were protected, and efforts were made not to 
inordinately burden participants’ time.  
Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was developed on the basis of focus group discussions previously carried out 
in five sites from October – December 2013 (BCAS 2013). It was divided into the following 7 
sections: household characteristics, fishing activities, hilsa trends and status, the compensation 
scheme, coping strategy, and opportunity cost questions. A pilot survey was conducted with 28 
households in April 2014, feedback and observations from which allowed the questionnaire to 
be refined. Efforts were taken to identify and minimise sources of bias (Choi & Pak 2005). The 
questionnaire was finalised in English (below) and translated into Bengali. 
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DARWIN Initiative: Economic Incentives to Conserve Hilsa Fish (Tenualosa Ilisha) in 
Bangladesh 
International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), 
Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies (BCAS) and Bangladesh Agricultural University 
(BAU) 
Questionnaire for the socio-economic survey of fishing households 
 
Name of enumerator: __________________ Date: ______________ 
Code: [number-dd-mm-yy] ____________________ 
District: 
Union: 
Upazila: 
Village: 
 
Village code: Lalpur 1, Uttar Gobindia 2, Sabujgram 3, Char Laxmi 4, Dakhin Razapur 5, Kalupur 6, Charipara 7, 
Nizampur 8, Baushia 9, Hizla Gourabdi 10, Baherchar 11, Kutubpur 12, Gosherchar 13, Sajapur 14, Sorab Mondal Para 
15, Padma 16, Gunpara 17, Kewrabunia 18,Shoto labongola 19,  Charkachopia 20, Rayrabad 21, Mewrapara 22, 
Chinguria 23, Golbunia 24, Other 25 ____________  
 
Union Code: Bishnopur 1, Hanerchar 2, Alexander 3, Char Laxmi 4, Dakhin Razapur 5, Ilisha 6, Lalua 7, Mahipur 8, 
Barojalia 9, Hizla Gourobdi 10, Debogram 11, Doulatdia 12, Muladi sadar 13, Nazirpur 14, Lalmahan 15, Pathorgata 
sadar 16, Charduani 17, Ailapathagata 18, Burirchar 19, Badarpur 20, Other 21____________ 
 
Upazila Code: Chandpur Sadar 1, Ramgati 2, Bhola sadar 3, Doulatkhan 4, Kalapara 5, Hizl -6, Pathargata 7, Cox’s 
Bazar 8, Muladi 9, Rajbari 10, Barguna Sadar 11, Goalondo 12, Lalmahon 13, Other 14____________ 
 
District Code: Chandpur 1, Laxmipur 2, Bhola 3, Patualkhali 4, Barisal 5, Barguna 6, Cox’s Bazar 7, Rajbari 8, Other 8 
____________ 
 
Household Characteristics  
1. a)   Name of household head________________________ 
b) Cell number________________________ 
c) Name of respondent________________________ 
d) Relation to household head______________________ 
 
2. Gender (0 = Male, 1= Female) _______  
 
3. Age (years) ____________ 
 
4. Years of schooling____________  
 
5. Number of people currently living in household____________Adult male____________Adult 
female____________ Children up to 11____________ Adolescents____________ Male ________Female____________ 
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6. Number of other people supported outside of household____________ 
 
7. Number of economically active (earning) household members____________ 
 
8. Main income generating activity____________ 
 
9. Secondary income generating activities____________ 
 
(Professional Code Q8 & Q9: Hilsa/Jatka Fishing 1, Other Fishing 2, Day labor  3, Agricultural Activities  4, Fish Trading  
5, Service  6, Business  7, Handicrafts  8, Rickshaw/Van puller 9, Farming (Livestock) 10, Farming (Vegetables) 11, 
Tailoring  12, Net Repairing /Making  13, Foreign currency  14, Boat man  15, Other (Specify) 16   
 
10. Remittance from family members (1= Yes 0= No) ____________ 
[If yes] How much per month? ____________Taka 
 
11. Do you own livestock (1= Yes 0= No) ____________ 
[If yes] What and how many? 
Cows____________ Chickens____________ Goats____________ Others (Specify) ____________  
 
12. Do you have own land (1= Yes 0= No) ____________ 
[If yes] How much (local units)?  Homestead____________ Agricultural____________ Other____________  
 
13. Have you ever borrowed money from any source (1= Yes 0= No) ____________ 
[If yes] When was the last time and how much? mm-yy ___________________ Amount 
____________Taka 
[If no] Why? 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. [if Yes Q13 above, then] who do you usually borrow money from? 
Microfinance institutions (e.g. Grameen Bank or other local MFIs) ____________Taka 
Local money lenders (aratdars and dadondars) ____________ Taka 
Relatives and friends (no interest rate) ____________ Taka 
Other (please specify) ____________ Taka 
 
Fishing activities  
15. What is the primary purpose of your involvement in fishing? 
1=Subsistence or consumption  
2=Consumption and selling  
3=To sell in the local market  
4=Labour (employed by others)  
5=Other _______________ 
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16.  How do you access fishing rights? 
1=Lease 
2= Share  
3= Labour  
4= Contract  
5= License 
6= Free access  
 
17. What is your average monthly income from fishing? ____________Taka  
 
Month/Season  Monthly income (Taka) 
March-April   
May-July   
August-October   
November-January  
February    
 
18. What are your other sources of income of the household? 
 
Source of income  Yearly income (Tk) 
  
  
  
Total   
 
19. Over the last 5 years has your income from fishing changed? 
1= increased  
2= decreased  
3= stayed the same/stable  
4=Not sure    Why? ____________________________________________ 
 
20. Are you a member of a fishers association? (1= Yes 0= No) 
If yes, then why? 
1=Access to information/knowledge  
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2=Access to micro-credit  
3=Access to market 
4=Access to fishing rights  
5=other (please specify) __________________________ 
 
21. Do you own a fishing boat? (1= Yes 0= No) 
  
22. Do you catch hilsa fish? (1= Yes 0= No)            
If not, then why? 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________ 
23. What types of fishing gear do you use? 
 
 Name of Gear  Target Fish species (Use 
code)  
Fishing period 
(month)  
Location  
1 Chandi Jal -2 (large mess)     
2 Chandi Jal-4 (small mess)     
3 Gulti Jal     
4 Current Jal     
5 Behendi net     
6 Poa Jal      
7 Chapri Net     
8 Chewa net      
9 Chai     
10 Hooks     
11 Moi     
12 Masheri Jal    
13 Khot Jal     
14 Kachki Jal     
15 Bata/goara Jal     
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16 Pona Jal     
17 Chargherajal     
18 Cast net     
19 Khota Jal     
20 Scoop net     
21 Dragnet      
22 Lift net/Khora/Beshal jal     
23 Other (Specify)     
 
Species code: Hilsa 1, Jatka 2, Poa 3, Chewa 4, pangas 5 boal 6 , air 7, baghair 8, chital 9, foli 10, rita 11, puti 12, tengra 
13, Golda Chingri 14, Bagda Chingri 15, Bagda 16, kakila 17, baim 18, bele  19, rui 20, Catla 21, mrigel 22, kalibaus 23, 
miror carp 24, chanda 25, tepa,potka 26, pabda 27, gutum 28, naftani 29, chela 30, mola 31, tatkini 32, bata 33, 
chapila/mamoli 34, kuchia 35, bacha 36, Kazali/baspata 37, chaka/gangina 38, dela 39, shilong 40, ghaura 41, peali 
42, Bajila/batasi 43, tapasi 44, Kholla 45, Small shrimp 46, Kachki 47, Other 48  
 
Month Code: April 1, May 2, June 3, July 4, August 5, September 6,October 7, November 8, December 9, January 10, 
February 11, March 12 
 
Location code: Meghna River 1, Tetulia River 2, Andermanik River 3, Agunmukha River 4, Sea 5, Padma River 6, Arial 
Kha River 7, Bishkhali 8, Payra River 9, Ilisha River 10, Jamuna 11, Other (Specify) 12 ____________ 
 
 
Hilsa trends and status 
24. How does hilsa vary with season and from year to year? 
 
 Peak season 
  
Lean season  Year to Year (1=Increase 
2=Decrease 3=Same 4=don’t 
know)  
a) Average catch per fishing trip(kg)     
b) Fish size (1=Small 2=Medium 3=Large)     
c) Presence of eggs/fries  
(1=Many  2=few  3=none) 
   
 
25. Over the last 5 years, has your hilsa catch…  
 1= Increased  
2 = Decreased 
3 = Stable   
4 = I don't know  
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26.  Over the last 5 years hilsa abundance has… 
1= Increased  
2= Decreased  
3= Stayed stable  
4= I don't know  
 
27. Are you aware of any hilsa management regimes introduced by the Government? 
Jatka fishing ban period (1= Yes 0= No)            
Hilsa sanctuaries (1= Yes 0= No)            
Conservation of gravid hilsa (1= Yes 0= No)            
 
The compensation scheme 
 
28. [Explain the compensation scheme to respondent] 
a) Are you a recipient of the scheme? 
 1=Yes          0= No       2= I don't know 
b) How long have you been participating in the scheme? _______________Years  
 
29. Do you think the compensation scheme has had positive impact on hilsa stock regeneration? 
       1=Yes          0= No       2= I don't know 
 
30. Do you think the compensation scheme has had positive impact on hilsa catch levels? 
       1=Yes          0= No       2= I don't know  
 
31. Do you think the compensation scheme has had positive impact on the improvement of 
fisher livelihoods? 
       1=Yes          0= No       2= I don't know  
 
32. Over the last 5 years, do you think hilsa stocks have changed as a direct result of the 
compensation scheme? 
1= Increasing     2=Decreasing 3= No change    4= I don’t know  
[If no change] What is the reason?  
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________ 
 
33. Do you think the distribution of compensation is fair? 1=Yes          0= No  
      Why/why not? …………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
34. Which people in the village get compensation?  
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1= Poorest (needy) households  
2= Richest households  
3= People who fish most  
4= People who are most dependent on fishing for their livelihoods  
5= People who are part of fisheries association  
6= People who are well connected in the village) 
7= I don't know  
 
35.  Who do you think should be receiving compensation? (Choose any) 
1= Poorest households  
2= People who are most dependent on fishing for their livelihoods  
3= All fishermen should receive compensation  
4= I don't know  
 
36. In your opinion, what is the level of compliance with the ban period and zone among: 
 
Fisher type  Degree of compliance [tick one for each type of fisher]  
1=Everybody 
complies 
 
2=Most people 
comply  
3=Some 
people 
comply  
4=Only few 
people comply  
5=No one 
complies  
a) Subsistence fishermen      
Commercial 
fishermen  
b) Recipient       
c) Non-
recipient  
     
d) Baddya       
 
37. If not everyone complies in a particular group, then (in your opinion) what needs to be done 
to enhance compliance within these groups? 
 
 
 
 
38. Do you think the pressure to repay loan is an obstruction to abide with ban period? 
  1= Yes 0 = No  
39. Do you think the fishing ban period fits well with the hilsa’s breeding season? 
391 
 
       1= Yes 0 = No 2= I don’t know  
 
Coping strategy 
40. Is your livelihood affected by the closed/off season and zone?  
               1=Yes          0 = No   
 
41. How sufficient is the compensation provided?  
1= More than enough 2=Just enough 3= Not enough  
 
42. If you are not a recipient or the compensation is not sufficient, what are the most important 
strategies you do to cope in times of hardship? Please rank the 5 most frequently used coping 
strategies.  
 
Coping strategies  Ranking  
1=Use my savings  
2=Borrow from relatives/friends/others  
3=Loan with interest    
4=Shopping credit   
5=Do some other job (e.g. labour or rickshaw/petty business)  
6=Consume less preferred and less expensive food  
7=Limit portion size at meal times  
8=Sell some assets (livestock if any)   
9=Other (specify)   
 
Opportunity Cost Questions  
43. Has not being allowed to catch hilsa in particular zones during the ban period changed your 
fishing behaviour?  
1 = Yes  0 = No  
If, yes, then 
1= changed location  
2= changed location and gears  
3= changed target species  
4= don't fish during the ban period  
5= I go fishing anyway  
6=others/specify) ___________________ 
 
44. If so, has this had an effect on your household income?  
1=Increased 2=decreased 3=stayed the same  
4=not sure  
 
45. How much in household income do you lose directly due to the ban period and zone? This includes 
wages (if employed by other fishermen), or loss in earnings from selling fish. 
_________________ Taka per closure period [Jatka]  
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_________________ Taka per closure period [brood]  
 
46. How much in household income do you get from other activities that you do during the ban 
period, which you wouldn't have done if you had been fishing (not things that your household 
would have done anyway)?  
_________________ Taka per closure period  
 
47. If you are affected by the current ban period (or if you were to be affected in the future) how much is 
your minimum willingness to accept compensation in Taka?  
_____________Taka per year  
 
This questionnaire was followed by a choice experiment, which was not used in this PhD. 
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B.2 Model selection tables and results 
 
Table B.2: Model selection table for Model 1: LMM for ecological impact with sanctuary and compensation recipient as fixed effects.  
(Intercept) Boat 
ownership 
Compensation 
recipient 
Sanctuary Fishing 
location 
Gear diversity df logLik AICc delta 
weight 
0.335826 + NA NA + NA 6 -312.876 637.878 0 0.422613 
0.060388 + NA + + NA 7 -311.871 637.9109 0.032885 0.415721 
0.026273 + + + + NA 8 -312.878 641.9751 4.097111 0.054484 
0.309627 + + NA + NA 7 -314.04 642.2489 4.370833 0.047515 
0.317267 + NA NA + + 7 -314.617 643.4037 5.525625 0.026673 
0.04445 + NA + + + 8 -313.599 643.417 5.53892 0.026496 
0.010026 + + + + + 9 -314.595 647.4637 9.585711 0.003503 
0.291066 + + NA + + 8 -315.779 647.7767 9.898691 0.002996 
 
Table B.3: Model selection table for Model 2: LMM for ecological impact with compensation area as fixed effects. 
(Intercept) Boat Compensation area Fishing location Gear diversity df logLik AICc delta weight 
0.342135 + - + NA 7 -336.24 686.6329 0 0.597082 
0.535062 + NA + NA 6 -337.8 687.714 1.081091 0.347759 
0.325237 + - + + 8 -338.054 692.305 5.672144 0.035022 
0.519061 + NA + + 7 -339.629 693.4118 6.778963 0.020137 
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Table B.4: Model selection table for Model 3: LMM for ecological impact with fishing dependence as a 
fixed effect. 
Intercept Fishing dependence df LogLik AICc Delta Weight 
0.6716 NA 4 -366.823 741.7    0.0 0.825 
0.6613 0.07323 5 -367.358 744.8 3.1 0.175 
 
Table B.5: Coefficient estimates for (a) a binomial generalised linear mixed effects model with the 
probability of targeting jatka as the response variable (0 = jatka, 1 = no jatka); and (b) a linear mixed 
effects model with reported average catch volume (kg per fishing trip) as the response variable, based on 
669 households from 19 villages in 6 districts. Random effects estimates of variance are also presented 
[with standard deviation]. From these models I extracted and mapped the best linear unbiased 
predictors, which measured the residual effect associated with the district random effect. 
(a) Size selectivity (b) Catch volume 
Fixed effects Estimate  Fixed effects Estimate t value 
Intercept -0.016 (0.914)   Intercept 0.809 (0.197) 4.098 
Random effects    Random effects   
Village 1.539 [1.240]   Village 0.009 [0.095] 
District 5.749 [2.398]   District 0.305 [0.552] 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
 
Figure B.3: BLUPs for the random effects of village for (a) Model 1 and (b) Model 2. The x axes show the 
effect of living in a particular village in terms of the difference in threat from the intercept. Error bars 
show the 95% confidence interval based on the conditional variance for each random effect. Village 
names are prefixed by district. 
Village
Patuakhali: Nizampur
Barisal: Gosherchar
Barisal: Kutubpur
Bhola: Charkachopia
Patuakhali: Golbunia
Chandpur: Uttar Gobindia
Bhola: Rayrabad
Barguna: Gunpara
Barisal: Padma
Laxmipur: Char Laxmi
Laxmipur: Sabujgram
Patuakhali: Charipara
Bhola: Kalapur
Barisal: Baushia
Bhola: Razapur
Barisal: Gourabdia
Patuakhali: Chinguria
Patuakhali: Mewrapara
Chandpur: Lalpur
-0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
(Intercept)
Village
Patuakhali: Nizampur
Barisal: Gosherchar
Chandpur: Uttar Gobindia
Barisal: Kutubpur
Rajbari: Sorab Mondol Para
Bhola: Charkachopia
Patuakhali: Golbunia
Bhola: Rayrabad
Barguna: Gunpara
Laxmipur: Char Laxmi
Cox's Bazar: Naniachara
Barisal: Padma
Laxmipur: Sabujgram
Rajbari: Sajapur
Patuakhali: Charipara
Bhola: Kalapur
Cox's Bazar: Kutubdiapara
Bhola: Razapur
Barisal: Baushia
Barisal: Gourabdia
Chandpur: Lalpur
Patuakhali: Chinguria
Patuakhali: Mewrapara
-0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2
(Intercept)
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Appendix C: Supplementary material for Chapter 5 
 
C.1 Key informant interview topics 
 
1. Recent trends in hilsa stock and production 
2. Constraints, limitations and strengths of current hilsa fisheries management 
3. Opportunities for improved hilsa fisheries management 
4. Opinion of the compensation scheme and impact on the hilsa fisheries and livelihoods 
5. Enforcement of and compliance with regulations 
6. Impact of current management on livelihoods 
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C.2 Household survey questions used in this chapter (see Appendix B.1 for full 
questionnaire) 
  
14. Relation to household head______________________ 
 
15. Gender (0 = Male, 1= Female) _______  
 
16. Age (years) ____________ 
 
17. Years of schooling____________  
 
15. What is the primary purpose of your involvement in fishing? 
1=Subsistence or consumption  
2=Consumption and selling  
3=To sell in the local market  
4=Labour (employed by others)  
5=Other _______________ 
 
19. Over the last 5 years has your income from fishing changed? 
1= increased  
2= decreased  
3= stayed the same/stable  
4=Not sure    Why? ____________________________________________ 
 
20. Are you a member of a fishers association? (1= Yes 0= No) 
If yes, then why? 
1=Access to information/knowledge  
2=Access to micro-credit  
3=Access to market 
4=Access to fishing rights  
5=other (please specify) __________________________ 
 
21. Do you own a fishing boat? (1= Yes 0= No) 
  
22. Do you catch hilsa fish? (1= Yes 0= No)            
If not, then why? 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________ 
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23. What types of fishing gear do you use? 
 Name of Gear  Target Fish species (Use 
code)  
Fishing period 
(month)  
Location  
1 Chandi Jal -2 (large mess)     
2 Chandi Jal-4 (small mess)     
3 Gulti Jal     
4 Current Jal     
5 Behendi net     
6 Poa Jal      
7 Chapri Net     
8 Chewa net      
9 Chai     
10 Hooks     
11 Moi     
12 Masheri Jal    
13 Khot Jal     
14 Kachki Jal     
15 Bata/goara Jal     
16 Pona Jal     
17 Chargherajal     
18 Cast net     
19 Khota Jal     
20 Scoop net     
21 Dragnet      
22 Lift net/Khora/Beshal jal     
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23 Other (Specify)     
 
24. How does hilsa vary with season and from year to year? 
 
 Peak season 
  
Lean season  Year to Year (1=Increase 
2=Decrease 3=Same 4=don’t 
know)  
a) Average catch per fishing trip(kg)     
b) Fish size (1=Small 2=Medium 3=Large)     
c) Presence of eggs/fries  
(1=Many  2=few  3=none) 
   
 
25. Over the last 5 years, has your hilsa catch…  
 1= Increased  
2 = Decreased 
3 = Stable   
4 = I don't know  
 
26.  Over the last 5 years hilsa abundance has… 
1= Increased  
2= Decreased  
3= Stayed stable  
4= I don't know  
 
27. Are you aware of any hilsa management regimes introduced by the Government? 
Jatka fishing ban period (1= Yes 0= No)            
Hilsa sanctuaries (1= Yes 0= No)            
Conservation of gravid hilsa (1= Yes 0= No)            
 
28. [Explain the compensation scheme to respondent] 
a) Are you a recipient of the scheme? 
 1=Yes          0= No       2= I don't know 
b) How long have you been participating in the scheme? _______________Years  
 
29. Do you think the compensation scheme has had positive impact on hilsa stock regeneration? 
       1=Yes          0= No       2= I don't know 
 
30. Do you think the compensation scheme has had positive impact on hilsa catch levels? 
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       1=Yes          0= No       2= I don't know  
 
31. Do you think the compensation scheme has had positive impact on the improvement of 
fisher livelihoods? 
       1=Yes          0= No       2= I don't know  
 
32. Over the last 5 years, do you think hilsa stocks have changed as a direct result of the 
compensation scheme? 
1= Increasing     2=Decreasing 3= No change    4= I don’t know  
[If no change] What is the reason?  
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________ 
 
36. In your opinion, what is the level of compliance with the ban period and zone among: 
 
Fisher type  Degree of compliance [tick one for each type of fisher]  
1=Everybody 
complies 
 
2=Most people 
comply  
3=Some 
people 
comply  
4=Only few 
people comply  
5=No one 
complies  
Commercial 
fishermen  
b) Recipient       
c) Non-
recipient  
     
 
37. If not everyone complies in a particular group, then (in your opinion) what needs to be done 
to enhance compliance within these groups? 
 
 
 
 
39. Do you think the fishing ban period fits well with the hilsa’s breeding season? 
       1= Yes 0 = No 2= I don’t know  
 
 
42. If you are not a recipient or the compensation is not sufficient, what are the most important 
strategies you do to cope in times of hardship? Please rank the 5 most frequently used coping 
strategies.  
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Coping strategies  Ranking  
1=Use my savings  
2=Borrow from relatives/friends/others  
3=Loan with interest    
4=Shopping credit   
5=Do some other job (e.g. labour or rickshaw/petty business)  
6=Consume less preferred and less expensive food  
7=Limit portion size at meal times  
8=Sell some assets (livestock if any)   
9=Other (specify)   
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C.3 GLMM results 
 
Table C.1: Results for GLMMs of probability of reporting an increase in (a) hilsa catch volume from year 
to year, where compensation area is included as an explanatory variable instead of sanctuary and 
compensation; (b) hilsa egg/fry presence from year to year, where compensation area is included as an 
explanatory variable instead of sanctuary and compensation; and (c) hilsa egg/fry presence from year to 
year, where sanctuary and compensation are included as explanatory variables and district random effect 
is removed. Tables show the full model-averaged coefficient estimates (standard error) and relative 
importance of each variable from the candidate set of models where ΔAICc <4, based on 739 households 
from 23 villages in 8 districts. Coefficient estimates are presented as contrasts from the intercept, 
standardised on 2 standard deviations following Gelman (2008). Where the relative importance of a 
variable is < 0.5, only the direction of the effect is presented. Random effects estimates of variance 
[standard deviation] were taken from the global model.  
(a) Fixed effects  Estimate (SE) Relative importance 
 Intercept 2.92 (0.81)  
 Age -0.18 (0.24) 0.50 
 Compensation area (1 = compensation area, 0 = control) + 0.38 
 Awareness (1 = aware of regulations, 0 = not aware) - 0.33 
 Target jatka (1 = target jatka, 0 = no jatka) + 0.29 
 Fishing location (1 = sea, 0 = only river) - 0.28 
 # of models in candidate set 27  
 Random effects   
 Village  2.52 [1.59]  
 District  2.83 [1.68]  
 
(b) Fixed effects  Estimate (SE) Relative importance 
 Intercept -0.17 (0.19)  
 Compensation area (1 = compensation area, 0 = control)  0.83 (0.63) 0.78 
 Fishing location (1 = sea, 0 = only river) + 0.36 
 Age  - 0.30 
 Target jatka (1 = target jatka, 0 = no jatka) - 0.24 
 Awareness (1 = aware of regulations, 0 = not aware) + 0.19 
 # of models in candidate set 18  
 Random effects   
 Village  0.52 [0.72]  
 District  0.02 [0.12]  
 
(c) Fixed effects  Estimate (SE) Relative importance 
 Intercept -0.13 (0.17)  
 Sanctuary (1 = inside, 0 = outside)  1.08 (0.38) 1.00 
 Fishing location (1 = sea, 0 = only river) + 0.38 
 Awareness (1 = aware of regulations, 0 = not aware) - 0.34 
 Age - 0.27 
 Target jatka (1 = target jatka, 0 = no jatka) - 0.21 
 Compensation (1 = recipient, 0 = non-recipient) + 0.20 
 # of models in candidate set 19  
 Random effects   
 Village  0.44 [0.66]  
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Figure C.1: BLUPs for the district random effect in the GLMM for probability of reporting an increase in 
catch volume, where sanctuary is included as an explanatory variable. The x axis shows the effect of living 
in a particular district in terms of the difference in probability of perceiving an increase in catch volume 
from the intercept. Error bars show the 95% confidence interval based on the conditional variance for the 
random effect.   
District
Patuakhali
Chandpur
Barguna
Rajbari
Cox's Bazar
Barisal
Laxmipur
Bhola
-2 -1 0 1 2
(Intercept)
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C.4 Model selection tables 
Table C.2: Model selection table for GLMM with the probability of perceiving an increase in hilsa catch (with compensation area as an explanatory variable). 
(Intercept) Age Compensation Area Jatka fishing Fishing location Awareness df logLik AICc delta weight 
2.826258 -0.3394 NA NA NA NA 4 -259.52 527.0948 0 0.09613 
2.813248 NA NA NA NA NA 3 -260.564 527.1603 0.065526 0.093031 
3.113442 -0.33935 1.8701 NA NA NA 5 -258.96 528.0019 0.907101 0.061078 
3.059488 NA 1.81908 NA NA NA 4 -260.006 528.0658 0.971083 0.059155 
2.815681 -0.34948 NA -0.35849 NA NA 5 -259.064 528.2104 1.115607 0.055031 
2.802082 NA NA -0.33503 NA NA 4 -260.165 528.3855 1.29071 0.050418 
2.814638 NA NA NA 0.24045 NA 4 -260.237 528.528 1.433262 0.046949 
2.791257 NA NA NA NA -0.4561 4 -260.244 528.543 1.448265 0.046598 
2.805155 -0.32974 NA NA NA -0.41244 5 -259.262 528.606 1.511196 0.045155 
2.825568 -0.32885 NA NA 0.213935 NA 5 -259.264 528.609 1.514218 0.045087 
3.117111 -0.34973 2.0066 -0.37504 NA NA 6 -258.462 529.038 1.943269 0.036382 
3.103196 NA 1.98885 -0.35176 NA NA 5 -259.559 529.2002 2.105489 0.033547 
3.057767 NA 1.80615 NA 0.24218 NA 5 -259.674 529.4307 2.335892 0.029897 
3.051 NA 1.72182 NA NA -0.45365 5 -259.686 529.4532 2.358439 0.029562 
3.109375 -0.3286 1.85597 NA 0.215634 NA 6 -258.7 529.5147 2.419991 0.028666 
3.070081 -0.32982 1.74637 NA NA -0.40994 6 -258.707 529.5295 2.434729 0.028455 
2.816938 -0.33948 NA -0.34513 0.199088 NA 6 -258.843 529.801 2.706259 0.024843 
2.80559 NA NA -0.31993 0.227009 NA 5 -259.875 529.8323 2.737505 0.024458 
2.800501 -0.34099 NA -0.3249 NA -0.33539 6 -258.897 529.9092 2.81447 0.023534 
2.785837 NA NA -0.2959 NA -0.38594 5 -259.942 529.965 2.870222 0.022887 
2.796321 NA NA NA 0.216912 -0.40863 5 -259.98 530.0428 2.948037 0.022014 
2.807888 -0.32122 NA NA 0.193456 -0.37195 6 -259.054 530.2225 3.127702 0.020123 
3.119486 -0.33956 1.99399 -0.36089 0.199566 NA 7 -258.24 530.6335 3.538726 0.016384 
3.108455 NA 1.99744 -0.33687 0.225697 NA 6 -259.269 530.6521 3.557364 0.016233 
3.087821 -0.34144 1.90063 -0.34169 NA -0.32819 7 -258.303 530.7592 3.664476 0.015386 
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3.066103 NA 1.86416 -0.31328 NA -0.37863 6 -259.346 530.8059 3.711187 0.015031 
3.056712 NA 1.72720 NA 0.218614 -0.40447 6 -259.419 530.9527 3.857962 0.013967 
407 
 
Table C.3: Model selection table for GLMM with the probability of reporting an increase in hilsa catch (with sanctuary and compensation recipient as explanatory 
variables instead of compensation area) 
(Intercept) Sanctuary Age Awareness Jatka Fishing Fishing 
location 
Compensation df logLik AICc delta weight 
3.258244 2.830415 -0.3382 NA NA NA NA 5 -257.204 524.4894 0 0.08635 
3.238005 2.798665 NA NA NA NA NA 4 -258.235 524.5236 0.0342 0.084886 
3.24337 3.084928 -0.35004 -0.48111 NA NA NA 6 -256.386 524.8863 0.396933 0.070806 
3.220821 3.040622 NA -0.46096 NA NA NA 5 -257.484 525.0503 0.560892 0.065233 
3.220878 2.790783 NA NA 0.285709 NA NA 5 -257.78 525.6409 1.151546 0.048552 
3.151212 2.564772 NA NA NA -0.54009 NA 5 -257.807 525.6952 1.205761 0.047254 
3.240401 2.820663 -0.32489 NA 0.258141 NA NA 6 -256.835 525.7857 1.296347 0.045161 
3.177693 2.615334 -0.32628 NA NA -0.49327 NA 6 -256.851 525.8161 1.326686 0.044481 
3.20839 3.030023 NA -0.44427 0.268354 NA NA 6 -257.083 526.281 1.791633 0.035255 
3.229957 3.073038 -0.33761 -0.46612 0.239641 NA NA 7 -256.069 526.291 1.801617 0.035079 
3.265779 2.819584 -0.3422 NA NA NA 0.117023 6 -257.143 526.4009 1.911459 0.033204 
3.244529 2.791017 NA NA NA NA 0.093902 5 -258.195 526.4725 1.983109 0.032036 
3.182327 2.899275 -0.34004 -0.44532 NA -0.39535 NA 7 -256.16 526.4739 1.984452 0.032014 
3.153133 2.831591 NA -0.41995 NA -0.44717 NA 6 -257.192 526.4997 2.010298 0.031603 
3.249293 3.073639 -0.35292 -0.47413 NA NA 0.085298 7 -256.354 526.8606 2.371251 0.026385 
3.147322 2.587195 NA NA 0.259288 -0.48355 NA 6 -257.434 526.983 2.493576 0.024819 
3.225505 3.03312 NA -0.45557 NA NA 0.061609 6 -257.467 527.0496 2.56023 0.024006 
2.826258 NA -0.3394 NA NA NA NA 4 -259.52 527.0948 2.60536 0.02347 
2.813248 NA NA NA NA NA NA 3 -260.564 527.1603 2.670885 0.022714 
3.171769 2.632145 -0.31539 NA 0.23504 -0.44463 NA 7 -256.547 527.247 2.757581 0.02175 
3.227546 2.784874 NA NA 0.283906 NA 0.08631 6 -257.746 527.6074 3.117971 0.018164 
3.158885 2.559061 NA NA NA -0.54054 0.095387 6 -257.766 527.6464 3.156957 0.017813 
3.24827 2.811792 -0.32891 NA 0.25578 NA 0.110041 7 -256.782 527.7166 3.227223 0.017198 
3.186309 2.60612 -0.33055 NA NA -0.49453 0.118822 7 -256.788 527.7284 3.238982 0.017097 
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Table C.4: Model selection table for GLMM with the probability of reporting an increase in egg/fry presence (with compensation area as an explanatory variable) 
(Intercept) Compensation area Fishing location Age Jatka fishing Awareness df logLik AICc delta weight 
-0.15835 1.05392 NA NA NA NA 4 -486.542 981.1381 0 0.168209 
-0.15712 1.10616 0.30335 NA NA NA 5 -485.9 981.882 0.743901 0.115961 
-0.15908 1.05425 NA -0.13224 NA NA 5 -486.203 982.4871 1.34903 0.085686 
-0.15708 1.05521 NA NA -0.11859 NA 5 -486.343 982.768 1.629924 0.074459 
-0.15526 1.0111 NA NA NA 0.105753 5 -486.474 983.0289 1.890823 0.065352 
-0.24305 NA NA NA NA NA 3 -488.518 983.0682 1.930117 0.064081 
-0.15883 1.10655 0.313363 -0.13846 NA NA 6 -485.532 983.1786 2.040519 0.060639 
-0.15667 1.1034 0.280922 NA -0.07526 NA 6 -485.825 983.7643 2.62616 0.045246 
-0.25651 NA 0.321967 NA NA NA 4 -487.87 983.7938 2.655669 0.044584 
-0.15406 1.08832 0.290882 NA NA 0.047319 6 -485.89 983.8938 2.755692 0.042409 
-0.15777 1.0555 NA -0.13046 -0.11592 NA 6 -486.013 984.1416 3.003488 0.037467 
-0.24493 NA NA -0.13722 NA NA 4 -488.155 984.3642 3.226075 0.033521 
-0.15604 1.0122 NA -0.13153 NA 0.10333 6 -486.138 984.3902 3.252071 0.033088 
-0.24229 NA NA NA -0.1175 NA 4 -488.331 984.7163 3.578203 0.028109 
-0.15485 1.02381 NA NA -0.10997 0.078061 6 -486.307 984.7281 3.590009 0.027944 
-0.219 NA NA NA NA 0.14841 4 -488.428 984.9102 3.772058 0.025513 
-0.25936 NA 0.334775 -0.14586 NA NA 5 -487.463 985.0071 3.869021 0.024305 
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Table C.5: Model selection table for GLMM with the probability of perceiving an increase in egg presence (with sanctuary and compensation recipient as 
explanatory variables instead of compensation area.) 
(Intercept) Sanctuary Fishing 
location 
Awareness Age Compensation 
recipient 
Jatka Fishing df logLik AICc delta weight 
-0.13172 1.000132 NA NA NA NA NA 4 -484.517 977.0891 0 0.157312 
-0.12909 1.033748 0.275942 NA NA NA NA 5 -483.946 977.973 0.883867 0.101119 
-0.13268 1.187963 NA -0.27596 NA NA NA 5 -484.148 978.3774 1.288296 0.082606 
-0.13237 1.00276 NA NA -0.13429 NA NA 5 -484.168 978.4185 1.329346 0.080928 
-0.12999 1.278181 0.327213 -0.35406 NA NA NA 6 -483.364 978.842 1.752821 0.065485 
-0.13179 0.990478 NA NA NA -0.05805 NA 5 -484.469 979.0208 1.931669 0.059883 
-0.13076 1.00021 NA NA NA NA 0.015487 5 -484.514 979.1095 2.020353 0.057286 
-0.12959 1.037645 0.281196 NA -0.13801 NA NA 6 -483.579 979.2726 2.183472 0.052799 
-0.13338 1.192036 NA -0.2782 -0.13533 NA NA 6 -483.793 979.7011 2.612001 0.042616 
-0.12912 1.03144 0.272298 NA NA -0.01186 NA 6 -483.944 980.0022 2.913017 0.036661 
-0.1289 1.03369 0.275668 NA NA NA 0.002986 6 -483.945 980.0056 2.916509 0.036597 
-0.13053 1.284117 0.332665 -0.35716 -0.13973 NA NA 7 -482.988 980.1286 3.03947 0.034415 
-0.13292 1.186225 NA -0.29388 NA -0.08024 NA 6 -484.058 980.2303 3.141169 0.032709 
-0.13243 0.993618 NA NA -0.13341 -0.05508 NA 6 -484.125 980.3654 3.276265 0.030572 
-0.13248 1.187664 NA -0.27549 NA NA 0.003203 6 -484.148 980.41 3.320896 0.029898 
-0.13038 1.002973 NA NA -0.13728 NA 0.032319 6 -484.153 980.4213 3.332202 0.029729 
-0.13013 1.275184 0.318516 -0.3583 NA -0.02964 NA 7 -483.352 980.8572 3.768073 0.023908 
-0.13095 1.280185 0.329027 -0.35663 NA NA -0.01564 7 -483.36 980.8734 3.78429 0.023714 
-0.13075 0.990469 NA NA NA -0.0585 0.017067 6 -484.465 981.0452 3.956085 0.021762 
-0.13172 1.000132 NA NA NA NA NA 4 -484.517 977.0891 0 0.157312 
-0.12909 1.033748 0.275942 NA NA NA NA 5 -483.946 977.973 0.883867 0.101119 
-0.13268 1.187963 NA -0.27596 NA NA NA 5 -484.148 978.3774 1.288296 0.082606 
-0.13237 1.00276 NA NA -0.13429 NA NA 5 -484.168 978.4185 1.329346 0.080928 
-0.12999 1.278181 0.327213 -0.35406 NA NA NA 6 -483.364 978.842 1.752821 0.065485 
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Appendix D: Supplementary material for Chapter 6  
 
D.1 Household survey questions used in this chapter (see Appendix B.1 for full 
questionnaire) 
 
Household Characteristics  
18. Relation to household head______________________ 
 
19. Gender (0 = Male, 1= Female) _______  
 
20. Age (years) ____________ 
 
21. Years of schooling____________  
 
22. Number of people currently living in household____________Adult male____________Adult 
female____________ Children up to 11____________ Adolescents____________ Male ________Female____________ 
 
23. Number of other people supported outside of household____________ 
 
24. Number of economically active (earning) household members____________ 
 
25. Main income generating activity____________ 
 
26. Secondary income generating activities____________ 
 
27. Remittance from family members (1= Yes 0= No) ____________ 
[If yes] How much per month? ____________Taka 
 
28. Do you own livestock (1= Yes 0= No) ____________ 
[If yes] What and how many? 
Cows____________ Chickens____________ Goats____________ Others (Specify) ____________  
 
29. Do you have own land (1= Yes 0= No) ____________ 
[If yes] How much (local units)?  Homestead____________ Agricultural____________ Other____________  
 
30. Have you ever borrowed money from any source (1= Yes 0= No) ____________ 
[If yes] When was the last time and how much? mm-yy ___________________ Amount 
____________Taka 
[If no] Why? 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
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14. [if Yes Q13 above, then] who do you usually borrow money from? 
Microfinance institutions (e.g. Grameen Bank or other local MFIs) ____________Taka 
Local money lenders (aratdars and dadondars) ____________ Taka 
Relatives and friends (no interest rate) ____________ Taka 
Other (please specify) ____________ Taka 
 
Fishing activities  
15. What is the primary purpose of your involvement in fishing? 
1=Subsistence or consumption  
2=Consumption and selling  
3=To sell in the local market  
4=Labour (employed by others)  
5=Other _______________ 
 
17. What is your average monthly income from fishing? ____________Taka  
 
18. What are your other sources of income of the household? 
 
Source of income  Yearly income (Tk) 
  
  
  
Total   
 
 
20. Are you a member of a fishers association? (1= Yes 0= No) 
If yes, then why? 
1=Access to information/knowledge  
2=Access to micro-credit  
3=Access to market 
4=Access to fishing rights  
5=other (please specify) __________________________ 
 
21. Do you own a fishing boat? (1= Yes 0= No) 
  
22. Do you catch hilsa fish? (1= Yes 0= No)            
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If not, then why? 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________ 
23. What types of fishing gear do you use? 
 
 Name of Gear  Target Fish species (Use 
code)  
Fishing period 
(month)  
Location  
1 Chandi Jal -2 (large mess)     
2 Chandi Jal-4 (small mess)     
3 Gulti Jal     
4 Current Jal     
5 Behendi net     
6 Poa Jal      
7 Chapri Net     
8 Chewa net      
9 Chai     
10 Hooks     
11 Moi     
12 Masheri Jal    
13 Khot Jal     
14 Kachki Jal     
15 Bata/goara Jal     
16 Pona Jal     
17 Chargherajal     
18 Cast net     
19 Khota Jal     
20 Scoop net     
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21 Dragnet      
22 Lift net/Khora/Beshal jal     
23 Other (Specify)     
 
 
The compensation scheme 
 
28. [Explain the compensation scheme to respondent] 
a) Are you a recipient of the scheme? 
 1=Yes          0= No       2= I don't know 
b) How long have you been participating in the scheme? _______________Years   
 
33. Do you think the distribution of compensation is fair? 1=Yes          0= No  
      Why/why not? …………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
34. Which people in the village get compensation?  
1= Poorest (needy) households  
2= Richest households  
3= People who fish most  
4= People who are most dependent on fishing for their livelihoods  
5= People who are part of fishers associations  
6= People who are well connected in the village) 
7= I don't know  
 
35.  Who do you think should be receiving compensation? (Choose any) 
1= Poorest households  
2= People who are most dependent on fishing for their livelihoods  
3= All fishermen should receive compensation  
4= I don't know  
 
Coping strategy 
40. Is your livelihood affected by the closed/off season and zone?  
               1=Yes          0 = No   
 
41. How sufficient is the compensation provided?  
1= More than enough 2=Just enough 3= Not enough  
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42. If you are not a recipient or the compensation is not sufficient, what are the most important 
strategies you do to cope in times of hardship? Please rank the 5 most frequently used coping 
strategies.  
 
Coping strategies  Ranking  
1=Use my savings  
2=Borrow from relatives/friends/others  
3=Loan with interest    
4=Shopping credit   
5=Do some other job (e.g. labour or rickshaw/petty business)  
6=Consume less preferred and less expensive food  
7=Limit portion size at meal times  
8=Sell some assets (livestock if any)   
9=Other (specify)   
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Table D.1: Details of survey sites with the total numbers of fishing households in each, the numbers of compensation recipients and non-recipients, and sample 
sizes. Village statistics were obtained from DoF (2014). 
 
District Upazila Village Fishing 
households 
Recipients   Non- recipients Sample size 
       Recipients Non-recipients Total 
Chandpur Chandpur 
Sadar 
Lalpur 143 143 0 25 0 25 
Uttar Gabindia 737 737 0 125 0 125 
Sub-total 880 880 0 150 0 150 
Laxmipur Ramgati Sabujgram 1186 782 404 25 48 73 
Char Laxmi 1480 1190 290 25 52 77 
Sub-total 2666 1972 694 50 100 150 
Bhola Bhola Sadar Dakhin Razapur 790 425 365 10 30 40 
Kalupur 659 24 635 20 15 35 
Lalmohan Char Kachopia 865 459 406 16 36 52 
Rayrabad 400 268 132 5 18 23 
Sub-total 2714 1176 1538 51 99 150 
Patuakhali Kalapara Charipara 320 160 160 5 13 18 
Nizampur 1475 737 738 25 50 75 
Golbunia 302 150 152 5 10 15 
Mewrapara 598 298 300 12 18 30 
Chinguria 280 140 140 5 7 12 
Sub-total 2975 1485 1490 52 98 150 
Barisal Hizla Baushia 899 727 172 37 20 57 
Hizla Gourbdi 325 263 62 13 5 18 
 Muladi Kutubpur 55 20 35 5 15 20 
Goswherchar 78 40 38 28 2 30 
  Sub-total 1357 1050 307 83 42 125 
Barguna Patharghata Padma 444 186 258 20 15 35 
 Gunpara 515 216 299 29 11 40 
Sub-total 959 402 557 49 26 75 
Grand total 11551 6965 4586 435 365 800 
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D.3 Model selection tables 
Table D.2: Model selection table for GLMM with the probability of fishing jatka. 
(Intercept) Fishing 
dependence 
Income Dependency 
ratio 
Household 
Size 
Respondent 
identity 
Sanctuary Fisher 
association 
membership 
Food 
insecurity 
Debt df logLik AICc delta weight 
0.111297 0.830196 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 4 -376.215 760.4814 0 0.048199 
0.114365 0.800711 -0.14707 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 5 -375.436 760.948 0.466595 0.03817 
0.116037 0.798804 -0.17991 -0.15055 NA NA NA NA NA NA 6 -374.542 761.1913 0.709885 0.033798 
0.112111 0.83363 NA -0.12059 NA NA NA NA NA NA 5 -375.62 761.3158 0.834349 0.031759 
0.117768 0.791589 -0.24586 -0.19313 0.157198 NA NA NA NA NA 7 -373.767 761.6761 1.194612 0.026524 
0.110669 0.83331 NA NA NA 0.110643 NA NA NA NA 5 -375.899 761.875 1.393603 0.024012 
0.066151 0.82826 NA NA NA NA -0.63444 NA NA NA 5 -375.944 761.9648 1.483351 0.022958 
0.103241 0.833377 NA NA NA NA NA 0.261075 NA NA 5 -375.947 761.9697 1.488292 0.022901 
0.104447 0.80076 -0.16284 NA NA NA NA 0.328748 NA NA 6 -375.019 762.1451 1.663645 0.020979 
0.113847 0.802167 -0.15721 NA NA 0.126837 NA NA NA NA 6 -375.023 762.154 1.672512 0.020886 
0.115083 0.796958 -0.17906 NA 0.096631 NA NA NA NA NA 6 -375.111 762.3294 1.847956 0.019132 
0.111232 0.831205 NA NA 0.043813 NA NA NA NA NA 5 -376.139 762.3552 1.873706 0.018887 
0.106115 0.798756 -0.19587 -0.15061 NA NA NA 0.329189 NA NA 7 -374.125 762.3937 1.912234 0.018527 
0.115452 0.800109 -0.19042 -0.15008 NA 0.125652 NA NA NA NA 7 -374.139 762.4203 1.938898 0.018282 
0.111665 0.825053 NA NA NA NA NA NA -0.05078 NA 5 -376.183 762.4418 1.960376 0.018086 
0.069674 0.799021 -0.14615 NA NA NA -0.62677 NA NA NA 6 -375.174 762.4542 1.972762 0.017975 
0.111778 0.829058 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.027715 5 -376.206 762.4875 2.006043 0.017678 
0.072425 0.797227 -0.17866 -0.14934 NA NA -0.61015 NA NA NA 7 -374.294 762.7311 2.249654 0.015651 
0.111401 0.836557 NA -0.11858 NA 0.107004 NA NA NA NA 6 -375.325 762.7571 2.275682 0.015448 
0.107219 0.791008 -0.26449 -0.19443 0.16191 NA NA 0.349926 NA NA 8 -373.3 762.7843 2.302807 0.01524 
0.067744 0.831729 NA -0.11956 NA NA -0.62272 NA NA NA 6 -375.359 762.8243 2.342875 0.014938 
0.104279 0.836715 NA -0.11886 NA NA NA 0.252563 NA NA 6 -375.369 762.8443 2.362894 0.014789 
0.114831 0.793739 -0.14927 NA NA NA NA NA -0.06378 NA 6 -375.385 762.8771 2.395682 0.014549 
0.117062 0.792789 -0.25786 -0.19294 0.158567 0.127928 NA NA NA NA 8 -373.349 762.8826 2.401146 0.014509 
418 
 
0.115394 0.797738 -0.15032 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.05666 6 -375.4 762.9076 2.426121 0.014329 
0.112036 0.835655 NA -0.13521 0.073048 NA NA NA NA NA 6 -375.421 762.9481 2.466682 0.014041 
0.117652 0.794118 -0.18623 -0.15495 NA NA NA NA NA 0.0889 7 -374.461 763.064 2.582523 0.013251 
0.116496 0.791871 -0.18227 -0.15044 NA NA NA NA -0.06273 NA 7 -374.493 763.1284 2.647001 0.012831 
0.073074 0.789815 -0.24526 -0.19236 0.159112 NA -0.62954 NA NA NA 8 -373.5 763.1833 2.701838 0.012484 
0.112441 0.828799 NA -0.12019 NA NA NA NA -0.04741 NA 6 -375.591 763.2892 2.807799 0.011839 
0.112897 0.831733 NA -0.12243 NA NA NA NA NA 0.048084 6 -375.594 763.2945 2.813018 0.011809 
0.065823 0.831359 NA NA NA 0.109094 -0.62829 NA NA NA 6 -375.637 763.3817 2.900283 0.011304 
0.104261 0.802102 -0.17229 NA NA 0.123136 NA 0.319259 NA NA 7 -374.631 763.4051 2.923654 0.011173 
0.102949 0.836247 NA NA NA 0.106631 NA 0.249828 NA NA 6 -375.654 763.4151 2.933656 0.011117 
0.104784 0.79664 -0.19701 NA 0.101178 NA NA 0.341975 NA NA 7 -374.663 763.468 2.986506 0.010827 
0.057728 0.831445 NA NA NA NA -0.63637 0.259011 NA NA 6 -375.681 763.4681 2.986651 0.010827 
0.114526 0.798349 -0.19028 NA 0.098392 0.128716 NA NA NA NA 7 -374.687 763.5169 3.035478 0.010566 
0.119417 0.787118 -0.25228 -0.19735 0.156668 NA NA NA NA 0.085626 8 -373.691 763.5659 3.084459 0.01031 
0.118225 0.785656 -0.24759 -0.19278 0.156068 NA NA NA -0.05418 NA 8 -373.73 763.6443 3.162865 0.009914 
0.059379 0.799132 -0.16174 NA NA NA -0.62825 0.326324 NA NA 7 -374.764 763.6709 3.189455 0.009783 
0.105812 0.799965 -0.20569 -0.15021 NA 0.122079 NA 0.320126 NA NA 8 -373.745 763.6747 3.193264 0.009764 
0.069531 0.80048 -0.15621 NA NA 0.125284 -0.61948 NA NA NA 7 -374.772 763.6862 3.204744 0.009708 
0.110548 0.834284 NA NA 0.04264 0.110028 NA NA NA NA 6 -375.827 763.7615 3.280053 0.009349 
0.069493 0.795091 -0.17882 NA 0.098868 NA -0.64195 NA NA NA 7 -374.834 763.8111 3.329642 0.00912 
0.065593 0.829272 NA NA 0.046084 NA -0.64227 NA NA NA 6 -375.86 763.828 3.346536 0.009044 
0.103123 0.834383 NA NA 0.04384 NA NA 0.261396 NA NA 6 -375.87 763.8478 3.366385 0.008954 
0.110898 0.829888 NA NA NA 0.108054 NA NA -0.03294 NA 6 -375.885 763.878 3.396548 0.00882 
0.111167 0.832068 NA NA NA 0.110963 NA NA NA 0.030549 6 -375.888 763.8825 3.401055 0.008801 
0.103566 0.827982 NA NA NA NA NA 0.262563 -0.05339 NA 6 -375.911 763.9284 3.446997 0.008601 
0.066644 0.823084 NA NA NA NA -0.63316 NA -0.05119 NA 6 -375.911 763.9292 3.447731 0.008598 
0.06215 0.79723 -0.19445 -0.14942 NA NA -0.61142 0.32688 NA NA 8 -373.884 763.9526 3.471148 0.008497 
0.103796 0.831746 NA NA NA NA NA 0.266643 NA 0.042076 6 -375.926 763.9591 3.47761 0.00847 
0.06653 0.827101 NA NA NA NA -0.63592 NA NA 0.028518 6 -375.934 763.9749 3.493464 0.008403 
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0.072264 0.798538 -0.18909 -0.1489 NA 0.124163 -0.60292 NA NA NA 8 -373.901 763.9851 3.503651 0.00836 
0.106847 0.792121 -0.27555 -0.19422 0.163006 0.124146 NA 0.340524 NA NA 9 -372.908 764.047 3.565569 0.008106 
0.105524 0.796659 -0.16806 NA NA NA NA 0.341358 NA 0.078527 7 -374.953 764.0496 3.568128 0.008095 
0.104878 0.793222 -0.16545 NA NA NA NA 0.33172 -0.06864 NA 7 -374.96 764.0634 3.581961 0.008039 
0.114965 0.798908 -0.16092 NA NA 0.127884 NA NA NA 0.062188 7 -374.981 764.1052 3.62372 0.007873 
0.114178 0.797295 -0.15848 NA NA 0.123464 NA NA -0.04405 NA 7 -374.999 764.1411 3.65969 0.007733 
0.107633 0.792907 -0.20481 -0.15615 NA NA NA 0.347113 NA 0.111603 8 -374 764.1835 3.702006 0.007571 
0.117172 0.795095 -0.19745 -0.15489 NA 0.127398 NA NA NA 0.095143 8 -374.046 764.2762 3.794783 0.007228 
0.11555 0.790645 -0.18074 NA 0.095426 NA NA NA -0.05833 NA 7 -375.069 764.2811 3.7997 0.00721 
0.067341 0.834638 NA -0.11761 NA 0.105523 -0.61696 NA NA NA 7 -375.072 764.2876 3.806191 0.007187 
0.06204 0.789304 -0.26365 -0.19365 0.163729 NA -0.63175 0.347687 NA NA 9 -373.041 764.3113 3.829878 0.007102 
0.115963 0.794447 -0.18158 NA 0.095485 NA NA NA NA 0.048755 7 -375.084 764.3118 3.830313 0.007101 
0.106514 0.791252 -0.19864 -0.15049 NA NA NA 0.332118 -0.06757 NA 8 -374.068 764.3203 3.838848 0.00707 
0.111551 0.826412 NA NA 0.042489 NA NA NA -0.04713 NA 6 -376.112 764.3301 3.848656 0.007036 
0.103967 0.839423 NA -0.11703 NA 0.103229 NA 0.242015 NA NA 7 -375.095 764.333 3.851597 0.007025 
0.059584 0.834823 NA -0.11786 NA NA -0.62469 0.250672 NA NA 7 -375.112 764.3669 3.885489 0.006907 
0.111595 0.830308 NA NA 0.043007 NA NA NA NA 0.021449 6 -376.133 764.3735 3.892093 0.006885 
0.070308 0.792022 -0.14835 NA NA NA -0.6251 NA -0.0641 NA 7 -375.122 764.3873 3.905885 0.006837 
0.115794 0.795273 -0.19178 -0.15002 NA 0.12236 NA NA -0.04328 NA 8 -374.115 764.4141 3.932618 0.006747 
0.111308 0.838504 NA -0.13276 0.071112 0.105297 NA NA NA NA 7 -375.136 764.4144 3.932964 0.006745 
0.072764 0.791026 -0.25714 -0.19219 0.160376 0.126388 -0.6219 NA NA NA 9 -373.093 764.4164 3.934985 0.006739 
0.070486 0.79601 -0.14945 NA NA NA -0.62959 NA NA 0.057417 7 -375.137 764.4171 3.935612 0.006736 
0.06696 0.833728 NA -0.13458 0.075124 NA -0.63407 NA NA NA 7 -375.148 764.4392 3.957708 0.006662 
0.112028 0.824342 NA NA NA NA NA NA -0.0488 0.022158 6 -376.176 764.4595 3.978068 0.006595 
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Table D.3: Model selection table for GLMM with probability of receiving compensation 
(Intercept) Fisher 
association 
membership 
Food 
Insecurity 
Dependency 
ratio 
Household 
Size 
Income Respondent 
identity 
Sanctuary Jatka 
fishing 
Fishing 
dependence 
Debt df logLik AICc delta weight 
0.38789 -0.48528 0.264463 -0.17669 0.29694 NA NA NA NA NA NA 7 -403.102 820.3462 0 0.030774 
0.388714 -0.4754 NA -0.16933 0.281568 NA NA NA NA NA NA 6 -404.208 820.5226 0.176382 0.028176 
0.387466 -0.46356 NA NA 0.239418 NA NA NA NA NA NA 5 -405.302 820.6804 0.334117 0.026039 
0.386382 -0.47252 0.252911 NA 0.252417 NA NA NA NA NA NA 6 -404.289 820.684 0.337801 0.025991 
0.389055 -0.53937 0.255025 NA 0.207568 0.186455 NA NA NA NA NA 7 -403.42 820.9828 0.636584 0.022385 
0.390088 -0.52902 NA NA 0.194767 0.184156 NA NA NA NA NA 6 -404.449 821.0054 0.659205 0.022133 
0.383961 NA 0.257772 -0.17083 0.288434 NA NA NA NA NA NA 6 -404.531 821.1689 0.822684 0.020396 
0.384843 NA NA -0.16377 0.273609 NA NA NA NA NA NA 5 -405.582 821.2405 0.894298 0.019678 
0.383709 NA NA NA 0.232789 NA NA NA NA NA NA 4 -406.608 821.2676 0.921325 0.019414 
0.382571 NA 0.246746 NA 0.245335 NA NA NA NA NA NA 5 -405.643 821.3633 1.017099 0.018506 
0.389623 -0.53028 0.264024 -0.14642 0.256244 0.137058 NA NA NA NA NA 8 -402.668 821.5194 1.173172 0.017117 
0.387556 -0.53919 NA NA NA 0.24989 NA NA NA NA NA 5 -405.771 821.6186 1.272394 0.016289 
0.390487 -0.52023 NA -0.13894 0.240601 0.137352 NA NA NA NA NA 7 -403.769 821.6811 1.334882 0.015788 
0.386736 -0.54937 0.23183 NA NA 0.25581 NA NA NA NA NA 6 -404.908 821.9222 1.575988 0.013995 
0.389379 -0.49125 0.274844 -0.17772 0.2984 NA 0.077311 NA NA NA NA 8 -402.946 822.0763 1.73008 0.012957 
0.385056 NA NA NA 0.199345 0.136348 NA NA NA NA NA 5 -406.104 822.2844 1.938169 0.011677 
0.370026 -0.48533 0.264904 -0.17656 0.297223 NA NA -0.16526 NA NA NA 8 -403.091 822.3666 2.020401 0.011206 
0.387903 -0.48575 0.264321 -0.17591 0.296071 NA NA NA 0.013859 NA NA 8 -403.097 822.3778 2.031567 0.011144 
0.387493 -0.48638 0.262571 -0.17608 0.296617 NA NA NA NA -0.0118 NA 8 -403.097 822.3779 2.031696 0.011143 
0.383928 NA 0.247282 NA 0.211894 0.13716 NA NA NA NA NA 6 -405.136 822.3783 2.032055 0.011141 
0.387933 -0.48509 0.265133 -0.17685 0.29662 NA NA NA NA NA 0.006047 8 -403.101 822.3865 2.040238 0.011096 
0.389737 -0.47931 NA -0.16996 0.282263 NA 0.054855 NA NA NA NA 7 -404.129 822.4002 2.054 0.011019 
0.387677 -0.47827 0.262957 NA 0.253538 NA 0.07354 NA NA NA NA 7 -404.147 822.4372 2.090979 0.010818 
0.387441 -0.47859 NA -0.16777 0.280925 NA NA NA NA -0.03254 NA 7 -404.173 822.4882 2.141956 0.010545 
0.388495 -0.4771 NA -0.16839 0.284208 NA NA NA NA NA -0.0443 7 -404.191 822.5239 2.177708 0.010359 
0.373529 -0.47542 NA -0.16921 0.281791 NA NA -0.14105 NA NA NA 7 -404.201 822.5441 2.197866 0.010255 
421 
 
0.388784 -0.47595 NA -0.16844 0.280594 NA NA NA 0.015833 NA NA 7 -404.202 822.546 2.199795 0.010245 
0.388388 -0.46732 NA NA 0.239902 NA 0.051782 NA NA NA NA 6 -405.231 822.5693 2.223062 0.010126 
0.385885 -0.46791 NA NA 0.239211 NA NA NA NA -0.04209 NA 6 -405.243 822.5938 2.247578 0.010003 
0.38716 -0.46599 NA NA 0.24326 NA NA NA NA NA -0.05949 6 -405.271 822.6483 2.302021 0.009734 
0.387644 -0.46467 NA NA 0.237975 NA NA NA 0.030435 NA NA 6 -405.279 822.6649 2.318697 0.009653 
0.386404 -0.47359 0.252689 NA 0.251021 NA NA NA 0.029167 NA NA 7 -404.267 822.6777 2.331489 0.009592 
0.385561 -0.47475 0.249303 NA 0.252164 NA NA NA NA -0.02282 NA 7 -404.271 822.6857 2.339427 0.009554 
0.371022 -0.46359 NA NA 0.23969 NA NA -0.15265 NA NA NA 6 -405.294 822.6941 2.347905 0.009513 
0.367282 -0.4726 0.253392 NA 0.252761 NA NA -0.17624 NA NA NA 7 -404.277 822.6965 2.350277 0.009502 
0.386318 -0.47298 0.251568 NA 0.253161 NA NA NA NA NA -0.01257 7 -404.287 822.7175 2.371284 0.009403 
0.384698 NA 0.256844 -0.15089 0.261582 0.089394 NA NA NA NA NA 7 -404.33 822.8037 2.457447 0.009006 
0.390158 -0.54276 0.263496 NA 0.20956 0.182509 0.062949 NA NA NA NA 8 -403.317 822.8182 2.471942 0.008941 
0.385635 NA NA -0.14346 0.246199 0.090977 NA NA NA NA NA 6 -405.373 822.8538 2.507518 0.008784 
0.389392 -0.54343 0.254762 NA 0.203244 0.193742 NA NA 0.053787 NA NA 8 -403.35 822.8834 2.537134 0.008655 
0.390691 -0.53315 NA NA 0.190418 0.191471 NA NA 0.054576 NA NA 7 -404.377 822.896 2.549775 0.0086 
0.390845 -0.53102 NA NA 0.195839 0.181569 0.041315 NA NA NA NA 7 -404.404 822.9517 2.605506 0.008364 
0.389753 -0.53217 NA NA 0.198911 0.185499 NA NA NA NA -0.06944 7 -404.406 822.9555 2.609248 0.008348 
0.385217 NA 0.266915 -0.17172 0.28963 NA 0.06845 NA NA NA NA 7 -404.408 822.9597 2.613443 0.008331 
0.389963 -0.53937 0.258764 NA 0.206056 0.193783 NA NA NA 0.022945 NA 8 -403.405 822.9933 2.647017 0.008192 
0.369474 -0.53947 0.255523 NA 0.207902 0.186538 NA -0.18068 NA NA NA 8 -403.407 822.9989 2.65262 0.008169 
0.388922 -0.54028 0.25262 NA 0.208782 0.186868 NA NA NA NA -0.0224 8 -403.416 823.0157 2.669437 0.008101 
0.383205 -0.44016 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 4 -407.483 823.0176 2.671408 0.008093 
0.37326 -0.52909 NA NA 0.195036 0.184217 NA -0.15648 NA NA NA 7 -404.44 823.0232 2.676986 0.00807 
0.390112 -0.52903 NA NA 0.194725 0.184372 NA NA NA 0.00069 NA 7 -404.449 823.0413 2.69506 0.007998 
0.382335 NA NA NA NA 0.199784 NA NA NA NA NA 4 -407.496 823.0438 2.697582 0.007987 
0.385722 NA NA -0.16429 0.274143 NA 0.046871 NA NA NA NA 6 -405.524 823.1551 2.808852 0.007555 
0.383706 NA 0.255559 NA 0.246233 NA 0.064905 NA NA NA NA 6 -405.533 823.1727 2.826436 0.007489 
0.365906 NA 0.258209 -0.17071 0.288734 NA NA -0.1668 NA NA NA 7 -404.521 823.1842 2.837921 0.007446 
0.384488 NA NA NA 0.233137 NA 0.043994 NA NA NA NA 5 -406.557 823.1903 2.844051 0.007423 
422 
 
0.384092 NA 0.259821 -0.1713 0.287475 NA NA NA NA NA 0.018537 7 -404.528 823.198 2.851752 0.007395 
0.383955 NA 0.25766 -0.17028 0.287839 NA NA NA 0.009509 NA NA 7 -404.529 823.2003 2.854026 0.007386 
0.383833 NA 0.257212 -0.17065 0.288328 NA NA NA NA -0.00339 NA 7 -404.531 823.2039 2.857675 0.007373 
0.382418 NA NA NA 0.23252 NA NA NA NA -0.03315 NA 5 -406.572 823.2195 2.873259 0.007316 
0.383875 NA NA -0.16261 0.273061 NA NA NA NA -0.02384 NA 6 -405.563 823.2329 2.886673 0.007267 
0.384667 NA NA -0.1631 0.275376 NA NA NA NA NA -0.0307 6 -405.574 823.2547 2.908491 0.007188 
0.383424 NA NA NA 0.235651 NA NA NA NA NA -0.04538 5 -406.59 823.2564 2.910194 0.007182 
0.36941 NA NA -0.16365 0.273836 NA NA -0.14328 NA NA NA 6 -405.575 823.2566 2.910379 0.007181 
0.383821 NA NA NA 0.231558 NA NA NA 0.025887 NA NA 5 -406.592 823.2594 2.913174 0.007171 
0.384878 NA NA -0.16311 0.272899 NA NA NA 0.011475 NA NA 6 -405.579 823.2646 2.918364 0.007153 
0.367107 NA NA NA 0.233064 NA NA -0.1541 NA NA NA 5 -406.6 823.2762 2.929915 0.007111 
0.387215 -0.53542 NA -0.06881 NA 0.234241 NA NA NA NA NA 6 -405.587 823.2808 2.934549 0.007095 
0.390915 -0.53381 0.273242 -0.14838 0.259093 0.13201 0.068831 NA NA NA NA 9 -402.545 823.3208 2.974557 0.006954 
0.382585 NA 0.246555 NA 0.244153 NA NA NA 0.024619 NA NA 6 -405.628 823.3637 3.017458 0.006807 
0.388643 -0.54492 NA NA NA 0.258524 NA NA 0.076017 NA NA 6 -405.628 823.364 3.017735 0.006806 
0.3634 NA 0.247219 NA 0.245679 NA NA -0.177 NA NA NA 6 -405.632 823.3709 3.024655 0.006782 
0.379845 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 3 -408.673 823.3766 3.030384 0.006763 
0.382061 NA 0.24448 NA 0.245132 NA NA NA NA -0.01411 NA 6 -405.637 823.3806 3.034364 0.00675 
0.382585 NA 0.246811 NA 0.245304 NA NA NA NA NA 0.000567 6 -405.643 823.394 3.047771 0.006704 
0.382405 -0.44694 0.221894 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 5 -406.688 823.453 3.106775 0.00651 
0.381456 NA 0.223271 NA NA 0.203952 NA NA NA NA NA 5 -406.695 823.4655 3.119291 0.006469 
0.389778 -0.5331 0.26365 -0.14324 0.252416 0.142716 NA NA 0.034669 NA NA 9 -402.639 823.5079 3.161693 0.006333 
0.371155 -0.53038 0.2645 -0.14626 0.256518 0.137194 NA -0.17053 NA NA NA 9 -402.657 823.5434 3.197206 0.006222 
0.390382 -0.53021 0.267166 -0.14605 0.254934 0.143253 NA NA NA 0.019544 NA 9 -402.657 823.5435 3.197267 0.006222 
0.386475 -0.54544 0.233726 -0.07162 NA 0.239451 NA NA NA NA NA 7 -404.708 823.5598 3.213598 0.006171 
0.389586 -0.53046 0.263563 -0.14628 0.256432 0.137188 NA NA NA NA -0.00427 9 -402.668 823.5655 3.219296 0.006153 
0.38821 -0.54075 NA NA NA 0.247949 0.03425 NA NA NA NA 6 -405.74 823.5875 3.241224 0.006086 
0.391335 -0.52239 NA -0.14017 0.242228 0.133984 0.046409 NA NA NA NA 8 -403.713 823.6097 3.263437 0.006019 
0.388266 -0.53915 NA NA NA 0.254945 NA NA NA 0.01672 NA 6 -405.763 823.6326 3.286391 0.00595 
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0.373788 -0.53924 NA NA NA 0.25001 NA -0.12772 NA NA NA 6 -405.765 823.6377 3.291476 0.005935 
0.387319 -0.54031 NA NA NA 0.250875 NA NA NA NA -0.02493 6 -405.766 823.6384 3.292209 0.005933 
0.390807 -0.52319 NA -0.13562 0.236613 0.143247 NA NA 0.036578 NA NA 8 -403.737 823.6576 3.311367 0.005877 
0.387554 -0.5552 0.232167 NA NA 0.264662 NA NA 0.076662 NA NA 7 -404.763 823.6688 3.322538 0.005844 
0.390207 -0.52277 NA -0.13742 0.243368 0.138911 NA NA NA NA -0.05441 8 -403.743 823.6698 3.323526 0.005841 
0.374747 -0.52029 NA -0.13879 0.240807 0.137452 NA -0.14598 NA NA NA 8 -403.761 823.7065 3.360313 0.005735 
0.390346 -0.52026 NA -0.13901 0.240831 0.136372 NA NA NA -0.00309 NA 8 -403.769 823.7215 3.375282 0.005692 
0.387729 -0.55213 0.238954 NA NA 0.252865 0.053748 NA NA NA NA 7 -404.832 823.8074 3.461122 0.005453 
0.388293 -0.54964 0.238562 NA NA 0.26774 NA NA NA 0.038661 NA 7 -404.863 823.8695 3.523269 0.005286 
0.379032 NA 0.216895 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 4 -407.914 823.8781 3.53191 0.005263 
0.37073 -0.54948 0.232208 NA NA 0.255972 NA -0.14783 NA NA NA 7 -404.899 823.9418 3.595548 0.005098 
0.386923 -0.54854 0.234188 NA NA 0.255044 NA NA NA NA 0.020814 7 -404.903 823.9496 3.603364 0.005078 
0.371779 -0.49128 0.275265 -0.17759 0.298685 NA 0.077186 -0.16285 NA NA NA 9 -402.936 824.1027 3.756505 0.004704 
0.389381 -0.49177 0.274703 -0.17687 0.297481 NA 0.077497 NA 0.014922 NA NA 9 -402.941 824.1116 3.765387 0.004683 
0.389012 -0.49213 0.273204 -0.17719 0.298117 NA 0.077006 NA NA -0.00981 NA 9 -402.943 824.1161 3.769833 0.004673 
0.389455 -0.49084 0.276282 -0.17805 0.297741 NA 0.077679 NA NA NA 0.012619 9 -402.945 824.1194 3.773116 0.004665 
0.382975 -0.44539 NA -0.1045 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 5 -407.041 824.158 3.811813 0.004576 
0.385397 NA NA NA 0.195929 0.141807 NA NA 0.044027 NA NA 6 -406.056 824.2195 3.873231 0.004437 
0.385693 NA NA NA 0.200224 0.134085 0.035502 NA NA NA NA 6 -406.071 824.2486 3.902394 0.004373 
0.384916 NA 0.254869 NA 0.213616 0.133532 0.056299 NA NA NA NA 7 -405.053 824.2487 3.902456 0.004373 
0.384696 NA NA NA 0.202408 0.137158 NA NA NA NA -0.05174 6 -406.08 824.2672 3.920916 0.004333 
0.368133 NA NA NA 0.19961 0.136405 NA -0.15728 NA NA NA 6 -406.095 824.2972 3.950985 0.004268 
0.385086 NA NA NA 0.199293 0.13657 NA NA NA 0.000738 NA 6 -406.104 824.3151 3.968838 0.00423 
0.384087 NA 0.247002 NA 0.208534 0.142542 NA NA 0.042997 NA NA 7 -405.09 824.3233 3.977087 0.004213 
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Table D.4: Model selection table for GLMM with probability of perceiving fair distribution of compensation. 
(Intercept) Compensation Fishing 
dependence 
Fisher 
association 
membership 
Respondent 
identity 
Awareness Household 
income 
df logLik AICc delta weight 
-11.1138 21.05317 -0.56013 NA NA NA NA 5 -192.404 394.885 0 0.206577 
-10.9769 20.75322 -0.55416 0.752744 NA NA NA 6 -192.133 396.3727 1.487638 0.098185 
-10.5378 19.79568 NA NA NA NA NA 4 -194.174 396.3986 1.513581 0.09692 
-11.0933 21.0055 -0.55521 NA -0.13674 NA NA 6 -192.323 396.7541 1.869027 0.081139 
-11.2649 21.41719 -0.56254 NA NA 0.224493 NA 6 -192.349 396.8051 1.920114 0.079092 
-10.8139 20.39828 -0.56678 NA NA NA -0.03798 6 -192.394 396.8956 2.0106 0.075594 
-11.3266 21.52562 NA 0.810324 NA NA NA 5 -193.862 397.8004 2.915356 0.048086 
-10.962 20.72143 NA NA -0.15918 NA NA 5 -194.062 398.2003 3.3153 0.039371 
-11.0655 20.94467 -0.54863 0.775601 -0.15032 NA NA 7 -192.035 398.2134 3.328349 0.039115 
-11.1617 21.19592 -0.55722 0.78766 NA 0.270581 NA 7 -192.052 398.2474 3.362361 0.038455 
-11.0187 20.87618 NA NA NA 0.185878 NA 5 -194.135 398.3465 3.461435 0.036597 
-11.7061 22.35356 -0.56192 0.757929 NA NA -0.0438 7 -192.119 398.3817 3.496646 0.035958 
-11.4158 21.71721 NA NA NA NA 0.039732 5 -194.163 398.4019 3.516919 0.035595 
-11.4605 21.84345 -0.55771 NA -0.13625 0.222482 NA 7 -192.269 398.6814 3.796329 0.030954 
-10.6192 19.96829 -0.55958 NA -0.13269 NA -0.02431 7 -192.319 398.7819 3.89687 0.029437 
-11.2242 21.33076 -0.56987 NA NA 0.228686 -0.04161 7 -192.337 398.8169 3.931918 0.028925 
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Appendix E: Supplementary material for Chapter 7  
 
E.1 Conservation Trust Fund (CTF) Case Studies40 
1. Mexican Nature Conservation Fund (FMCN)  
Key informants: FMCN1; FMCN2 
FMCN was established in 1994 as a non-profit civil association, following a three-year 
participatory consulting process funded by United States (US) Government agencies and a 
number of philanthropic organisations. It is one of the largest and most credible CTFs in the 
world, created with the aim of financing and strengthening efforts for the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity in Mexico, through the operation of four conservation 
programmes: Protected Areas, Forests and Basins, Oceans and Coasts and Special Projects. Not 
only has it distributed over USD 65 million in support of nearly 1000 conservation projects, it 
has helped to promote sustainable businesses and public-private partnerships,  built 
institutional capacity, and played a fundamental role in consolidating and improving Mexico’s 
protected area (PA) system (Locker & Rosenzweig 2011). FMCN manages a total endowment of 
USD 120 million, capitalised by the US and Mexican Governments, the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF) and a group of US private philanthropic donors, which is complemented by a 
stream of earmarked sinking funds raised from diverse sources at a rate of USD 3-4 million per 
year.  
FMCN is governed by a General Assembly composed of 32 members, representing both Mexican 
civil society and the international conservation community. The Assembly is responsible for 
approving annual reports and financial statements, and for appointing the Board of Directors, 
which provide the next level of authority. The Board is composed of 19 members from business 
and civil society organisations, selected from the Assembly members to meet the needs of the 
CTF and the diversity of its stakeholders, and including the Minister of Environment as an ex 
                                                             
40 These case studies are published in Bladon et al. (2014). It should be noted that facts and figures were 
correct in 2013/2014. 
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officio member. In addition to strong leadership and good timing, the support of the Mexican 
Government from the beginning has been a key factor in success. At the same time, its autonomy 
has allowed it to last through three changes in administration. Due to the size and diversity of 
its board FMCN has been able to establish seven specialised technical committees to assist with 
the day-to-day operations of the CTF, including an Executive Committee. Asset managers were 
initially given control of financial strategy but, due to unsatisfactory results, they are now 
advised by an independent financial expert (Locker & Rosenzweig 2011). 
Having established a successful track record in managing endowments, in 1996 FMCN was 
appointed manager of a separate endowment of USD 16.48 million from GEF, the Protected 
Areas Fund (FANP), established for the support of ten priority PAs. This is not a legal entity, but 
a fund which is segregated from FMCN’s other programmes. It later received further 
capitalisation from GEF for the inclusion of 12 additional PAs in the programme, contingent 
upon 1:1 matching funds. FANP surpassed the required match, and today supports the 
management of 29 of Mexico’s 176 PAs with an endowment of USD 76 million, many of which 
were previously paper parks. By covering basic operation costs of the PAs and building capacity, 
FANP has helped attract additional funds from both public and private sources. Furthermore, 
FANP has been able to customise disbursements to PA needs, making them available at a time of 
the year when Government resources are not – an example of diversified revenue sources 
strengthening each other’s deficiencies.  
2. Arannayk Foundation, Bangladesh 
Key informant: AF1 
The Arannayk Foundation, also known as the Bangladesh Tropical Forest Conservation 
Foundation, was established in 2003 by the Governments of Bangladesh and USA through a debt 
reduction program on interest payments, under the provisions of the US Tropical Forest 
Conservation Act (TFCA) of 1998. Its aim is to facilitate the conservation, restoration and 
sustainable use and management of tropical forests in Bangladesh, with key objectives including 
428 
 
capacity-development of stakeholders and building partnerships between NGOs, the 
Government and private sector organisations engaged in activities related to forestry.  
The CTF is registered as a non-profit company without shares under the Bangladesh Companies 
Act. Although these organisations are subject to more stringent government oversight than 
other NGOs registered under the Society Act, Arannayk is exempt from the usual government 
requirement for all foreign donations to pass through the Governmental NGO Bureau, a 
cumbersome and time-consuming process. Early on, little attention was given to fundraising 
and communication strategies, despite the fact that debt reduction funds were expected to be 
exhausted by 2018. But since the arrival of a new Executive Director in 2007, Arannayk has 
received USD 3.8 million from the World Bank, USD 1 million from GIZ (German Corporation for 
International Cooperation), financial and technical support from other development partners, 
and created an endowment (not yet tax exempt).  
It is a small CTF, with only eight core members of staff and the Executive Director, appointed by 
a Board of Directors, which is comprised of representatives from USAID (United States Agency 
for International Development), the Government of Bangladesh (Additionality Secretary 
[Development] of Ministry of Environment and Forests), and five civil society representatives 
from relevant organisations such as educational institutes, NGOs, and the financial sector. 
Though it abides by Bangladesh Governmental policy, the Board has complete authority over 
grant-making decisions, using a panel of external experts to evaluate proposals. Arannayk 
started making grants in 2006 and by the end of 2015 had given over 93 financial grants and 
support to NGOs and other organisations active in forest and biodiversity conservation, and in 
‘exceptional circumstances’ to the national Government. External evaluation has found 
Arannayk’s policy and framework for administration and grant-making to allow effective and 
efficient operation meeting best practice standards, financial accountability and transparency 
(Mikitin et al. 2008). For example, Arannayk has begun delineating the priority areas and issues 
it wants to fund and calling for proposed implementation plans, which helps to focus efforts 
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spatially and strategically. This call is followed by a peer review process and the proposals are 
chosen on the basis of a competitive scoring system.  
3. Phoenix Islands Protected Area Conservation (PIPA) Trust, Kiribati  
Key informant: PIPA1 
The PIPA Trust was established under the Phoenix Islands Protected Area Conservation Trust 
Act of 2009 in the Republic of Kiribati, with the aim of providing sustainable financing for the 
protection of PIPA, one of the largest MPAs in the world. The Trust was founded by the 
Government of Kiribati, Conservation International (CI) and the New England Aquarium (NEA) 
as a result of a personal relationship between a representative of NEA and the President of 
Kiribati, whose strong interest in the conservation of Kiribati’s natural resources opened 
conversations with Government officials which were critical to creating a trusting relationship.  
In addition to some sinking funds (e.g. USD 1 million from GEF and support from regional 
governments) which are allocated to projects which require major capital expenditure, the PIPA 
Trust has established the PIPA Trust Endowment Fund (PTEF) in order to cover the costs of the 
Trust itself, the core costs of PIPA in accordance with the management plan and, most 
importantly, to finance the ‘Conservation Contract’ or PES arrangement between the PIPA Trust 
and the Government of Kiribati. Often termed a ‘reverse fishing license’, the arrangement 
compensates the Government for the fishing licenses which would have been sold to foreign 
fishing operations if the PIPA were not protected, in return for satisfactory performance under 
the contract. Though still in its infancy, PTEF has been capitalised with USD 2.5 million by CI and 
matching funds from the Government of Kiribati’s Reserve Fund. Currently only 3.12 per cent of 
the MPA is no-take, but with further fundraising, PTEF aims to generate more compensation and 
thereby phase out commercial fishing (Davis 2013). By the end of 2014 it is expected that PTEF 
will be adequately capitalised to compensate for losses from 25 per cent no-take coverage, 
though the President of Kiribati is now calling for complete closure of PIPA, which would 
require about USD 25 million. 
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Key challenges in the creation of the PIPA Trust included the need to create a legal framework 
for marine conservation and CTFs, and the lack of scientific knowledge about the Phoenix 
Islands. However, strong public and political support was developed through publicity, which 
began with Kiribati’s designation as a World Heritage site, relationship development with key 
Government officials, and the official status gained by establishing the PIPA Office within the 
environmental ministry, and hiring a senior bureaucrat. Without this unanimous and high level 
political support, the Executive Director noted that the donor community would not have come 
forward. Though the PIPA Trust Board of Directors is independent of the Kiribati Government, 
the Minister of the Environment joins representatives from CI and the NEA to form an equal 
management partnership. The project also benefited from Kiribati’s previous positive 
experience with trust funds, and early relationships developed with New Zealand and Australia, 
which provided technical experience.  
4. Banc d’Arguin Coastal and Marine Biodiversity Trust Fund (BACoMaB), Mauritania 
Key informants: BACoMaB1; BACoMaB2 
BACoMaB was established in 2009 as a foundation governed by UK law, with the aim of 
ensuring long term financing for Banc d’Arguin National Park (PNBA), a UNESCO World 
Heritage Site and the largest marine park in Africa. BACoMaB is partially financed through the 
EU-Mauritania Fisheries Partnership Agreement, an international PES scheme (Binet et al. 
2013). In exchange for commercial exploitation of Mauritania’s EEZ, the EU (European Union) 
pays Mauritania a fee, and since 2006 a proportion of this has been set aside to finance the 
operating costs of the National Park. In 2009, part of this annual payment was allocated to 
BACoMaB in the form of an endowment. The endowment is currently worth EUR 10 million, 2 
million of which has come through the fisheries agreement, the rest from KfW Development 
Bank, MAVA Foundation and Tasiast Gold Mine through the Lundin Foundation. Commitments 
have also been made by AFD (French Development Agency) and FFEM (Fonds Français pour 
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l'Environnement Mondial), and additional revenues will soon be explored, including revenues 
received from royalties received in connection with oil and gas exploitation concessions. 
The idea of creating a CTF emerged in 2002, but the planning process was lengthy; it took time 
to get the Mauritanian Government on board, and enabling preconditions set out in a feasibility 
study had to be established, which involved a modernisation and restructuring of the PNBA 
authority. It was not until 2007 that a steering committee was finally put together by the main 
partners GIZ and the International Foundation of Banc d’Arguin (FIBA), for which a ministerial 
decree was required. Furthermore, although the Mauritanian Government agreed to earmark 
part of the Fisheries Agreement funds, initially this replaced their own contribution to the park, 
a situation which was rectified in 2008 (Binet et al. 2013).  
A key factor in the successful establishment of BACoMaB was the support of FIBA, which helped 
to strengthen the management of PNBA and prepared an excellent communication strategy built 
on the notoriety of the park. FIBA also helped to lobby the Brussels Commission into supporting 
the Fisheries Partnership Agreement negotiations, which were in turn championed by the 
Director of the EU Common Fisheries Policy and which became instrumental in leveraging 
additional donor support. The mechanism has set a precedent and an attempt to replicate it is 
underway in Guinea-Bissau, where the CTF BioGuinea has formed an agreement with the EU 
which is being delayed by political constraints. 
However, BACoMaB has experienced governance challenges. The appointment of an 
incompetent Director led to the suspension of some donor commitments this year. His poor 
leadership aggravated a lack of clarity amongst board members over roles and responsibilities, 
the need for which was underestimated by BACoMaB, leading to a division between Mauritanian 
and international members. Furthermore, annual revenue is eventually expected to guarantee 
effective management of PNBA, but given current market conditions funds would need to 
amount to EUR 100 million in order to generate substantial revenues, and by 2017 funds are not 
expected to exceed EUR 50 million.  
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5. Sangha Tri-National (TNS) Foundation 
No key informants 
The TNS Foundation was established in 2007 with a view to strengthening the long-term 
financing of the transboundary forest complex formed by three adjoining National Parks and 
their buffer zones in Cameroon, Central African Republic and Republic of Congo. Its creation 
began with the signing of a formal Cooperation Agreement to establish and manage the 
transboundary complex between the Governments of these countries in 2000. Although they 
differed in their initial aims and objectives, the formal links between the relevant ministries and 
the Foundation led to political endorsement which was crucial in its establishment (Klug et al. 
2003; Usongo 2010).  
As a multi-stakeholder and tri-national CTF, the process of creation was lengthy and expensive, 
with key support coming from WWF (World Wildlife Fund), GIZ, WCS (Wildlife Conservation 
Society), French Cooperation, and the Central Africa Regional Program for Environment 
(CARPE). A consultative meeting was held in which all actors involved in the management and 
financing of the TNS discussed the proposed plan and the composition of a steering committee 
(Klug et al. 2003). The selected steering committee then worked with experts in finance and a 
regional coordinator to bring together financial needs assessments for each TNS PA, which 
formed the basis of a business plan (Spergel & Taieb 2008; Usongo 2010). The Foundation is 
thus tailored to the specific needs of each National Park with four funding windows: one for 
transboundary management and one for each of the Parks. 
Due to the financial insecurity and political instability of the TNS countries, the Foundation was 
registered as a UK charity, a decision which took more than 2 years for the TNS Governments to 
agree to (Usongo 2010).  
At the time of writing, an endowment has been capitalised by KfW, AFD, and WWF Germany’s 
Regenwald Stiftung, which channels funds through a targeted marketing campaign by 
Krombacher Brewery (TNS Foundation 2009). However, the Foundation is still a way off its 
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minimum target of USD 22 million, and it has been suggested that TNS should therefore be 
exploring other mechanisms such as PES to secure the levels of funding required (Usongo 
2010).  
TNS Foundation is managed by an independent Board of Directors with representatives from 
the public and private sectors: the Governments of the TNS countries, WCS, WWF, Regenwald 
Stiftung, AFD and KfW (TNS Foundation 2009). These Directors have then nominated three 
private sector members from the TNS countries with expertise in conservation, law, business or 
finance. The Board is led by an Executive Director, based in Cameroon, and supported by two 
subcommittees specialising in fundraising and investment (Spergel & Taieb 2008). In 2009 TNS 
appointed an internationally recognised investment manager through an international tender 
process to manage funds according to Foundation’s Investment Policy Statement.  
6. Mesoamerican Reef Fund  
Key informant: MAR1 
The Mesoamerican Reef (MAR) Fund was created in 2004 in order to help finance the 
conservation and sustainable use of the marine and coastal ecosystems of the MAR region and 
the watersheds which drain into the Caribbean. By encompassing an entire ecoregion, it aims to 
consolidate and allocate donor contributions to common and strategic objectives in the area.  
The importance of MAR is recognised by each of the four countries that share it, formalised 
through the signing of the Tulum Declaration in 1997 by the four heads of state. The MAR Fund 
relies on the technical, administrative and financial capacities of four pre-existing national CTFs 
in Mexico, Honduras, Belize and Guatemala. Though decisions are made by the Board of 
Directors, which includes representation from the four member CTFs, the Executive Director 
passes technical coordination to the member CTFs, allowing MAR Fund to benefit from their 
experience and save on costs. It was established with the endorsement of RedLAC and technical 
and financial support from WWF and TNC (The Nature Conservancy) as a US tax-exempt 
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charitable foundation. Not only did this increase access to US donors who often require US 
charity status, it avoided navigation of the complex legislation and corruption in the 
participating countries.  
MAR Fund launched its fundraising campaign in 2007, but the economic climate made it difficult 
even to raise project funds. Over 6 years it built a relationship with the German Government via 
KfW, and having proved that it could operate effectively at the regional level, obtained a five-
year EUR 5 million grant for a project focusing on priority protected areas in 2010. Phase II of 
this project, again for five years and EUR 5 million, was formalised in 2013.  In 2011, KfW also 
granted the Fund a USD 13.05 million endowment. Consequently, MAR Fund attracted 
additional investment (EUR 1 million) from the French Global Environment Facility (FFEM) in 
2013 and a second contribution of EUR 7 million from KfW in 2014. It is optimistic about 
growth of the endowment, the revenue from which will now help finance operation costs and 
help to ensure a steady flow of finance to conservation initiatives in the region.  Although it took 
longer than would have been desirable to raise the investment, this time has also allowed MAR 
Fund to incrementally strengthen its processes.  
Since the growth of its endowment MAR Fund has expanded its grant-making strategy from a 
small grants programme and a community fisheries programme to operate larger projects 
focusing on a number of clearly defined priority PA sites. Requests for proposals are given with 
defined objectives, and rather than funds being disbursed equitably between the member CTFs, 
grants are made on the basis of competitive selection to ensure that funds are used as effectively 
as possible. 
In 2013, MAR Fund committed to expanding their community fisheries programme, which runs 
in all four countries. It financially supports the active participation of self-organised groups of 
fishers in fisheries management and recovery, promoting an ecosystem-based approach which 
includes the establishment of critical fisheries recovery sites (no-take zones, fish refuges and 
community marine reserves). For example, in Honduras, three communities organised 
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themselves to create an association and signed an agreement with the co-administrator of an 
MPA for co-management of a fishing territory with no-take zones. They designed and monitor 
these together, and they identified training and capacity needs for which they receive external 
financial assistance from MAR Fund. In Guatemala, fisher associations organised themselves to 
establish no-take zones, and although they work with the Government agency 
that administrates the PA in a ‘discussion table’ for the no-take zones, they undertake control 
and surveillance measures on their own, in response to the lack of financial resources within 
Government for these activities.  In a newly established no-take zone in Honduras, close to the 
Guatemalan border, seven communities have been supported to establish the site, do a baseline 
analysis of the local fisheries and to monitor it. In Guatemala and Honduras associations do not 
have formal fishing rights over their managed areas, but in Belize MAR Fund has supported the 
implementation of fishing rights in one PA, and in Mexico fishing cooperatives can legally obtain 
fishing concessions.  
7. Caribbean Biodiversity Fund 
Key informants CBF1; CBF2 
The Caribbean Biodiversity Fund (CBF) is a regional endowment fund, launched in 2012 with 
the support of TNC, GEF (through The World Bank and United Nations Development Project 
[UNDP]), and the German Government through KfW, who pledged USD 42 million. The CBF, 
together with eight national level CTFs (in Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Dominican 
Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, St Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis and St Vincent and the Grenadines), 
form the Caribbean Sustainable Finance Architecture for Conservation. This Architecture is 
being designed and established as a vehicle to achieve commitments made by the participating 
countries under the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Caribbean Challenge Initiative, 
to support national environmental priorities and to close the financing gap for conservation.  
By 2016, the CBF aims to start disbursing funds to some of the eight proposed national level 
CTFs, and if successful it will be the first regional endowment in the world to support multiple 
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national level Trust Funds for marine and terrestrial PA management (TNC 2012). This design 
decision was made on the basis of economies of scale; investing the donor capital as one 
endowment fund made more financial sense than investing it in eight separate funds. The hope 
is that the CBF will over time attract additional donor capital, allowing different thematic 
windows to be opened for growing the endowment. 
Legal agreements will be set out between each national CTF and the CBF before disbursements 
can be made. Negotiations are already underway with the CTF in the Dominican Republic and, at 
least, three additional negotiations are expected to be underway in 2016. The CBF is also 
exploring and assisting CTFs in identifying, designing and implementing sustainable 
mechanisms for the generation of matching funds by each participating country. These 
matching mechanisms can be established through government instruments, private sector, or 
public-private partnerships. Although the initial focus was on generating revenue through 
government instruments, due to the current economic climate the CBF is now considering more 
creative and less government-centric financing tools. It is also important to note that CBF 
disbursements must supplement, not replace, current government financing for the 
environment.  
The CBF currently has two members on its Board of Directors, representing KfW and TNC. As 
each national CTF signs a legal agreement with the CBF, it will be able to nominate a Director 
from its Board to be part of the CBF Board. The only restriction is that at all time the CBF Board 
must have a non-government majority, which the CBF hoped would be an incentive to sign early 
on. In this case, creating the first agreement quickly will be a key factor in success of the CBF; 
there is a competitive instinct among the islands. 
Five of the CTFs expected to become CBF partners are already legally established (Antigua and 
Barbuda, the Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines). 
One (Dominican Republic) is already negotiating the terms of the agreement with the CBF and 
the other 4 are eagerly working on preparing the necessary documentation to officially become 
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CBF eligible. Three other CTFs have advanced significantly their legal establishment. CTFs are 
being established through the Company’s Act or legislation. Most countries have opted to use 
the Company’s Act. According to the Chief Executive Officer, one of the greatest challenges in the 
process for establishing this regional financial architecture has been the political process and 
working through the establishment of nine CTFs all at the same time. CTFs are not a traditional 
institution in the Caribbean, and finding the balance between independence from government 
and supporting national agendas has required intensive policy and technical work. In addition 
public-private partnerships in the Caribbean on environment issues are still an emerging way to 
address environmental priorities, and different sectors have reservations about how these 
partnerships can be effectively managed and deliver strong results. The previous Executive 
Director noted that, in hindsight, more effort could have been put into sensitising influential 
people at an earlier stage. In addition, the inevitable bureaucracy inherent in an initiative of this 
size, involving so many stakeholders, also results in process delays. 
However, commitment from governments and other stakeholders continues to be high and 
significant progress has been achieved. The CBF and national stakeholders have put a lot of 
effort and resources into the technical development of the CTFs and sustainable finance 
mechanisms. In the near future the CBF will be establishing a multi-year Strategic Plan to 
consolidate the Caribbean Sustainable Finance Architecture for Conservation.  
8. Bhutan Trust Fund for Environmental Conservation (BTFEC) 
No key informants 
BTFEC was established in 1991 by the Royal Government of Bhutan with financial support from 
WWF and technical assistance from UNDP, in order to provide sustainable financing for 
environmental programmes in the country and allow the national treasury to focus more on 
direct poverty reduction (Namgyal 2003). It received USD 10 million from the GEF in 1992, and 
went on to raise additional capital from the Governments of Bhutan, Denmark, Finland, 
Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland (GEF 1998). The original capitalisation of just over USD 
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21 million has since risen to USD 44 million. Although it was let down by an initial 
inappropriately low risk investment strategy, the success of BTFEC’s fundraising has been 
attributed to a combination of pre-existing political will, links with aid agencies and the 
disbursement of GEF contributions in tranches which were conditional on, among other factors, 
securing other donor contributions (GEF 1998).  
BTFEC is governed by the 1996 Royal Charter of the Trust Fund for Environmental 
Conservation and managed by a board of seven Bhutanese members, including the Director who 
acts as an ex-officio Member Secretary. Five of these members are government-appointed, and 
include the Minister of Agriculture and Forests as the chairman, the Secretary of the National 
Environment Commission, the Director of National Budget, Head of Policy and Planning in the 
Ministry of Works and Human Settlement. The non-governmental representative is the 
Executive Director of a national NGO, though the board once also included two donor 
representatives. The Director chairs a seven-member technical advisory committee, and the 
board is also advised by an asset management committee. Board decisions are implemented by 
a small secretariat of staff.  BTFEC has tax-exempt status with the US Government and assets 
have been managed by a professional asset manager based in the US since 1996 (Namgyal 
2003).  
Much of BTFEC’s support has been directed towards building institutional and human capacity; 
this was Bhutan’s largest constraint to conservation, and donors like to see their investments 
yielding immediate results (Namgyal 2003). It has strengthened the absorptive and 
implementation capacity of government agencies and played a role in the creation and 
expansion of Bhutan’s first NGOs (GEF 1998; Klarer & Galindo 2012). This success may probably 
contributed to the subsequent creation of more CTFs around the world. However, there are 
areas of BTFEC’s operation which require work, including the monitoring and evaluation of 
biodiversity impacts, diversification of revenue sources, and grant-making procedures; it has 
been criticised for a lack of clear focus at an early stage (GEF 1998). 
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9. Yasuni-ITT Trust Fund 
No key informants 
The Yasuni-ITT Trust Fund was established in 2010, managed by the Multi-Partner Trust Fund 
Office of UNDP and to be capitalised under the Yasuni-ITT Initiative, which was launched by the 
President of Ecuador. Under this initiative, the national Government proposed to forego 
exploitation of the Ishpingo–Tambococha–Tiputini (ITT) oil fields, which lie under the core of 
the Amazonian Yasuni National Park, and are thought to be one of the most biodiverse parks in 
the world (Bass et al. 2010). In exchange, it asked for USD 3.6 billion in public and private 
donations from the international community over a 13 year period, the interest from which 
would accrue in the Trust Fund for use in funding national sustainable development projects 
(Larrea 2009). In return, the Government would issue guarantee certificates reflecting the 
carbon value of contributions, tradable on the EU carbon credit market (Finer et al. 2010). The 
initiative therefore promised not only to result in the protection of biodiversity and indigenous 
territory, but by preventing deforestation and locking away over 850 million barrels of crude 
oil, it would also prevent emissions and thus address climate change.  
In the years that followed, this compensated moratorium was described as ‘innovative’ and 
‘precedent-setting’; it garnered support from the Ecuadorian public, from Germany and the EU; 
received endorsements from high profile figures including UN General Secretary Ban Ki Moon; 
and the UNDP even suggested that it might serve as a model for conservation around the world 
(Larrea 2009; Finer et al. 2010; Marx 2010). But despite pledges from governments, NGOs and 
individuals, only USD 13 million was deposited and by August 2013 the liquidation of the Trust 
Fund was announced (Petherick 2013). 
Perhaps the failure of donors to pay up was largely a product of the financial crisis (Petherick 
2013), but there were those who suspected failure from the beginning. Economists criticised the 
estimation of lost revenues, citing flawed valuations and unclear accounting (Finer et al. 2010; 
Haddad 2012). Others blame the fundraising process; its compensation framework essentially 
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shifts the burden of responsibility from the state to the international community, which 
undermines the philosophy behind UNFCCC and REDD+ (Haddad 2012). There was also a great 
deal of concern over the integrity of the Ecuadorian Government and resentment for the way it 
handled the negotiation process, which has been termed ‘environmental extortion’ (Petherick 
2013). Multiple changes in institutional design bred scepticism (Arsel & Angel 2012), and not 
only did the President continue to pursue the licensing procedure for oil extraction in case of 
initiative failure, there was nothing to stop Ecuador reneging on its promise to forego drilling 
after payment and no guarantee that funds would be returned if this happened (Petherick 
2013). A further factor was the political instability of Ecuador and subsequent lack of trust from 
the outset (Finer et al. 2010). But the greatest flaw appears to be governance; it was clear from 
its inception that the Yasuni-ITT initiative was to be driven by the Ecuadorian Government 
itself, despite promises of increased engagement with civil society (Arsel & Angel 2012). The 
proposal was in fact rejected at the Copenhagen Climate Summit in 2009 because the 
Government of Ecuador wanted more authority over the fund (Marx 2010). Discussions were 
conducted at an institutional level, civil society and particularly indigenous populations were 
largely excluded from the decision-making process, and the Board of Directors was 
government-dominated (Arsel & Angel 2012). Ironically, the initiative was born outside of the 
state, but those who had initiated and been involved in early discussions were soon offered 
state positions and continued their involvement not as representatives of civil society but of the 
Government (Arsel & Angel 2012).   
10. Fund for the Protection of Water (FONAG), Ecuador 
No key informants 
FONAG is a water conservation fund and public-private partnership established in Quito, 
Ecuador, in 2000 (Benítez et al. 2009). Quito derives most of its water flows from PAs in the 
Andean region, so FONAG was created with the aim of pooling demand for watershed services 
among its various beneficiaries through PES, in order to improve Quito’s water quality and 
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quantity in the long-term. It is an 80 year endowment fund, regulated under Ecuador’s stock 
market law, and launched by TNC, local NGO Fundación Antisana, the Mayor of Quito through 
the Quito water utility, and USAID with a seed capital of USD 21,000 (RedLAC 2010). In the last 
decade it has received contributions from Quito’s electrical utility, a private brewery and a 
water bottling company, returns from which have allowed it to leverage matching funds from 
international and local NGOs and governments, and has grown to an endowment of  over USD 6 
million (RedLAC 2010). 80 per cent of annual returns are invested in conservation projects 
within the watersheds that supply the city, which by 2008 had amounted to USD 9.3 million 
(RedLAC 2010). All contributions were initially voluntary, but in 2006 an ordinance was passed 
which established a mandatory 2 per cent contribution on fees collected by the water utility, 
increasing long-term financial stability of the fund without increasing water user fees 
(Goldman-Benner et al. 2012).    
FONAG was the first water fund to be established and has since served as a model for a number 
of others in Ecuador and throughout the Andes region, which lends itself to the creation of 
water funds (Goldman-Benner et al. 2012). Although FONAG was criticised in the early days for 
making very small grants to conservation projects despite large amounts of money coming into 
the fund (Benítez et al. 2009), it has nevertheless made enormous contributions to watershed 
conservation. There is evidence that FONAG has reforested 2,033 ha of land with 2 million trees, 
engaged children in environmental education programmes and families in community 
development projects, trained and employed community-based park guards, and maintained 
ecosystems in a pristine state, and ensured sustainable and transparent use of resources 
(Goldman-Benner et al. 2012). A major factor in its success was the willingness of beneficiaries 
to invest from the outset, despite legal challenges, political instability, and a lack of clear science 
linking watershed services with downstream benefits (Echavarria 2002; Postel & Thompson 
2005). This was in part due to excellent communication of the benefits to all stakeholders from 
the start. For example, it produced a short publication which was also used to raise awareness 
amongst the city’s residents and to gain support from the Mayor’s office – support which was 
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critical due to its authority over the municipal water utility (RedLAC 2010). It also clearly 
established the activities for which the funds would be used, identifying five watersheds as 
priority areas.  
In 2004 FONAG hired a high profile Technical Secretariat with expertise in watershed 
management, which strengthened institutional capacity. The Secretariat led a strategic planning 
process to develop FONAG’s projects, with approval of the Board of Directors, which includes 
representatives from local communities; local NGOs, government; the national PA authority; and 
business (Benítez et al. 2009). Funds are invested by an independent financial manager (Postel 
& Thompson 2005).  
11. The Protected Areas Conservation Trust (PACT), Belize 
Key informant: PACT1 
PACT was established as a public-private CTF in 1996, under special legislation, with the aim of 
financing the management of Belize’s extensive PA network. Initial capital was provided by 
USAID (USD 72,000), but PACT is primarily financed through a revolving fund generated 
through tourism taxes or conservation fees, including a 20 per cent commission on cruise ship 
passenger fees and a USD 3.75 visitor departure fee. 5 per cent of total revenues are now 
deposited in an endowment fund, which would only be used in extreme circumstances and is 
currently approximately BZUSD 6 million. PACT also manages a sinking fund created through a 
small debt-for-nature swap with the US Government under the TFCA.  
Although the bill allowing for the creation of the CTF had already been drafted by 1992, the 
stakeholder consultation process was very lengthy and it was another five years before PACT 
became operational; a delay which was largely a result of lengthy negotiations with the tourism 
sector. There was concern that the size of the fees on top of other taxes already in place would 
discourage tourists, and concern over a proposed government majority on the Board of 
Directors. A general election and lack of interest from the new ruling party also delayed the bill. 
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Negotiations were eventually successful and PACT is now governed by a non-governmental 
majority Board of Directors with representatives from all stakeholder groups, including an 
independent finance expert. PACT ensures that it complements governmental funding, rather 
than supplementing it, by ensuring that grants are awarded based on conservation criteria 
evaluated by a technical advisory panel which makes recommendations to the Board. 
Furthermore, PACT legislation prohibits the funding of salaries or any recurring expenses of 
government agencies or NGOs, or any profit-making organisation; although NGOs have been 
lobbying for PACT to support a portion of their core costs as donor contributions diminish, and 
a clause allowing for the support of up to 20 per cent of NGO core costs is currently under 
negotiation.  
PACT started out as a small grants programme and has since expanded to give grants of ten 
types which fall under two broad categories – project grants and capacity-building grants – and 
gained an international reputation for its strong policies and structures. However, PACT is in a 
state of change after what the Senior Grants Officer refers to as a period of ‘stagnation’. 
Following an institutional assessment completed in 2011, PACT is now pursuing growth more 
aggressively and looking to expand its role in conservation. For example, it is in the process of 
creating a private PACT Foundation which will be able to raise additional donations inaccessible 
to the main CTF due to government involvement. If this had been achieved earlier, perhaps 
PACT would have made more progress in filling the USD 6 million-gap in funding which is 
needed to sustainably manage the country’s PA network. The failure to recognise the need to 
diversify PACT’s funding sources earlier may be in large part due to the lack of formal 
assessment of the PA network until recently; it is only now that PACT has begun working with 
the government on a national PA system and policy that it has been able to identify needs at the 
system level and begun exploring additional modes of fundraising. Furthermore, PACT is 
working with RedLAC to pilot a monitoring and evaluation methodology which incorporates 
biodiversity impacts more systematically – impacts which have really only been assessed on an 
ad hoc basis in the past.   
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12.  Fondo Accion, Columbia 
Key informant: FA1 
Fondo Accion, also known as The Fund for Environmental Action and Childhood, has origins in a 
bilateral agreement between the US and Columbian Governments in 1993, which created the 
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative Account (EIA) and channelled USD 41.6 million of capital 
into a fund through a debt reduction agreement.  Fondo Accion itself was established in 2000 as 
a private NGO, and took over the administration of the EIA account from a failing NGO platform, 
with the aim of co-financing projects intended to protect and sustainably manage Columbia’s 
natural resources whilst promoting child development. In 2006 the account was divided into a 
sinking and endowment fund in order to increase financial sustainability; the sinking fund has 
since been depleted, and the endowment fund, now USD 33 million, has been used to 
successfully attract new donors, establish new sub-accounts for specific purposes, and has 
allowed  Fondo Accion to grow substantially in size and permanence.  
Furthermore, in 2004 its bylaws were modified, allowing  Fondo Accion to manage other 
additional accounts, and a debt-for-nature swap was signed under the TFCA by the same 
governments with TNC, WWF and CI, generating another USD 10 million over 10 years for use 
by NGOs and Community-Based Organisations with previous experience in tropical forest 
conservation in the targeted areas. Some of this is managed as an endowment and used to fund 
the management of PAs, buffer zones and corridors, while the remainder is a sinking fund used 
to provide direct funding for sustainable development and conservation activities.  
The Directive Council or Board of Directors makes decisions and recommendations through an 
Executive Secretary who oversees the Executive Secretariat, a team of 21. The TFCA account is 
managed by a separate Oversight Committee. Financial management is overseen by a financial 
commission of three members, and performance is monitored by the Directive Council and 
Executive Secretariat. The Board has always comprised of diverse representatives; one from 
USAID, two from the Columbian Government, and five from civil society. The incorporation of 
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representatives from the corporate sector has been very valuable in terms of strategic planning, 
and contributed to growth of the CTF.  
A change of directorship in 2004 led to a number of improvements in the operations of the CTF. 
There had previously been very little documentation of procedures, but he introduced a system 
of organisation, created trust within and between the board, introduced a legal area and an 
organised accounting system, and improved communication generally. An important factor in 
success of the CTF is the existence of a strategic plan for which implementation is carefully 
monitored. Fondo Accion is one of only two Latin American CTFs to have its own quality 
management standard, similar to that which most other private enterprises use, which 
standardises processes and has been particularly useful for the arrival of new members. 
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E.2 Key informant interviews 
Key topics in general study key informant interviews: 
1. Rationale for creation 
2. Planning 
3. Legal framework 
4. Governance structure 
5. Fundraising 
6. Administration and finance 
7. Grant-making 
8. Monitoring and evaluation 
9. Impact 
10. Challenges and setbacks 
11. Conditions for success 
12. Payments for Ecosystem Services 
Key topics in Bangladesh case study key informant interviews41: 
1. Constraints and limitations of current hilsa fisheries management 
2. Strengths of current hilsa fisheries management 
3. Opinion of the compensation scheme and impact on the hilsa fisheries and livelihoods 
4. Impact of current management on livelihoods 
5. Opportunities for improved hilsa fisheries management 
6. Trust Funds and PPPs  in Bangladesh 
7. CTFs in Bangladesh 
8. The prospect of setting up a hilsa CTF  
                                                             
41 Questions 1-5 were largely the focus of chapter 5 and were used minimally in this chapter. 
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